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The accounting scandals in the 2000s and 2010s have led to a number of large-scale 
reforms in financial reporting and corporate governance regulations around the world, 
and still attract a lot of public debates recently. In that context, the demand for further 
knowledge on earnings management is very topical. What we have known is earnings 
management does exist. What we have not known, however, seems still 
overwhelming. We need to know more about issues such as how earnings 
management could be detected, to what extent earnings management has an impact 
on investment decisions, what drives earnings management behaviour etc. The 
accounting research community has responded to such demand by producing a very 
large, and still growing, volume of publications on the topic during the last few 
decades. In fact, earnings management has now been one of the largest strands in 
the mainstream accounting literature.  
This thesis aims to make original and important contributions to the literature on 
earnings management. The main components of the thesis comprise of three 
empirical chapters which analyse secondary data on the United Kingdom’s (the UK 
hereafter) stock market during the period from 1995 to 2011. The contributions are 
made on three important and inter-related research strands within the earnings 
management literature, namely the earnings management detection models, the 
impact of earnings management on stock market investment, and the spread of 
earnings management as a corporate decision through board network. 
The first empirical chapter constructs a signal-based composite index, namely 
ESCORE, which captures the context of earnings management. Specifically, 
ESCORE aggregates fifteen individual signals related to earnings management 
based on prior relevant literature. Empirical results using UK data shows that when 
 xx 
 
ESCORE is higher, firms do manage earnings with greater magnitude and are more 
likely to be most aggressive using both accruals and real earnings management. 
Firms which are investigated for financial-statement-related irregularities are also 
shown to have significantly higher ESCORE. The composite score can be easily 
applied in practice as well as replicated in subsequent studies, especially in emerging 
market where small samples technically constrain the use of other existing earnings 
management detection models. The approach to construct ESCORE is innovative 
and it only measures the likelihood rather than the magnitude of earnings 
management. This aspect of ESCORE is important given the growing criticisms that 
none of the existing earnings management models could actually measure the 
magnitude of earnings management. 
Using ESCORE as a measure that captures the general context of earnings 
management, the second empirical chapter asks if investors rationally price the 
information contained in such context. Empirical evidence shows that firms with low 
ESCORE outperform those with high ESCORE by 1.37% per month after controlling 
for risk loadings on the market, size, book-to-market and momentum factors in up to 
one year after portfolio formation. The relationship between ESCORE and future 
returns is still significant, in both economic and statistical terms, after controlling for 
various other known ‘market anomalies’, including the size, value-glamour, seasoned 
equity offer, market irrational reaction to financial distress, balance sheet bloat, 
profitability and discretionary accruals. This finding is in line with the behavioural 
explanation that investors tend to ignore the observable context of earnings 
management under the influence of the well-documented base rate fallacy. This is an 
original piece of knowledge which makes significant and interesting contributions to 
the literature on market anomalies. 
The third and last empirical chapter investigates whether aggressive earnings 
management practices spread across firms sharing interlocked directors. The 
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evidence shows that if a firm aggressively manages earnings (referred to as a 
‘contagious firm’) via accruals (or production activities and discretionary expenses) 
manipulation in a year, any firms (referred to as ‘exposed firms’) which are interlocked 
with that contagious firm in that year and the two following years are more likely to 
aggressively manage earnings via accruals (or production activities and discretionary 
expenses, respectively) manipulation. The contagion effect is found to be more 
pronounced if the interlocked director is male, older, British, and charged with duties 
which could influence financial reporting. The contagion effect is robust after 
controlling for endogeneity issues and common characteristics of the interlocked 
firms. The evidence presented in this chapter is both original and a significant 
contribution to our knowledge on the impact of board networks on corporate 
decisions, a topic which attracts a lot of attention as it fits directly to the process of 
reforming corporate governance codes to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness 







Many aspects of financial reporting are within the discretion of managers. For 
example, managers could make a choice between permitted accounting methods, 
exercise managerial judgements over accounting estimations (e.g. depreciation, 
allowance etc.), or even engage in more pernicious practices such as frauds to 
influence reported earnings. The popular wisdom among both academics and 
practitioners suggests that managers do manage earnings from time to time (Healy 
and Wahlen, 1999). Hence, “how far can we trust earnings numbers?”, as asked by 
Walker (2013), among many others, is a sensible and important question to ask. 
The pursuit of a general answer to the above question attracts a great deal of 
interest from accounting academics during the last few decades and has since grown 
into one of the largest strands of the accounting literature, namely the literature on 
earnings management. Research in earnings management provides the insights for 
market participants to make more informed decisions, boards of directors to play more 
effective monitoring roles, and regulators to put in place more suitable rules to ensure 
well-functioning capital markets. The series of recent significant accounting scandals 
(such as Enron, WorldCom, Lehman Brothers, Toshiba to name just a few) could only 
make it more important that we investigate and understand more about earnings 
management. The importance of research in earnings management is, therefore, 
cannot be understated. Walker (2013) reports that research on earnings management 
on average accounts for between 7% to 10% of accounting publications in leading 
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journals during the period from 2001 to 2011 and that the rate is still increasing. It is 
not an overstatement, hence, to say earnings management research is currently one 
of the major items on the agenda of the accounting research community. This thesis 
aims to make significant and meaningful contributions to that agenda. 
The main component of the thesis comprises of three empirical chapters 
investigating three inter-related topics on the general theme of earnings 
management. The next section (Section 1.1) will set the background on which the 
empirical chapters are based by discussing the adopted definition of earnings 
management before Section 1.2 explores the theoretical framework which explains 
why and how earnings management would happen. The discussions in Section 1.1 
and 1.2 are only meant to provide the background for the rest of thesis and put 
subsequent empirical chapters in context while a complete review of the whole 
literature on earnings management is avoided because the size of it is too large for 
the thesis to attempt1. Instead, only the definitions and theoretical foundations of 
earnings management are reviewed in this introduction chapter, while the literature 
which is directly related to the issues investigated in each of the empirical chapters 
will be reviewed separately later in the corresponding chapters. Section 1.3 will then 
introduce the topics investigated in each of the empirical chapters and highlight the 
original and important contributions made in each chapter. All empirical chapters in 
this thesis are based on the UK stock market. Section 1.4 will explain the 
characteristics of the UK stock market which makes it an interesting and suitable 
setting for the purposes of the thesis. 
                                                             
1
 See, for example, Ronen and Yaari (2008) for an excellent review. 
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1.1. DEFINITION OF EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
Although the term ‘earnings management’ has been used widely in the 
literature, it does not always mean the same thing. When used for different research 
purposes, earnings management could be defined differently. An early definition of 
earnings management is provided by Schipper (1989) with the aim is to provide a 
framework to analyse the implications and trade-offs between various research 
design choices and to describe the connection between research in earnings 
management and other accounting research areas. In particular, Schipper (1989, p. 
92) defines earnings management as “a purposeful intervention in the external 
financial reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private gain (as opposed 
to, say, merely facilitating the neutral operation of the process)”. Schipper’s (1989) 
definition does explicitly assume earnings management is only engaged for private 
gains and is restricted to the manipulation through intervening the financial reporting 
process regardless of whether or not such intervening has violated Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (hereafter GAAP). Healy and Wahlen (1999, p. 368), 
taking the view of standard setters, define earnings management as “managers use 
judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports 
to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of 
the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported 
accounting numbers.” The definition covers both accounting manipulation and 
changing real economic decisions to influence earnings, but it does emphasize the 
nature of earnings management is to “mislead” or “influence contractual outcomes”.  
Earnings management, however, is not always ‘bad’. Managers could also 
manage earnings to make it more informative (Holthausen and Lefwich, 1983). 
Allowing for both the misleading and informative nature of earnings management, 
Walker (2013, p. 446) makes a broader definition of earnings management as “the 
use of managerial discretion over (within GAAP) accounting choices, earnings 
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reporting choices, and real economic decisions to influence how underlying economic 
events are reflected in one or more measures of earnings.” This definition, however, 
focuses only on practices which are allowed in existing regulations. Ronen and Yaari 
(2008, p. 27) provide a more complete definition of earnings management, which is 
also the one adopted in this thesis: 
 
Earnings management is a collection of managerial decisions that result in 
not reporting the true short-term, value-maximizing earnings as known to 
management. 
Earnings management can be 
Beneficial: it signals long-term value; 
Pernicious: it conceals short- or long-term value; 
Neutral: it reveals the short-term true performance. 
 
The adopted definition does not exclude any means of earnings management 
or presume any intention of the managers so long as the resulting effect is that the 
reported earnings is different from the “true” earnings known to management. 
Earnings management under this definition is not necessarily “pernicious”, but it could 
also be “neutral”, or even “beneficial” if it could provide information for financial 
statement users to better understand the firm’s long-term value. For policy makers 
and regulatory authorities, the above definition implies that rules in financial reporting 
should not be directed to eliminate earnings management by, for example, stifling 
away all flexibilities which managers could exploit to influence reported earnings. 
Studies which adopted the above definition, including this thesis, often take the stance 
that leaving room for earnings management, such as allowing flexibilities or 
development of principle-based accounting standards, could in effect even make 
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financial reporting more informative. Therefore, all the policy implications drawn from 
the results of the thesis should be taken with this perspective in mind. 
1.2. THE THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE OF EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
As discussed in the previous section, the thesis adopts the definition of earnings 
management following Ronen and Yaari (2008) as any course of actions, regardless 
of intentions, which results in reported earnings being different from the earnings 
known to management. Having defined earnings management this way, it is important 
to understand the theoretical foundation which explains why managers would want to 
engage in earnings management. Theoretically earnings management could be 
explained within the framework of the well-developed agency theory (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Under the agency theory, there are conflicts of interest between 
managers (the ‘agent’) and shareholders (the ‘principal’). Managers often have more 
power and possess better information set compared to external investors, and they 
generally work to maximize their rewards (e.g. remuneration) and not necessarily 
shareholders’ wealth (Goergen and Renneboog, 2011). Shareholders, on the other 
hand, rely on managers to run the business and are the residual claimants to what is 
left after all other stakeholders have taken their shares of the firm’s profit (including 
managers’ rewards). This creates a moral hazard problem in which managers could 
potentially abuse the power entrusted in them to report earnings in a way that 
maximizes their private rewards rather than shareholders’ wealth. Earnings 
management in this case is costly, including direct cost (e.g. decline in share prices) 
and indirect cost (e.g. costs associated with establishing monitoring measures). 
It has been argued earlier, however, that earnings management is not 
necessarily always ‘bad’. The signalling theory suggests that in equilibrium, it could 
be the optimal solution that one party with information advantage (i.e. insiders) signals 
some private information to the other party (i.e. outsiders) (Spence, 1973; Myers and 
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Majluf, 1984). In the context of financial reporting, this could create an adverse 
selection problem in which shareholders would be reluctant to make capital 
investments because they know managers possess superior information and are 
afraid that managers could take advantage of such information to pursue their self-
interest (Walker, 2013). To deal with this problem, managers might use earnings 
management as a signalling tool and therefore make reported earnings more 
informative (Holthausen and Lefwich, 1983). The positive accounting theory also 
suggests that earnings management could be a tool to optimize the nexus of contracts 
firms have signed up with various stakeholders (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Watts 
and Zimmerman, 1990). 
1.3. THE MAIN COMPONENTS OF THE THESIS 
This thesis aims at making contributions to the growing literature on earnings 
management. The main components of the thesis comprise of three empirical 
chapters, each contributing significantly to an important topic within the earnings 
management theme. This section is devoted to introduce the topic investigated in 
each of the empirical chapters and highlights the main contributions along the line. 
1.3.1. Chapter 2: A signal-based composite index to detect the context of 
earnings management  
The strand of the literature which develops models to detect earnings 
management is arguably one of the most important drivers behind the significant 
growth of academic research on earnings management (Walker, 2013). The 
introduction of the discretionary accruals model (Jones, 1991) provides accounting 
researchers with a useful metric to capture the component of total accruals which is 
within managerial discretion. Such ‘discretionary accruals’ has been widely used as 
an empirical proxy for earnings management. The Jones’ model is perhaps one of 
the key milestones which fosters the development of the empirical earnings 
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management literature. Several subsequent modifications to the Jones’ model have 
significantly improved its statistical performance in various contexts (Dechow et al., 
1995; Peasnell et al., 2000; Kothari et al., 2005). More recently, the literature starts 
looking beyond the manipulation of accruals arguing that managers might influence 
reported earnings via changing real decisions, such as altering sales policies, varying 
production levels or cutting discretionary spending. A notable contribution on this front 
is the study conducted by Roychowdhury (2006) which develops three models to 
capture real earnings management. Roychowdhury’s (2006) models have attracted a 
lot of attention from the accounting community.  
Apart from the discretionary accruals and real earnings management models 
which have the lion’s shares of attention as highlighted above, many other studies 
also introduce various models to detect other types of earnings management, such 
as timing of asset sales, classificatory shift, earnings guidance etc. (Athanasakou et 
al., 2009; Gunny, 2010; Athanasakou et al., 2011). Nevertheless, the quest for a 
model to detect earnings management is still ongoing as almost all models of 
earnings management detection are subject to fierce criticism (for example, 
Holthausen et al., 1995; Fields et al., 2001; Ball, 2013; Owens et al., 2013; McNichols, 
2000; Dechow and Skinner, 2000; Dechow et al., 2010; Gerakos and Kovrijnykh, 
2013; Walker, 2013). The main concern lies with the lack of a comprehensive theory 
on the accruals generating process leading to potential model mis-specifications.  
Chapter 2, the first empirical chapter of the thesis, attempts to address the 
above-mentioned weakness in the literature. The chapter proposes an innovative 
approach to assess the likelihood of earnings management without measuring the 
magnitude of earnings management (which, as discussed above, is arguably 
‘immeasurable’ in the absence of a theory on the accruals generating process). In 
particular, the chapter develops a signal-based composite index, namely ESCORE, 
which accumulates fifteen individual signals. The fifteen individual signals are 
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selected from the indicators of earnings management which have been established 
in the extant literature. Hence, ESCORE would capture the general context in which 
a firm is operating. The individual signals are translated into binary variables (i.e. 
having value of either one or zero) before the composite score ESCORE is created 
by adding up those fifteen binary variables. By design, the resulting ESCORE is an 
integer with value ranging from zero to fifteen. A lower (higher) ESCORE would imply 
the context surrounding the firm is less (more) susceptible to earnings management.  
Empirical tests using all UK listed firms during the period from 1995 to 2011 
show that ESCORE, despite being constructed using a completely different approach 
compared to existing models of earnings management, is generally consistent with 
most traditional models of earnings management, including discretionary accruals, 
real earnings management and ex-post cases of accounting investigations.  
The ESCORE model is a novel approach in detecting earnings management. 
There are many advantages of using ESCORE. First, ESCORE does not directly 
measure the magnitude of discretionary accruals, hence it is free from the limitation 
of the lack of a comprehensive theory to explain the accruals generating process. 
Second, ESCORE has a lot to offer to investment practitioners, especially the less 
sophisticated ones, as it is easy to calculate based on data which is readily available 
in published financial statements. Last but not least, ESCORE could be useful for 
earnings management research in smaller markets where data is not sufficient to 
reliably estimate the traditional measures of earnings management because it does 
not require regressions within industry-years. 
1.3.2. Chapter 3: Does the context of earnings management contain 
information about future stock returns?  
Having constructed ESCORE in Chapter 2 as a composite index which could 
capture the context of earnings management, Chapter 3 empirically investigates 
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whether the information contained in the context of earnings management is correctly 
priced by the market. Previous research has established that investors generally 
misprice the information contained in total accruals, especially the discretionary 
component (see, for example, Sloan, 1996; Teoh et al., 1998a; Teoh et al., 1998b; 
Xie, 2001; Desai et al., 2004; Iqbal et al., 2009; Iqbal and Strong, 2010). Since 
discretionary accruals is widely used as a proxy for earnings management, such 
mispricing could be attributable to investors not being able to fully reflect on the ‘true’ 
earnings which is not revealed to the market as a result of earnings management. In 
general, the extant literature suggests that earnings management is unobservable to 
outsiders, hence the pricing errors exist. 
The chapter takes a step further arguing that even if the actual earnings 
management behaviour is unobservable, the context surrounding it could not be 
concealed. The key argument is similar to the old saying ‘there’s no smoke without 
fire’. If we see ‘smoke’ (i.e. when the context is susceptible to earnings management), 
we could guess there is a ‘fire’ (i.e. there is actual earnings management) without 
having to directly observe the fire. If the market indeed misprices earnings 
management, it must have underreacted to both the misleading reported earnings 
and the surrounding context. The chapter seeks to examine whether the market fails 
to reflect on the information contained in the context of earnings management.  
Chapter 3 uses ESCORE as developed in Chapter 2 as a proxy for the context 
of earnings management. Empirical analysis using UK data from 1995 to 2011 reveals 
that the market indeed misprices the context of earnings management leading to large 
and significant abnormal returns being earned by trading strategies designed based 
on ESCORE. In particular, low ESCORE stocks typically earn higher returns than the 
high ESCORE counterpart, after adjusting for risk loadings on size, book-to-market 
and momentum factors. 
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Unlike the actual earnings management actions which are arguably 
concealable, the general context surrounding such actions is often observable. 
Therefore, that investors miss such observable information is an interesting and 
original piece of knowledge. The evidence is in line with the explanation in which 
investors, as human beings, suffer systematically from the base rate fallacy (Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1982). Under the influence of the base rate fallacy, judgement about 
the probability of earnings management is based more on specific information than 
on generic context leading to the information contained in the context of earnings 
management being mispriced. The evidence of abnormal returns earned from 
ESCORE-based trading strategies is an original and significant contribution to both 
the literature on earnings management and behavioural finance. 
1.3.3. Chapter 4: The contagion of aggressive earnings management through 
board interlocks 
Also contributing to the theme of earnings management, Chapter 4 empirically 
examines whether aggressive earnings management spreads from one company to 
another through the network of board directors. Board interlock, a practice which is 
allowed and quite common in the UK, once in place could have a range of implications 
for the decision making process at companies. The chapter looks particularly at the 
influence of board interlocks on the financial reporting function of connected 
companies. On this topic, a recent study by Chiu et al. (2013) provides some 
important initial insights. In particular, they define contagious firms as those which are 
asked to restate earnings by the government and any firms which are interlocked with 
a contagious firm as exposed firms. They then provide evidence that exposed firms 
are more likely to engage in earnings management and interpret it as evidence that 
earnings management is contagious through the board network. 
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The evidence provided by Chiu et al. (2013) is the first evidence on the 
contagion effect of earnings management, hence it is novel and very interesting. 
Nevertheless, a lot of further research is still needed before we could claim a thorough 
understanding of how and why earnings management spreads through the board 
network. One of the missing pieces from Chiu et al. (2013) evidence is whether real 
earnings management, which is often within the discretion of managers and hence 
rarely leads to restatements, is also contagious. The chapter hypothesizes that the 
interlocked directors would spread both accruals and real earnings management from 
one firm to another. The mechanism behind this contagion effect is the interlocked 
directors would influence the boards of the exposed firms to adopt aggressive 
accruals earnings management (or real earnings management) practices upon 
observing the use of accruals earnings management (or real earnings management) 
practices at the contagious firms. Using UK data from 2005 to 2012, empirical 
evidence reveals that interlocked directors act as a channel through which aggressive 
earnings management spreads across companies. In particular, the chapter defines 
contagious firms as those which are aggressive in financial reporting and the three-
year period starting from and including the year in which a contagious firm is detected 
as an aggressive firm is defined as the contagious period. The chapter finds that 
exposed firms, defined as those which share a board link with a contagious firm during 
the contagious period, are significantly more likely to also be an aggressive firm. The 
evidence of the contagion effect holds for both accruals and real earnings 
management. Furthermore, the contagion effect is found to be more pronounced 
when the interlocked directors are male, older, British or those who are charged with 
financial-reporting-related duties. 
The chapter makes original and significant contribution to the existing literature 
on the topic. Building up on the contagion of earnings restatements reported by Chiu 
et al. (2013), the chapter sheds further light on the contagion effect by showing that 
 12 
 
both accruals and real earnings management are also contagious. This is an original 
and significant contribution to the literature which shows that board interlocks would 
spread earnings management, even in the forms which does not violate any 
accounting regulations and thus does not necessarily result in restatements. The 
chapter also uses ESCORE to address an important research design issue which the 
existing literature has not resolved. In particular, the exposed and contagious firms 
might share some common characteristics which make them both more likely to 
manage earnings and at the same time more likely to appoint the same directors. 
Previous research on this topic generally interprets evidence that the exposed firm 
manage earnings as the result of the interlocked director spreading the behaviour 
from the contagious firm without being able to reject the alternative explanation that 
the shared common characteristics cause the exposed and contagious firms to 
appoint the same director. ESCORE as designed in Chapter 2 could identify the 
context in which firms are more likely to be aggressive and hence is useful to address 
this important issue. Using ESCORE and its components to control for the shared 
common characteristics of the exposed and contagious firms, the chapter establishes 
stronger evidence for the existence of the spread of earnings management through 
the network of board directors. The use of ESCORE in this context is an innovative 
research design which could help reject an important alternative explanation and 
subsequent studies on the contagion effect of earnings management could greatly 
benefit from this methodology. 
Overall, the three empirical chapters together do make important and original 
contributions to the literature. The literature related to the topics investigated in this 
thesis is very large, but mainly concentrated on the United States of America’s (the 
US hereafter) market. The next section will explain how a UK study like this thesis 
could make an interesting and important contribution to both the academic literature 
and practitioners’ world. 
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1.4. THE EMPIRICAL SETTING: UK LISTED STOCKS FROM 1995 TO 2012 
The thesis selects all UK listed stocks during the period from 1995 to 2012 as 
the primary setting. The empirical investigations build upon a rich literature on 
earnings management detection models, the market mispricing of accruals and the 
contagion of earnings management. Many existing studies in these areas focus on 
the US market. Nevertheless, the choice of the UK market as the setting for this study 
is justifiable for a variety of reasons which make the thesis an interesting and 
important contribution to the advancement of our knowledge on these topics. First, 
during the sample period, the UK market offers a unique setting shaped by several 
characteristics of the environment in which listed companies operate, ranging from 
financial reporting and corporate governance regulations, cultural factors and the 
norms in business and reporting practices, to the popular bases of share ownership 
in listed companies. During the 1990s and 2000s, which overlaps with the sample 
employed in this study, the UK experiences several major changes to its financial 
reporting and corporate governance regulations, for example, the mandatory 
adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in 2005 or many 
revisions to the UK Corporate Governance Code. These changes at the regulatory 
level would create an interesting setting to investigate earnings management 
behaviour at the firm level. Existing evidence also suggests that the norms in business 
and financial reporting practices in the UK, especially when it comes to selecting the 
mechanism for earnings management, are quite different from other developed 
markets such as the US (e.g. Bond, 2000; Athanasakou et al., 2009; Athanasakou et 
al., 2011). In addition, institutional holdings tend to be more prevalent in the UK 
compared to other markets. Institutional stockholders, especially financial institutions 
and professionally-managed funds, typically play a more active monitoring role, which 
in turns constraints managers’ discretion over financial reporting practices. Those 
characteristics jointly suggest that using the UK market as the setting for further 
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research into earnings management detection, market mispricing and earnings 
management contagion would yield interesting and unique insights. 
Second, the UK is one of the world’s major economies with one of the largest 
stock markets. Hence, the importance of understanding how the UK market operates 
cannot be understated. Compared to the US, the UK-based literature on earnings 
management is remarkably thinner and that creates an important gap for further 
studies to fill in. This thesis does not simply replicate US studies in the UK, but rather 
it provides original evidence which is directly relevant in the UK context with a number 
of implications for other developed markets such as the US and the Europe.  
Furthermore, using the UK market allows the use of unique datasets which 
could significantly add strength to the analyses as well as reinforce previous findings 
using US data. One of the recent strands in the earnings management literature is to 
employ an ex-post indicator of earnings management which has low Type I error (e.g. 
Dechow et al., 2010). This strand is most fruitful in the US thanks to the rich and 
readily available data on earnings restatements, such as the Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s (SEC hereafter) accounting and auditing enforcement releases (AAER 
hereafter) or US Government Accountability Office’s (GAO) releases of restatements. 
These ex-post measures of earnings management have significant advantages as 
well as drawbacks (see, for example, Dechow et al., 2010). One of the most notable 
pitfalls of the ex-post measures is the sample selection biases (Dechow et al., 2010). 
In particular, the SEC or GAO does not randomly select firms to investigate. Due to 
constrained resources, they have to adopt some strategies to target firms for 
investigation, such as to prioritize large companies, unambiguous cases or serious 
frauds. As far as the accounting profession is concerned, such pitfall could not be 
completely corrected. However, it could be mitigated by having more datasets where 
the investigated firms are selected by other authorities applying different sampling 
strategies. One of the analyses in Chapter 2 of this thesis employs the sample of firms 
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subjected to investigation by the UK Financial Reporting Review Panel (FRRP 
henceforth), which has a rather different sampling strategy compared to the SEC and 
GAO in the US. Hence, the evidence linking the FRRP-investigated firms with 
earnings management is a complement to further mitigate the concerns of using ex-
post measures of earnings management. Moreover, the use of the FRRP data also 
makes the thesis especially distinctive compared to previous UK-based studies.  
Research on corporate governance thrives significantly in the US thanks partly 
to the very rich and readily available datasets on the characteristics of the boards of 
directors and executive compensation, such as Risk Metrics and ExecuComp. 
Although such data for the UK market is also available, it is laborious to collect the 
data and turn it to analysable datasets. Therefore, until recently research on corporate 
governance in the UK is quite thin compared to the US-based literature. Chapter 4 
makes a major attempt to compile a dataset that covers compensation and 
biographical characteristics of executives and directors of all UK listed firms. The 
dataset enables the thesis to make original contribution by addressing interesting 
issues in the UK which have not been looked at before due to data constraint.  
The time period starts from 1995 for a number of reasons. First, the Financial 
Reporting Standard 3 (FRS3) – Reporting Financial Performance, which became 
effective from 1993, is an important accounting standard that arguably enhances 
transparency in the UK accounting environment (Athanasakou et al., 2009). Second, 
Datastream’s data availability, especially for cash-flows-related items, is quite serious 
for the years before 1994. Therefore, starting from 1995 ensures the sample is free 
from years with too few observations and to stay within the post-FRS3 period, 
including lagged values needed to calculate a range of variables in this thesis. For 
practical reason, the thesis only collects data up to June 2013. Starting from 1995, 
the main sample used in Chapter 2 and 3 includes all stocks with fiscal years ending 
in the calendar year of 2011 to allow for the measurement of stock returns in one year 
afterwards. For empirical analyses which require compensation and corporate 
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governance variables, including the multivariate regressions in Chapter 2 (Section 
2.5.5.2) and Chapter 4, the sample covers the post-2005 period only because 
compensation and corporate governance variables need to be hand-collected directly 
from annual reports and it is difficult to retrieve old annual reports. Hence, the main 
sample used in Chapter 2 and 3 spans from 1995 to 2011 (with the subsample being 
used in Section 2.5.5.2 covers only from 2005 to 2011) while the sample in Chapter 
4 covers the period from 2005 to 2012. Please see the sample selection sections in 





A SIGNAL-BASED COMPOSITE INDEX TO 





There are several aspects of the extant literature on earnings management that 
could still be improved. One of the most prominent issues is the question of how to 
detect earnings management. Among the most theoretically-appealing and popularly-
used earnings management detection models are the Jones model and its variants 
to estimate discretionary accruals (Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995; Peasnell et al., 
2000).  Those models are, however, recently subject to considerable criticisms. For 
example, Dechow et al. (2010) observe that “the majority of the studies... are about 
the determinants and consequences of abnormal accruals derived from accrual 
                                                             
2
 The chapter has been greatly benefited from the comments and advices of Beatriz Garcia 
Osma, William Rees, Ane Tamayo, Mark Clatworthy, Elisabeth Dedman, Daniel Coulombe, 
Karin Thorburn, Soo Hee Lee, Warwick Funnell as well as three anonymous reviewers, the 
reviewers and participants at the 2013 and 2014 British Accounting and Finance Association 
Annual Conference and Doctoral Colloquium, 2014 European Accounting Association Annual 
Congress and Doctoral Colloquium, 2015 European Accounting Association Annual Congress, 
2015 Financial Management Association European Doctoral Student Consortium, 2015 
European Financial Management Association Annual Conference and 2015 American 
Accounting Association Annual Meeting. 
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models, with the idea that abnormal accruals, whether they represent errors or bias, 
erode decision usefulness”. In other words, the literature has over-relied on models, 
such as the accruals models, to disentangle the component of earnings subject to 
managers’ discretion from the ‘normal’ level of performance without fully appreciating 
that discretionary accruals is a ‘noisy’ measure of earnings management. A number 
of studies share the same concern (for example, Holthausen et al., 1995; Fields et 
al., 2001; Ball, 2013; Owens et al., 2013). With the lack of a comprehensive theory 
on the accruals generating process (i.e. what accruals would be if there is no 
manipulation), as a profession researchers are using (allegedly) mis-specified model 
trying to measure the ‘immeasurable’ (McNichols, 2000; McNichols, 2002; Dechow et 
al., 2010; Owens et al., 2013). Other researchers also raise a concern about the 
implausibly large magnitude and high frequency of earnings management 
documented in the extant literature using accruals models (Ball, 2013; Gerakos and 
Kovrijnykh, 2013). Ball (2013) “worries” that the current practice that considers 
positive (negative) discretionary accruals as income-increasing (income-decreasing) 
earnings management seems to create “the incorrect belief” that earnings 
management is “rife” because technically “no observation sits exactly on the 
regression line”.  
This chapter attempts to mitigate the above-mentioned weaknesses of the 
literature. Given the well-acknowledged difficulties to reliably measure earnings 
management using accruals models, the key idea is to develop an approach to get 
round the problem by assessing the likelihood of earnings management without 
having to directly measure the magnitude of discretionary accruals. Hence, instead 
of measuring discretionary accruals, the chapter develops an empirical proxy that 
captures the context in which earnings management is more likely to occur3. The 
                                                             
3
 Within this thesis, ‘the context of earnings management’ is defined as the factors that 
reveal firm’s incentives, pressures, constraints and innate factors which suggest earnings 
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advantage of this approach is that the resulting model does not affirmatively indicate 
the magnitude of earnings management if it does happen, the area which currently 
attracts great criticism in the earnings management literature. The model only ‘flags 
up’ firms which are suspicious based on the context surrounding it.  
After decades of growth, the literature on earnings management now has quite 
a few generally accepted areas of consensus about the signals of earnings 
management behaviour (Dechow et al., 2010). For example, it has been well 
documented that firms would manage earnings when certain things happen or in 
certain conditions, such as prior to equity issues (Teoh et al., 1998b; Cohen and 
Zarowin, 2010; DuCharme et al., 2004; Siew Hong and Wong, 2002; Rangan, 1998; 
Shivakumar, 2000; Iqbal et al., 2009; Iqbal and Strong, 2010) or when earnings would 
otherwise miss an important benchmark (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Gore et al., 
2007). Such evidence is strong and has been documented in different markets and in 
different time periods. Based on the rich established literature on the indicators of 
earnings management, this chapter is the first attempt to develop a model of earnings 
management detection based on a systematic analysis of the financial statements for 
suspicious signals of earnings management. The signals are those which have been 
shown in the literature as effective indicators of earnings management.  
In total, the chapter aggregates fifteen individual signals, all transformed into 
binary variables that take the value of either one (if suspicious) or zero (otherwise), 
into a composite index, namely ESCORE. The signals are grouped into four broad 
categories. The first category covers capital-market-driven incentives. The first three 
signals in this category includes binary variables which take the value of one if there 
is (i) an equity issue, (ii) a debt issue and (iii) a share-financed merger and acquisition 
                                                             




(M&A hereafter), zero otherwise. Intuitively, if a firm is going to raise capital (e.g. 
equity or debt) or finance an M&A by shares, the managers, assumingly working to 
maximize existing shareholders’ wealth, might want to inflate earnings to temporarily 
boost stock price up to gain advantage in the transaction (e.g. Teoh et al., 1998b; 
Cohen and Zarowin, 2010, Athanasakou and Olsson, 2012, Botsari and Meeks, 
2008). In addition, following Jensen (2005) who suggests that overvalued firms would 
manage earnings to avoid stock price correction, the fourth (iv) signal in this category 
is designed as a binary variable which is one if a firm’s share is overvalued, zero 
otherwise.  
The second category captures external pressures. To start with, listed firms are 
under strong pressures to meet or beat earnings benchmarks to avoid market penalty. 
The existing literature provides strong evidence that firms would inflate earnings when 
the unmanaged earnings is close to important benchmarks, including zero earnings, 
last year’s earnings and cash dividend (e.g. Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Daniel et 
al., 2008). Consequently, the first three signals in this category are when reported 
earnings (v) is very small, (vi) has changed by a small margin compared to last year, 
and (vii) is slightly higher than total cash dividends. The rest of the signals in this 
category capture the pressures faced by (viii) firms which are in financial distress, (ix) 
those with limited use of debt, (x) small firms and (xi) those which are still in the early 
stage in their business life cycle. Firms operating in those situations have been shown 
to be highly susceptible to earnings management (e.g. Lara et al., 2009; Astami and 
Tower, 2006; Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Skinner and Sloan, 2002).  
The third category captures the constraints to earnings management. The first 
signal in this category turns on when (xii) a firm’s external auditor is not one of the 
reputable big auditing firms. The literature strongly suggest that being audited by 
more reputable external auditors would effectively constrain firms from manipulating 
its accounts (e.g. Becker et al., 1998; Francis et al., 1999). Another constraint to 
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earnings management is the balance sheet bloat. Is has been shown that if a firm has 
managed earnings too much in the past, net operating asset on the balance sheet 
would be bloated and, because of the reversal nature of accruals, it would be 
increasingly more difficult for further earnings management to be engaged (e.g. 
Barton and Simko, 2002). Following this established intuition, the last signal in this 
category would turn on when (xiii) net operating asset is too low, a sign that there is 
still plenty of room for earnings management. 
Lastly, the fourth category covers firm’s innate characteristics. The first signal 
turns on for (xiv) firms with low tangible asset intensity, a factor which has been shown 
to be associated with higher likelihood of earnings management (e.g. Francis et al., 
2004).  Finally, the last signal is designed to take the value of one if (xv) reported 
earnings is too different from taxable income, zero otherwise. If this signal turns on, 
assuming that it is difficult to manipulate taxable income, it is a sign that reported 
earnings might have been managed (e.g. Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010).  
Based on the above fifteen individual signals, each has a value of either one or 
zero, the composite ESCORE is constructed as the sum of the individual signals. 
ESCORE can, therefore, theoretically range from zero to fifteen, with higher values 
suggesting higher likelihood that the firm is engaging in earnings management. 
Using a sample of UK listed firms during the period from 1995 to 2011, the 
chapter tests the efficacy of ESCORE in capturing the context of earnings 
management. The chapter provides evidence to support the effectiveness of 
ESCORE in capturing the context of earnings management by showing that high 
ESCORE stocks indeed engage in earnings management in larger magnitude and 
are more likely to engage in aggressive earnings management practices. The chapter 
also finds that firms which are investigated by the FRRP have higher ESCORE in the 
year to which the investigation is related. The FRRP is responsible for ensuring that 
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public companies in the UK comply with applicable laws and financial reporting 
standards. Firms which are selected by the FRRP for investigation are typically those 
which have signs of violating accounting standards (such as being complained by the 
public) or have some sensitive operations which could easily attract frauds and/or 
errors. Hence, the evidence on the association of ESCORE with the likelihood of 
investigation by FRRP could further suggest that ESCORE indeed captures the 
context in which earnings management is more likely. 
ESCORE is shown to be a simple, yet highly effective, model to detect earnings 
management. The model promises to be a useful tool for practitioners in accessing 
the trustworthiness of reported earnings, one of the most important figures on which 
practitioners base their investment decisions. The model is also useful for academic 
research, especially in settings where the problem of data unavailability is severe. In 
such settings, using ESCORE as a proxy for earnings management is superior to 
existing measures of discretionary accruals and real earnings management proxies 
since it does not involve data collection for whole industries or unreliable regressions 
with too few observations. As Dechow et al. (1995) point out, existing models of 
earnings management detection may need hundreds of observations to have a 
reasonable chance of detecting more subtle earnings management cases. ESCORE 
can also mitigate this limitation to enhance the ability to detect earnings management. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the literature 
on existing models of earnings management and discusses the need for a new signal-
based model. Section 2.3 explains the sample selection procedures. Section 2.4 
describes the procedures to construct ESCORE. Section 2.5 presents and discusses 
the results of the main tests on the construction and efficacy of ESCORE. Section 2.6 
reports the results of some robustness checks while Section 2.7 provides some 




2.2. EARNINGS MANAGEMENT DETECTION MODELS: A LITERATURE 
REVIEW  
This chapter aims at developing a new model of earnings management 
detection which accumulates individual signals indicating the existence of earnings 
management. Therefore, the chapter makes a direct contribution to the literature on 
earnings management detection models which is reviewed in this section. The 
purpose of the review is to examine the strengths and weaknesses of major existing 
earnings management detection models and against that background argue how the 
new model introduced in this chapter could make a meaningful contribution. 
Furthermore, the chapter also builds upon the literature which looks at various internal 
and external factors which make a firm more likely to engage in earnings 
management. This literature will be reviewed separately in Section 2.4 along with the 
selection of the signals to be included in ESCORE. 
2.2.1. Accruals earnings management 
The adopted definition of earnings management as presented in Section 1.1 
suggests earnings could be managed in various ways. As a result, there are several 
existing models to detect earnings management. The most popular method measures 
discretionary (unexpected or abnormal) accruals, the deviation of actual accruals 
from an expected level of accruals derived using some firm-specific characteristics 
(Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995; Peasnell et al., 2000; Dechow and Dichev, 2002). 
Although there are a few variants to the models to estimate discretionary accruals, 
typically in the first stage a measure of accruals is regressed on some exogenous 
variables, such as revenues and plant, property and equipment, which are assumingly 
outside the discretion of managers. In the second stage, the estimated coefficients 
from the first-stage regression are then used to calculate a ‘normal’ level of accruals, 
from which the deviation of actual accruals is termed ‘abnormal’ and used as proxy 
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for earnings management. The abnormal accruals model helps detect one type of 
earnings management, namely managers exercise their discretion over accounting 
methods to influence reported earnings.  
Jones (1991) introduces one of the most widely-used models of earnings 
management detection. Jones estimates discretionary accruals for each firm using 
time-series data, an approach which is subject to several criticisms, including the 
potential structural changes to the relationship between the fundamentals and 
accruals across time and the issue of survivorship bias. DeFond and Jiambalvo 
(1994) suggest a cross-sectional approach which could mitigate these concerns. 
Dechow et al. (1995) provide an important improvement to the Jones model by 
adjusting for credit sales, a component of total sales which is within manager’s 
discretion. Dechow et al. (1995) test the power of various earnings management 
detection models and confirm that the modified-Jones model is the most powerful 
one. Peasnell et al. (2000) reach similar conclusion for the UK market, although they 
also propose the ‘margin model’ that seems to outperform when cash flow 
performance is extreme.  
Although the modified-Jones model is quite commonly used in the literature, 
there are still various disagreements on how the model is best specified. One line of 
argument comes from the concerns about the role of depreciation as a means of 
earnings management (Young, 1999). Following this argument, many studies employ 
working capital accruals rather than total accruals, which also results in the removal 
of gross property, plant and equipment on the right-hand-side of the Jones-type 
models. Another criticism is related to the concerns that accruals estimated using the 
balance sheet approach would suffer from potential errors in the presence of ‘non-
articulation’ transactions, such as M&A or reclassification (Hribar and Collins, 2002). 
Following this study, researchers start using the cash flow approach to estimate 
accruals. On the contrary, however, several authors claim that the cash flow approach 
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is itself not unproblematic (Gore et al., 2007). Kothari et al. (2005) suggest a 
performance-matched approach to account for the correlation between performance 
and accruals. Nevertheless, as argued by Dechow et al. (2010), the performance-
matching approach may reduce the power of the model and add more noises to the 
residual accruals. Overall, the extant literature currently stands at a point where the 
modified-Jones model or one of its variants is used extensively, but there is a lack of 
consensus as to how best to specify the model. 
2.2.2. Real earnings management 
One may argue that to change reported earnings, managers do not necessarily 
resort to playing around with accounting methods and estimates, but rather they could 
change real operation decisions, such as sales policy, production level, discretionary 
expense spending etc. Graham et al. (2005) present influential survey evidence 
suggesting many US financial executives would manage earnings via changing real 
operation decisions. In the UK, a survey of financial analysts also suggests that real 
earnings management is preferred when it comes to meeting or beating consensus 
analysts’ forecast (Choi et al., 2006). As a result, earnings management research in 
the late 2000s onwards has a clear shift towards real earnings management rather 
than focusing only on accruals earnings management.  
To detect real earnings management, the existing literature normally measures 
the deviation of the actual level of real activities with the expected level derived using 
some firm-specific information. In an influential study, Roychowdhury (2006) finds that 
firms inflate earnings to avoid reporting losses via boosting up sales through more 
discounts and more lenient credit terms, overproduction and reduction of 
discretionary expenses. Roychowdhury (2006) models the ‘normal’ levels of cash 
flow, production cost and discretionary expenses as a function of some fundamentals 
such as the level and change in sales. In a manner similar to when discretionary 
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accruals is estimated, the deviations of the actual levels from the ‘normal’ levels are 
then used as proxies for real earnings management. Roychowdhury (2006) argues 
that firms are managing earnings upwards if they exhibit low abnormal cash flows, 
high production costs and low discretionary expenses. A vast amount of subsequent 
studies employ Roychowdhury’s (2006) model to capture real earnings management. 
Gunny (2010) introduces three measures of abnormal research and development 
expenses (R&D hereafter), selling, general and administrative expenses and gains 
on asset sales, generally using the same procedures as in estimating discretionary 
accruals. Zang (2012) finds that managers use accruals and real earnings 
management as substitutes based on the relative costs and benefits of each method. 
Real earnings management has also been shown to be increasingly more popular 
given the increase in financial reporting regulations (Cohen et al., 2008).  
In general, real earnings management has attracted a lot of attention which 
results in various models to detect it. Those models, however, are developed in 
similar manner as the discretionary accruals models, hence they also suffer from the 
same pitfalls as applicable to the discretionary accruals models, including model mis-
specification as a result of the lack of an underlying theory which could explain what 
the ‘normal’ level of real activities would be in the absence of real earnings 
management. Extant evidence obtained from applying existing models of real 
earnings management could, therefore, be attributable to measurement errors and is 
as a result subject to considerable scepticism. 
2.2.3. Other earnings management detection models 
Apart from the above accruals and real earnings management detection models 
which have been used very popularly in the literature, there are also a number of 
other notable ones. Gerakos and Kovrijnykh (2013) develop a model which could 
detect both accruals and real earnings management by exploring the time-series 
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properties of earnings. They demonstrate that earnings management often results in 
serial correlation patterns in earnings, hence if the second-order autocorrelation of 
the residual from regressing current earnings on lagged earnings is negative, it would 
indicate the presence of earnings management. Leuz et al. (2003) create a composite 
measure of earnings management to be used in an international context which 
aggregates four existing measures of earnings management into an index. A body of 
the literature also develops different approaches to detect earnings management 
which are based on analyses of observed signals. Based on twelve signals which 
may reveal managerial incentives and/or ability to violate GAAP, Beneish (1997) 
develops a model to identify GAAP violators from accruals aggressors. Beneish 
(1999a) provides an accounting-based index which could help assess the likelihood 
of earnings overstatement. Dechow et al. (2011), however, argue that Beneish’s 
model is difficult to be used in practice due to its use of indices and matching 
procedures. They, therefore, develop a new model, namely the FSCORE, which can 
help predict the likelihood of earnings restatement. They start with an analysis of the 
characteristics of restated firms and employ a logistic regression to estimate the 
relation between firm’s characteristics and the likelihood of misstatement. FSCORE 
is used as a ‘thermometer’ for financial statement users to quickly and timely assess 
the likelihood of earnings misstatements.  
Beneish (1997), Beneish (1999a) and Dechow et al. (2011) pave an innovative 
and highly practical way to detect earnings management. Nevertheless, these models 
are not entirely free from limitations. One issue is the focus on firms subject to 
enforcements by the SEC. Those firms are typically large since SEC would aim to 
maximize public benefits given its constrained budget. Moreover, Dechow et al. 
(2010) also highlight that SEC is more likely to target egregious misstatements and 
avoid ambiguity cases of aggressive but within-GAAP earnings management. Thus, 
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the predictive power of the models cannot be generalized to other firms engaged in 
earnings management but not enforced by SEC. 
2.2.4. Summary: Existing models to detect earnings management and the 
case for a new model  
In general, the above-mentioned models of earnings management detection, 
albeit being used widely by academics, are subject to various criticisms. Dechow et 
al. (1995) note that existing discretionary accruals models typically require hundreds 
of observation to have a reasonable chance of detecting subtle earnings 
management. Data constraints and the complexity of econometric methods also 
mean existing models of earnings management detection is hard to be used in 
practice. To be more specific, using the Jones-type models, when an analyst wants 
to know if firm A is engaging in earnings management, he or she needs to gather 
information either for all firms in the same industry or for firm A across many years, 
then perform a regression before a measure of discretionary accruals can be 
estimated. From a practical perspective, even ignoring the complexity of the 
econometric procedures which can in many cases discourage an average investor, 
the approach suffers from the look-ahead bias, i.e. at the time firm A releases its 
financial statement, information for the whole industry may be incomplete since there 
are firms which release their financial statements later. In addition, if firm A is a newly 
listed firm with little historical information, the estimation of discretionary accruals 
using time-series approach is impossible. Furthermore, the problem of data 
unavailability could be intensified in smaller markets which effectively prevents us 
from gaining more knowledge on earnings management behaviour in those 
interesting settings. Existing real earnings management detection models also suffer 
from the same pitfalls highlighted above because the way they are estimated is 
generally similar to estimating discretionary accruals. Therefore, it would certainly be 
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preferable if there is a more practical model that allows easy and realistic application 
in practice without having to collect large datasets. 
Furthermore, the Jones-type and real earnings management models are also 
subject to fierce criticism regarding the possibility of model mis-specification. In the 
absence of an underlying theory which could predict what accruals and real earnings 
management levels would look like if there is no earnings management, the 
development of existing models seems ad hoc, if not unfounded. Consequently, the 
issue could lead to potentially large measurement errors (see, for example, 
Holthausen et al., 1995; Fields et al., 2001; Ball, 2013; Owens et al., 2013). Also, 
using Jones-type and real earnings management models to detect earnings 
management results in too high frequency of earnings management and too large 
magnitudes of those manipulation which also attracts a lot of scepticism (Ball, 2013; 
Gerakos and Kovrijnykh, 2013). The development of signal-based models to detect 
earnings management seems to be a good direction to respond to those criticisms. 
However, this line of research is still under-researched with only a few notable 
contributions which also have pitfalls, such as the sample selection bias (e.g. 
Beneish, 1997; Beneish, 1999b; Dechow et al., 2011). 
The above-discussed literature creates the niche to which this chapter 
contributes. The chapter develops a model that can reliably detect earnings 
management, yet is easy to construct and apply in practice. The model developed in 
this study would base only on observable data and accumulate individual signals, all 
of which have been translated into binary variables to make it easy to construct. This 
approach is arguably more convenient for real-life application and the model can give 
implications beyond enforced manipulators. The next section (Section 2.4) will explain 
the sample selection procedures before the model construction and testing are 
presented in Section 2.5. 
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2.3. SAMPLE SELECTION 
The following procedures are applied to derive at the sample which is used in 
both Chapter 2 and 3. The sample comprises all UK listed stocks on London Stock 
Exchange (LSE hereafter) during the period from 1995 to 2011. Data is collected 
mainly from Datastream, except for external auditor and M&A deals which are 
collected from Bloomberg. Data from Datastream and Bloomberg are combined using 
the International Securities Identification Number (ISIN hereafter). To avoid 
survivorship bias, both live and dead stocks are included.  
The sample starts with Datastream’s constituent lists which consist of all UK 
listed live and dead stocks. From these initial lists, the first screen is conducted to 
keep only ordinary shares traded on the LSE (i.e. preferred shares, indices, 
depository receipts and ordinary shares not traded on the LSE are excluded). To 
facilitate the matching between data from Datastream and Bloomberg, any stocks 
which do not have an ISIN are excluded. Financial and utilities firms are excluded due 
to their distinct financial reporting requirements. Following Gore et al. (2007), for firms 
which have more than one types of ordinary shares, only one is included in the 
sample. To ensure comparability, the sample is also restricted to include only firms 
which report financial figures in Pound Sterling (£) and whose financial years have 
between 350 and 380 days. Firms with market value less than £1 million are also 
excluded to avoid very small firms which are typically very thinly traded in practice but 
can influence the returns on the equally-weighted portfolios. The exclusion of small 
firms also mitigate the concerns about Datastream’s returns data raised by Ince and 
Porter (2006). In addition, stocks with negative book value of equity are also excluded. 
Finally, further requiring data availability to calculate all variables needed for Chapter 
2 and 3 results in a final sample of 11,920 firm-year observations, consisting of 1,866 
unique firms across 43 Datastream level-six industries. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to mitigate the influence of outliers.  
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2.4. THE CONSTRUCTION OF ESCORE  
One of the key innovations of this chapter is the empirical measure of the 
context of earnings management. Within the scope of this thesis, the ‘context of 
earnings management’ is defined as the incentives to manage earnings, the 
pressures under which managers are more likely to resort to earnings management 
to respond, the constraints to earnings management and the innate factors of the firm 
which could indicate the existence of earnings management. This is certainly not a 
‘comprehensive’ definition in the sense that it could not capture every signals which 
suggest earnings management. The chapter deliberately focuses mainly on the 
context which could be easily extracted from financial statement information, hence 
the exclusion of areas such as performance-linked compensation, corporate 
governance, institutional and managerial holdings etc. The reason is twofold. First, 
the chapter aims to create a parsimonious model which covers a reasonable range 
of signals for which data can be easily obtained in practice. This feature of the model 
makes it more useful for practitioners who want to apply the model in their trading 
practices. Second, if compensation, corporate governance, institutional and 
managerial holdings variables are included, the constraint of data availability could 
severely depress the sample size. Dechow et al. (2011) argue that an inclusion of 
those variables would introduce biases into the sample due to data unavailability. 
Nevertheless, those omissions do not affect the main conclusions obtained from this 
chapter. Future research is invited to expand the model to cover these aspects of the 
context of earnings management.  
In this study, an aggregate index, namely ESCORE, is constructed as the sum 
of fifteen individual binary variables, each takes the value of one if a firm has a 
suspicious signal and zero otherwise. The selection of these signals is mainly guided 
by the extant earnings management literature. The signals are grouped into four 
categories and presented in Section 2.4.2, 2.4.3, 2.4.4 and 2.4.5 before Section 2.4.6 
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explains how the aggregate ESCORE is created based on those signals. A number 
of the individual signals need a ‘benchmark’ to construct. For example, although small 
firms might be suspicious of earnings management, a ‘benchmark’ is needed to 
determine which firms should be considered as ‘small’. Such ‘benchmarks’ should 
reflect the characteristics of the corresponding industry. Therefore, before ESCORE 
and its components are explained, the next section will start by explaining how those 
benchmarks are constructed.  
2.4.1. Benchmark construction procedure  
First, for each industry-year, firms are ranked based on ߛ, where ߛ represents 
the relevant individual signals used in this study which need benchmarks to construct. 
For example, market-to-book ratio and book-tax difference require an upper 
benchmark to determine which sample firms have those signals being too high. 
Contrarily, firm’s size, debt ratio, net operating assets and tangible asset intensity 
require lower benchmarks to determine which of the sample firms have those signals 
being too low4. For market-to-book ratio and book-tax difference (firm’s size, debt 
ratio, net operating assets and tangible asset intensity), the 80th (20th) percentiles5 
in each industry-year are determined and used as the upper (lower) benchmarks. The 
upper and lower benchmarks are denoted as ߛ௞,௧଼଴  and ߛ௞,௧ଶ଴ , respectively, where k = 1... 
43 are the unique Datastream level-six industries remained in the sample, and t = 
1995... 2011 represent the 17 sample years. 
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 The next four sub-sections discuss these variables in detail. 
5
 The cut-off points are set at 20th and 80th percentiles to ensure the resulting individual 
signals would not flag up too many firms as ‘suspicious’. However, it is admittedly an arbitrary 
choice. Although it is needed for the research to go ahead, all main analyses in Chapters 2, 3 
and 4 which use ESCORE are replicated using the cut-off points at 25th and 75th percentiles 
as well as 10th and 90th percentiles. Unreported results show that none of the main 
conclusions of the thesis are sensitive to the choice of the cut-off points to construct ESCORE. 
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2.4.2. Incentives: Equity issue, debt issue, share-for-share merger and 
acquisition, and stock overvaluation  
The first category of signals which constitute the aggregate ESCORE covers 
various incentives to engage in earnings management. Under the agency theory, 
managers could manage earnings to maximize personal incentives, such as 
performance-linked compensation (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, in this 
study, such personal incentives are deliberately excluded to keep the resulting model 
parsimonious and to restrict the model’s inputs to only information which could be 
easily extracted from financial statements. Therefore, this category selects the 
incentives for earnings management based on the assumption that managers 
manage earnings in response to those incentives in order to maximize shareholders’ 
wealth.  
First, there is strong evidence that firms would inflate earnings prior to equity 
issues (Teoh et al., 1998b; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; DuCharme et al., 2004; Siew 
Hong and Wong, 2002; Rangan, 1998; Shivakumar, 2000; Iqbal et al., 2009; Iqbal 
and Strong, 2010). To capture this incentive, ESEO, a dummy which turns on if a firm 
has a seasoned equity offering (SEO hereafter) in a year 6. In particular, ESEO is 
defined as a dummy that takes the value of one if (i) a firm’s outstanding shares 
increase by at least 5% compared to last year and (ii) there are positive proceeds 
from issuing ordinary/preferred stocks, zero otherwise7. If data on proceeds from 
issuing ordinary/preferred stocks is missing from Datastream, a value of zero is used 
                                                             
6
 In this study, initial public offerings (IPOs hereafter) are not considered since many of the 
signals need up to two years of lagged data, hence data availability constraint would 
technically eliminate those initial public offerings. However, initial public offerings represent 
only a small number of observations in the sample. 
7
 Firms which satisfy only (i) could have done a stock split rather than a stock issue, while 
those which satisfy only (ii) could have not issued ordinary shares (e.g. issuance of preferred 
stocks or proceeds from stock options… also yield positive proceeds from issuing 
ordinary/preferred stocks). Therefore, the chapter requires both conditions to be satisfied.  
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as a replacement rather than dropping the observation. This approach is to ensure 
the sample is not depressed unnecessarily because this data is more likely to be 
missing because the firm does not report the item if the value is zero rather than a 
real missing data (i.e. the item has a non-zero value but not retrievable from 
Datastream)8. Similar approach will be used for other data which shares this feature, 
i.e. a missing data is more likely to be a zero value and each time the replacement 
approach is used, it will be clearly stated. 
Second, there is also a great incentive for managers to ‘decorate’ financial 
statements prior to a major debt issue to negotiate the cost of debt down and/or to 
have better terms of the debt contract. Athanasakou and Olsson (2012) find a positive 
relationship between an indicator of debt issue and earnings management. To 
capture the incentive to inflate earnings prior to debt issues, EDDEBT is defined as a 
dummy that takes the value of one if DDEBT is 5% or higher, where DDEBT is 
calculated as the percentage change of total of short- and long-term debts9 compared 
to last year, zero otherwise. The 5% benchmark is employed to make sure the issue 
is large enough for managers to consider managing earnings. 
Third, firms have strong incentives to inflate earnings prior to share-for-share 
M&A deals in an attempt to temporarily push stock price up to minimize the number 
of shares paid. Strong empirical evidence has been documented for the income-
increasing earnings management prior to share-financed M&A deals in the US and 
the UK (Erickson and Wang, 1999; Botsari and Meeks, 2008; Louis, 2004). Following 
                                                             
8
 To check the validity of this assumption, a random sample of 50 observations with missing 
proceeds from issuing common/preferred stocks in years 2010 and 2011 are selected and 
traced to original financial statements obtained through Key Note platform. In all of those 
sampled instances, the original financial statements show the firms do not have any 
proceeds from issuing common and preferred stocks or there is simply no such item in the 
financial statements.  
9
 A value of zero is assigned to observations with missing Datastream’s data for short-term 
and long-term debts.  
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this established literature, EMA is defined as a dummy that takes the value of one if 
a firm announces an M&A deal within the financial year for which share is proposed 
as (part of) the payment method. The data for share-financed M&A transactions is 
collected from Bloomberg.  
The last signal in this category captures the effect of stock market overvaluation 
on earnings management. Jensen (2005) conjectures that overvaluation would create 
a pressure for firms to inflate earnings to maintain the high market valuation. Such 
conjecture has attracted a lot of attention as it can explain quite well the series of 
accounting scandals in the 2000s which involve many high profile firms. There is 
empirical evidence to support the case that overvaluation would induce income-
increasing earnings management (Chi and Gupta, 2009; Houmes and Skantz, 2010; 
Badertscher, 2011). To capture this signal, the next variable, EOV, is defined as a 
dummy that takes the value of one if a firm’s beginning market-to-book ratio (denoted 
MTB), calculated as market value of equity at the end of fiscal year divided by ordinary 
shareholders’ equity, is higher than the corresponding ܯܶܤ௞,௧଼଴ , zero otherwise. 
2.4.3. Pressures: Meeting or just beating earnings benchmarks, financial 
distress, debt level, firm size and business life cycle  
For companies whose stocks are listed on an exchange, there are several 
earnings benchmarks which need to be met if the companies do not want to be 
penalized by means of a drop in their stock price. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) 
document a discontinuity of earnings around two important benchmarks, namely zero 
earnings and last year’s earnings. A similar pattern has also been documented in the 
UK (Gore et al., 2007). Following Gore et al. (2007), to capture the pressure to meet 
or beat zero earnings benchmark, EROA is defined as a dummy that takes the value 
of one if a firm’s returns-on-assets ratio (denoted ROA), calculated as earnings before 
extraordinary items scaled by beginning total assets, is equal to or larger than zero 
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but smaller than 0.01, zero otherwise. EDROA, employed to capture the pressure to 
avoid reporting earnings decreases, is defined as a dummy that takes the value of 
one if a firm’s DROA, calculated as the change of earnings before extraordinary items 
compared to last year scaled by beginning total assets, is equal to or larger than zero 
but smaller than 0.005, zero otherwise. 
Furthermore, there is also evidence that firms would engage in earnings 
management if the unmanaged earnings fall short of the expected dividends by small 
amount (Daniel et al., 2008; Atieh and Hussain, 2012). To capture this pressure, EDIV 
is defined as a dummy that takes the value of one if a firm’s dividend deficit, denoted 
as DIVDEF, calculated as the difference between net income and total cash 
dividends10 scaled by beginning total assets, is equal to or larger than zero but smaller 
than 0.01, zero otherwise.11 
Firms which are in financial distress are understandably under pressure to 
inflate earnings. Lara et al. (2009) provide evidence that financially distressed firms 
manage earnings upwards. Beneish (1997) reports that financial distress is a factor 
that leads to GAAP violation. To capture the presence of these pressures, the UK-
based ZSCORE is calculated following Taffler (1983) as follows: 
ܼܵܥܱܴܧ = 3.2 + 12.8ݔଵ + 2.5ݔଶ െ 10.68ݔଷ + 0.029ݔସ (E2.1) 
where: ݔଵ is pre-tax income divided by current liabilities; ݔଶ is current assets divided 
by total liabilities; ݔଷ is current liabilities divided by total assets; ݔସ is quick assets 
                                                             
10
 A value of zero is assigned to observations with missing Datastream’s data for cash 
dividends. 
11
 Beside zero earnings, last year’s earnings and dividends, consensus analysts’ forecast is 
also an important earnings threshold. However, consensus analysts’ forecast benchmark is 




minus current liabilities divided by daily operating expense, where daily operating 
expense is sales minus pre-tax income minus depreciation expense divided by 365. 
Taffler (1983) and Agarwal and Taffler (2007) have showed that UK firms with 
negative ZSCORE is more likely to go bankrupt. Following the established evidence, 
EDISTRESS is defined as a dummy that takes the value of one if a firm’s ZSCORE 
is negative, zero otherwise. 
The use of debt also has implications about earnings management. Watts and 
Zimmerman (1986) suggest that debt contracts have vital influence on firms’ 
accounting policy. On one hand, higher level of debt would induce pressure for firms 
to inflate earnings. Indeed, debts usually come with some covenants which firms need 
to comply with. Breaking debt covenants would lead to firms being penalized by 
means of higher cost of debt (Dichev and Skinner, 2002). Therefore, firms with more 
debt have a greater pressure to manage earnings to avoid violation of debt covenants. 
DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) find that abnormal accruals is significantly higher in 
the years preceding debt covenant violation. Ghosh and Moon (2010) find that firms 
with high level of debt would have strong incentive to manage earnings. On the other 
hand, however, the literature also suggests that firms with low level of debt are also 
likely to engage in earnings management (Astami and Tower, 2006). In addition, the 
evidence that financial leverage is positively related to accounting conservatism 
(Watts, 2003a; Watts, 2003b; Pae, 2007) implies that firms with little debt are less 
bound contractually and their reported earnings are less subject to scrutiny from 
lenders, hence there are more scope for earnings management. In brief, the literature 
suggests that firms which have either too high or too low level of debt are suspicious 
of earnings management. The ZSCORE as explained earlier has already captured 
firms with high debt (ݔଷ in the ZSCORE is in fact a measure of leverage, the larger of 
which would reduce ZSCORE). To capture firms with low level of debt, EDEBT is 
defined as a dummy that takes the value of one if a firms’ beginning DEBT, measured 
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as the total of short- and long-term debts scaled by total assets, is lower than the 
corresponding ܦܧܤ ௞ܶ,௧ଶ଴, zero otherwise. 
It has been found that it is more difficult for large firms to manage earnings due 
to their high public visibility (Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Dechow and Dichev, 2002). 
Smaller firms, on the contrary, usually face less public attention and struggle to 
perform under various financial constraints. Hence small firms are often more likely 
to engage in earnings management, especially if the managers believe the struggles 
are just transitory. To capture this signal, ESIZE is defined as a dummy that takes the 
value of one if a firm’s beginning market value of equity (denoted MVE) is lower than 
the corresponding ܯܸܧ௞,௧ଶ଴, zero otherwise. 
The last variable in this group, ECYCLE, is constructed to capture firms which 
are in the introduction and growth stage in their business life cycle. Young listed firms, 
most of which are using funds from the capital market for the first time, are usually 
under pressure to perform and grow. Earnings management could be a way for those 
young listed firms to respond to such pressure (Beneish, 1997; Dopuch et al., 1987). 
Growth firms usually face strong investment opportunities and are expected to deliver 
sound growth and financial performance. Fama and French (1995) show that growth 
firms typically report higher earnings. Lakonishok et al. (1994) suggest that the market 
generally places too much expectation on growth stocks which results in market 
overreaction. Under such pressure, firms might have to resort to earnings 
management should their underlying economic performance fall short of the 
expectation to avoid market penalty. Such prediction that growth firms manage 
earnings has been substantiated by empirical evidence (Skinner and Sloan, 2002; 
Sawicki and Shrestha, 2008). To capture the pressure to management earnings 
induced by business life cycle, following Dickinson (2011)  ECYCLE is defined as a 
dummy that takes the value of one if a firm’s operating cash flows are negative, 
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financing cash flows are positive and investing cash flows are negative (introduction 
stage), or its operating and financing cash flows are positive while its investing cash 
flows are negative (growth stage), and zero otherwise. 
2.4.4. Constraints: External auditor and balance sheet bloat  
External audit quality also plays a major role in constraining accruals earnings 
management (Becker et al., 1998; Francis et al., 1999). Krishnan (2003) finds that 
firms whose external auditors have more industry experience on average have less 
discretionary accruals. Following the established literature, several studies have used 
an indicator of firms being audited by the Big 5 as a control variable in regression 
where the dependent variable is discretionary accruals and in general a significant 
negative relationship is found (Zang, 2012; Athanasakou and Olsson, 2012). In this 
study, EAUDIT is defined as a dummy that takes the value of one if a firm is not 
audited by the Big 5 accountancy firms12.  
Due to the reversal nature of accruals, past use of accruals earnings 
management would act as a constraint to further engagement (Barton and Simko, 
2002; Baber et al., 2011). In the extant literature, net operating asset (denoted as 
NOA hereinafter) is usually used to measure the ‘balance sheet bloat’ which captures 
the constraint induced by past engagement in accruals earnings management 
(Houmes and Skantz, 2010). Firms with high NOA have been shown to engage 
extensively in income-increasing accruals earnings management in the past, which 
in turn constrains their ability to further manage accruals. Following the literature, 
NOA is calculated as the sum of net book value of equity and total debts minus cash 
                                                             
12
 The Big 5 is defined as the following firms and their affiliates: Arthur Andersen, Deloitte 
Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst and Young, KPMG, PriceWaterhouseCoopers. In the thesis, the term 
‘Big 5’ is used for simplicity; however, during the period from 1995 to 2011, it could be Big 6 
(before Price Waterhouse merged with Coopers and Lybrand) or Big 4 (after the collapse of 
Arthur Andersen). If data on the auditor is missing from Bloomberg for a firm in a year, it is 
assumed that the firm is not audited by a Big 5 auditor. 
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and cash equivalents, all scaled by total assets. EBLOAT is defined as a dummy that 
takes the value of one if a firm’s beginning NOA is lower than the corresponding ܱܰܣ௞,௧ଶ଴ , zero otherwise. EBLOAT would identify firms which has very low NOA, a sign 
that there is still scope for further engagement in accruals earnings management. 
2.4.5. Innate characteristics: tangible assets intensity and book-tax 
difference  
Earnings management is engaged not only because of managerial motives, but 
also due to some innate factors (Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Francis et al., 2005; 
Francis et al., 2004; Athanasakou and Olsson, 2012). Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
suggest some important innate factors which could imply earnings management, 
including the variability of some fundamentals such as sales or cash flows, firm size, 
operating cycle and incident of losses. It has also been shown that the intensity of 
intangible and tangible assets is inversely related to earnings quality (Francis et al., 
2004; Athanasakou and Olsson, 2012). Several of these innate factors, including firm 
size, operating cycle and incident of losses, have been covered in the signals 
presented earlier. In this study, the variability of sales and cash flows, which requires 
long history of data to calculate, is not considered because requiring long history of 
data would eliminate young firms from the sample, a practice that may introduce bias 
to the sample since some earnings management signals (e.g. ECYCLE) are designed 
to capture young firms. The intensity of intangible assets is also not considered due 
to insufficient data to establish the industry benchmarks13. To capture the intensity of 
tangible assets, CAP is calculated as the ratio of property, plant and equipment 
divided by total assets. The literature has shown that smaller CAP is associated with 
                                                             
13
 Many UK listed companies during the sample period do not report research and 
development expenses. A common approach in the literature is to replace those missing 
values by zero. Nevertheless, having too many zero values makes the lower benchmarks in 
many industry zero, which is quite problematic to use. 
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poor earnings quality, hence the relevant firms are suspicious of earnings 
management (Athanasakou and Olsson, 2012; Francis et al., 2004). ECAP is defined 
as a dummy that takes the value of one if a firm’s beginning CAP is smaller than the 
corresponding ܥܣ ௞ܲ,௧ଶ଴, zero otherwise. 
Lastly, the effect of book-tax conformity on earnings management is also 
strongly documented in the literature (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010; Athanasakou and 
Olsson, 2012). If one agrees that taxable profits are generally difficult and costly to 
manipulate, the more accounting earnings diverge from taxable profits, the more likely 
that such accounting earnings have been manipulated. There is empirical evidence 
in support of such intuition (Desai, 2005). Following the literature, BOOKTAX is 
calculated as the absolute value of the difference between reported pre-tax income 
and an estimate of total taxable profits, denoted TTP, all scaled by sales. In the UK 
during the period from 1995 to 2011, the particular rules on corporate tax vary 
considerably, but most of the changes are for the tax rates and marginal reliefs while 
the principles could be summarized as follows. If taxable profit is below the lower limit 
for marginal tax relief, corporate tax is calculated using the small profit tax rate. If 
taxable profit is above the upper limit for marginal tax relief, corporate tax is calculated 
using the main tax rate, but for firms with profit fall between the lower and upper limit, 
they could claim some marginal relief which essentially makes the effective tax rate 
higher than the small profit tax rate but smaller than the main tax rate. The chapter 
works back the total taxable profit based on the corporate tax expenses reported by 
firms (denoted TXT) and the above simplified principles of calculating corporate tax. 
For this calculation, the lower and upper limit for marginal tax relief (denoted LL and 
UL, respectively), small profit tax rate (SR) and main tax rate (MR) applicable in each 
sample year are sourced from HM Revenue & Customs (2013). With only published 
information, it is almost impossible to estimate TTP. Therefore, some assumptions 
need to be made to simplify the estimation. First, it is assumed that the reported tax 
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expenses represent solely the amount of income tax levied in the considered period 
(i.e. no extraordinary penalty or retrospective payment or anything else of that nature). 
Second, for the profits that fall between the lower and upper limit for marginal tax 
relief, the tax rate is assumed to be the average of the small profit tax rate and the 
main tax rate to avoid complicated calculation. The average tax rate is denoted as 
AR. With those assumptions being made and the corporate tax system being 
simplified as summarized above, TTP is worked back from the tax expenses as 
follows: 
x If TXT ൑ ?ǡൌ ? 
x If 0 <  TXT ൑ǡܶܶܲ = ்௑்ௌோ  
x If LL x SR ൑൑ሺ– LL) x AR, then ܶ ܶܲ = ்௑்ି(௅௅×ௌோ)஺ோ + ܮܮ 
x If TXT ൒ሺ– LL) x AR, then ܶ ܶܲ = ்௑்ି(௅௅×ௌோ)ି[(௎௅ି௅௅)×஺ோ]ெோ + ܷܮ (E2.2) 
EBT is defined as a dummy that takes the value of one if a firm’s BOOKTAX is 
higher than the corresponding ܤܱܱܭܶܣܺ௞,௧ଶ଴, zero otherwise. EBT, therefore, captures 
firms which have reported accounting earnings too different from taxable profits, an 
indication that accounting earnings might have been managed. 
2.4.6. The ESCORE  
The individual signals as presented above capture four dimensions of the 
context surrounding a firm which might suggest the existence of earnings 
management. The more a firm exhibits those signals, the more likely that the firm has 
actually managed earnings. Following that intuition, the composite ESCORE is finally 
calculated as the sum of all fifteen individual binary signals as follows: 
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ESCORE =  ESEO +  EDDEBT +  EMA +  EOV +  EROA +  EDROA +  EDIV +  EDISTRESS 
+  EDEBT +  ESIZE +  ECYCLE +  EAUDIT +  EBLOAT +  ECAP +  
EBT (E2.3) 
As designed, ESCORE is an integer which can range from zero to fifteen. The 
smaller (larger) ESCORE is, the less (more) suspicious the context surrounding a firm 
is. ESCORE has undeniably not been designed to capture all signals of suspicious 
earnings management. As explained earlier, a number of signals have been ignored 
(such as meeting or just beating consensus analysts’ earnings forecast, sales and 
cash flows variability etc.). Besides, ESCORE does not cover many other areas, such 
as performance-linked compensation, managerial and institutional holdings, 
corporate governance etc. With those limitations being fully acknowledged, however, 
ESCORE has covered a wide range of financial-statement-based signals across 
different dimensions. Having designed ESCORE as an aggregate index which 
accumulates fifteen individual signals suggesting earnings management exists, it is 
important to examine whether ESCORE is appropriately constructed and whether it 
could actually capture earnings management. The next section will address these 
issues. 
2.5. TESTS OF THE CONSTRUCTION AND EFFICACY OF ESCORE 
The purpose of this section is two-fold. First, it provides evidence in support of 
the proper construction of ESCORE. In particular, the chapter looks at the efficacy of 
each individual signal in capturing the context of earnings management and if the 
model could be improved by developing some principal components. Second, the 
section examines whether ESCORE could indeed capture the context of earnings 
management in relation to the other established models of earnings management 
detection. Before presenting those tests, the section starts with explaining the 
procedures to estimate the established measures of earnings management used as 
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benchmarks in the tests (Section 2.5.1) before the descriptive statistics and 
correlations of the sample are discussed (Section 2.5.2). Finally, the results of the 
tests are presented and discussed in Section 2.5.3, 2.5.4 and 2.5.5. 
2.5.1. Empirical proxies for earnings management 
To test if ESCORE could actually capture earnings management, the chapter 
examines how ESCORE is correlated with other traditional proxies of earnings 
management. This section explains how those traditional measures of earnings 
management, including two measures of accruals earnings management and four 
measures of real earnings management, are estimated. 
2.5.1.1. Discretionary accruals 
The chapter employs the modified-Jones model (Jones, 1991; Dechow et al, 
1995) to estimate discretionary accruals as follows. First, total accruals is calculated 
as the difference between income before extraordinary items and net operating cash 
flows. The calculation of total accruals follows the cash flows approach to avoid the 
potential measurement errors identified by Hribar and Collins (2002). In particular, the 
balance sheet approach, as used in Dechow et al. (1995), may induce errors into the 
measurement of total accruals in the presence of non-articulation transactions, such 
as M&A or divestitures. Second, the cross-sectional version of the modified-Jones 
model (Dechow et al., 1995) is estimated for each (Datastream level-six) industry-
year with at least fifteen observations: 
஺஼೔,೟்஺೔,೟షభ = ߙ + ߚଵ ൬ ଵ்஺೔,೟షభ൰ + ߚଶ ൬	?ோா௏೔,೟்஺೔,೟షభ൰ + ߚଷ ൬ ௉௉ா೔,೟்஺೔,೟షభ൰ + ߝ௜,௧ (E2.4) 
where: AC୧,୲ is total accruals of firm i in year t, which is calculated as income before 
extraordinary items minus net operating cash flows; TA୧,୲ିଵ is total assets of firm i at 
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the end of year t – 1; 	?REV୧,୲ is change in sales from year t – 1 to year t of firm i; and 
PPE୧,୲ is gross plant, property and equipment of firm i at the end of year t. 
The level of discretionary accruals is then estimated as: 
ܦܣܥ௜,௧ = ஺஼೔,೟்஺೔,೟షభ െ ൤ߙො + ߚመଵ ൬ ଵ்஺೔,೟షభ൰ + ߚመଶ ൬	?ோா௏೔,೟ି	?ோா஼೔,೟்஺೔,೟షభ ൰ + ߚመଷ ൬ ௉௉ா೔,೟்஺೔,೟షభ൰൨ (E2.5) 
where: DAC୧,୲  is discretionary accruals of firm i in year t; Įෝ , ȕ෡ଵ , ȕ෡ଶ , ȕ෡ଷ  are the 
estimated coefficients from Equation (E2.4); 	?REC୧,୲ is the changes in receivables 
from year t – 1 to year t of firm i. 
Although there are competing models to estimate discretionary accruals 
(Dechow et al., 1995; Guay et al., 1996; Bernard and Skinner, 1996; Young, 1999; 
Thomas and Zhang, 2000; Peasnell et al., 2000; Fields et al., 2001), the existing 
literature generally suggests that there is no other model that clearly outperforms the 
modified-Jones model (Peasnell et al., 2000; Botsari and Meeks, 2008). 
Nevertheless, an issue that attracts considerable attention, especially in the UK 
context, is the treatment of depreciation in calculating accruals. Many UK studies 
focus only on working capital accruals arguing that depreciation is not a suitable 
means to manage earnings since it is highly visible and if earnings are managed 
through depreciation, the effects could be unwound quite easily by financial statement 
users (Young, 1999; Peasnell et al., 2000; Gore et al., 2007). To account for this 
argument, the second measure of earnings management is estimated using the 
‘margin model’ introduced by Peasnell et al. (2000), which has been shown to work 
well in the UK context. In particular, working capital accruals is firstly estimated as: 
ܹܣܥ = ( 	?ܥܣ െ 	?ܥܪܧ) െ ( 	?ܥܮ െ 	?ܵܶܦ)  (E2.6) 
where: ¨&$ LV FKDQJH LQ FXUUHQW DVVHWV ¨&+( LV FKDQJH LQ FDVK DQG FDVK
equivalents; ¨&/LVFKDQJHLQFXUUHQWOLDELOLWLHV¨67'LVFKDQJHLQVKRUW-term debts. 
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Then the following regression is estimated within each (Datastream level-six) 
industry-year with at least fifteen observations: 
ௐ஺஼೔,೟்஺೔,೟షభ = ߙ + ߚଵ ൬ ோா௏೔,೟்஺೔,೟షభ൰ + ߚଶ ൬ோா௏೔,೟ି	?ோா஼೔,೟்஺೔,೟షభ ൰ + ߝ௜,௧ (E2.7) 
where: ܹܣܥ௜,௧ is working capital accruals, defined as in (E2.6), of firm i in year t; REV୧,୲ 
is sales of firm i in year t. 
Having obtained the estimated coefficients Įෝ, ȕ෡ଵ, ȕ෡ଶ from Equation (E2.7), the 
discretionary working capital accruals, denoted DWAC, is calculated as: 
ܦܹܣܥ௜,௧ = ௐ஺஼೔,೟்஺೔,೟షభ െ ൤ߙො + ߚመଵ ൬ ோா௏೔,೟்஺೔,೟షభ൰ + ߚመଶ ൬ோா௏೔,೟ି	?ோா஼்஺೔,೟షభ ൰൨ (E2.8) 
Table T2.1 presents some basic statistics of estimating the above two models 
of discretionary accruals to facilitate comparison with previous studies. The table 
reports the average coefficients across industry-years together with the t-statistics 
comparing the average coefficients with zero. In general, all coefficients have the 
predicted signs and are of similar magnitudes compared to previous studies, such as 
those statistics reported in Peasnell et al. (2000) and Roychowdhury (2006). 
2.5.1.2. Real earnings management 
As mentioned in Section 2.2, to manage earnings managers might not 
necessarily have to ‘cook the book’, but rather they could even change real activities 
to influence reported earnings. To consider real earnings management, the chapter 
follows Roychowdhury (2006) to estimate three measures of real earnings 
management by running the following regressions in each (Datastream level-six) 
industry-year with at least fifteen observations: 
஼ிை೔,೟்஺೔,೟షభ = ߙ + ߚଵ ൬ ଵ்஺೔,೟షభ൰ + ߚଶ ൬ ோா௏೔,೟்஺೔,೟షభ൰ + ߚଷ ൬	?ோா௏೔,೟்஺೔,೟షభ൰ + ߝ௜,௧ (E2.9) 
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௉ோை஽೔,೟்஺೔,೟షభ = ߙ + ߚଵ ൬ ଵ்஺೔,೟షభ൰ + ߚଶ ൬ ோா௏೔,೟்஺೔,೟షభ൰ + ߚଷ ൬	?ோா௏೔,೟்஺೔,೟షభ൰ + ߚସ ൬	?ோா௏೔,೟షభ்஺೔,೟షభ ൰ + ߝ௜,௧ (E2.10) 
஽ூௌா௑௉೔,೟்஺೔,೟షభ = ߙ + ߚଵ ൬ ଵ்஺೔,೟షభ൰ + ߚଶ ൬ோா௏೔,೟షభ்஺೔,೟షభ ൰ + ߝ௜,௧ (E2.11) 
where: CFO୧,୲ is net cash flows from operation of firm i in year t; PROD୧,୲ is production 
cost, calculated as cost of goods sold plus change in inventory, of firm i in year t; 
DISEXP୧,୲ is discretionary expenses, calculated as selling and general administrative 
expenses plus R&D expenses14, of firm i in year t. 
Using the respective sets of estimated coefficients from Equation (E2.9), 
(E2.10), (E2.11) above, abnormal cash flow (DCF), abnormal production cost 
(DPROD) and abnormal discretionary expense (DDISEXP) are then calculated as: 
ܦܥܨ௜,௧ = െ1 × ൜ ஼ிை೔,೟்஺೔,೟షభ െ ൤ߙො + ߚመଵ ൬ ଵ்஺೔,೟షభ൰ + ߚመଶ ൬ ோா௏೔,೟்஺೔,೟షభ൰ + ߚመଷ ൬	?ோா௏೔,೟்஺೔,೟షభ൰൨ൠ (E2.12) 
ܦܴܱܲܦ௜,௧ = ௉ோை஽೔,೟்஺೔,೟షభ െ ൤ߙො + ߚመଵ ൬ ଵ்஺೔,೟షభ൰ + ߚመଶ ൬ ோா௏೔,೟்஺೔,೟షభ൰ + ߚመଷ ൬	?ோா௏೔,೟்஺೔,೟షభ൰ +ߚመସ ൬	?ோா௏೔,೟షభ்஺೔,೟షభ ൰൨ (E2.13) 
ܦܦܫܵܧܺ ௜ܲ,௧ = െ1 × ൜஽ூௌா௑௉೔,೟்஺೔,೟షభ െ ൤ߙො + ߚመଵ ൬ ଵ்஺೔,೟షభ൰ + ߚመଶ ൬ோா௏೔,೟షభ்஺೔,೟షభ ൰൨ൠ (E2.14) 
DCF, DPROD and DDISEXP are estimated using separate samples which 
require data availability only for the variables needed for each case. Table T2.2 
presents some basic statistics of estimating the above models of real earnings 
management. The table presents the average coefficients across industry-years 
together with the t-statistics under the null that the average coefficients are zero. In 
                                                             
14
 If R&D expense is missing from Datastream, it is replaced by a value of zero. 
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general, all coefficients have the predicted signs and are of similar magnitude 
compared to those reported in Roychowdhury (2006). 
Table T2.1. Average parameters across industry-years in models to estimate 
discretionary accruals and discretionary working capital accruals 
  ACt/  TAtm1 (E2.4)  WACt/  TAtm1  (E2.7) 
  Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept -0.0357 -9.54***   0.0036 1.32 
1/TAtm1 -0.0252 -0.71    
UREVt /TAtm1 0.0365 4.62***     
PPEt/TAtm1 -0.0377 -5.43***     
REVt/TAtm1    0.4534 19.98***  
(REVt - URECt)/TAtm1    -0.4607 -20.22***  
R2 0.3007   0.3408  
Notes: Within each industry-year with at least 15 observations of available data, the following models 
are estimated: ஺஼೔,೟்஺೔,೟షభ = ߙ + ߚଵ ൬ ଵ்஺೔,೟షభ൰ + ߚଶ ൬	?ோா௏೔,೟்஺೔,೟షభ൰ + ߚଷ ൬ ௉௉ா೔,೟்஺೔,೟షభ൰ + ߝ௜,௧   (E2.4) ௐ஺஼೔,೟்஺೔,೟షభ = ߙ + ߚଵ ൬ ோா௏೔,೟்஺೔,೟షభ൰ + ߚଶ ൬ோா௏೔,೟ି	?ோா஼்஺೔,೟షభ ൰ + ߝ௜,௧   (E2.7) 
The table reports the average across industry-years of the parameters estimated from the above 
models, together with the t-statistics estimated from using the standard errors of the mean across 
industry-years. Definitions of variables are in Section 2.8. * , * * , * ** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 
1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Table T2.2. Average parameters across industry-years in models to estimate 
real earnings management 
  CFOt/ TAt-1 (E2.9)  PRODt/ TAt-1 (E2.10)  DISEXPt/ TAt-1 (E2.11) 
  Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept 0.0317 1.97**   -0.2104 -14.58***   0.1757 10.37***  
1/TAt-1 -0.6555 -7.18***   -0.3496 -4.69***   1.4085 12.52***  
REVt/TAt-1 0.0703 3.74***   0.7804 57.26***     
REVt-1/TAt-1       0.1014 7.35***  
UREVt /TAt-1 -0.0396 -0.73  -0.0241 -1.15    
UREVt -1/TAt-1    -0.0373 -1.74*     
R2 0.4570 35.1***   0.8478 107.18***   0.4055 28.93***  
Notes: Within each industry-year with at least 15 observations of available data, the following models 
are estimated: ஼ிை೔,೟்஺೔,೟షభ = ߙ + ߚଵ ൬ ଵ்஺೔,೟షభ൰ + ߚଶ ൬ ோா௏೔,೟்஺೔,೟షభ൰ + ߚଷ ൬	?ோா௏೔,೟்஺೔,೟షభ൰ + ߝ௜,௧ (E2.9) ௉ோை஽೔,೟்஺೔,೟షభ = ߙ + ߚଵ ൬ ଵ்஺೔,೟షభ൰ + ߚଶ ൬ ோா௏೔,೟்஺೔,೟షభ൰ + ߚଷ ൬	?ோா௏೔,೟்஺೔,೟షభ൰ + ߚସ ൬	?ோா௏೔,೟షభ்஺೔,೟షభ ൰ + ߝ௜,௧ (E2.10) ஽ூௌா௑௉೔,೟்஺೔,೟షభ = ߙ + ߚଵ ൬ ଵ்஺೔,೟షభ൰ + ߚଶ ൬ோா௏೔,೟షభ்஺೔,೟షభ ൰ + ߝ௜,௧ (E2.11) 
The table reports the average across industry-years of the parameters estimated from the above 
models, together with the t-statistics estimated from using the standard errors of the mean across 
industry-years. Definitions of variables are in Section 2.8. * , * * , * ** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 




DCF, DPROD and DDISEXP capture three dimensions of real earnings 
management, namely the manipulation of sales activities, production activities and 
discretionary expenses. Those three ways of managing earnings could be engaged 
as substitutes, i.e. a manager would manipulate earnings through changing real 
operation decisions in one or two areas of the three, not necessarily all of them. As a 
result, for example, when the context suggests a firm is managing earnings and the 
firm decides to do it through sales manipulation, DPROD and DDISEXP are not 
necessarily high. It is, hence, important to look at the overall real earnings 
management strategy rather than just the individual ones. To facilitate this, a 
composite measure which pools together the three measures of real earnings 
management is constructed as follows: 
ܱܶܶܣܮܴܯ௜,௧ = ൤஽஼ி೔,೟ି஽஼ி೟,ೖതതതതതതതതതఙ(஽஼ி)೟,ೖ + ஽௉ோை஽೔,೟ି஽௉ோை஽೟,ೖതതതതതതതതതതതതതതఙ(஽௉ோை஽)೟,ೖ + ஽஽ூௌா௑௉೔,೟ି஽஽ூௌா௑௉೟,ೖതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതఙ(஽ூௌா௑௉)೟,ೖ ൨ 3ൗ (݅ א ݇) (E2.15) 
where: ܱܶܶܣܮܴܯ௜,௧ is the composite measure of real earnings management of firm i 
in year t; ܦܥܨ௧,௞തതതതതതതതത,  ܦܴܱܲܦ௧,௞തതതതതതതതതതതതത, ܦܦܫܵܧܺ ௧ܲ,௞തതതതതതതതതതതതതതത [ߪ(ܦܥܨ)௧,௞, ߪ(ܦܴܱܲܦ)௧,௞, ߪ(ܦܫܵܧܺܲ)௧,௞] is, 
respectively, the mean [standard deviation] of DCF, DPROD, DDISEXP of all firms in 
industry k in year t; k = 1…43 are 43 unique Datastream level-six industries remained 
in the sample. 
The above procedure converts DCF, DPROD and DDISEXP into standardized 
variables with similar distributions (i.e. within each industry-year, the standardized 
DCF, DPROD and DDISEXP are all distributed with an expected mean of zero and 
standard deviation of one) before adding them together. TOTALRM, therefore, 
captures the combined effects of the three real earnings management proxies 
employed in this study. 
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2.5.1.3. Transformation of earnings management proxies in tests of the 
efficacy of ESCORE 
The six measures of earnings management as described above are then 
transformed as follows before being employed to test the efficacy of ESCORE in 
capturing the context of earnings management. ESCORE is primarily designed to 
capture the context in which earnings management is more likely to occur, not the 
sign of such manipulation. Some components of ESCORE, including ESEO, 
EDDEBT, EMA, EOV, EBLOAT, EROA, EDROA, EDIV, EDISTRESS, ECYCLE, 
predict inflationary (i.e. aggressive) earnings management, while others, including 
EAUDIT, EBT, ECAP, EDEBT, ESIZE, only suggest the possible presence of 
earnings management behaviour regardless of the sign.  
Therefore, the chapter tests the effectiveness of ESCORE in two ways. First, 
the chapter examines if ESCORE is able to indicate the presence of earnings 
management, in both directions, by looking at how the absolute value of DAC, DWAC, 
DCF, DPROD, DDISEXP and TOTALRM (denoted ADAC, ADWAC, ADCF, 
ADPROD, ADDISEXP and ATOTALRM, respectively) vary across ESCORE groups.  
Second, as most of the components of ESCORE suggest an inflation of 
earnings as discussed above, it is also expected that ESCORE could identify the 
context in which the most aggressive earnings management occurs. For investors, 
aggressive earnings management is arguably more harmful, hence it is important to 
see if ESCORE can indicate those circumstances. For this purpose, the chapter 
examines the association of ESCORE with the indicators of aggressive earnings 
management, denoted by HDAC, HDWAC, HDCF, HDPROD, HDDISEXP and 
HTOTALRM. These variables are defined as the dummy variables that take a value 
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of one if the stock is in the top quintile ranked in each industry-year by DAC, DWAC, 
DCF, DPROD, DDISEXP and TOTALRM, respectively15.  
Taken together, the chapter employed twelve measures of earnings 
management in subsequent tests of the construction and efficacy of ESCORE (i.e. 
ADAC, ADWAC, ADCF, ADPROD, ADDISEXP, ATOTALRM, HDAC, HDWAC, 
HDCF, HDPROD, HDDISEXP and HTOTALRM). 
2.5.2. Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Table T2.3 reports some descriptive statistics of the sample. The mean DAC is 
small (0.0066) but different from zero because the variable has been winsorized. The 
same applies for all other earnings management variables (DWAC, DCF, DPROD, 
DDISEXP and TOTALRM). The mean of ROA is –0.0072 while the median is 0.0451, 
which shows the existence of some very large negative values. This could be a sign 
of the presence of firms which ‘take a bath’ since such practice typically involves 
booking very large losses. Mean market value of equity, MVE, (£390 million) is 
significantly larger than the median (£44 million) which suggests the existence of 
some very large observations. Those large firms could significantly influence the 
returns of value-weighted portfolios16. Overall, the descriptive statistics do not exhibit 
any abnormal pattern and are quite comparable to previous UK studies (e.g. 
Athanasakou et al., 2009).  
Table T2.4 presents the correlations between ESCORE and its components. 
By construct, ESCORE is also positively correlated with all of the individual signals. 
The correlations between individual signals are quite low (the largest coefficient is 
                                                             
15
 Unreported results show that defining stocks in the top quartile or decile as aggressive 
firms would not qualitatively change the main results of the chapter. 
16
 This aspect of the sample motivates the use of the equally-weighted scheme in forming 
portfolios in the main tests of Chapter 3. 
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0.381 between EDISTRESS and EBT) and insignificant in many cases. It suggests 
that the individual signals capture different uncorrelated dimensions of the context of 
earnings management which reinforces the construction of ESCORE as the sum of 
all factors.  
2.5.3. Principal component analyses  
Being aggregated from fifteen individual signals, an immediate question 
regarding the construction of ESCORE is whether those signals are correlated and 
thus could be reduced to a more parsimonious model through, for example, principal 
component analyses. To start with, it could be observed from Table T2.4 that the 
correlations between the individual signals are quite low, with the largest coefficient 
is only 0.381 (between EDISTRESS and EBT), and are insignificant in many cases. 
It suggests that the individual signals capture different dimensions of the context of 
earnings management.  
Nevertheless, the chapter conducts principal component analysis to mitigate 
any residual concerns. Table T2.5 reports the Eigen values from principal 
components analysis. The first principal component, which has the largest variance 
of any linear combinations of the individual scores, could explain only 12.83% of the 
total variance. Subsequent principal components contribute about the same 
proportion, ranging from 9.37% to 3.96%.  
Looking at the Eigen vectors in Table T2.6, there seems to be no significantly 
high loading on any particular variables, which suggests that none of the individual 
scores play a too large role in the variance of the composite ESCORE. Overall, it is 
unlikely that a variable reduction through principal component analysis would 
significantly enhance ESCORE compared to the simple sum-of-binary-variable 












DAC 0.0066 -0.0447 0.0096 0.0621 0.1251
DWAC 0.0017 -0.0383 0.0026 0.0441 0.0926
DCF 0.0033 -0.0793 -0.0060 0.0661 0.2176
DPROD 0.0112 -0.0996 0.0199 0.1423 0.2627
DDISEXP 0.0059 -0.1021 0.0266 0.1486 0.3196
TOTALRM -0.0202 -0.3648 0.0092 0.3610 0.6446
TA (£ million) 402 16 54 200 1,204
SALE (£ million) 409 14 55 232 1,149
NI (£ million) 19 -1 2 10 73
DIV (£ million) 10 0 1 4 33
MVE (£ million) 390 12 44 188 1,246
DDEBT 1.3388 -0.2759 -0.0023 0.4303 7.0904
MTB 3.3217 1.0471 1.8317 3.3463 5.0650
ROA -0.0072 -0.0288 0.0451 0.0965 0.2201
DROA 0.0135 -0.0309 0.0095 0.0449 0.1850
DIVDEF -0.0311 -0.0417 0.0236 0.0626 0.2091
ZSCORE 12.7507 3.0669 9.1751 18.3813 27.0573
DEBT 0.1565 0.0190 0.1292 0.2521 0.1467
NOA 0.5004 0.3636 0.5398 0.6690 0.2363
CAP 0.4524 0.1507 0.3817 0.6906 0.3463
BOOKTAX 0.8242 0.0082 0.0252 0.0997 4.1755
DAC 0.0066 -0.0447 0.0096 0.0621 0.1251
ESEO 0.2107 0 0 0 0.4078
EDDEBT 0.3790 0 0 1 0.4852
EMA 0.0498 0 0 0 0.2176
EOV 0.2161 0 0 0 0.4116
EROA 0.0344 0 0 0 0.1823
EDROA 0.0496 0 0 0 0.2171
EDIV 0.0553 0 0 0 0.2285
EDISTRESS 0.1573 0 0 0 0.3641
EDEBT 0.2436 0 0 0 0.4293
ESIZE 0.2163 0 0 0 0.4117
ECYCLE 0.0273 0 0 0 0.1631
EAUDIT 0.4453 0 0 1 0.4970
EBLOAT 0.2159 0 0 0 0.4115
ECAP 0.2157 0 0 0 0.4113
EBT 0.2149 0 0 0 0.4108
ESCORE 2.7313 1 2 4 1.7346
Notes: The table reports the mean, 25th, 50th (the median), 75th percentiles and standard deviation of 
selected variables. Definitions of variables are in Section 2.8.  
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Table T2.4. Correlations 
  ESEO EDDEBT EMA EOV EROA EDROA EDIV EDISTRESS EDEBT ESIZE ECYCLE EAUDIT EBLOAT ECAP EBT 
EDDEBT 0.078 1.000              
EMA 0.218 0.103 1.000             
EOV 0.053 0.013 0.034 1.000            
EROA -0.025 -0.008 -0.014 -0.043 1.000           
EDROA -0.049 0.022 -0.017 -0.026 0.021 1.000          
EDIV -0.048 -0.011 -0.010 -0.056 0.333 0.024 1.000         
EDISTRESS 0.134 -0.042 -0.007 0.035 -0.049 -0.055 -0.058 1.000        
EDEBT -0.003 -0.205 0.008 0.067 -0.043 -0.019 -0.044 0.041 1.000       
ESIZE 0.101 -0.056 0.001 -0.117 0.024 -0.026 0.000 0.153 0.058 1.000      
ECYCLE 0.101 0.029 0.009 -0.003 -0.012 -0.019 -0.023 0.117 -0.003 0.072 1.000     
EAUDIT 0.108 -0.030 0.021 -0.003 -0.017 -0.015 -0.037 0.061 0.089 0.223 0.029 1.000    
EBLOAT 0.025 -0.071 0.026 0.224 -0.015 -0.035 -0.035 0.119 0.233 0.023 0.010 0.020 1.000   
ECAP 0.089 -0.025 0.031 0.053 -0.003 -0.027 -0.005 0.096 0.118 0.047 0.023 0.064 0.173 1.000  
EBT 0.148 -0.056 0.011 0.007 -0.071 -0.069 -0.103 0.381 0.082 0.149 0.108 0.100 0.063 0.126 1.000 
ESCORE 0.435 0.200 0.232 0.304 0.089 0.057 0.071 0.434 0.344 0.386 0.202 0.431 0.420 0.415 0.448 
Notes: The table reports Pearson correlation coefficients between selected variables. Definitions of variables are in Section 2.8. Values reported in italic indicate the 
corresponding coefficients are not significant at 5% level. 
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Table T2.5. Eigen values of the correlation matrix from principal components 
analysis 
Principal 
components Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
1 1.9246 0.5198 0.1283 0.1283 
2 1.4048 0.0552 0.0937 0.2220 
3 1.3496 0.0909 0.0900 0.3119 
4 1.2587 0.1562 0.0839 0.3959 
5 1.1025 0.1143 0.0735 0.4694 
6 0.9882 0.0511 0.0659 0.5352 
7 0.9371 0.0084 0.0625 0.5977 
8 0.9286 0.0288 0.0619 0.6596 
9 0.8999 0.0930 0.0600 0.7196 
10 0.8068 0.0561 0.0538 0.7734 
11 0.7507 0.0328 0.0500 0.8234 
12 0.7179 0.0493 0.0479 0.8713 
13 0.6686 0.0012 0.0446 0.9159 
14 0.6673 0.0726 0.0445 0.9604 
15 0.5947 - 0.0396 1.0000 
Notes: The table reports the Eigen values of the correlation matrix resulted from principal component 




Table T2.6. Eigen vectors from principal components analysis 
  Prin. 1 Prin. 2 Prin. 3 Prin. 4 Prin. 5 Prin. 6 Prin. 7 Prin. 8 Prin. 9 Prin. 10 Prin. 11 Prin. 12 Prin. 13 Prin. 14 Prin. 15 
ESEO 0.2906 0.3144 -0.1603 0.3480 0.1554 -0.0540 -0.0399 -0.1708 0.1037 -0.3294 -0.3382 0.5928 -0.1539 0.0519 -0.0249 
EDDEBT -0.1154 0.3318 -0.3374 0.2857 -0.0613 0.1666 0.0492 0.4290 -0.1839 0.4405 0.3512 0.2924 0.1514 0.0562 0.0218 
EMA 0.0966 0.1836 -0.2373 0.4637 0.3249 -0.1199 -0.2119 -0.4092 0.1207 0.1918 0.1445 -0.5245 0.0409 -0.0555 0.0353 
EOV 0.1282 -0.3619 -0.2578 0.3311 -0.1377 0.0668 0.3126 0.2919 0.3823 -0.2704 -0.1217 -0.1652 0.4454 0.0935 0.0410 
EROA -0.1648 0.0835 0.5299 0.3882 -0.1477 -0.0148 0.0308 0.0349 0.1097 -0.0249 0.0550 0.0944 0.1175 -0.6768 0.1174 
EDROA -0.1317 -0.0058 0.0296 -0.0258 0.1346 0.9340 -0.1825 -0.1428 0.1766 -0.0523 -0.0470 -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0038 -0.0271 
EDIV -0.2021 0.0679 0.5192 0.3767 -0.1471 -0.0278 -0.0117 -0.0153 0.0636 -0.0326 0.1106 -0.0397 -0.0771 0.6850 -0.1617 
EDISTRES
S 
0.4301 0.1431 0.0655 -0.0800 -0.4248 0.0692 -0.1968 0.0535 0.2535 0.1131 0.0684 -0.0772 -0.1914 0.1142 0.6478 
EDEBT 0.2622 -0.4336 0.1731 -0.0240 0.2657 -0.0134 0.0384 -0.3443 -0.0302 0.1647 0.4151 0.4126 0.3275 0.0999 0.1845 
ESIZE 0.2793 0.2704 0.3306 -0.1542 0.2875 0.0211 0.1135 0.1528 0.0387 0.4213 -0.4988 -0.0869 0.3906 0.0853 -0.0355 
ECYCLE 0.1841 0.2291 -0.0082 0.0195 -0.2786 0.2080 0.7077 -0.3993 -0.3295 -0.0399 0.0580 -0.1341 -0.0096 -0.0138 -0.0132 
EAUDIT 0.2537 0.1465 0.1809 -0.0659 0.5259 0.0532 0.2711 0.4003 0.0947 -0.2957 0.3891 -0.1474 -0.3037 -0.0325 0.0332 
EBLOAT 0.2844 -0.4571 0.0181 0.2652 -0.0448 0.0934 0.1107 0.0994 0.0101 0.4489 -0.1688 0.0183 -0.5383 -0.1084 -0.2732 
ECAP 0.2760 -0.1559 0.0888 0.2342 0.0037 0.1289 -0.3284 0.1950 -0.7356 -0.2611 -0.1063 -0.1614 0.1280 0.0086 0.1057 
EBT 0.4517 0.1607 0.0440 -0.1370 -0.3098 0.0150 -0.2673 -0.0011 0.1484 -0.0833 0.2982 -0.0188 0.1965 -0.1078 -0.6429 
Notes: The table reports the Eigen vectors resulted from principal component analyses on 15 individual components of ESCORE. ‘Prin.’ Is abbreviation for ‘Principal 
component’. Definitions of variables are in Section 2.8. 
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2.5.4. The efficacy of individual signals in capturing the context of earnings 
management 
Although all of the fifteen selected signals have been shown in the extant 
literature to be strong determinants of earnings management, it is important to see if 
after being transformed into binary variables, as in this study, they are still able to 
capture earnings management. To examine this, a t-test is performed to compare the 
mean of the twelve selected measures of earnings management (see Section 2.5.1) 
between the group of suspicious firms (i.e. those with an individual score of one) and 
the rest of the sample (i.e. those with an individual score of zero). Table T2.7 reports 
the number of susceptible firms based on each individual signal, which is graphically 
illustrated by Figure F2.1. The signals which require a benchmark to construct (see 
Section 2.4.1), including EOV, EDEBT, ESIZE, EBLOAT, ECAP, EBT, flag up 
approximately one fifth of the sample by design. The number of firms which issue 
equity and debt is quite high (2,512 and 4,518 observations, respectively), while 
share-financed mergers and acquisitions seem to be rather rare events (only 594 
observations with EMA being one). It is also observed that there is not a lot of firms 
which just meet or beat earnings benchmarks (only 410, 591 and 659 observations 
with EROA, EDROA and EDIV, respectively, being one). 
Table T2.8 and T2.9 shows that all of the individual signals can effectively 
identify firms suspicious of earnings management, although the power of each signal 
varies. Looking at Panel A of Table T2.8, suspicious firms are shown to be associated 
with significantly higher ADAC (except for EDDEBT, EROA, EDROA and EDIV) and 
higher HDAC (except for EROA, EDROA, EDIV and EDISTRESS). In Panel B of 
Table T2.8, the only signals which do not exhibit the expected power to identify firms 
with higher level of earnings management are EROA, EDROA, EDIV and EBT. In 
Table T2.9, most signals tend to be able to detect real earnings management, with 
only a few exceptions (e.g. EDROA, EDIV). It is noted that EROA, EDROA and EDIV 
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could flag up only a small number of firms which just meet or slightly beat the earnings 
benchmarks (see Table T2.7). There is evidence that only a few firms with 
unmanaged earnings being close to the benchmarks would manage earnings to meet 
or just beat earnings benchmarks while firms which need to a lot of earnings 
management to meet the benchmarks would refrain or even take a bath to make the 
benchmarks more achievable in the future (DeGeorge et al., 1999). Hence, the extant 
literature suggests firms which slightly fall short of earnings benchmarks would 
engage in earnings management (see Section 2.4.3), but the magnitude of such 
earnings management would not necessarily be too large, nor would those firms be 
the most aggressive firms. In other words, firms only need to manage earnings with 
a moderate magnitude to meet or beat earnings benchmarks. Therefore, the evidence 
observed in Table T2.8 and T2.9 that firms with EROA, EDROA and EDIV of one do 
not have higher measures of earnings management is more likely to be attributable 
to the measures of earnings management employed in this chapter being unable to 
detect the type of earnings management engaged by those firms rather than because 
those firms do not manage earnings. The chapter, therefore, proceeds with EROA, 
EDROA and EDIV being all kept to reflect the current state of the literature supporting 
those signals. 
In general, the evidence seems to suggest that the individual signals employed 
in this study are quite efficient in identifying firms suspicious of earnings management, 
including the most aggressive earnings manipulators. The next section will then test 
if aggregating those signals together into a composite index can give a reliable model 




Table T2.7. Number of suspicious firms versus the rest of the sample as 
identified by each individual signal 
  Number of observations 
  
Suspicious (signal = 1) Rest of sample (signal = 0) 
ESEO 2,512 9,408 
EDDEBT 4,518 7,402 
EMA 594 11,326 
EOV 2,576 9,344 
EROA 410 11,510 
EDROA 591 11,329 
EDIV 659 11,261 
EDISTRESS 1,875 10,045 
EDEBT 2,904 9,016 
ESIZE 2,578 9,342 
ECYCLE 326 11,594 
EAUDIT 5,308 6,612 
EBLOAT 2,574 9,346 
ECAP 2,571 9,349 
EBT 2,562 9,358 
Notes: The table reports the number of suspicious firms versus the rest of the sample as identified by 
each individual signal. Definitions of variables are in Section 2.8. 
 
Figure F2.1. Number of suspicious firms versus the rest of the sample by each 
individual signal 
 















Suspicious (signal = 1) Rest of sample (signal = 0)
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Table T2.8. Measures of accruals earnings management of suspicious firms versus the rest of the sample 
  Absolute value     Indicator of aggressiveness   
 Rest of sample Suspicious Suspicious - Rest of sample t-stat  Rest of sample Suspicious Suspicious - Rest of sample t-stat 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Panel A: Discretionary accruals               
ESEO 0.0732 0.125 0.0518 19.544***  0.2005 0.2763 0.0758 7.71*** 
EDDEBT 0.0847 0.0832 -0.0015 -0.833  0.1986 0.2457 0.0471 5.955*** 
EMA 0.0821 0.1233 0.0413 7.838***  0.2141 0.2609 0.0468 2.54** 
EOV 0.0815 0.0935 0.012 5.462***  0.2064 0.2527 0.0463 4.854*** 
EROA 0.0848 0.0651 -0.0197 -6.097***  0.2171 0.1976 -0.0196 -0.945 
EDROA 0.0859 0.0506 -0.0352 -16.309***  0.2188 0.1709 -0.0479 -3*** 
EDIV 0.0857 0.0566 -0.0291 -13.206***  0.2176 0.1973 -0.0203 -1.23 
EDISTRESS 0.0733 0.1419 0.0686 21.779***  0.2248 0.1717 -0.0531 -5.494*** 
EDEBT 0.0804 0.0958 0.0154 7.225***  0.203 0.2583 0.0553 6.035*** 
ESIZE 0.0776 0.1076 0.03 12.551***  0.1978 0.2839 0.0861 8.795*** 
ECYCLE 0.0825 0.1412 0.0587 7.97***  0.2117 0.3865 0.1748 6.41*** 
EAUDIT 0.0739 0.0969 0.023 13.231***  0.1921 0.2468 0.0547 7.155*** 
EBLOAT 0.0808 0.0962 0.0154 6.867***  0.2019 0.2692 0.0673 6.955*** 
ECAP 0.0806 0.0969 0.0162 7.192***  0.2087 0.2447 0.036 3.8*** 
EBT 0.0718 0.1291 0.0573 21.696***   0.2128 0.2299 0.0171 1.867*  
Panel B: Discretionary working capital accruals    
ESEO 0.055 0.0938 0.0388 20.452***  0.2007 0.2747 0.074 7.505*** 
EDDEBT 0.0605 0.0675 0.007 5.332***  0.1863 0.2654 0.0791 9.88*** 
EMA 0.0611 0.1031 0.042 10.358***  0.2147 0.2466 0.032 1.841*  
EOV 0.0604 0.0731 0.0127 7.677***  0.2048 0.2578 0.053 5.521*** 
EROA 0.0635 0.0526 -0.0109 -4.065***  0.2159 0.2266 0.0107 0.515 
EDROA 0.0642 0.043 -0.0212 -10.596***  0.2189 0.1658 -0.0531 -3.343*** 
EDIV 0.0638 0.0521 -0.0117 -5.899***  0.2151 0.2363 0.0212 1.282 
EDISTRESS 0.06 0.0802 0.0202 10.425***  0.2114 0.2421 0.0307 2.866*** 
EDEBT 0.0607 0.0707 0.01 6.571***  0.2087 0.2399 0.0312 3.453*** 
ESIZE 0.0585 0.0802 0.0217 12.365***  0.2062 0.2531 0.047 4.899*** 
ECYCLE 0.0625 0.0885 0.026 5.203***  0.2142 0.2906 0.0764 2.973*** 
EAUDIT 0.0572 0.0706 0.0134 10.508***  0.2018 0.2342 0.0324 4.235*** 
EBLOAT 0.0593 0.077 0.0177 10.343***  0.2009 0.2718 0.0709 7.296*** 
ECAP 0.0612 0.0703 0.0091 5.728***  0.211 0.2355 0.0246 2.608*** 
EBT 0.0598 0.0757 0.0159 9.183***   0.2164 0.2156 -0.0008 -0.087 
Notes: Column 2 to 5 (6 to 9) of Panel A report the mean of ADAC (HDAC) of the suspicious firms identified by each individual score, together with the mean of the rest of 
the sample and the t-statistics under the null that the difference is zero. Panel B reports the same for ADWAC and HDWAC. Definitions of variables are in Section 2.8. * , * * , 
***  indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively.
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Table T2.9. Measures of real earnings management of the suspicious firms versus the rest of the sample 
  Absolute value     Indicator of aggressiveness   
 Rest of sample Suspicious Suspicious - Rest of sample t-stat 
  
Rest of sample Suspicious Suspicious - Rest of sample t-stat 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Panel A: Abnormal cash flows    
ESEO 0.1108 0.1959 0.0851 16.417***  0.1778 0.345 0.1672 15.482*** 
EDDEBT 0.1363 0.1174 -0.0188 -5.584***  0.1886 0.2554 0.0668 7.941*** 
EMA 0.1258 0.1912 0.0654 6.413***  0.2109 0.2682 0.0573 2.928*** 
EOV 0.119 0.1665 0.0475 10.136***  0.2112 0.2232 0.0121 1.243 
EROA 0.1306 0.0865 -0.0441 -8.372***  0.2135 0.2207 0.0071 0.324 
EDROA 0.1317 0.08 -0.0517 -9.693***  0.2168 0.1544 -0.0624 -3.8*** 
EDIV 0.1316 0.0852 -0.0464 -8.705***  0.2147 0.1968 -0.0179 -1.013 
EDISTRESS 0.1154 0.2036 0.0881 14.454***  0.1683 0.4606 0.2923 22.669*** 
EDEBT 0.119 0.1607 0.0417 9.609***  0.2124 0.218 0.0055 0.597 
ESIZE 0.1191 0.1661 0.047 9.812***  0.1949 0.2828 0.0879 8.464*** 
ECYCLE 0.1265 0.2204 0.0939 6.718***  0.2036 0.5671 0.3636 12.527*** 
EAUDIT 0.1154 0.146 0.0306 8.804***  0.1967 0.2348 0.0381 4.73*** 
EBLOAT 0.1189 0.1669 0.048 9.871***  0.1931 0.2894 0.0962 9.209*** 
ECAP 0.1263 0.1397 0.0135 3.138***  0.196 0.2791 0.0831 8.01*** 
EBT 0.1165 0.1757 0.0592 11.764***   0.1697 0.3765 0.2069 18.822*** 
Panel B: Abnormal production costs    
ESEO 0.1758 0.2065 0.0306 5.864***  0.2068 0.2498 0.0429 4.083*** 
EDDEBT 0.1806 0.1848 0.0042 1.071  0.2029 0.2366 0.0338 3.946*** 
EMA 0.1793 0.2365 0.0572 5.207***  0.215 0.2285 0.0134 0.71 
EOV 0.1717 0.2219 0.0501 9.508***  0.2215 0.1936 -0.0279 -2.845*** 
EROA 0.1829 0.1625 -0.0204 -2.374**  0.2143 0.255 0.0407 1.825*  
EDROA 0.1845 0.1374 -0.0471 -7.99***  0.2171 0.1889 -0.0283 -1.501 
EDIV 0.1838 0.1544 -0.0294 -4.423***  0.2154 0.2214 0.0061 0.339 
EDISTRESS 0.1769 0.2125 0.0355 5.969***  0.2 0.3062 0.1062 8.349*** 
EDEBT 0.1779 0.1961 0.0182 3.811***  0.2189 0.2052 -0.0137 -1.418 
ESIZE 0.1775 0.1997 0.0222 4.486***  0.2031 0.2631 0.06 5.673*** 
ECYCLE 0.1822 0.1796 -0.0026 -0.219  0.2135 0.2977 0.0842 2.944*** 
EAUDIT 0.1709 0.1966 0.0257 6.626***  0.2062 0.2279 0.0217 2.617*** 
EBLOAT 0.1742 0.2123 0.0381 7.549***  0.2048 0.2569 0.0521 4.935*** 
ECAP 0.1835 0.1771 -0.0064 -1.406  0.2054 0.2556 0.0502 4.724*** 
EBT 0.1811 0.1864 0.0052 1.055   0.2055 0.2566 0.0511 4.756*** 
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Table T2.9. (continued) 
  Absolute value     Indicator of aggressiveness   
 Rest of sample Suspicious Suspicious - Rest of sample t-stat 
  
Rest of sample Suspicious Suspicious - Rest of sample t-stat 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Panel C: Abnormal discretionary expenses      
ESEO 0.1866 0.282 0.0953 12.785***  0.2168 0.2184 0.0015 0.148 
EDDEBT 0.2168 0.1934 -0.0234 -4.553***  0.217 0.2175 0.0005 0.055 
EMA 0.2018 0.318 0.1162 7.372***  0.2181 0.2009 -0.0172 -0.879 
EOV 0.1937 0.2594 0.0657 9.265***  0.2238 0.1935 -0.0303 -2.946*** 
EROA 0.2102 0.1417 -0.0686 -8.854***  0.2168 0.2274 0.0106 0.437 
EDROA 0.2104 0.1556 -0.0548 -5.719***  0.2183 0.1926 -0.0257 -1.228 
EDIV 0.2114 0.1458 -0.0656 -8.335***  0.2185 0.1936 -0.0249 -1.272 
EDISTRESS 0.1905 0.2963 0.1058 12.011***  0.2159 0.2237 0.0078 0.66 
EDEBT 0.196 0.2444 0.0485 7.366***  0.2104 0.2376 0.0272 2.63*** 
ESIZE 0.196 0.2494 0.0534 7.666***  0.1963 0.2896 0.0933 8.315*** 
ECYCLE 0.2054 0.2902 0.0848 3.942***  0.2174 0.2097 -0.0077 -0.299 
EAUDIT 0.1889 0.2305 0.0417 7.965***  0.1909 0.2483 0.0575 6.521*** 
EBLOAT 0.1952 0.2537 0.0585 8.318***  0.2109 0.2397 0.0287 2.646*** 
ECAP 0.2077 0.2087 0.001 0.167  0.2029 0.2667 0.0638 5.787*** 
EBT 0.1991 0.2392 0.0402 5.657***   0.2194 0.2093 -0.0101 -0.962 
Panel D: Total real earnings management       
ESEO 0.4686 0.5035 0.0349 2.761***  0.2026 0.2753 0.0728 6.278*** 
EDDEBT 0.4717 0.4832 0.0115 1.185  0.1965 0.2535 0.057 6.042*** 
EMA 0.4731 0.5308 0.0577 2.07**  0.2178 0.2271 0.0093 0.458 
EOV 0.4426 0.6022 0.1596 11.996***  0.2275 0.1834 -0.0441 -4.185*** 
EROA 0.4786 0.4084 -0.0702 -3.426***  0.2166 0.2644 0.0478 1.955*  
EDROA 0.4791 0.4166 -0.0624 -3.306***  0.219 0.202 -0.017 -0.8 
EDIV 0.4795 0.4182 -0.0613 -3.735***  0.2172 0.2354 0.0182 0.921 
EDISTRESS 0.4698 0.5102 0.0404 2.999***  0.1942 0.3477 0.1535 11.023*** 
EDEBT 0.4606 0.526 0.0654 5.253***  0.2217 0.207 -0.0147 -1.392 
ESIZE 0.4649 0.5158 0.0509 4.034***  0.204 0.2688 0.0647 5.661*** 
ECYCLE 0.4753 0.5065 0.0312 0.949  0.214 0.366 0.152 4.777*** 
EAUDIT 0.4602 0.4957 0.0356 3.693***  0.2062 0.233 0.0268 2.955*** 
EBLOAT 0.4508 0.5706 0.1198 9.067***  0.2059 0.2643 0.0584 5.051*** 
ECAP 0.4789 0.466 -0.0129 -1.119  0.2019 0.2776 0.0757 6.525*** 
EBT 0.4748 0.4813 0.0066 0.56   0.2036 0.2748 0.0712 6.033*** 
Notes: Column 2 to 5 (6 to 9) of Panel A report the mean of ADCF (HDCF) of the suspicious firms identified by each individual score, together with the mean of the rest of 
the sample and the t-statistics under the null that the difference is zero. Panel B (C; D) reports the same for ADPROD and HDPROD (ADDISEXP and HDDISEXP; ATOTALRM 
and HTOTALRM, respectively). Definitions of variables are in Section 2.8. * , ** , ***  indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively.
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2.5.5. How well does ESCORE capture the context of earnings management? 
ESCORE is designed to capture the ‘context’ in which earnings management 
is more likely. This section provides evidence about the effectiveness of ESCORE by 
looking at how other traditional measures of earnings management (e.g. discretionary 
accruals and real earnings management proxies) vary as the context (captured by 
ESCORE) changes. Before presenting the tests in the next sub-sections, Table T2.10 
shows the distribution of the firm-year observations across ESCORE portfolios. 
Subsequent analyses focus on the portfolios of low and high ESCORE stocks. For 
this purpose, stocks with ESCORE of zero are arbitrarily grouped into the low 
ESCORE group, those with ESCORE of six and above into the high ESCORE group 
and the rest to the medium ESCORE group. Since there are fewer stocks having 
larger ESCORE as graphically illustrated by Figure F2.2, the high ESCORE group 
includes all stocks with ESCORE of 6 and above (865 observations). The purpose is 
to ensure that the high ESCORE portfolio has a comparable number of observations 
to the low ESCORE counterpart (which comprises 862 stocks with ESCORE of zero). 
Intuitively, the adopted grouping scheme is equivalent to considering that the context 
surrounding a stock which has accumulated six or more signals is highly susceptible 
to earnings management 17 . Using this grouping scheme, the next sub-sections 
present the tests conducted to examine the efficacy of ESCORE to capture earnings 
management. 
                                                             
17
 The choice of the cut-off at zero and six is quite arbitrary since it is hard to say, for example, 
a stock with ESCORE of five is qualitatively less ‘susceptible’ than another one with ESCORE 
of six. While the study cannot proceed without a arbitrarily-determined cut-off point, 
unreported results show that all of the main conclusions of the thesis do not change 
qualitatively if stocks with ESCORE of zero and one are grouped into the low ESCORE portfolio 
(3,080 observations) and those with ESCORE of four and above into the high ESCORE 
portfolio (3,534 observations).  
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2.5.5.1. Univariate analysis 
The first test examines how the twelve measures of earnings management (as 
presented in Section 2.5.1) would vary as the context of earnings management 
captured by ESCORE changes. Table T2.11 and T2.12 present the mean of ADAC, 
ADWAC, ADCF, ADPROD, ADDISEXP, ATOTALRM (the absolute values) and 
HDAC, HDWAC, HDCF, HDPROD, HDDISEXP, HTOTALRM across ESCORE 
groups, together with the t-test comparing the means of the high ESCORE group 
(ESCORE of six and above) with those of the low ESCORE group (ESCORE of zero). 
As graphically illustrated by Figure F2.3 to F2.14, as ESCORE increases, all of the 
12 measures of earnings management also increase quite monotonically and 
consistently. The differences of all measures between the high ESCORE and low 
ESCORE group are positive, economically large and statistically significant (see 
Table T2.11 and T2.12). The results, therefore, strongly suggest ESCORE is highly 
effective in capturing the context of earnings management as when the context is 
more susceptible (higher ESCORE), firms indeed manage earnings in larger 
magnitudes and are more likely to be an aggressor. 
 
Table T2.10. Distribution of observations across ESCORE groups 
ESCORE N ESCORE GROUP N 
0 862 Low (0) 862 
1 2,218 










Notes: The table reports the distribution of observations across groups sorted by ESCORE. Definitions 




Figure F2.2. Distribution of observations across ESCORE groups 
 
Notes: Definitions of variables are in Section 2.8. 
  
Table T2.11. Measures of accruals earnings management across ESCORE 
groups 
ESCORE ADAC HDAC  ADWAC HDWAC 
0 0.0525 0.1323  0.0389 0.1083 
1 0.0579 0.1486 
 
0.0463 0.17 
2 0.0693 0.2049 
 
0.0548 0.1991 
3 0.0855 0.2359 
 
0.0657 0.2294 
4 0.099 0.2598 
 
0.0736 0.2596 
5 0.1198 0.2808 
 
0.0868 0.2969 
6 0.1494 0.2814 
 
0.0968 0.2808 
7 0.1644 0.3025 
 
0.1103 0.308 
8 0.1639 0.3636 
 
0.1153 0.3256 
9 0.1887 0.4074  0.1136 0.2692 
Low (0) 0.0525 0.1323  0.0389 0.1083 
High (6-9) 0.1561 0.2992  0.1028 0.2923 
High - Low 0.1036 0.1669  0.0639 0.184 
t-stat 20.064***  8.662***  
 
17.896***  9.839***  
Notes: The table reports the mean of ADAC, HDAC, ADWAC, HDWAC in each group sorted by ESCORE. 
The t-statistic is calculated under the null that the difference between mean values of the low and 
high ESCORE group is zero. Definitions of variables are in Section 2.8. * , * * , ***  indicate significance 
at 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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Figure F2.3. Absolute value of discretionary accruals across ESCORE groups 
 
Notes: Definitions of variables are in Section 2.8. 
 
Figure F2.4. Absolute value of discretionary working capital accruals across 
ESCORE groups 
 
































Figure F2.5. Indicators of high discretionary accruals across ESCORE groups 
 
Notes: Definitions of variables are in Section 2.8. 
 
Figure F2.6. Indicators of high discretionary working capital accruals across 
ESCORE groups 
 
































Table T2.12. Measures of real earnings management across ESCORE groups 
ESCORE ADCF HDCF ADPROD HDPROD ADDISEXP HDDISEXP ATOTALRM HTOTALRM 
0 0.0946 0.0833 0.1423 0.1617 0.1533 0.1754 0.3673 0.1256 
1 0.096 0.1072 0.1606 0.1776 0.1676 0.1919 0.4419 0.1721 
2 0.1031 0.1647 0.1769 0.1963 0.1802 0.2102 0.4668 0.1949 
3 0.1211 0.2217 0.188 0.2322 0.2027 0.2121 0.49 0.2238 
4 0.1461 0.2789 0.198 0.237 0.2332 0.2289 0.484 0.233 
5 0.1868 0.3711 0.2088 0.2759 0.2711 0.285 0.5425 0.33 
6 0.2316 0.4351 0.2247 0.2895 0.3079 0.2433 0.5515 0.3373 
7 0.279 0.4836 0.2278 0.3125 0.3691 0.2438 0.6438 0.3473 
8 0.2925 0.575 0.2379 0.2958 0.328 0.3286 0.6461 0.3279 
9 0.3833 0.6522 0.2853 0.3684 0.4215 0.1429 0.8847 0.3889 
Low (0) 0.0946 0.0833 0.1423 0.1617 0.1533 0.1754 0.3673 0.1256 
High (6-9) 0.2553 0.4692 0.2288 0.2988 0.3308 0.2489 0.5981 0.3408 
High - Low 0.1607 0.3858 0.0865 0.1371 0.1775 0.0736 0.2308 0.2152 
t-stat 14.637*** 18.858*** 7.851*** 6.127*** 11.503*** 3.307*** 8.272*** 9.090*** 
Notes: The table reports the mean of ADCF, HDCF, ADPROD, HDPROD, ADDISEXP, HDDISEXP, 
ATOTALRM, HTOTALRM in each group sorted by ESCORE. The t-statistic is calculated under the null 
that the difference between mean values of the low and high ESCORE group is zero. Definitions of 
variables are in Section 2.8. * , * * , * **  indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Figure F2.7. Absolute value of abnormal cash flows across ESCORE groups 
 


















Figure F2.8. Absolute value of abnormal production costs across ESCORE 
groups 
 
Notes: Definitions of variables are in Section 2.8. 
 
Figure F2.9. Absolute value of abnormal discretionary expenses across 
ESCORE groups 
 































Figure F2.10. Absolute value of total real earnings management across 
ESCORE groups 
 
Notes: Definitions of variables are in Section 2.8. 
 
Figure F2.11. Indicator of high abnormal cash flows across ESCORE groups 
 
































Figure F2.12. Indicator of high abnormal production costs across ESCORE 
groups 
 
Notes: Definitions of variables are in Section 2.8. 
 
Figure F2.13. Indicator of high abnormal discretionary expenses across 
ESCORE groups 
 
































Figure F2.14. Indicator of high total real earnings management across ESCORE 
groups 
 
Notes: Definitions of variables are in Section 2.8. 
 
2.5.5.2. Multivariate regression 
The univariate analysis as presented above suffers from possible problems of 
omitted variables. Particularly, the selection of individual signals to include in the 
ESCORE model deliberately focuses only on those which could be easily constructed 
using financial statement information. Hence, some dimensions of the context of 
earnings management have been omitted, most notably corporate governance and 
compensation18.  
Corporate governance, especially the monitoring role of the board of directors, 
has been shown to be an important factor affecting earnings management behaviour. 
                                                             
18
 The chapter does not control for institutional and managerial holdings due to lack of access 
to a high quality source of data. While it is fully acknowledged as a limitation of the thesis 
(see the conclusion), there is no strong reason which suggests the main conclusions of the 
thesis would fundamentally change should institutional and managerial holdings be 



















Beasley (1996) finds that firms engaged in financial reporting fraudulent activities 
often have less outside directors on board compared to those without discovered 
frauds. Similar results are reported by Uzun et al. (2004). The results suggest that 
board independence is an important feature which enhance the monitoring role of the 
boards of directors. On the same line of argument, Dechow et al. (1996) provide 
evidence that violations of GAAP enforced by the SEC are significantly associated 
with less independent boards, for example those where the chief executive officer is 
also the chairman of the board or the company’s founder or those without an audit 
committee. Huang et al. (2012a) find that when the chief executive officer is also the 
board chairman, firms often release more conservative management earnings 
forecasts. Klein (2002) documents the negative relationship between discretionary 
accruals and the independence of the boards and audit committees. Bédard et al. 
(2004) find that more independent audit committees would significantly mitigate 
earnings management. Using UK data, Peasnell et al. (2005) find that boards with 
more outside directors would be more effective in constraining earnings 
management. Beekes et al. (2004) also report that the proportion of outside directors 
on board would significantly improve earnings quality. 
With regards to compensation, the existing evidence generally suggests that 
where managers’ compensation package is linked to performance, they would have 
stronger incentive to inflate earnings. In fact, firms increasingly pay their executive 
based on performance rather than fixed salary (Perry and Zenner, 2001). 
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) find that earnings management using discretionary 
accruals is more pronounced in firms where the chief executive officer’s total 
compensation is more tied to the value of stocks and options he or she is holding. 
Cheng and Warfield (2005) report that firms which provide managers with more equity 
incentives, such as stock-based rewards, are more likely to have earnings inflated. 
On the same vein, Beneish (1999b) find that GAAP violations are companioned with 
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large stock selling and exercises of stock options by executives. Dechow and Sloan 
(1991), Burns and Kedia (2006) and Efendi et al. (2007) are among the studies which 
find that the stock option component of managers’ compensation packages is 
significantly related to earnings management. Healy (1985), Holthausen et al. (1995) 
and Guidry et al. (1999), among others, provide evidence that executive bonuses 
which are set based on accounting earnings are associated with earnings 
management. Jenkins and Seiler (1990) find that executive compensation schemes 
also drive managers’ real earnings management through the manipulation of 
discretionary expenditures. Narayanan (1996) provides evidence that executive 
compensation packages would also lead to suboptimal real investment decisions. 
To respond to the rich literature as reviewed as above regarding the effects of 
corporate governance and executive compensation on earnings management, it is 
important to determine if ESCORE is still related to the measures of earnings 
management after controlling for the characteristics of corporate governance and 
executive compensation as well as the incremental magnitude of such relationship. 
This section controls for these omitted variables by considering the size of the board, 
audit committees (measured by the number of board directors and audit committee 
members, respectively), the independence of the boards (measured by the 
percentage of non-executive directors on board and a dummy which turns on if a 
firm’s chief executive officer is also the chairman), and the performance-linked 
components of executives’ compensation packages. In particular, the following 
ordinary least square (OLS hereafter) regressions are first estimated: 
ܣܧܯ௜,௧ = ߙ + ߚଵܤܱܵܫܼܧ௜,௧ + ߚଶܤܱܫܰܦ௜,௧ + ߚଷܣܷܵܫܼܧ௜,௧ + ߚସܦܷܣܮܫܶ ௜ܻ,௧ +ߚହܱܶܶܥܱܯܲܧ ௜ܰ,௧ + ߚ଺ܧܵܥܱܴܧ௜,௧ + ܻ݁ܽݎܨ݅ݔ݁݀ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ +ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕܨ݅ݔ݁݀ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ + ߝ (E2.16) 
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where: AEM is replaced in each regression by ADAC, ADWAC, ADCF, ADPROD, 
ADDISEXP, ATOTALRM; BOSIZE is the number of board directors; BOIND is the 
percentage of non-executive directors on board; AUCOMSIZE is the number of 
directors on the audit committee (set to zero if a firm does not have an audit 
committee); DUALITY is a dummy which is one if a firm’s chief executive officer is 
also the chairman of the board, zero otherwise; TOTCOMPEN is the average 
performance-linked compensation of all executive directors scaled by sales, where 
performance-linked compensation is defined as the total of bonus, shares, options 
and other long-term incentive pay awarded during the year, all times by 1,000 to avoid 
too small ratios because performance-linked executive compensation is typically 
quite small compared to total sales. 
In a similar fashion, the following logistic regressions are also estimated to 
examine the incremental relationship between ESCORE and the indicators of 
aggressive earnings management after controlling for the above-mentioned control 
variables: 
ܮ݋݃݅ݐ(ܪܧܯ௜,௧) = ߙ + ߚଵܤܱܵܫܼܧ௜,௧ + ߚଶܤܱܫܰܦ௜,௧ + ߚଷܣܷܥܱܯܵܫܼܧ௜,௧ +ߚସܦܷܣܮܫܶ ௜ܻ,௧ + ߚହܲܮܥܱܯ௜,௧ + ߚ଺ܧܵܥܱܴܧ௜,௧ +ܻ݁ܽݎܨ݅ݔ݁݀ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ + ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕܨ݅ݔ݁݀ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ + ߝ (E2.17) 
where: HEM is replaced in each regression by HDAC, HDWAC, HDCF, HDPROD, 
HDDISEXP, and HTOTALRM. 
The following procedure is followed to prepare the sample for the above 
multivariate regressions, which is a subsample of the main sample used in this 
chapter as described in Section 2.3. First, the sample is restricted to the period from 
2005 to 2011 only because going further backwards would make the manual 
collection of data on compensation and corporate governance very difficult as firm’s 
annual reports are no longer available online. Second, for all firm-years which remain 
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in the main sample, data on corporate governance and compensation (as described 
above) are manually collected from Bloomberg. Third, those firm years which do not 
have the additional data from Bloomberg, their annual reports are retrieved from Key 
Note platform and the relevant data is manually collected. Finally, those which still 
have missing data after the above steps are excluded from the subsample for 
multivariate regression. This procedure yields an unbalanced panel of 2,059 
observations, remarkably smaller than the main sample due to the availability of 
corporate governance and compensation data, but it is still large enough for statistical 
inferences. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to 
mitigate the influence of outliers. 
Table T2.13 presents the results of the multivariate regression test. The control 
variables generally have the predicted signs, i.e. measures of earnings management 
are negatively (positively) related to BOSIZE, BOIND and AUSIZE (DUALITY and 
PLCOM, respectively). The main focus is on ESCORE, which is shown to be 
significantly positively related to all measures of earnings management. The results 
of estimating equation (E2.16) (Panel A of Table T2.13) show that after controlling for 
compensation and corporate governance, one unit increase in ESCORE results in an 
increase of 1.24% (2.54%) in ADAC (ATOTALRM), which is statistically significant at 
1% level. Looking at the results of estimating equation (E2.17) (Panel B of Table 
T2.13), ESCORE is also significantly positively related with both HDAC and 
HTOTALRM after the control variables are added (coefficient of 0.1839 and 0.1381, 
respectively, both are statistically significant at 1% level). The evidence reinforces the 
chapter’s earlier conclusion that ESCORE is consistent with other traditional 
measures of earnings management. 
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Table T2.13. Measures of accruals and real earnings management regressed on ESCORE and control variables (n = 2,059 observations) 
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Coef. Chi-square  Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square 













































































Notes: Panel A (B) reports the results of OLS (logistic) regressions of ADAC, ADWAC, ADCF, ADPROD, ADDISEXP, ATOTALRM (HDAC, HDWAC, HDCF, HDPROD, HDDISEXP, 
HTOTALRM) on ESCORE and control variables. Year and industry fixed effects are included in all regressions. ‘Coef.’ is abbreviation for ‘Coefficient’. Definitions of variables 
are in Section 2.8. * , * * , *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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2.5.5.3. Ex-post measure of earnings management 
ESCORE has so far been shown to be consistent with other traditional 
measures of earnings management, including discretionary accruals and real 
earnings management proxies. Although these measures are the most popular ones 
in the earnings management literature, they are increasingly subject to criticism (see 
Section 2.2.4). Given these criticisms, a valid concern would be that the presented 
evidence on the relationship between ESCORE and discretionary accruals and real 
earnings management proxies might be attributable to the mis-specification and 
measurement errors of the established models rather than a reflection of the 
association of ESCORE with actual earnings management. This section addresses 
the concern by looking at how ESCORE is associated with an external ex-post 
measure of earnings management.  
In the UK, the FRRP is responsible for ensuring financial statements of public 
companies, which contain the main data inputs to the ESCORE model, comply with 
applicable laws and financial reporting standards. The FRRP selects firms for review 
based on some published criteria, including firms from specific sectors in the economy 
which are under particular stress, firms involved with special accounting issues which 
give rise to judgement, subjectivity and risk of misstatements as well as from 
complaints from the public, press or the accounting and financial community. As such, 
similar to the AAER and GAO samples of restatements in the US, the FRRP sample 
too is not free from selection bias. However, because each institution has a different 
sampling scheme, the evidence could reinforce each other and the limitations of each 
source could be mitigated.  
If a firm is selected by the FRRP for review, several steps are taken, including 
an initial review, formal and informal discussions before a Review Group being set up 
if necessary, then a thorough investigation followed by a recommendation to the 
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FRRP chairman. A review may investigate into one or more annual reports of the 
selected firm. At the end of the process, the FRRP might decide it is suitable for a 
press notice. It is most likely that a press notice is issued in case the directors have 
agreed that the financial statements are defective and proposed corrective actions 
have been taken and that the FRRP is satisfied with those actions.  
From the above description, firm-years which are investigated by the FRRP 
followed by a press notice are defined as instances of earnings management. As 
shown in Table T2.14, there are 70 annual reports with fiscal year ending between 
1/1/1995 and 31/12/2012 which are subjected to FRRP press notices19. 37 firm-years 
which are in the financial and utility industries and do not have enough data to 
calculate ESCORE are removed. The 33 remaining cases spread across 22 
Datastream level-six industries. 
If ESCORE could capture the context of earnings management, the 33 firms 
being investigated by the FRRP and subsequently having a press notice (FRRP firms 
henceforth) are expected to have ESCORE being significantly larger in the year 
subjected to the investigation compared to other years. To test this conjecture, 
ESCORE of 33 FRRP firms for the period from 1995 to 2012 is extracted to create a 
subsample of 576 firm-year observations. As shown in Table T2.15, the size of FRRP 
firms is generally larger compared to average firms in the main sample (see Table 
T2.3), e.g. mean MVE of FRRP firms is £2,708 million compared to £390 million in 
the main sample (the difference is statistically significant at 1% level). It suggests the 
FRRP’s sampling method is quite biased towards larger firms, which typically play an 
important role in the economy and if a misstatement exists, it would have more 
pronounced effects on investors. The mean (standard deviation) of ESCORE in this 
subsample is 2.1667 (1.4685).  
                                                             
19




Table T2.14. The FRRP sample selection 
FRRP press notices related to annual reports with fiscal year ended between 
1/1/1995 and 31/12/2012 70 
Less: Financial and utility firms and those with insufficient data to calculate 
ESCORE 37 
Selected firms being investigated by FRRP 33 
Notes: Definition of ESCORE is in Section 2.8.  
 
 











TA (£ million) 2,230 39 118 508 8,895 
SALE (£ million) 1,404 36 133 702 4,298 
IB (£ million) 152 0 4 29 706 
BVE (£ million) 899 17 56 162 3,748 
MVE (£ million) 2,708 20 105 419 9,846 
ESCORE 2.1667 1 2 3 1.4685 
 Notes: The table reports descriptive statistics of the FRRP sample, including 33 FRRP firms across 1995 
to 2012 where data is sufficient to calculate ESCORE. Definitions of variables are in Section 2.8. 
 
The year for which the annual reports are investigated by the FRRP is defined 
as the investigation year. Panel A of Table T2.16 shows that the mean ESCORE of 
FRRP firms in investigation years (3.2424) is significantly larger than that of the rest 
of the sample (2.1013) at 1% level. The magnitude of the difference (1.1411) is also 
large, considering that the standard deviation of ESCORE in the subsample is only 
1.4685 (see Table T2.15) and that of the main sample (see Table T2.3) is only 1.7346.  
The 33 selected investigations might eventually result in different effects on 
financial statements. For each case, the FRRP press notice is read through to 
determine the nature of the cases and the effects on the firm’s financial statements. 
Of the 33 FRRP cases, only 12 cases (36%) where the FRRP requires restatements 
involving items on the income statement. As shown in Panel B of Table T2.16, the 
mean ESCORE of those 12 cases is 3.20, which is 1.0536 unit higher than that of the 




Table T2.16. Mean ESCORE in FRRP firm-years versus the rest of the sample 
Panel A: FRRP firm-years  
 FRRP firm-years  Rest of sample  Difference t-statistic 
Number of observations 33 543   
ESCORE 3.2424 2.1013 1.1411 4.4*** 





restatements Rest of sample Difference t-statistic 
Number of observations 12 564   
ESCORE 3.2 2.1464 1.0536 2.26**  
 Notes: Panel A (B) compares the mean ESCORE of FRRP firm-years (FFRP firm-years with income 
statement restatements) with that of the rest of the sample using the t-test under the null that the 
difference is zero.  Definitions of variables are in Section 2.8. * , * * , * ** indicate significance at 10%, 
5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Ideally ESCORE should then be added together with some control variables, 
such as corporate governance and compensation variables, to the right hand side of 
a logistic regression where the indicator of FRRP investigations is on the left hand 
side. However, further constraining the sample for the availability of these additional 
data would result in a sample which is too small for any reliable statistical inferences. 
Instead, a logistic regression of the indicator of FRRP investigations (which is equal 
to one for firm-years which are investigated by the FRRP, zero otherwise) on a 
constant and ESCORE (year and industry fixed effects included) is estimated. The 
coefficient on ESCORE, as shown in Table T2.17, is 0.532 (significant at 1% level). 
In terms of economic significance, one unit increase of ESCORE raises the probability 
of being investigated by FRRP by 2.02%, which is economically large compared to 
the unconditional probability of 5.73% (33/576).  
Overall, the evidence suggests that firms investigated by FRRP, especially 
those which are required to restate the income statements, generally have higher 




Table T2.17. Logistic regression of the indicator of FRRP investigations on 
ESCORE 
 Specification 1 Specification 2 
Coefficient on ESCORE 0.4521 0.532 
z-statistic 4.1*** 3.85***  
Marginal effect 0.0232 0.0202 
Pseudo R2 6.57% 13.37% 
Year fixed effects Not included Included 
Industry fixed effects Not included Included 
 Notes: The table reports the results of the logistic regression of the indicator of FRRP investigations 
(equals to one if a firm-year is investigated by FRRP, zero otherwise) on a constant and ESCORE. In 
Specification 1, year and industry fixed effects are excluded. In Specification 2, year and industry fixed 
effects are included. Definitions of variables are in Section 2.8. * , ** , * ** indicate significance at 10%, 
5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
 
2.6. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
2.6.1. Is the efficiency of ESCORE time-specific? 
The sample in this study spans across some remarkable ups and downs of the 
UK market and important changes in the accounting regulation framework. In 
particular, the 1995-2011 sample period covers the IT bubble burst in 2000, the global 
financial crisis in 2008-2009 and the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis thereafter. The 
sample also spans across two accounting regimes in the UK with the adoption of the 
IFRS in the UK in 2005. To mitigate concerns if those events may potentially affect 
the efficacy of ESCORE, Table T2.18 and T2.19 show that in each year over the 
sample period, high ESCORE stocks consistently have higher ADAC and DAC than 
the low ESCORE counterpart. Although there are a few exceptions where the mean 
differences are positive but insignificant, it should be noted that the statistical 
inference should be interpreted with care because the number of observations in each 
year is quite small. Generally, it can be concluded that the efficacy of ESCORE is 
robust over time. 
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Table T2.18. Measures of accruals earnings management of the low ESCORE group versus the high ESCORE group in each year 
Panel A: Discretionary accruals 
  ADAC   HDAC 
Year Low ESCORE High ESCORE High - Low t-statistic  Low ESCORE High ESCORE 
High - 
Low t-statistic 
1995 0.0373 0.1359 0.0985 1.866*  
 
0.1915 0.3333 0.1418 0.941 
1996 0.0556 0.05 -0.0056 -0.364 
 
0.1837 0.0833 -0.1003 -0.832 
1997 0.052 0.1582 0.1062 2.545**  
 
0.082 0.4286 0.3466 2.445**  
1998 0.0472 0.1306 0.0834 2.834**  
 
0.1389 0.3125 0.1736 1.468 
1999 0.0447 0.1621 0.1174 4.243***  
 
0.087 0.4444 0.3575 3.369***  
2000 0.053 0.2186 0.1657 6.257***  
 
0.0889 0.3256 0.2367 2.815***  
2001 0.0558 0.1803 0.1246 6.042***  
 
0.1628 0.254 0.0912 1.114 
2002 0.0566 0.1511 0.0945 4.844***  
 
0.1918 0.2632 0.0714 0.966 
2003 0.0445 0.1665 0.1221 6.14***  
 
0.1566 0.3 0.1434 1.979**  
2004 0.0503 0.174 0.1237 5.416***  
 
0.0779 0.2833 0.2054 3.101***  
2005 0.0709 0.1617 0.0908 5.421***  
 
0.1091 0.2976 0.1885 2.869***  
2006 0.0653 0.1615 0.0963 5.311***  
 
0.0889 0.3043 0.2155 3.338***  
2007 0.0529 0.1671 0.1142 7.488***  
 
0.1111 0.3043 0.1932 2.693***  
2008 0.0599 0.1868 0.1269 6.409***  
 
0.0741 0.2778 0.2037 2.912***  
2009 0.0547 0.1333 0.0786 4.305***  
 
0.2143 0.3548 0.1406 1.69*  
2010 0.0471 0.1617 0.1146 6.085***  
 
0.1 0.2982 0.1982 2.839***  




Table T2.18 (continued) 
Panel B: Discretionary working capital accruals 
  ADWAC   HDWAC 
Year Low ESCORE High ESCORE High - Low t-statistic  Low ESCORE High ESCORE 
High - 
Low t-statistic 
1995 0.0385 0.0846 0.0461 1.213 
 
0.1277 0.25 0.1223 0.897 
1996 0.0356 0.0425 0.0069 0.635 
 
0.1429 0.1667 0.0238 0.205 
1997 0.0389 0.1092 0.0703 2.515**  
 
0.1148 0.2143 0.0995 0.981 
1998 0.0448 0.1223 0.0775 3.889***  
 
0.1111 0.4 0.2889 2.045*  
1999 0.0443 0.1337 0.0894 4.487***  
 
0.1087 0.5 0.3913 3.55***  
2000 0.0414 0.1403 0.099 5.623***  
 
0.1364 0.2619 0.1255 1.462 
2001 0.0384 0.0981 0.0597 4.687***  
 
0.1163 0.2258 0.1095 1.434 
2002 0.0401 0.0982 0.0581 4.056***  
 
0.1781 0.3684 0.1903 2.49**  
2003 0.0338 0.0859 0.052 3.716***  
 
0.0602 0.2653 0.2051 2.975***  
2004 0.0399 0.101 0.0611 4.084***  
 
0.039 0.1833 0.1444 2.623**  
2005 0.0371 0.1025 0.0654 5.698***  
 
0.0727 0.3214 0.2487 3.994***  
2006 0.0431 0.1028 0.0597 5.049***  
 
0.1111 0.2778 0.1667 2.485**  
2007 0.0406 0.1205 0.0799 6.31***  
 
0.0833 0.3187 0.2353 3.472***  
2008 0.0502 0.1021 0.0519 3.902***  
 
0.1111 0.2247 0.1136 1.295 
2009 0.0315 0.0807 0.0492 4.707***  
 
0.0536 0.371 0.3174 4.607***  
2010 0.0319 0.1303 0.0984 6.509***  
 
0.1 0.4211 0.3211 4.332***  
2011 0.0266 0.0887 0.0621 4.814***    0.1071 0.3269 0.2198 2.825***  
Notes: Panel A (B) reports the mean of ADAC, HDAC (ADWAC, HDWAC) in each year for the low and high ESCORE groups, together with the t-statistic under the null that the 
difference is zero. Definitions of variables are in Section 2.8. * , * * , ***  indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table T2.19. Measures of real earnings management of the low ESCORE group versus the high ESCORE group in each year 
Panel A: Abnormal cash flows 
  ADCF   HDCF 
YEAR Low ESCORE High ESCORE High - Low t-statistic  Low ESCORE High ESCORE High - Low t-statistic 
1995 0.0508 0.17 0.1192 1.223 
 
0.1707 0.25 0.0793 0.52 
1996 0.0461 0.0854 0.0392 2.052*  
 
0.075 0.2 0.125 0.894 
1997 0.0686 0.2718 0.2032 2.022*  
 
0.12 0.4167 0.2967 1.905*  
1998 0.0476 0.1217 0.074 2.469**  
 
0.0968 0.4667 0.3699 2.571**  
1999 0.0699 0.3547 0.2848 4.257***  
 
0.1463 0.5652 0.4189 3.857***  
2000 0.0786 0.2832 0.2046 3.82***  
 
0.075 0.3333 0.2583 2.865***  
2001 0.0805 0.2245 0.144 4.353***  
 
0.1905 0.4138 0.2233 2.407**  
2002 0.0941 0.2571 0.1631 3.801***  
 
0.1286 0.5192 0.3907 4.839***  
2003 0.087 0.2209 0.1339 3.235***  
 
0.0597 0.4444 0.3847 4.786***  
2004 0.104 0.2726 0.1686 3.813***  
 
0.0882 0.4737 0.3854 5.127***  
2005 0.0937 0.2882 0.1945 5.477***  
 
0.08 0.5195 0.4395 6.352***  
2006 0.1371 0.2865 0.1494 3.792***  
 
0.0769 0.5 0.4231 6.1*** 
2007 0.0795 0.2317 0.1522 5.715***  
 
0.0571 0.4706 0.4134 6.129***  
2008 0.0886 0.2292 0.1407 3.532***  
 
0.0769 0.5244 0.4475 5.816***  
2009 0.0947 0.1762 0.0815 3.013***  
 
0.0638 0.4561 0.3923 5.183***  
2010 0.1867 0.3753 0.1886 3.004***  
 
0.0746 0.5 0.4254 5.515***  





Table T2.19 (continued) 
Panel B: Abnormal production costs  
  ADPROD   HDPROD 
YEAR Low ESCORE High ESCORE High - Low t-statistic  Low ESCORE High ESCORE High - Low t-statistic 
1995 0.1262 0.2747 0.1485 1.108 
 
0.15 0.2857 0.1357 0.87 
1996 0.1611 0.2406 0.0795 1.106 
 
0.2308 0.2 -0.0308 -0.204 
1997 0.1352 0.2915 0.1563 3.047***  
 
0.1224 0.2222 0.0998 0.788 
1998 0.1692 0.241 0.0718 1.083 
 
0.2581 0.2667 0.0086 0.061 
1999 0.0998 0.3451 0.2453 3.674***  
 
0.175 0.4 0.225 1.924*  
2000 0.1254 0.2559 0.1305 2.532**  
 
0.075 0.2333 0.1583 1.776*  
2001 0.1451 0.1621 0.017 0.53 
 
0.2439 0.2609 0.017 0.18 
2002 0.1257 0.1961 0.0705 1.996*  
 
0.1714 0.381 0.2095 2.527**  
2003 0.1269 0.2071 0.0802 2.38**  
 
0.1194 0.3333 0.2139 2.48**  
2004 0.1585 0.2808 0.1222 2.485**  
 
0.2388 0.3 0.0612 0.737 
2005 0.2537 0.2433 -0.0104 -0.197 
 
0.2 0.2698 0.0698 0.86 
2006 0.1848 0.2128 0.028 0.76 
 
0.1316 0.3188 0.1873 2.363**  
2007 0.1598 0.2108 0.0511 1.368 
 
0.2857 0.2985 0.0128 0.133 
2008 0.1088 0.228 0.1191 2.93***  
 
0.08 0.3857 0.3057 3.792***  
2009 0.1281 0.1583 0.0302 0.905 
 
0.1304 0.2245 0.0941 1.192 
2010 0.1605 0.2282 0.0677 1.507 
 
0.209 0.2553 0.0464 0.576 







Table T2.19 (continued) 
Panel C: Abnormal discretionary expenses   
  ADDISEXP   HDDISEXP 
YEAR Low ESCORE High ESCORE High - Low t-statistic  Low ESCORE High ESCORE High - Low t-statistic 
1995 0.115 0.117 0.002 0.05 
 
0.1176 0.3333 0.2157 1.362 
1996 0.0839 0.121 0.0371 0.755 
 
0.2414 0.25 0.0086 0.049 
1997 0.0933 0.3306 0.2373 1.768 
 
0.1538 0.3 0.1462 1.055 
1998 0.1272 0.1788 0.0516 0.942 
 
0.12 0.1333 0.0133 0.12 
1999 0.0973 0.5129 0.4156 3.805***  
 
0.2069 0.25 0.0431 0.349 
2000 0.1721 0.4433 0.2712 3.267***  
 
0.1429 0.2941 0.1513 1.527 
2001 0.1034 0.2735 0.1701 3.953***  
 
0.1935 0.1887 -0.0049 -0.054 
2002 0.1607 0.2959 0.1352 2.279**  
 
0.1964 0.3333 0.1369 1.568 
2003 0.1694 0.3141 0.1447 2.32**  
 
0.1607 0.325 0.1643 1.904*  
2004 0.1482 0.3814 0.2332 4.472***  
 
0.1864 0.3889 0.2024 2.427**  
2005 0.1962 0.3556 0.1594 2.962***  
 
0.25 0.2778 0.0278 0.315 
2006 0.1789 0.3462 0.1672 3.519***  
 
0.125 0.1923 0.0673 0.843 
2007 0.1329 0.2873 0.1544 3.846***  
 
0.2143 0.1974 -0.0169 -0.189 
2008 0.1408 0.2989 0.1581 3.249***  
 
0.1 0.1739 0.0739 0.793 
2009 0.1116 0.2442 0.1326 2.84***  
 
0.125 0.25 0.125 1.5 
2010 0.253 0.3788 0.1258 1.733*  
 
0.1964 0.24 0.0436 0.539 






Table T2.19 (continued) 
Panel D: Total real earnings management    
  ATOTALRM   HTOTALRM 
YEAR Low ESCORE High ESCORE High - Low t-statistic  Low ESCORE High ESCORE High - Low t-statistic 
1995 0.3002 0.62 0.3199 0.827 
 
0.1515 0.2 0.0485 0.27 
1996 0.3768 0.6822 0.3054 2.495**  
 
0.1786 0.125 -0.0536 -0.349 
1997 0.3967 0.8771 0.4803 3.159***  
 
0.1316 0.375 0.2434 1.665 
1998 0.4295 0.7289 0.2994 1.575 
 
0.16 0.2 0.04 0.315 
1999 0.2598 0.9532 0.6934 3.755***  
 
0.0714 0.3529 0.2815 2.176**  
2000 0.3135 0.7646 0.4511 1.911*  
 
0 0.25 0.25 3***  
2001 0.3124 0.4344 0.122 1.541 
 
0.1 0.2558 0.1558 1.783*  
2002 0.3946 0.6473 0.2527 2.557**  
 
0.1429 0.4571 0.3143 3.22***  
2003 0.3813 0.5202 0.1389 1.807*  
 
0.1071 0.4286 0.3214 3.399***  
2004 0.4219 0.7262 0.3043 2.72***  
 
0.1552 0.383 0.2278 2.642***  
2005 0.4187 0.6391 0.2204 2.303**  
 
0.15 0.35 0.2 2.24**  
2006 0.413 0.5194 0.1064 1.049 
 
0.1613 0.2951 0.1338 1.401 
2007 0.4374 0.5293 0.092 1.003 
 
0.3214 0.35 0.0286 0.26 
2008 0.3758 0.4512 0.0754 0.742 
 
0.1 0.3793 0.2793 2.966***  
2009 0.3871 0.447 0.0599 0.767 
 
0.15 0.2609 0.1109 1.258 
2010 0.4372 0.4961 0.0588 0.589 
 
0.125 0.3556 0.2306 2.718***  
2011 0.3359 0.6087 0.2728 3.235***    0.05 0.4211 0.3711 4.2*** 
Notes: Panel A (B; C; D) reports the mean of ADCF, HDCF (ADPROD, HDPROD; ADDISEXP, HDDISEXP; ATOTALRM, HTOTALRM, respectively) in each year for the low and high 
ESCORE groups, together with the t-statistic under the null that the difference is zero. Definitions of variables are in Section 2.8. * , * * , *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 
1% levels, respectively. 
 89 
 
2.6.2. Alternative models to estimate discretionary accruals 
In the main test, the cross-sectional version of the modified-Jones model is used 
to estimate DAC. Despite there are competing models to estimate discretionary 
accruals (Dechow et al., 1995; Guay et al., 1996; Bernard and Skinner, 1996; Young, 
1999; Thomas and Zhang, 2000; Peasnell et al., 2000; Fields et al., 2001), the 
existing literature generally suggests that there is no other model that outperforms 
the modified-Jones model, especially in the UK context (Peasnell et al., 2000; Botsari 
and Meeks, 2008). Nevertheless, to mitigate the concerns over whether the results 
can be affected by the models employed to estimate discretionary accruals, in this 
section the main test is replicated with various variants of the modified-Jones model.  
In the first robustness check, DAC is estimated using the cross-sectional 
version of the original-Jones model as follows: 
ܦܣܥ௜,௧ = ஺஼೔,೟்஺೔,೟షభ െ ൤ߙො + ߚመଵ ൬ ଵ்஺೔,೟షభ൰ + ߚመଶ ൬	?ோா௏೔,೟்஺೔,೟షభ൰ + ߚመଷ ൬ ௉௉ா೔,೟்஺೔,೟షభ൰൨ (E2.18) 
where: Įෝ, ȕ෡ଵ, ȕ෡ଶ, ȕ෡ଷ are the estimated coefficients from Equation (E2.4) as presented 
in Section 2.5.1.1 in the main test [i.e. the regression is exactly the same as with the 
modified-Jones model, the only difference is that in (E2.18) the change in receivables 
is not taken away from the change in revenues]. Table T2.20 shows that the efficacy 
of ESCORE in revealing the context of earnings management is qualitatively the 
same when the original Jones model is employed. 
Hribar and Collins (2002) argue that accruals estimated using the cash flows 
approach can overcome the potential error induced by ‘non-articulation’ transactions 
in the balance sheet approach. However, other authors, such as Gore et al. (2007), 
have argued that the cash flows approach is also problematic because ‘non-




Table T2.20. Measures of discretionary accruals across ESCORE groups using 
the original Jones model 
ESCORE ADAC HDAC 
0 0.0531 0.1334 
1 0.0578 0.1537 
2 0.0687 0.2045 
3 0.0849 0.2338 
4 0.0991 0.2621 
5 0.1185 0.2857 
6 0.1477 0.2678 
7 0.1629 0.2845 
8 0.1559 0.3295 
9 0.1907 0.4231 
Low (0) 0.0531 0.1334 
High (6-9) 0.1539 0.2832 
High - Low 0.1008 0.1498 
t-statistic 19.386***  7.797***  
Notes: The table reports the mean of ADAC and HDAC, estimated using the original Jones model, in 
each group sorted by ESCORE. The t-statistic is calculated under the null that the difference between 
mean values of the low and high ESCORE group is zero. Definitions of variables are in Section 2.8. * , 
* * , * ** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
 
resulted from the cash flows approach may include items which cannot be classified 
as either discretionary or non-discretionary. Therefore, both the Jones and modified-
Jones models are replicated using the balance sheet approach to account for the 
ongoing contention surrounding this issue.  
Following Dechow et al. (1995), AC (total accruals) is estimated under the 
balance sheet approach as follows: 
ܣܥ = ( 	?ܥܣ െ 	?ܥܪܧ) െ ( 	?ܥܮ െ 	?ܵܶܦ) െܦܲ  (E2.19) 
where: DP is depreciation and amortization expenses.  
Table T2.21 reports summary statistics of estimating discretionary accruals 
using the balance sheet approach. No significant change to the parameters compared 
to the ones reported in Table T2.1 (Section 2.5.1.1) in the main test is noted. Table 
T2.22 and T2.23 confirm the robustness of the ESCORE model when the balance 
sheet approach is used. 
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Table T2.21. Average parameters across industry-years in models to estimate 
discretionary accruals using modified Jones model where total accruals is 
calculated using balance sheet approach 
  ACt/  TAtm1 (E2.4) 
  Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept -0.0246 -7.969***  
1/TAtm1 0.0155 0.544 
UREVt /TAtm1 0.0349 4.826***  
PPEt/TAtm1 -0.0333 -3.621***  
R2 0.3317  
Notes: Within each industry-year with at least 15 observations of available data, the following model 
is estimated: ஺஼೔,೟்஺೔,೟షభ = ߙ + ߚଵ ൬ ଵ்஺೔,೟షభ൰ + ߚଶ ൬	?ோா௏೔,೟்஺೔,೟షభ൰ + ߚଷ ൬ ௉௉ா೔,೟்஺೔,೟షభ൰ + ߝ௜,௧  (E2.4) 
in which total accruals is estimated using balance sheet approach:  ܣܥ = ( 	?ܥܣ െ 	?ܥܪܧ) െ ( 	?ܥܮ െ 	?ܵܶܦ) െ ܦܲ  (E2.19) 
The table reports the average across industry-years of the parameters estimated from the above 
model, together with the t-statistics estimated from using the standard errors of the mean across 
industry-years. Definitions of variables are in Section 2.8. * , * * , * ** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 
1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Table T2.22. Measures of discretionary accruals across ESCORE groups using 
modified Jones model where total accruals is calculated using balance sheet 
approach 
ESCORE ADAC HDAC 
0 0.0480 0.1000 
1 0.0555 0.1594 
2 0.0637 0.2084 
3 0.0766 0.2295 
4 0.0866 0.2653 
5 0.1033 0.3030 
6 0.1137 0.2680 
7 0.1258 0.3219 
8 0.1309 0.2727 
9 0.1391 0.3600 
Low (0) 0.0480 0.1000 
High (6-9) 0.1194 0.2857 
High - Low 0.0714 0.1857 
t-statistic 17.093***  10.023***  
Notes: The table reports the mean of ADAC, HDAC, estimated using the modified Jones model where 
total accruals is estimated using balance sheet approach, in each group sorted by ESCORE. The t-
statistic is calculated under the null that the difference between mean values of the low and high 
ESCORE group is zero. Definitions of variables are in Section 2.8. * , * * , * ** indicate significance at 






Table T2.23. Measures of discretionary accruals across ESCORE groups using 
original Jones model where total accruals is calculated using balance sheet 
approach 
ESCORE ADAC HDAC 
0 0.0478 0.1047 
1 0.0550 0.1630 
2 0.0630 0.2090 
3 0.0755 0.2278 
4 0.0858 0.2677 
5 0.1015 0.2989 
6 0.1127 0.2583 
7 0.1251 0.3047 
8 0.1263 0.2614 
9 0.1280 0.3600 
Low (0) 0.0478 0.1047 
High (6-9) 0.1179 0.2741 
High - Low 0.0701 0.1694 
t-statistic 17.013***  9.163***  
Notes: The table reports the mean of ADAC, HDAC, estimated using the original Jones model where 
total accruals is estimated using balance sheet approach, in each group sorted by ESCORE. The t-
statistic is calculated under the null that the difference between mean values of the low and high 
ESCORE group is zero. Definitions of variables are in Section 2.8. * , * * , * ** indicate significance at 
10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
 
The last robustness check related to the discretionary accruals model involves 
the removal of the intercept. The modified-Jones model as specified in the main test 
is actually slightly different from the original model because an intercept has been 
added to avoid forcing the regression line through the origin (Gore et al., 2007). In 
this section, both the original and modified Jones models, each uses both the cash 
flow and balance sheet approach to calculate total accruals, are re-estimated without 
an intercept. In particular, Equation (E2.4) is modified as below: 
஺஼೔,೟்஺೔,೟షభ = ߚଵ ൬ ଵ்஺೔,೟షభ൰ + ߚଶ ൬	?ோா௏೔,೟்஺೔,೟షభ൰ + ߚଷ ൬ ௉௉ா೔,೟்஺೔,೟షభ൰ + ߝ௜,௧  (E2.20) 
All the rest of the estimation of DAC using the modified-Jones and original 
Jones models where total accruals is estimated using the cash flow and balance 
sheet approaches are unchanged.  
 93 
 
Table T2.24 reports the summary statistics of estimating the model without the 
intercept where total accruals is calculated using the cash flow approach. Table T2.25 
and T2.26 show that the main results are qualitatively unchanged for both cases when 
the original and modified Jones models are used. Similar results using the model 
without the intercept where total accruals is calculated using the balance sheet 
approach are reported in Table T2.27, T2.28 and T2.29. Again, the main conclusions 
are qualitatively similar to the main test. 
 
Table T2.24. Average parameters across industry-years in models to estimate 
discretionary accruals using modified Jones model without an intercept 
  ACt/  TAtm1 (E2.20) 
  Coef. t-statistic 
1/TAtm1 -40.4850 -1.069 
UREVt /TAtm1 0.0345 4.263***  
PPEt/TAtm1 -0.0808 -14.99***  
R2 0.3673  
Notes: Within each industry-year with at least 15 observations of available data, the following model 
is estimated: ஺஼೔,೟்஺೔,೟షభ = ߚଵ ൬ ଵ்஺೔,೟షభ൰ + ߚଶ ൬	?ோா௏೔,೟்஺೔,೟షభ൰ + ߚଷ ൬ ௉௉ா೔,೟்஺೔,೟షభ൰ + ߝ௜,௧  (E2.20) 
The table reports the average across industry-years of the parameters estimated from the above 
model, together with the t-statistics estimated from using the standard errors of the mean across 
industry-years. Definitions of variables are in Section 2.8. * , * * , * ** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 
1% levels, respectively. 
 
Table T2.25. Measures of discretionary accruals across ESCORE groups using 
modified Jones model without an intercept 
ESCORE ADAC HDAC 
0 0.0522 0.1299 
1 0.0581 0.1560 
2 0.0697 0.2055 
3 0.0852 0.2297 
4 0.1008 0.2579 
5 0.1223 0.2827 
6 0.1555 0.2967 
7 0.1685 0.2888 
8 0.1677 0.3636 
9 0.1898 0.3846 
Low (0) 0.0522 0.1299 
High (6-9) 0.1613 0.3040 
High - Low 0.1090 0.1741 
t-statistic 19.668***  8.977***  
 Notes: The table reports the mean of ADAC, HDAC, estimated using the modified Jones model without 
an intercept, in each group sorted by ESCORE. The t-statistic is calculated under the null that the 
difference between mean values of the low and high ESCORE group is zero. Definitions of variables 
are in Section 2.8. * , * * , * ** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table T2.26. Measures of discretionary accruals across ESCORE groups using 
original Jones model without an intercept 
ESCORE ADAC HDAC 
0 0.0526 0.1323 
1 0.0578 0.1600 
2 0.0692 0.2045 
3 0.0847 0.2301 
4 0.1010 0.2567 
5 0.1207 0.2837 
6 0.1531 0.2967 
7 0.1661 0.2716 
8 0.1597 0.3182 
9 0.1870 0.3462 
Low (0) 0.0526 0.1323 
High (6-9) 0.1583 0.2936 
High - Low 0.1057 0.1614 
t-statistic 19.098***  8.353***  
Notes: The table reports the mean of ADAC, HDAC, estimated using the original Jones model without 
an intercept, in each group sorted by ESCORE. The t-statistic is calculated under the null that the 
difference between mean values of the low and high ESCORE group is zero. Definitions of variables 




Table T2.27. Average parameters across industry-years in models to estimate 
discretionary accruals using modified Jones model without an intercept where 
total accruals is calculated using balance sheet approach 
  ACt/  TAtm1 (E2.20) 
  Coefficient t-statistic 
1/TAtm1 5.0031 0.17 
UREVt /TAtm1 0.0354 4.879***  
PPEt/TAtm1 -0.0676 -10.064***  
R2 0.3928  
Notes: Within each industry-year with at least 15 observations of available data, the following model 
is estimated: ஺஼೔,೟்஺೔,೟షభ = ߚଵ ൬ ଵ்஺೔,೟షభ൰ + ߚଶ ൬	?ோா௏೔,೟்஺೔,೟షభ൰ + ߚଷ ൬ ௉௉ா೔,೟்஺೔,೟షభ൰ + ߝ௜,௧  (E2.20) 
in which total accruals is estimated using balance sheet approach:  ܣܥ = ( 	?ܥܣ െ 	?ܥܪܧ) െ ( 	?ܥܮ െ 	?ܵܶܦ) െ ܦܲ  (E2.19) 
The table reports the average across industry-years of the parameters estimated from the above 
model, together with the t-statistics estimated from using the standard errors of the mean across 
industry-years. Definitions of variables are in Section 2.8. * , * * , * ** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 







Table T2.28. Measures of discretionary accruals across ESCORE groups using 
modified Jones model without an intercept where total accruals is calculated 
using balance sheet approach 
ESCORE ADAC HDAC 
0 0.0497 0.1176 
1 0.0572 0.1726 
2 0.0648 0.2066 
3 0.0786 0.2240 
4 0.0881 0.2575 
5 0.1054 0.2968 
6 0.1169 0.2796 
7 0.1297 0.2833 
8 0.1370 0.2614 
9 0.1559 0.3200 
Low (0) 0.0497 0.1176 
High (6-9) 0.1236 0.2799 
High - Low 0.0739 0.1623 
t-statistic 16.671***  8.592***  
Notes: The table reports the mean of ADAC, HDAC, estimated using the modified Jones model without 
an intercept where total accruals is estimated using the balance sheet approach, in each group sorted 
by ESCORE. The t-statistic is calculated under the null that the difference between mean values of the 
low and high ESCORE group is zero. Definitions of variables are in Section 2.8. * , ** , ***  indicate 
significance at 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Table T2.29. Measures of discretionary accruals across ESCORE groups using 
original Jones model without an intercept where total accruals is calculated 
using balance sheet approach 
ESCORE ADAC HDAC 
0 0.0494 0.1235 
1 0.0566 0.1744 
2 0.0642 0.2069 
3 0.0777 0.2240 
4 0.0874 0.2581 
5 0.1038 0.2927 
6 0.1156 0.2699 
7 0.1297 0.2747 
8 0.1337 0.2386 
9 0.1432 0.3200 
Low (0) 0.0494 0.1235 
High (6-9) 0.1220 0.2695 
High - Low 0.0726 0.1459 
t-statistic 16.695***  7.729***  
Notes: The table reports the mean of ADAC, HDAC, estimated using the original Jones model without 
an intercept where total accruals is estimated using the balance sheet approach, in each group sorted 
by ESCORE. The t-statistic is calculated under the null that the difference between mean values of the 
low and high ESCORE group is zero. Definitions of variables are in Section 2.8. * , ** , ***  indicate 




2.6.3. Alternative versions of ESCORE 
ESCORE, as constructed in the main test, requires rolling benchmarks to 
calculate six signals, i.e. the signals used to capture overvalued firms (EOV), firms 
with low debt (EDEBT), firms with small size (ESIZE), firms with high net operating 
assets (EBLOAT), firms with low tangible asset intensity (ECAP) and firms with high 
book-tax difference (EBT). In particular, to determine EOV of firm i in year t, for 
example, the 80th percentile of MTB (market-to-book ratio) for the corresponding 
industry in year t needs to be calculated to compare against firm i's actual MTB. In 
the next year, the benchmark for year t+1 is needed, and so on. This rolling-
benchmark approach is arguably more appropriate to make sure the benchmarks are 
updated over time and thus are closest to reality. Nevertheless, from a practitioner’s 
viewpoint, it might be difficult to calculate the rolling benchmarks (or at least it is time-
consuming) because the use of rolling benchmarks requires an update of the 
benchmarks every year, including the collection of industry-wide data. Therefore, this 
section creates another version of ESCORE, namely ESCORE_FIXED, which uses 
time-fixed benchmarks. The time-fixed benchmarks do not change over time, so 
ESCORE_FIXED is a simplified and more practice-oriented version of ESCORE. For 
each industry, the time-fixed benchmarks are calculated as the averages of the 
benchmarks across 17 sample years: 
ߛ௞ଶ଴തതതതത = ෍ ൫ఊೖ,೟మబ൯మబభభ೟సభవవఱଵ଻  (E2.21) 
ߛ௞଼଴തതതതത = ෍ ൫ఊೖ,೟ఴబ൯మబభభ೟సభవవఱଵ଻  (E2.22) 
where: k = 1... 43 are the unique Datastream level-six industries remained in the 
sample, and t = 1995... 2011 represent the 17 sample years. 
ߛ௞ଶ଴തതതതത and ߛ௞଼଴തതതതത are used as the upper and lower benchmarks, respectively. If a 
signal is lower (higher) than ߛ௞ଶ଴തതതതത (ߛ௞଼଴തതതതത), it would be considered as too low (high). As 
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constructed, the benchmarks are constant over the time but are different across 
industries. The pitfall of the approach is, however, that the benchmarks remain 
unchanged over time, which may make them outdated as time goes. Table T2.30 
reports the time-fixed benchmarks for each (Datastream level-six) industry across the 
years. The time-fixed benchmarks as reported in Table T2.30 could serve as a quick 
reference point to simplify the calculation of ESCORE in practice, i.e. one could simply 
compare a firm’s market value of equity, for example, to the ܯܸܧ௞ଶ଴തതതതതതതതത  of the 
corresponding industry to decide if the signal ESIZE is one or zero, rather than having 
to collect MVE of the whole industry in that year, then calculate ܯܸܧ௞ଶ଴ to use as the 
benchmark. Table T2.31 reports the distribution of observations across groups sorted 
by ESCORE_FIXED while Table T2.32 and T2.33 report the result of a replication of 
the main test using ESCORE_FIXED calculated under the time-fixed benchmarks. 
The main conclusions from the main tests do not change qualitatively. 
ESCORE as constructed using either the time-fixed or rolling benchmarks could 
arguably still be difficult for an average investor to construct because of the need to 
collect industry-wide data to construct the benchmarks. This section further tests the 
efficacy of a suppressed version of ESCORE, namely ESCORE_9, which excludes 
all signals which require a benchmark to construct (i.e. ESIZE, EOV, EBT, EBLOAT, 
ECAP and EDEBT). In particular, ESCORE_9 is calculated as follows: 
ESCORE_9 =  ESEO +  EDDEBT +  EMA +  EROA +  EDROA +  EDIV +  EDISTRESS +  
ECYCLE +  EAUDIT (E2.23) 
As designed, ESCORE_9 is an integer ranging from 0 to 9. Table T2.34 shows 
the number of observations in each group sorted by ESCORE_9. To make sure the 
number of observations in the low and high ESCORE groups are approximately the 
same, stocks with ESCORE of zero (three and higher) are assigned to the low (high) 
ESCORE group. Table T2.35 and T2.36 report how the measures of earnings 
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management vary as ESCORE_9 increases. It could be noted that ESCORE_9 is still 
effective in capturing the context of earnings management, although the power 
shrinks remarkably compared to the complete ESCORE as used in the main test.
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Table T2.30. Average industry benchmarks 
Industries N ࡹࢂࡱ࢑૛૙തതതതതതതതതത ࡹࢀ࡮࢑ૡ૙തതതതതതതതതത ࡮ࡻࡻࡷࢀ࡭ࢄ࢑ૡ૙തതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത ࡺࡻ࡭࢑૛૙തതതതതതതതത ࡯࡭ࡼ࢑૛૙തതതതതതതതത ࡰࡱ࡮ࢀ࢑૛૙തതതതതതതതതതത 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Building Materials and Fixtures 410 10,932 2.5853 0.0763 0.4294 0.4395 0.0344 
Industrial Suppliers 276 18,902 3.3094 0.0362 0.4441 0.2082 0.0305 
Specialty Chemicals 318 19,608 4.0362 0.3146 0.4549 0.3670 0.0421 
Home Construction 258 35,980 1.5436 0.0188 0.5473 0.0238 0.0740 
Electrical Equipment 371 5,513 3.4570 0.3935 0.3941 0.2042 0.0201 
Heavy Construction 290 14,510 2.9180 0.0350 0.1079 0.1291 0.0232 
Media Agencies 383 9,208 8.0574 0.1898 0.1249 0.1097 0.0290 
Industrial Machinery 779 8,336 2.9728 0.0492 0.3813 0.3436 0.0315 
Healthcare Providers 23 4,306 4.3513 0.0664 0.6398 0.0398 0.1294 
Financial Administration 13 21,687 7.0500 0.0218 0.2797 0.2131 0.0552 
Exploration & Production 395 26,807 3.2060 3.1903 0.4571 0.2040 0.0074 
Oil Equipment and Services 73 24,051 4.2967 0.1684 0.1369 0.1302 0.0317 
Recreational Services 320 8,622 3.1160 0.2569 0.3706 0.4810 0.0592 
Electronic Equipment 299 8,257 4.4093 0.2077 0.4070 0.2317 0.0236 
Software 957 7,355 7.0822 0.4854 0.0854 0.1056 0.0003 
Durable Household Production 36 3,842 2.5772 0.0969 0.4870 0.5158 0.0000 
Furnishings 87 7,552 2.9622 0.0432 0.4151 0.4919 0.0326 
Transport Services 197 18,238 2.5858 0.1246 0.3755 0.3212 0.0735 
Apparel Retailers 259 27,892 4.2323 0.0341 0.3796 0.3621 0.0116 
Clothing and Accessory 318 5,025 2.7832 0.0914 0.4411 0.2317 0.0265 
Food Products 384 26,806 3.5921 0.0494 0.4398 0.3716 0.1082 




Table T2.30 (continued) 
Industries N ࡹࢂࡱ࢑૛૙തതതതതതതതതത ࡹࢀ࡮࢑ૡ૙തതതതതതതതതത ࡮ࡻࡻࡷࢀ࡭ࢄ࢑ૡ૙തതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത ࡺࡻ࡭࢑૛૙തതതതതതതതത ࡯࡭ࡼ࢑૛૙തതതതതതതതത ࡰࡱ࡮ࢀ࢑૛૙തതതതതതതതതതത 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Consumer Electronics 28 27,490 3.4635 0.0373 0.4746 0.4823 0.0204 
Publishing 405 20,541 5.6911 0.1624 0.3103 0.0745 0.0288 
Business Support Services 1398 9,503 4.3210 0.0610 0.2607 0.1707 0.0361 
Broadline Retailers 88 34,512 3.1222 0.0564 0.3830 0.5066 0.0093 
Food Retail, Wholesale 63 60,515 3.0112 0.0198 0.4670 0.7491 0.0703 
Specialty Retailers 458 16,742 3.4254 0.0323 0.3241 0.2590 0.0450 
Pharmaceuticals 282 14,821 8.6519 4.2351 0.1321 0.0556 0.0007 
Gambling 99 12,884 7.9496 0.2054 0.1682 0.0670 0.0274 
Medical Supplies 20 13,220 6.2058 0.5928 0.1704 0.0756 0.0092 
Broadcast and Entertainment 340 6,907 6.7370 0.5503 0.2331 0.1221 0.0201 
Gold Mining 71 24,323 3.5633 1.4136 0.4817 0.4019 0.0124 
General Mining 159 20,861 3.5954 4.7763 0.3582 0.1448 0.0041 
Telecommunication Equipment 84 12,398 3.4032 0.5757 0.2526 0.1235 0.0038 
Semiconductors 27 16,404 6.6568 1.7243 0.0556 0.0549 0.0000 
Medical Equipment 266 7,043 5.4608 0.8935 0.3200 0.1701 0.0059 
Business Training & Employment 344 7,524 6.6713 0.0857 0.2240 0.0813 0.0103 
Fixed Line Telecommunication 36 34,611 7.0520 0.5431 0.0882 0.3036 0.0752 
Mobile Telecommunication 20 11,793 5.8036 0.3703 0.1900 0.0231 0.0000 
Computer Services 531 13,501 7.5568 0.1861 0.1505 0.1381 0.0054 
Internet 12 3,904 4.4347 0.3279 0.0792 0.3561 0.0001 
Biotechnology 273 21,113 7.0276 17.6279 -0.0033 0.0751 0.0002 
Notes: Column (2) reports the distribution of observations across Datastream level-six industries. Columns (3), (6), (7) and (8) report the average across the years of the 20th 
percentile of MVE, NOA, CAP and DEBT in each industry. Columns (4) and (5) report the average of across the years of the 80th percentile of MTB and BOOKTAX in each 
industry. Definitions of variables are in Section 2.8. 
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Table T2.31. Distribution of observations across ESCORE_FIXED groups 
ESCORE_FIXED N ESCORE_FIXED GROUP N 
0 915 Low (0) 915 
1 2,269 










Notes: The table reports the distribution of observations across groups sorted by ESCORE_FIXED. 
Definitions of variables are in Section 2.8. 
 
 
Table T2.32. Measures of accruals management across ESCORE_FIXED groups  
ESCORE_FIXED ADAC HDAC   ADWAC HDWAC 
0 0.0521 0.1301  0.0377 0.1018 
1 0.058 0.1556 
 
0.0472 0.1768 
2 0.069 0.2024 
 
0.0546 0.2031 
3 0.0836 0.2404 
 
0.0656 0.233 
4 0.0998 0.2681 
 
0.0741 0.2529 
5 0.1245 0.262 
 
0.0887 0.2791 
6 0.1565 0.2619 
 
0.0994 0.2797 
7 0.1679 0.3658 
 
0.1098 0.3191 
8 0.1703 0.2921 
 
0.1119 0.3488 
9 0.1859 0.4   0.1202 0.3333 
Low (0) 0.0521 0.1301  0.0377 0.1018 
High (6-9) 0.1622 0.3   0.1044 0.3 
High - Low 0.1101 0.1699  0.0667 0.1982 
t-statistic 21.417***  8.924***  
  
18.917***  10.724***  
 Notes: The table reports the mean of ADAC, HDAC, ADWAC, HDWAC in each group sorted by 
ESCORE_FIXED. The t-statistic is calculated under the null that the difference between mean values of 
the low and high ESCORE_FIXED group is zero. Definitions of variables are in Section 2.8. * , * * , * ** 




Table T2.33. Measures of real earnings management across ESCORE_FIXED groups  
ESCORE_FIXED ADCF HDCF   ADPROD HDPROD   ADDISEXP HDDISEXP   ATOTALRM HTOTALRM 
0 0.0967 0.0984  0.1479 0.1688  0.1506 0.171  0.3809 0.1308 
























































9 0.3769 0.72   0.2711 0.3913   0.4343 0.1818   0.9309 0.3333 
Low (0) 0.0967 0.0984  0.1479 0.1688  0.1506 0.171  0.3809 0.1308 
High (6-9) 0.255 0.4738   0.2233 0.3037   0.3229 0.2514   0.5776 0.3399 
High - Low 0.1583 0.3754  0.0754 0.1349  0.1723 0.0803  0.1967 0.2091 
t-statistic 14.629***  18.279***    6.981***  6.092***    11.663***  3.671***    7.278***  8.943***  
Notes: The table reports the mean of ADCF, HDCF, ADPROD, HDPROD, ADDISEXP, HDDISEXP, ATOTALRM, HTOTALRM in each group sorted by ESCORE_FIXED. The t-statistic 
is calculated under the null that the difference between mean values of the low and high ESCORE_FIXED group is zero. Definitions of variables are in Section 2.8. * , * * , ***  
indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table T2.34. Distribution of observations across ESCORE_9 groups 
ESCORE_9 N ESCORE_9 GROUP N 
0 2,487 Low (0) 2,487 
1 4,438 
Medium (1-2) 7,608 2 3,170 
3 1,359 





 Notes: The table reports the distribution of observations across groups sorted by ESCORE_9. 
Definitions of variables are in Section 2.8. 
 
 
Table T2.35. Measures of accruals management across ESCORE_9 groups 
ESCORE_9 ADAC HDAC   ADWAC HDWAC 
0 0.0615 0.1709  0.048 0.1516 
1 0.0727 0.2037 
 
0.0561 0.2069 
2 0.0943 0.2473 
 
0.0699 0.2382 
3 0.1187 0.2494 
 
0.0851 0.2835 
4 0.1418 0.2605 
 
0.1002 0.3083 
5 0.1603 0.3396 
 
0.1066 0.283 
6 0.1389 0.5556 
 
0.1107 0.3333 
7 0.1052 0 
 
0.3088 0 
Low (0) 0.0615 0.1709   0.048 0.1516 
High (3-7) 0.1251 0.2559   0.0893 0.289 
High - Low 0.0636 0.085  0.0413 0.1374 
t-statistic 19.605***  6.691***  
  
18.132***  10.681***  
 Notes: The table reports the mean of ADAC, HDAC, ADWAC, HDWAC in each group sorted by 
ESCORE_9. The t-statistic is calculated under the null that the difference between mean values of the 
low and high ESCORE_9 group is zero. Definitions of variables are in Section 2.8. * , ** , * **  indicate 




Table T2.36. Measures of real earnings management across ESCORE_9 groups  
ESCORE_9 ADCF HDCF   ADPROD HDPROD   ADDISEXP HDDISEXP   ATOTALRM HTOTALRM 
0 0.1079 0.1034  0.1626 0.1627  0.1738 0.1851  0.451 0.1292 

















































Low (0) 0.1079 0.1034   0.1626 0.1627   0.1738 0.1851   0.451 0.1292 
High (3-7) 0.1849 0.3816   0.2053 0.275   0.2725 0.2218   0.5072 0.3018 
High – Low 0.077 0.2782  0.0427 0.1123  0.0986 0.0367  0.0562 0.1727 
t-statistic 12.167***  20.506***    6.505***  8.05***    10.549***  2.584***    3.391***  11.562***  
Notes: The table reports the mean of ADCF, HDCF, ADPROD, HDPROD, ADDISEXP, HDDISEXP, ATOTALRM, HTOTALRM in each group sorted by ESCORE_9. The t-statistic is 
calculated under the null that the difference between mean values of the low and high ESCORE_9 group is zero. Definitions of variables are in Section 2.8. * , ** , *** indicate 





This chapter demonstrates that a simple and easy-to-construct model, namely 
ESCORE, which accumulates fifteen individual financial-statement-based signals, 
could capture the context in which earnings management is more likely to happen. 
Using UK listed stocks during the period 1995 to 2011, stocks with ESCORE of six 
and above are shown to have managed earnings, both in accruals and real earnings 
management, by larger magnitudes and are more likely to be an accounting 
aggressor. Firms which are selected by the FRRP for investigation also have higher 
ESCORE. The results are robust across various modifications to the methodologies 
and across time.  
The new approach promises to be a useful tool for practitioners as well as an 
original contribution to the literature on earnings management detection models. One 
of the appeals of the ESCORE model is that it does not require industry-wide data 
collection and complicated econometric procedures to calculate. The model allows 
financial statement users to quickly access the reliability of reported earnings. This 
feature of ESCORE makes it a promising tool to be used in practice as well as in 
subsequent research in which data constraint is a major problem preventing the 
researchers to use other traditional measures of earnings management. For example, 
the use of the Jones-type models in emerging markets is quite problematic because 
of the issue of small sample size which could reduce the reliability of econometric 
regressions. Using ESCORE in such settings is clearly advantageous. Moreover, 
ESCORE only implies the likelihood of earnings management without directly 
measure the magnitude of such manipulation. Hence ESCORE does not suffer from 
the major weakness of the existing earnings management models which try to 
measure the magnitude of earnings management via modelling in the absence of a 
general theory. Last but not least, ESCORE captures both accruals and real earnings 
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management as well as financial reporting violations which require restatements. 
ESCORE is, hence, particularly advantageous to use in subsequent studies as it only 
focuses on earnings management and makes no prediction regarding which methods 
have been used to manage earnings. 
ESCORE has a unique characteristic that makes it stand out from the other 
proxies of earnings management. ESCORE accumulates individual signals of 
susceptible earnings management into an index. Such index is, therefore, capable of 
revealing the general context of in which earnings management is more likely to 
happen. There is no existing measure of earnings management which could do the 
same. This feature of ESCORE opens up many interesting research questions, one 
of which will be investigated in the next chapter: would the market take full account of 
the information contained in the general context of earnings management in setting 
share price?  
2.8. DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES USED IN CHAPTER 2 
઻ܓ,ܜ૛૙ and ઻ܓ,ܜૡ૙ are, respectively, the lower and upper benchmarks of industry k in year 
t, determined as the 20th and 80th percentiles of ߛ  in each industry-year. ɀ  is 
substituted by DEBT, MTB, MVE, NOA, CAP, BOOKTAX (definitions of these 
variables are below); k = 1... 43 are 43 unique Datastream level-six industries; t = 
1995... 2011 represent the sample years. 
઻ܓ૛૙തതതതത and ઻ܓ૛૙തതതതത are, respectively, the average of ɀ୩,୲ଶ଴  and ɀ୩,୲଼଴  across 17 years from 1995 
to 2011. 
EDDEBT is defined as a dummy that takes the value of one if DDEBT is 5% or higher, 
zero otherwise. DDEBT is the percentage change of total of short- and long-term 
debts compared to last year, and zero otherwise. 
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ESEO is one if CSHO increases by 5% compared to last year and PROISSUE is 
positive, zero otherwise. CSHO is number of outstanding shares. PROISSUE is the 
proceeds from issuing ordinary/preferred stocks. 
EMA is one if a firm announces a share-financed M&A deal in the financial year, zero 
otherwise. 
EOV is one if beginning MTB is higher than the corresponding MTB୩,୲଼଴, zero otherwise. 
MTB is calculated as market value of equity at the end of fiscal year divided by 
ordinary shareholders’ equity. 
EROA is one if ROA is equal to or larger than zero but smaller than 0.01, zero 
otherwise. ROA is calculated as earnings before extraordinary items scaled by 
beginning total assets. 
EDROA is one if DROA is equal to or larger than zero but smaller than 0.005, zero 
otherwise. DROA is calculated as the change of earnings before extraordinary items 
compared to last year scaled by beginning total assets. 
EDIV is one if DIVDEF is equal to or larger than zero but smaller than 0.01, zero 
otherwise. DIVDEF is calculated as the difference between net income and total cash 
dividends scaled by beginning total assets. 
EDISTRESS is one if ZSCORE is negative, zero otherwise. ZSCORE = 3.2 + 12.8xଵ +
2.5xଶ െ 10.68xଷ + 0.029xସ, where: xଵ is pre-tax income divided by current liabilities; 
xଶ is current assets divided by total liabilities; xଷ is current liabilities divided by total 
assets; xସ is quick assets minus current liabilities divided by daily operating expense, 
where daily operating expense is sales minus pre-tax income minus depreciation 
expense divided by 365. 
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EDEBT is one if beginning DEBT is lower than the corresponding DEBT୩,୲ଶ଴ , zero 
otherwise. DEBT is the total of short- and long-term debts scaled by total assets.  
ESIZE is one if beginning MVE is smaller than the corresponding MVE୩,୲ଶ଴ , zero 
otherwise. MVE is market value of equity at fiscal year-end. 
ECYCLE is one if (i) CFO is negative, CFF is positive, CFI is negative, or (ii) CFO is 
positive, CFF is positive, CFI is negative, zero otherwise, where CFO is operating 
cash flows, CFF is financing cash flows, CFI is investing cash flows. 
EAUDIT is one if the financial statements are not audited by one of the Big 5 audit 
firms, zero otherwise.  
EBLOAT is one if beginning NOA is smaller than the corresponding NOA୩,୲ଶ଴ , zero 
otherwise. NOA = (BVE + DEBT – CHE) / TA, where BVE is book value of equity, 
CHE is cash and cash equivalents, TA is total assets. 
ECAP is one if beginning CAP is smaller than the corresponding CAP୩,୲ଶ଴ , zero 
otherwise. CAP is plants, properties and equipment divided by total assets. 
EBT is one if BOOKTAX is higher than the corresponding BOOKTAX୩,୲଼଴ , zero 
otherwise. BOOKTAX is the absolute value of the difference between pre-tax income 
and TTP scaled by sales. The total taxable profit, TTP, is estimated as follows: 
x If TXT WKHQ773  
x If 0 < TXT //[65WKHQTTP = ୘ଡ଼୘ୗୖ  
x If LL x SR 7;78/– LL) x AR, then TTP = ୘ଡ଼୘ି(୐୐×ୗୖ)୅ୖ + LL 
x If TXT 8/– LL) x AR, then TTP = ୘ଡ଼୘ି(୐୐×ୗୖ)ି[(୙୐ି୐୐)×୅ୖ]୑ୖ + UL 
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where: TXT is the reported income tax expense, LL is the lower limit for marginal tax 
relief, UL is the upper limit for marginal tax relief, SR is the small profit tax rate, MR 
is the main tax rate, AR = (SR + MR) / 2. 
ESCORE = ESEO + EDDEBT + EMA + EOV + EROA + EDROA + EDIV + 
EDISTRESS + EDEBT + ESIZE + ECYCLE + EAUDIT + EBLOAT + ECAP + EBT. 
ESCORE_FIXED = ESEO + EDDEBT + EMA + EOV + EROA + EDROA + EDIV + 
EDISTRESS + EDEBT + ESIZE + ECYCLE + EAUDIT + EBLOAT + ECAP + EBT, 
where EOV, EDEBT, ESIZE, EBLOAT, ECAP and EBT are calculated using ɀ୩ଶ଴തതതത and ɀ୩ଶ଴തതതത. 
ESCORE_9 = ESEO + EDDEBT + EMA + EROA + EDROA + EDIV + EDISTRESS 
+ ECYCLE + EAUDIT. 
۲ۯ۱ܑ,ܜ = ୅େ౟,౪୘୅౟,౪షభ െ ൤Ƚෝ + Ⱦ෠ଵ ൬ ଵ୘୅౟,౪షభ൰ + Ⱦ෠ଶ ൬	?ୖ୉୚౟,౪ି	?ୖ୉େ౟,౪୘୅౟,౪షభ ൰ + Ⱦ෠ଷ ൬ ୔୔୉౟,౪୘୅౟,౪షభ൰൨ , is discretionary 
accruals of stock i in year t. Ƚෝ, Ⱦ෠ଵ , Ⱦ෠ଶ , Ⱦ෠ଷ  are the estimated coefficients from the 
following regression, which is run in each industry-year with at least 15 observations: ୅େ౟,౪୘୅౟,౪షభ = Ƚ + Ⱦଵ ൬ ଵ୘୅౟,౪షభ൰ + Ⱦଶ ൬	?ୖ୉୚౟,౪୘୅౟,౪షభ൰ + Ⱦଷ ൬ ୔୔୉౟,౪୘୅౟,౪షభ൰ + ɂ୧,୲, where AC୧,୲ is total accruals 
of firm i in year t, which is calculated as the difference between income before 
extraordinary items and net operating cash flows; 	?REV୧,୲ and 	?REC୧,୲ are the change 
in sales and receivables from year t – 1 to year t of firm i, respectively; and PPE୧,୲ is 
gross plant, property and equipment of firm i at the end of year t. 
ADAC is the absolute value of DAC. 
HDAC is one if DAC is equal to or higher than the 80th percentile of the corresponding 
industry-year ranked by DAC, zero otherwise. 
 110 
 
۲܅ۯ۱ܑ,ܜ = ୛୅େ౟,౪୘୅౟,౪షభ െ ൤Ƚෝ + Ⱦ෠ଵ ൬ ୖ୉୚౟,౪୘୅౟,౪షభ൰ + Ⱦ෠ଶ ൬ୖ୉୚౟,౪ି	?ୖ୉େ୘୅౟,౪షభ ൰൨ , is discretionary working 
capital accruals of stock i in year t. Ƚෝ, Ⱦ෠ଵ, Ⱦ෠ଶ are the estimated coefficients from the 
following regression, which is run in each industry-year with at least 15 observations: ୛୅େ౟,౪୘୅౟,౪షభ = Ƚ + Ⱦଵ ൬ ୖ୉୚౟,౪୘୅౟,౪షభ൰ + Ⱦଶ ൬ୖ୉୚౟,౪ି	?ୖ୉େ୘୅౟,౪షభ ൰ + ɂ୧,୲ , where: WAC୧,୲  is working capital 
accruals of stock i in year t, which is calculated as WAC= ( 	?CAെ 	?CHE) െ
( 	?CLെ 	?STD) [¨&$LVFKDQJHLQFXUUHQWDVVHWV¨&+(LVFKDQJHLQFDVKDQGFDVK
equivalents; ¨&/LVFKDQJHLQFXUUHQWOLDELOLWLHV¨67'LVFKDQJHLQVKRUW-term debts]. 
ADWAC is the absolute value of DWAC. 
HDWAC is one if DWAC is equal to or higher than the 80th percentile of the 
corresponding industry-year ranked by DWAC, zero otherwise. 
۲۱۴ܑ
,ܜ = െ1 × ൜ ஼ிை೔,೟்஺೔,೟షభ െ ൤ߙො + ߚመଵ ൬ ଵ்஺೔,೟షభ൰ + ߚመଶ ൬ ோா௏೔,೟்஺೔,೟షభ൰ + ߚመଷ ൬	?ோா௏೔,೟்஺೔,೟షభ൰൨ൠ, is abnormal cash 
flows of stock i in year t. Ƚෝ, Ⱦ෠ଵ, Ⱦ෠ଶ, Ⱦ෠ଷ are the estimated coefficients from the following 
regression, which is run in each industry-year with at least 15 observations: େ୊୓౟,౪୘୅౟,౪షభ =Ƚ + Ⱦଵ ൬ ଵ୘୅౟,౪షభ൰ + Ⱦଶ ൬ ୖ୉୚౟,౪୘୅౟,౪షభ൰ + Ⱦଷ ൬	?ୖ୉୚౟,౪୘୅౟,౪షభ൰ + ɂ୧,୲. 
ADCF is the absolute value of DCF. 
HDCF is one if DCF is equal to or higher than the 80th percentile of the corresponding 
industry-year ranked by DCF, zero otherwise. 
۲۾܀۽۲ܑ,ܜ = ୔ୖ୓ୈ౟,౪୘୅౟,౪షభ െ ൤Ƚෝ + Ⱦ෠ଵ ൬ ଵ୘୅౟,౪షభ൰ + Ⱦ෠ଶ ൬ ୖ୉୚౟,౪୘୅౟,౪షభ൰ + Ⱦ෠ଷ ൬	?ୖ୉୚౟,౪୘୅౟,౪షభ൰ + Ⱦ෠ସ ൬	?ୖ୉୚౟,౪షభ୘୅౟,౪షభ ൰൨ , is 
abnormal production costs of stock i in year t. Ƚෝ, Ⱦ෠ଵ , Ⱦ෠ଶ , Ⱦ෠ଷ , Ⱦ෠ସ  are the estimated 
coefficients from the following regression, which is run in each industry-year with at 
least 15 observations: ୔ୖ୓ୈ౟,౪୘୅౟,౪షభ = Ƚ + Ⱦଵ ൬ ଵ୘୅౟,౪షభ൰ + Ⱦଶ ൬ ୖ୉୚౟,౪୘୅౟,౪షభ൰ + Ⱦଷ ൬	?ୖ୉୚౟,౪୘୅౟,౪షభ൰ +
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Ⱦସ ൬	?ୖ୉୚౟,౪షభ୘୅౟,౪షభ ൰ + ɂ୧,୲, where: PROD୧,୲ is production cost, calculated as the sum of cost of 
goods sold and change in inventory, of firm i in year t. 
ADPROD is the absolute value of DPROD. 
HDPROD is one if DPROD is equal to or higher than the 80th percentile of the 
corresponding industry-year ranked by DPROD, zero otherwise. 
۲۲۷܁۳܆۾ܑ,ܜ = െ1 × ൜ୈ୍ୗ୉ଡ଼୔౟,౪୘୅౟,౪షభ െ ൤Ƚෝ + Ⱦ෠ଵ ൬ ଵ୘୅౟,౪షభ൰ + Ⱦ෠ଶ ൬ୖ୉୚౟,౪షభ୘୅౟,౪షభ ൰൨ൠ , is abnormal 
discretionary expenses of stock i in year t. Ƚෝ, Ⱦ෠ଵ, Ⱦ෠ଶ are the estimated coefficients 
from the following regression, which is run in each industry-year with at least 15 
observations: ୈ୍ୗ୉ଡ଼୔౟,౪୘୅౟,౪షభ = Ƚ + Ⱦଵ ൬ ଵ୘୅౟,౪షభ൰ + Ⱦଶ ൬ୖ୉୚౟,౪షభ୘୅౟,౪షభ ൰ + ɂ୧,୲ , where: DISEXP୧,୲  is 
discretionary expenses, calculated as selling and general administrative expenses 
plus research and development expenses, of firm i in year t. 
ADDISEXP is the absolute value of DDISEXP. 
HDDISEXP is one if DDISEXP is equal to or higher than the 80th percentile of the 
corresponding industry-year ranked by DDISEXP, zero otherwise. 
܂۽܂ۯۺ܀ۻܑ,ܜ = ൤ୈେ୊౟,౪ିୈେ୊౪,ౡതതതതതതതതത஢(ୈେ୊)౪,ౡ + ୈ୔ୖ୓ୈ౟,౪ିୈ୔ୖ୓ୈ౪,ౡതതതതതതതതതതതതതത஢(ୈ୔ୖ୓ୈ)౪,ౡ + ୈୈ୍ୗ୉ଡ଼୔౟,౪ିୈୈ୍ୗ୉ଡ଼୔౪,ౡതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത஢(ୈ୍ୗ୉ଡ଼୔)౪,ౡ ൨ 3ൗ (i א k) is total 
real earnings management, where: DCF୲,୩തതതതതതതത ,  DPROD୲,୩തതതതതതതതതതതത , DDISEXP୲,୩തതതതതതതതതതതതതതത  [ ɐ(DCF)୲,୩ , ɐ(DPROD)୲,୩, ɐ(DISEXP)୲,୩] is, respectively, the mean [standard deviation] of DCF, 
DPROD, DDISEXP of all firms in industry k in year t; k=1…43 are 43 unique 
Datastream level-six industries. 
BOSIZE is the number of board directors. 
BOIND is the percentage of non-executive directors on board. 
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AUCOMSIZE is the number of directors on the audit committee (set to zero if a firm 
does not have an audit committee). 
DUALITY is a dummy which is one if a firm’s chief executive officer is also the 
chairman of the board, zero otherwise. 
TOTCOMPEN is the average performance-linked compensation of all executive 
directors scaled by sales, where performance-linked compensation is defined as the 





CHAPTER 3  
 
THERE’S NO SMOKE WITHOUT FIRE: DOES 
THE CONTEXT OF EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 





Sloan (1996) shows that the market overprices the total accruals component of 
earnings. Xie (2001) further shows that it is the discretionary component of accruals 
that investors misprice. Since discretionary accruals, often estimated using the Jones 
(1991) model or one of its variants, is widely used in the literature to proxy for earnings 
management (see Section 2.2.1), the evidence seems consistent with the story 
suggesting the market fails to fully appreciate manager’s exercising discretion to 
influence reported earnings. Subsequent to Sloan’s (1996) seminal contribution, 
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research into how the market reacts to earnings management has emerged into a 
large strand in the literature. Evidence in support of the negative association of 
discretionary accruals and future stock returns is reported in various studies 
employing different methodologies, across different time period and in different 
markets (Desai et al., 2004; Iqbal et al., 2009; Iqbal and Strong, 2010).  
While it is well established that discretionary accruals is not fully priced, one 
aspect of the existing literature is still subject to considerable criticism which is rooted 
mainly from the weaknesses of the accruals model to capture earnings management. 
Discretionary accruals is typically calculated as the difference of reported accruals 
from a measure of ‘non-discretionary’ accruals estimated using some firm 
characteristics. As such, it represents the component of earnings that is subject to 
manager’s discretion. This methodology, however, fails to reflect the context in which 
earnings is managed. Suppose earnings management indeed occurs, discretionary 
accruals could arguably capture the magnitude of it but it is silent about how and why 
the incident happens. Assuming a semi-strong efficient market, the mispricing of 
discretionary accruals could be attributable to investors failing to fully reflect on the 
‘true’ earnings that a manager knows but does not truthfully releases to the market. 
One can arguably question the intuition of such story. Earnings management, of 
course, does not happen for no reason. There should be a ‘context’ which leads to 
the manager cooking the book, be it a personal motivation, a benefit to shareholders, 
a pressure or suitable room for managing earnings. While the manager can 
assumingly hide the ‘true’ earnings through earnings management, he or she cannot 
hide the surrounding context. Let us take a fictitious firm A for example. A is growth 
firm which is currently in financial distress. Struggling to finance its expanding 
strategy, mostly through acquisitions of companies which provide it needed 
supplementary resources, A decides to resort to raising more equity since it believes 
the current stock price is good for a seasoned equity offer. A is audited by a local less 
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reputable auditor (compared to the Big 4). What we can observe is a very susceptible 
context in which A is more likely to manage earnings, without having to observe the 
(arguably unobservable) actual earnings management behaviour. If A indeed 
manages earnings and the market is ‘fooled’, we can reasonably extrapolate that the 
market has mispriced both the distorted earnings and the context leading to A 
manipulating earnings. To date, while there is mounting evidence confirming the 
former hypothesis, the latter is not yet investigated in the extant literature. 
This chapter is the first to empirically test if the context of earnings management 
is mispriced. The chapter employs ESCORE as designed in Chapter 2 as an empirical 
proxy for the context of earnings management. Using the same sample of UK listed 
firms during the period from 1995 to 2011 as used in Chapter 2, this chapter tests if 
ESCORE could predict one-year-ahead stock returns. It is found that a zero-
investment hedge portfolio that takes long position in low ESCORE stocks (i.e. those 
with less susceptible context of earnings management) and short position in high 
ESCORE stocks (i.e. those with more susceptible context of earnings management) 
would earn an average abnormal return of 1.37% per month after adjusting for the 
risk loadings on the market, size, book-to-market and momentum factors in up to one 
year after portfolio formation. In multivariate regressions, ESCORE is found to be 
negatively and significantly related to one-year-ahead buy-and-hold returns after 
controlling for other existing market ‘anomalies’, including the mispricing of 
discretionary accruals. The result is robust across different ways to construct 
ESCORE, portfolio weighting schemes and models to estimate abnormal returns. 
Overall, the chapter concludes that the context of earnings management does help 
predict future stock returns.  
The chapter contributes significantly to the literature by presenting new 
evidence that not only the market misprices earnings management, it also does not 
fully appreciate the information contained in the context surrounding such 
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manipulation. The evidence is in line with the behavioural-based explanation that 
investors, as human beings, are systematically biased in processing financial 
statement information. In particular, under the influence of the base rate fallacy 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1982), investors seem to focus too much on details and 
under-react to the general context which is captured by ESCORE. The evidence 
presented in this chapter is an original and important contribution to the ‘market 
anomalies’ literature. For practitioners, the chapter could potentially lead to the design 
of trading strategies which could exploit the sub-optimal behaviour of the market to 
achieve abnormal returns. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the related 
literature and Section 3.3 states the testable hypothesis. Section 3.4 explains the data 
and methodologies employed in this chapter. Section 3.5 presents and discusses the 
main results. Some robustness checks with modifications to the methodologies are 
performed and presented in Section 3.6. Section 3.7 provides some concluding 
remarks. Section 3.8 provides the definitions of all variables used in this chapter. 
3.2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter examines whether the market misprices the context of earnings 
management. Hence, the chapter contributes directly to the literature of earnings 
management and the literature on test of market efficiency. Previous chapters have 
reviewed the literature on earnings management which serves as a foundation for this 
chapter. In this section, the literature on market efficiency and behavioural finance 
will be reviewed to set the background for the main contributions of this chapter. 
3.2.1. The efficient market hypothesis 
One of the key building blocks in modern corporate finance is the idea that the 
market is efficient (Fama, 1970; Fama, 1991; Fama, 1998). The central idea is simple, 
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yet very powerful, that market price is always correct as it has already reflected all 
available information. News in an efficient market spreads very fast and hence is 
instantly reflected in stock prices leaving no chance for any investor to take 
advantage. Depending on what ‘news’ is concerned, Fama (1970) formulates three 
levels of market efficiency, namely weak, semi-strong and strong forms. The weak 
form states that stock price already reflects all historical information leaving no chance 
for technical analysts, i.e. those investors who analyse patterns in stock prices, to 
earn abnormal returns. In the semi-strong form, all publicly available information is 
reflected instantly in stock price which means even fundamental analysts, i.e. those 
which analyse public information such as financial statements etc., could not have a 
better idea about what stock price should be rather than the price already prevails on 
the market. The strong form efficiency goes even further stating even private 
information would be instantly reflected in stock price, hence even trading which is 
based on insider’s information would not yield abnormal returns. Many early studies 
have provided evidence suggesting the market is very efficient (Fama, 1965; Ball and 
Brown, 1968; Fama et al., 1969) and the idea of market efficiency is so influential to 
the finance profession that Professor Fama is finally awarded the Nobel Prize in 2013. 
3.2.2. The ‘market anomalies’ 
The traditional paradigm of market efficiency would have been very convenient 
for us to think about how capital markets operate, but only if the theory is consistently 
confirmed with empirical evidence. However, evidence against market efficiency, 
known as the ‘anomaly’ literature, seems to be prevalent. Abnormal returns, defined 
as returns which could not be explained by risk, are found in many trading strategies 
which exploit one or more piece of information which is readily available to the market. 
For example, De Bondt and Thaler (1985) find that buying stocks with lower prior 
returns and short selling those with higher prior returns could be abnormally profitable. 
Lakonishok et al. (1994) construct portfolios based on some simple ratios, such as 
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book-to-market, cash-flow-to price, earnings-to-price ratios, and find that stocks with 
those ratios being high outperform those with low ratios. Banz (1981) finds that 
smaller firms earn abnormally higher returns than larger firms. Ritter (1991), Loughran 
et al. (1994), Loughran and Ritter (1995) provide evidence that firms tend to deliver 
abnormally poor returns following stock issues. Piotroski (2000) and Mohanram 
(2005) find that the market under-react to firm’s financial strength, hence buy 
financially strong and selling short financially weak firms would be a profitable trading 
strategy. Sloan (1996) makes an influential contribution by showing that the accruals 
component of earnings is negatively related to future returns. Xie (2001) go further 
showing that it is the discretionary accruals component which mainly drives Sloan’s 
result.  
The ‘abnormal’ returns earned by the above-mentioned strategies which are 
designed based on some observable and available information would be the end of 
the market efficient hypothesis. However, one reason which makes it difficult to 
completely reject the null that the market is efficient based on the above evidence lies 
with the problems associated with how to define ‘abnormal’ returns. In other words, 
the ‘abnormal’ returns documented could very well be the errors of the models used 
to adjust returns for risk. In fact, any test of market efficient hypothesis is a joint test 
with the validity of the employed risk-adjusting model. The finance literature has gone 
a long way to develop models to derive at expected returns given a level of risk, such 
as the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM hereafter) (Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965; 
Black, 1972) and its extended three-factor (Fama and French, 1992) and four-factor 
models (Carhart, 1997). However, saying we have got ‘the model’ to perfectly quantify 
the risk-return relationship is by far an overstatement. Hence, it is not uncommon that 
advocates of market efficiency cite the failure of the risk-adjusting model to explain a 
documented ‘anomaly’. Moreover, it has also been shown that the existence and 
magnitude of many of the ‘anomalies’ are highly sensitive to the methodologies 
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employed with many disappearing or significantly shrinking after some changes to the 
methodologies (Fama, 1998).  
Overall, although there is still criticism, the ‘market anomalies’ literature has 
grown very fast and really challenge the traditional paradigm. It would be meaningless 
if evidence is obtained but no plausible explanation could be presented. The next 
section will look into a possible answer to the ‘anomaly’ literature: behavioural finance.  
3.2.3. Heuristics and biases: The emergence of behavioural finance 
For the market to be efficient, a number of assumptions need to be maintained. 
One of the key assumptions is that market participants are all rational, have perfect 
access to unlimited information and could make unbiased decisions based only on 
the relevant information. This is where one of the most powerful criticisms of the 
market efficient hypothesis comes from. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) provide very 
strong foundation from the psychology literature to support that human beings are 
systematically biased. They outline three forms of heuristics which affect human’s 
judgement of probability and prediction of value under uncertainty. The first one is 
‘representativeness’. When tasked to judge the probability that an event originates 
from a process, people often rely on the representativeness heuristic and assign 
irrationally high probability if the event is highly representative of the process while in 
fact the similarity, or ‘representativeness’, should not affect the judgement of 
probability at all. On the other hand, representativeness heuristic also prevents 
people from taking into account relevant factors which would affect the judgement of 
probability. For example, when asked to judge if a person is a librarian or farmer, 
people tends to rely too much on information which could be representative of ‘typical’ 
librarians and farmers, and they tend to ignore the relevant prior probability that there 
are more farmers than librarians in the population. The second heuristic Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974) mention is ‘availability’. Under the influence of availability, one 
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tends to rely too much on information which is easily retrievable or readily available. 
Third, the ‘adjustment and anchoring’ heuristic leads people to making error in 
estimation as a result of making adjustments from an initial value.   
People are also shown to be overconfident (Fischhoff et al., 1977; Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1982). Overconfidence is particularly pronounced among experts and 
biases estimations of probability (De Bondt and Thaler, 1990; Oskamp, 1965). 
Weinstein (1980) shows that people are also unrealistically optimistic. Optimism is 
shown to bias planning decision in that people tend to allow insufficient time for tasks 
(Buehler et al., 1994). In addition, Edwards (1968) shows that on average people 
seem to be too conservative in the sense that they tend to over rely on prior 
experience in making judgement. People are also shown to preserve their existing 
belief in an irrational way (Lord et al., 1979). In particular, once one forms an opinion, 
he or she tends to be too reluctant to search for information which contradicts their 
opinion, or even if such information is presented to them, he or she tends to disregard 
the information.  
In general, that people, including all market participants, are systematically 
biased in making judgements and estimations is firmly evidenced. Hence, expecting 
everyone on the market to be rational as in the traditional paradigm is not a very 
plausible assumption. Behavioural finance has emerged over the last few decades 
as the alternative explanation for the numerous ‘market anomalies’ which have been 
found. Behavioural finance allows for irrationality as a results of heuristics and 
cognitive biases to exist, hence it seems to produce models which are closer to the 
real world.  
However, it is difficult to say behavioural finance is replacing the traditional 
paradigm of market efficiency at the moment. Fama (1998) observes that behavioural 
finance models seem to be developed for particular cases rather than a universal 
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model which could explain all ‘market anomalies’. For examples, while many studies 
show evidence of market over-reaction, evidence of market under-reaction is no less 
prevalent. The literature, therefore, at the moment stands at a point where market 
efficiency is still helpful to help shape our thinking about how capital market functions, 
behavioural finance is an expanding field with a lot of potential to respond to the 
difficulties faced by the traditional paradigm (Barberis and Thaler, 2003). 
3.3. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
The literature reviewed in Section 3.2 establishes that the market misprices 
earnings management as captured by accruals, especially its discretionary 
component. Nevertheless, one issue remains unexplored. While a manager can 
assumingly hide the ‘true’ earnings through earnings management, he or she cannot 
hide the surrounding context (for example, manager’s motivations, benefits to 
shareholders, pressures or opportunities for managing earnings etc.). As the old 
saying goes, “there’s no smoke without fire”, if a firm engages in earnings 
management (there is a ‘fire’), there should be a ‘context’ surrounding it (the ‘smoke’) 
which is difficult to hide. Hence investors should be able to ‘sense’ the existence of 
earnings management by observing the surrounding context. If investors are still 
‘fooled’ by earnings management, it implies that they must have mispriced both the 
magnitude and the context in which such manipulation occurs. In other words, if the 
market also misprices the context of earnings management incrementally beyond the 
mispricing of discretionary accruals, it would offer more convincing evidence that the 
market could not see through earnings management, which is a crucial knowledge to 
understand how the market processes publicly available financial statement 
information. 
There is good reason to expect that the market would misprice the context of 
earnings management which has a deep root in human heuristics and biases. Tversky 
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and Kahneman (1982) outline a cognitive bias, namely ‘base rate’ fallacy, which 
humans could systematically suffer from. In particular, it is found that when presented 
with generic information about the probability of an event (the base rate) together with 
specific information about the event, one tends to make judgements based too much 
on the specific information and ignore the base rate. In the case of using financial 
statements to invest on the stock market, investors are tasked with assessing whether 
the financial statements they are using have been manipulated. To make this 
judgement, investors could observe the general context surrounding a firm which 
would suggest the probability of earnings management together with a range of 
specific information about the firm, which is plenty for a listed company in a well-
developed market such as the UK. In this scenario, if investors are subjected to the 
base rate fallacy, it is expected that they would over-rely on specific information and 
fail to process the base rate information (i.e. the general context suggesting the 
existence of earnings management) rationally. Hence, the context of earnings 
management could contain information which has not been fully reflected in stock 
prices, leaving space for a context-based trading strategy to earn abnormal profits. 
Following this intuition, the testable hypothesis is stated as follows: 
Ceteris paribus, firms with more (less) susceptible context of earnings 
management earn lower (higher) abnormal returns. 
To empirically test this hypothesis, this chapter uses ESCORE as designed in 
Chapter 2 to capture the context of earnings management and investigates if such 
model can predict future stock returns. The next section (Section 3.4) will describe 
the data and methodologies employed in the main tests before the results are 
discussed in Section 3.5. 
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3.4. DATA AND METHODOLOGIES 
3.4.1. Sample and time convention 
The sample used in this chapter is similar to the one used in Chapter 2, i.e. the 
sample has 11,920 observations covering all UK listed dead and alive stocks during 
the period from 1995 to 201121. To avoid look ahead bias, the chapter measures stock 
returns from June year t+1 to May year t+2 for stocks with fiscal year ending in any 
calendar month in year t to ensure at the portfolio forming date, all financial 
statements of sampled firms are already published22. Hence, in terms of data on stock 
returns, the time period covered in this chapter spans from June 1996 to May 2013. 
3.4.2. Raw returns  
For each month, buy-and-hold raw returns, assuming dividend reinvestment, 
for each stock are calculated as follows: 
ܤܪܴܴ௜,௝௠ = ൬ ோூ೔,ೕோூ೔,ೕషభ൰ െ 1 (E3.1) 
where: ܤܪܴܴ௜,௝௠  is buy-and-hold returns of stock i in month j; ܴܫ௜,௝  is Datastream’s 
Return Index at the end of month j; ܴܫ௜,௝ିଵ is Datastream’s Return Index at the end of 
month j–1.  
If a stock delists during the holding period, the delisting returns are treated as 
follows. First of all, a delisting is identified as the first instance of a stock having a 
trailing zero returns or if the stock has an inactive date (WC07012). For each delisting 
instance, a screen through the footnotes to company status (Datastream’s code 
WC00000F) is conducted to identify the delisting reasons. The identified delisting 
                                                             
21
 Please see Section 2.3 for full explanation of the sample selection process. 
22
 Please see Section 3.4.2 for further discussion on portfolio formation. 
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reasons are grouped into either non-performance-related (M&A) and performance-
related (all other reasons, including where a delisting reason cannot be determined 
from the company status footnote). If a stock does not have a monthly return for June 
(the first month after portfolio formation), the firm-year observation is excluded from 
the sample (equivalent to assuming that investors cannot consider the stock for 
trading due to non-existence). If a stock has a return for June, but then delisted before 
the end of the holding period due to non-performance-related reasons, it is assumed 
that the investors earn the returns from portfolio forming date to delisting date, and 
then reinvest the proceeds in the size-matched portfolio which assumingly bears 
similar risk compared to the delisted firm. This approach has been used by other 
authors (e.g. Soares and Stark, 2009; Desai et al., 2004) to reflect the reality that the 
returns in most M&A-related delisting cases are positive. In effect, returns in the 
months following non-performance-related delisting are replaced by the returns on 
the size-matched portfolio23. If the delisting is performance-related, it is assumed that 
the whole initial investment is lost, hence a delisting return of –100% is used.  
Before proceeding, it is important to check if the returns calculated using the 
procedures explained above are reliable, especially given the concerns about using 
Datastream’s returns data (Ince and Porter, 2006). To check this, the returns on the 
Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE hereafter) All Shares Index are used as the 
benchmark. Each year, all sample stocks with available returns data are grouped into 
a portfolio. The value-weighted returns on the market portfolio are then compared 
year-by-year with the corresponding returns on the FTSE All Shares Index. As 
reported in Table T3.1, the two time-series are highly correlated (the correlation 
coefficient is 0.8718, significant at 1% level). It therefore provides reasonable 
assurance that returns have been properly handled. 
                                                             
23
 Returns on the size-matched portfolio are estimated using similar procedure to calculate 
size-adjusted returns described in the next section (Section 3.4.3). 
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Table T3.1. Correlation between returns on the value-weighted market portfolio 
and returns on the FTSE All Shares Index 
Year N 
Returns on the value-weighted 
market portfolio 
Returns on the FTSE All 
Shares Index 
1995 598 0.0197 0.2158 
1996 593 0.2354 0.3069 
1997 620 -0.0847 0.0580 
1998 649 0.0868 0.0681 
1999 726 0.0991 -0.0457 
2000 705 -0.0931 -0.0958 
2001 773 -0.1903 -0.1759 
2002 753 0.2390 0.1555 
2003 755 0.1636 0.1654 
2004 740 0.2405 0.2130 
2005 754 0.2747 0.2167 
2006 822 -0.1068 -0.0712 
2007 831 -0.1906 -0.2366 
2008 757 0.3808 0.2294 
2009 695 0.2266 0.2036 
2010 604 -0.0810 -0.0800 
2011 545 0.2355 0.3011 
Correlation coefficient   0.8718*** 
Notes: The table reports the returns on the value-weighted market portfolio and returns on the FTSE 
All Shares Index together with the Pearson correlation coefficient between the two time-series. 




Each year, stocks are sorted by ESCORE. ESCORE for year t (t= 1995… 2011) 
is calculated for all stocks with fiscal year ended in any month of the calendar year t. 
Based on ESCORE of year t, portfolios are formed at the end of May year t+1 and 
hold until the end of May year t+2. From the above firm-specific returns, the raw 
returns of portfolio p, denoted ܤܪܴܴ௣,௝௠  are the equally-weighted ܤܪܴܴ௜,௝௠  of all stocks 
in portfolio p. 
3.4.3. Abnormal returns  
To test the profitability of the ESCORE-based trading strategies, the chapter 
uses various measures of buy-and-hold abnormal returns. First of all, firm-specific 
monthly buy-and-hold size-adjusted returns are calculated as follows. Each year all 
stocks with available data are sorted into ten deciles based on market capitalization 
at the end of the last fiscal year. The returns on the size decile portfolio d (d = 1… 
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10), ܵܦܴௗ,௝௠ , is calculated as the average ܤܪܴܴ௜,௝௠  of all stocks which belong to decile 
d24. For each stock, its corresponding size decile and size decile return are identified. 
The buy-and-hold size-adjusted return of stock i in month j is then calculated as: 
ܤܪܵܣܴ௜,௝௠ = ܤܪܴܴ௜,௝௠ െ ܵܦܴௗ,௝௠ (݅ א ݀) (E3.2) 
Firm-specific monthly buy-and-hold market-adjusted returns are then calculated 
using returns on the FTSE All Shares Index as the benchmark as follows: 
ܤܪܯܣܴ௜,௝௠ = ܤܪܴܴ௜,௝௠ െ ܨܶܵܧܣܮܮ ௝ܴ௠ (E3.3) 
Similar to calculating raw returns of portfolios, the size-adjusted and market-
adjusted returns of portfolio p, ܤܪܵܣܴ௣,௝௠  and ܤܪܯܣܴ௣,௝௠ , are respectively the equally-
weighted ܤܪܵܣܴ௜,௝௠  and ܤܪܯܣܴ௜,௝௠  of all stocks in portfolio p.  
ܤܪܵܣܴ௣,௝௠  and ܤܪܯܣܴ௣,௝௠  are calculated using reference portfolios, an approach 
which could bias the test statistics (Barber and Lyon, 1997; Kothari and Warner, 
1997). Moreover, both measures are not capable of capturing some other known 
dimensions of risk, including the book-to-market and momentum factors. To 
strengthen the results, therefore, three additional measures of abnormal portfolio 
returns are used including the CAPM which has the market as the only risk factor 
(Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965; Black, 1972), the three-factor model which adds size 
and book-to-market as the additional risk factors (Fama and French, 1992) and the 
four-factor models which extend the three-factor model to also include momentum as 
the fourth risk factor (Carhart, 1997). Those three measures of abnormal returns are 
estimated by running the following time-series regressions: 
                                                             
24
 Unreported results show that using the value-weighted scheme to calculate returns on the 




ܤܪܴܴ௣,௝௠ െ ܴ ௝݂ = ߙ + ߚଵ(ܴ ௝݉ െ ܴ ௝݂) + ߝ (E3.4) 
ܤܪܴܴ௣,௝௠ െ ܴ ௝݂ = ߙ + ߚଵ(ܴ ௝݉ െ ܴ ௝݂) + ߚଶܵܯܤ௝ + ߚଷܪܯܮ௝ + ߝ (E3.5) 
ܤܪܴܴ௣,௝௠ െ ܴ ௝݂ = ߙ + ߚଵ(ܴ ௝݉ െ ܴ ௝݂) + ߚଶܵܯܤ௝ + ߚଷܪܯܮ௝ + ߚସܷܯܦ௝ + ߝ (E3.6) 
where: ܤܪܴܴ௣,௝௠  is the equally-weighted portfolio raw returns of portfolio p of month j 
(j is from June 1996 to May 2013 with portfolios being formed at the end of May each 
year based on ESCORE calculated from the previous fiscal year); ܴ ௝݂, ܴ ௝݉, ܵܯܤ௝, ܪܯܮ௝ , ܷܯܦ௝  are, respectively, the monthly risk-free rate, returns on the market 
portfolio, size, book-to-market and momentum factors, all as described and 
downloaded from the database which is made publicly available by Gregory et al. 
(2013). 
Table T3.2, T3.3 and T3.4 present the summary statistics of estimating 
Equation (E3.4), (E3.5) and (E3.6), respectively. In general, all the coefficients have 
the expected sign and are significant in most cases.  
 
Table T3.2. Summary statistics of estimating the CAPM for equally-weighted 
ESCORE portfolios 
ESCORE Intercept   Rm - Rf   R2 
  Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic     
0 0.0050 2.109**   0.8493 15.137***   0.5314 
1 0.0029 1.299  0.8910 16.593***   0.5768 
2 0.0020 0.918  0.8193 15.735***   0.5507 
3 -0.0004 -0.185  0.7959 14.685***   0.5163 
4 -0.0042 -1.604  0.9069 14.461***   0.5087 
5 -0.0077 -2.604***   0.7900 11.137***   0.3804 
6 -0.0097 -2.683***   0.8881 10.349***   0.3465 
7 -0.0076 -1.863*  0.9929 10.194***   0.3397 
8 -0.0259 -3.543***   0.9257 5.462***   0.1435 
9 -0.0131 -1.279  0.7441 3.33***   0.0859 
Low ESCORE (0) 0.0050 2.109**   0.8493 15.137***   0.5314 
Medium ESCORE (1-5) -0.0005 -0.221  0.8415 15.916***   0.5563 
High ESCORE (6-9) -0.0094 -2.873***    0.9084 11.677***    0.4030 
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients and the associated t-statistics obtained from 
running the following regression: ܤܪܴܴ௣,௝௠ െܴ ௝݂ = ߙ + ߚଵ(ܴ ௝݉ െܴ ௝݂) + ߝ (E3.4) 
‘Coef.’ is abbreviation for ‘Coefficient’. Definitions of variables are in Section 3.8. * , * * , * ** indicate 
significance at 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table T3.3. Summary statistics of estimating the Fama-French three-factor model for equally-weighted ESCORE portfolios 
ESCORE Intercept   Rm - Rf   SMB   HML   R2 
 Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic     
0 0.0036 2.391**   0.7433 20.167***   0.7433 16.8***   0.1956 4.852***   0.8074 
1 0.0014 1.26  0.7709 28.847***   0.8005 24.952***   0.2658 9.092***   0.9002 
2 0.0008 0.614  0.7179 23.891***   0.7474 20.718***   0.1487 4.525***   0.8575 
3 -0.0017 -1.326  0.6934 22.938***   0.7908 21.792***   0.1129 3.415***   0.8567 
4 -0.0056 -3.399***   0.7937 19.885***   0.8548 17.839***   0.1446 3.312***   0.8104 
5 -0.0089 -4.036***   0.6873 12.775***   0.8277 12.816***   0.0752 1.278  0.6605 
6 -0.0111 -3.791***   0.7722 10.916***   0.8866 10.441***   0.1361 1.759*   0.5771 
7 -0.0080 -2.156**   0.9459 10.545***   0.6398 5.941***   -0.2420 -2.466**   0.4666 
8 -0.0267 -3.998***   0.7680 4.84***   1.2639 6.296***   -0.2033 -0.941  0.3018 
9 -0.0155 -1.561  0.6813 3.099***   0.8539 3.057***   -0.0946 -0.411  0.1634 
Low ESCORE (0) 0.0036 2.391**   0.7433 20.167***   0.7433 16.8***   0.1956 4.852***   0.8074 
Medium ESCORE (1-5) -0.0018 -1.614  0.7339 26.954***   0.7941 24.296***   0.1573 5.281***   0.8879 
High ESCORE (6-9) -0.0105 -4.129***    0.8079 13.059***    0.8472 11.407***    0.0353 0.522   0.6404 
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients and the associated t-statistics obtained from running the following regression: ܤܪܴܴ௣,௝௠ െܴ ௝݂ = ߙ + ߚଵ(ܴ ௝݉ െܴ ௝݂) + ߚଶܵܯܤ௝ + ߚଷܪܯܮ௝ + ߝ (E3.5) 
‘Coef.’ is abbreviation for ‘Coefficient’. Definitions of variables are in Section 3.8. * , * * , *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table T3.4. Summary statistics of estimating the augmented Fama-French four-factor model for equally-weighted ESCORE portfolios 
ESCORE Intercept   Rm - Rf   SMB   HML   UMD   R2 
 Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic     
0 0.0033 2.086**    0.7491 19.968***    0.7524 16.514***    0.2191 4.471***    0.0307 0.844   0.8081 
1 0.0018 1.553  0.7646 28.174***   0.7906 23.987***   0.2400 6.77***   -0.0338 -1.283  0.9010 
2 0.0008 0.636  0.7170 23.401***   0.7458 20.045***   0.1448 3.618***   -0.0051 -0.173  0.8575 
3 -0.0016 -1.243  0.6927 22.473***   0.7897 21.095***   0.1099 2.73***   -0.0039 -0.132  0.8567 
4 -0.0046 -2.752***   0.7780 19.334***   0.8302 16.987***   0.0808 1.538  -0.0835 -2.139**   0.8147 
5 -0.0080 -3.483***   0.6709 12.313***   0.8020 12.12***   0.0087 0.122  -0.0871 -1.648  0.6651 
6 -0.0109 -3.586***   0.7689 10.662***   0.8815 10.064***   0.1228 1.303  -0.0175 -0.25  0.5772 
7 -0.0080 -2.075**   0.9458 10.341***   0.6397 5.759***   -0.2423 -2.028**   -0.0004 -0.005  0.4666 
8 -0.0249 -3.565***   0.7366 4.527***   1.2004 5.626***   -0.2902 -1.222  -0.1466 -0.882  0.3049 
9 -0.0156 -1.534  0.6832 3.043***   0.8569 2.972***   -0.0866 -0.296  0.0098 0.045  0.1634 
Low ESCORE (0) 0.0033 2.086**   0.7491 19.968***   0.7524 16.514***   0.2191 4.471***   0.0307 0.844  0.8081 
Medium ESCORE (1-5) -0.0014 -1.239  0.7277 26.31***   0.7844 23.352***   0.1320 3.654***   -0.0331 -1.233  0.8888 
High ESCORE (6-9) -0.0104 -3.923***    0.8055 12.77***    0.8434 11.01***    0.0256 0.311   -0.0127 -0.208   0.6405 
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients and the associated t-statistics obtained from running the following regression: ܤܪܴܴ௣,௝௠ െܴ ௝݂ = ߙ + ߚଵ(ܴ ௝݉ െܴ ௝݂) + ߚଶܵܯܤ௝ + ߚଷܪܯܮ௝ + ߚସܷܯܦ௝ + ߝ (E3.6) 
‘Coef.’ is abbreviation for ‘Coefficient’. Definitions of variables are in Section 3.8. * , * * , *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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The estimated coefficients obtained from Equation (E3.4) [(E3.5); and (E3.6)] 
are respectively denoted ߚመଵ,௣ଵி  [ߚመଵ,௣ଷி , ߚመଶ,௣ଷி , ߚመଷ,௣ଷி ; and ߚመଵ,௣ସி , ߚመଶ,௣ସி , ߚመଷ,௣ସி , ߚመସ,௣ସி ]. The monthly 
buy-and-hold portfolio abnormal returns are then calculated using these estimated 
coefficients as follows: 
ܤܪܣܴ1ܨ௣,௝௠ = ܤܪܴܴ௣,௝௠ െ [ܴ ௝݂ + ߚመଵ,௣ଵி൫ܴ ௝݉ െ ܴ ௝݂൯] (E3.7) 
ܤܪܣܴ3ܨ௣,௝௠ = ܤܪܴܴ௣,௝௠ െ [ܴ ௝݂ + ߚመଵ,௣ଷி൫ܴ ௝݉ െ ܴ ௝݂൯ + ߚመଶ,௣ଷிܵܯܤ௝ + ߚመଷ,௣ଷிܪܯܮ௝ ] (E3.8) 
ܤܪܣܴ4ܨ௣,௝௠ = ܤܪܴܴ௣,௝௠ െ [ܴ ௝݂ + ߚመଵ,௣ସி൫ܴ ௝݉ െ ܴ ௝݂൯ + ߚመଶ,௣ସிܵܯܤ௝ + ߚመଷ,௣ସிܪܯܮ௝ +ߚመସ,௣ସிܷܯܦ௝] (E3.9) 
The monthly buy-and-hold abnormal returns of the hedge portfolio 
(ܤܪܣܴ1ܨு௘ௗ௚௘,௝௠ , ܤܪܣܴ3ܨு௘ௗ௚௘,௝௠ ,ܤܪܣܴ4ܨு௘ௗ௚௘,௝௠ ) are calculated as the difference 
between abnormal returns on the low ESCORE portfolio (ܤܪܣܴ1ܨ௅௢ா ,௝௠ , ܤܪܣܴ3ܨ௅௢ா,௝௠ , ܤܪܣܴ4ܨ௅௢ா ,௝௠ ) and that abnormal returns on the high ESCORE portfolio (ܤܪܣܴ1ܨு௜ா,௝௠ , ܤܪܣܴ3ܨு௜ா,௝௠ , ܤܪܣܴ4ܨு௜ா ,௝௠ ): 
ܤܪܣܴ1ܨு௘ௗ௚௘,௝௠ = ܤܪܣܴ1ܨ௅௢ா,௝௠ െ ܤܪܣܴ1ܨு௜ா,௝௠  (E3.10) 
ܤܪܣܴ3ܨு௘ௗ௚௘,௝௠ = ܤܪܣܴ3ܨ௅௢ா,௝௠ െ ܤܪܣܴ3ܨு௜ா,௝௠  (E3.11) 
ܤܪܣܴ4ܨு௘ௗ௚௘,௝௠ = ܤܪܣܴ4ܨ௅௢ா,௝௠ െ ܤܪܣܴ4ܨு௜ா,௝௠  (E3.12) 
The above regression-based approach is also not flawless, especially in the UK 
context (Michou et al., 2007; Lee et al., 2007; Bauer et al., 2010). Nevertheless, since 
both the reference and regression-based approaches are used with five different 
measures of abnormal returns, it would reasonably guard the results against any 
possible significant biases due to the way abnormal returns are calculated. 
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3.4.4. Annualized returns 
One of the main tests in this chapter employ multivariate regressions (Section 
3.5.3). In those regressions, the monthly returns as estimated in Section 3.4.2 and 
3.4.3 are converted into annual returns to match with the annual update of the 
explanatory variables which are all calculated based on information from annual 
financial statements. In particular, for each firm the annual buy-and-hold raw returns 
are calculated as follows: 
ܤܪܴܴ௜,௧௔ = 	? (1 + ܤܪܴܴ௜,௝௠ )ଵଶ௝ୀଵ െ 1(݆ = Juneyear t …Mayyear t + 1)  (E3.13) 
The firm-specific annual buy-and-hold size-adjusted and market-adjusted 
returns are calculated as follows: 
ܤܪܵܣܴ௜,௧௔ = 	? (1 + ܤܪܴܴ௜,௝௠ )ଵଶ௝ୀଵ െ 	? ൫1 + ܵܦܴௗ,௝௠ ൯ଵଶ௝ୀଵ (݅ א ݀,݆ =Juneyear t …Mayyear t + 1)  (E3.14) 
ܤܪܯܣܴ௜,௧௔ = 	? (1 + ܤܪܴܴ௜,௝௠ )ଵଶ௝ୀଵ െ 	? ൫1 + ܨܶܵܧܣܮܮ ௝ܴ௠൯ଵଶ௝ୀଵ (݆ =Juneyear t …Mayyear t + 1)  (E3.15) 
For the firm-specific one-factor, three-factor and four-factor abnormal returns, 
the following equations are estimated for each stock: 
ܤܪܴܴ௜,௝௠ െ ܴ ௝݂ = ߙ + ߚଵ(ܴ ௝݉ െ ܴ ௝݂) + ߝ (E3.16) 
ܤܪܴܴ௜,௝௠ െ ܴ ௝݂ = ߙ + ߚଵ(ܴ ௝݉ െ ܴ ௝݂) + ߚଶܵܯܤ௝ + ߚଷܪܯܮ௝ + ߝ (E3.17) 
ܤܪܴܴ௜,௝௠ െ ܴ ௝݂ = ߙ + ߚଵ(ܴ ௝݉ െ ܴ ௝݂) + ߚଶܵܯܤ௝ + ߚଷܪܯܮ௝ + ߚସܷܯܦ௝ + ߝ (E3.18) 
To estimate Equation (E3.16), (E3.17) and (E3.18), the chapter requires at least 
36 observations. Therefore, stocks with less than 36 monthly returns are dropped 
from the main sample. The estimated coefficient[s] of stock i obtained from Equation 
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(E3.16) [(E3.17) and (E3.18)] is [are] denoted ߚመଵ,௜ଵி [ߚመଵ,௜ଷி, ߚመଶ,௜ଷி, ߚመଷ,௜ଷி and ߚመଵ,௜ସி, ߚመଶ,௜ସி, ߚመଷ,௜ସி, ߚመସ,௜ସி, respectively]. The monthly expected returns for each stock are then calculated 
using these estimated coefficients as follows: 
ܧ(ܴ1ܨ௜,௝௠) = ܴ ௝݂ + ߚመଵ,௜ଵி(ܴ ௝݉ െ ܴ ௝݂) (E3.19) 
ܧ(ܴ3ܨ௜,௝௠) = ܴ ௝݂ + ߚመଵ,௜ଷி(ܴ ௝݉ െ ܴ ௝݂) + ߚመଶ,௜ଷிܵܯܤ௝ + ߚመଷ,௜ଷிܪܯܮ௝  (E3.20) 
ܧ(ܴ4ܨ௜,௝௠) = ܴ ௝݂ + ߚመଵ,௜ସி(ܴ ௝݉ െ ܴ ௝݂) + ߚመଶ,௜ସிܵܯܤ௝ + ߚመଷ,௜ସிܪܯܮ௝ + ߚመସ,௜ସிܷܯܦ௝ (E3.21) 
where: ܧ(ܴ1ܨ௜,௝௠), ܧ(ܴ3ܨ௜,௝௠), ܧ(ܴ4ܨ௜,௝௠) are, respectively, the expected returns of stock 
i in month j using the one-, three- and four-factor model.  
The one-, three- and four-factor abnormal returns are next calculated as follows: 
ܤܪܣܴ1ܨ௜,௧௔ = 	? (1 + ܤܪܴܴ௜,௝௠ )ଵଶ௝ୀଵ െ 	? ൣ1 + ܧ(ܴ1ܨ௜,௝௠)൧ଵଶ௝ୀଵ (݆ =Juneyear t …Mayyear t + 1)  (E3.22) 
ܤܪܣܴ1ܨ௜,௧௔ = 	? (1 + ܤܪܴܴ௜,௝௠ )ଵଶ௝ୀଵ െ 	? ൣ1 + ܧ(ܴ3ܨ௜,௝௠)൧ଵଶ௝ୀଵ (݆ =Juneyear t …Mayyear t + 1)  (E3.23) 
ܤܪܣܴ1ܨ௜,௧௔ = 	? (1 + ܤܪܴܴ௜,௝௠ )ଵଶ௝ୀଵ െ 	? ൣ1 + ܧ(ܴ4ܨ௜,௝௠)൧ଵଶ௝ୀଵ (݆ =Juneyear t …Mayyear t + 1)  (E3.24) 
3.5. RESULTS 
3.5.1. Descriptive statistics and correlations  
Because this chapter employs the same sample as Chapter 2, the descriptive 
statistics of many variables have been presented in Chapter 2 (Section 2.5.2), except 
only for stock returns. Table T3.5 presents descriptive statistics of the measures of 
stock returns. On average, sample stocks earn a raw return of 7.04% per year. The 
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means of all measures of abnormal returns are small but are not zero, mainly because 
of the winsorization procedures. The statistics are, in general, quite comparable with 
other studies of stock returns in the UK (e.g. Hung et al., 2004; Duong et al., 2014). 
Table T3.6 reports the correlation coefficients between stock returns and ESCORE 
as well as its components. In general, a lot of the coefficients are negative and 
significant, especially between returns and ESCORE (coefficients ranging from 9% to 
11%, all are statistically significant). It provides initial evidence that ESCORE is 
related to future stock returns. 
 
Table T3.5. Descriptive statistics (n = 11,920) 
  
Mean 25th percentile Median 75th percentile Standard deviation
BHRRa 0.0704 -0.2843 0.0114 0.3245 0.5467
BHSARa 0.0079 -0.3003 -0.0420 0.2297 0.5047
BHMARa -0.0045 -0.3298 -0.0608 0.2245 0.5227
BHAR1Fa 0.0016 -0.3173 -0.0548 0.2276 0.5192
BHAR3Fa -0.0105 -0.3057 -0.0599 0.1987 0.5018
BHAR4Fa -0.0096 -0.2968 -0.0568 0.2020 0.4976
Notes: The table reports the mean, 25th, 50th (the median), 75th percentiles and standard deviation 
of selected variables. Definitions of variables are in Section 3.8. 
 
Table T3.6.Correlations 
  BHRRa BHSARa BHMARa BHAR1Fa BHAR3Fa BHAR4Fa 
ESEO -0.12 -0.10 -0.11 -0.11 -0.10 -0.10 
EDDEBT -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
EMA -0.07 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 
EOV -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
EROA 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 
EDROA 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 
EDIV 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 
EDISTRESS -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 
EDEBT -0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
ESIZE -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
ECYCLE -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
EAUDIT -0.06 -0.02 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 
EBLOAT -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
ECAP -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 
EBT -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 
ESCORE -0.11 -0.09 -0.10 -0.10 -0.09 -0.09 
Notes: The table reports Pearson correlation coefficients between selected variables. Definitions of 
variables are in Section 3.8. Values reported in italic indicate the corresponding coefficients are 
not significant at 5% level. 
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3.5.2. Portfolio analyses  
This section uses the t-test to compare monthly abnormal returns (i.e. ܤܪܵܣܴ௜,௝௠ , ܤܪܯܣܴ௜,௝௠ , ܤܪܣܴ1ܨ௣,௝௠ , ܤܪܣܴ3ܨ௣,௝௠ , ܤܪܣܴ4ܨ௣,௝௠ ) between various portfolios designed 
based on ESCORE and its components. Following Desai et al. (2004), to avoid the 
potential inflation of t-statistics when assessing the abnormal portfolio returns over 
time, ܤܪܵܣܴ௜,௝௠ , ܤܪܯܣܴ௜,௝௠ , ܤܪܣܴ1ܨ௣,௝௠ , ܤܪܣܴ3ܨ௣,௝௠  and ܤܪܣܴ4ܨ௣,௝௠  are calculated for 
each month (from June 1996 to May 2013 with portfolios being formed at the end of 
May each year based on ESCORE calculated from the previous fiscal year) and each 
monthly return is treated as one observation. The employed t-statistics are calculated 
from 204 time-series monthly observations (across 17 years). 
Table T3.7 compares the mean return of the suspicious stocks identified by 
individual signals and that of the rest of the sample. It could be noted that most 
individual signals are effective in identifying poorly-performing stocks. As a result, the 
portfolios taking long position in stocks which are flagged up by the individual signals 
as suspicious mostly earn negative returns and significantly lower than returns earned 
by the rest of the sample.  
Table T3.8 reports the buy-and-hold returns on each ESCORE portfolio (0-9), 
the low, medium and high ESCORE portfolios as well as the hedge portfolio which 
takes long position in low ESCORE and short position in high ESCORE stocks. The 
t-statistics are reported under the null hypothesis that the corresponding return is 
zero. The results are easy to summarize. First, as ESCORE increases, all measures 
of stock returns decrease quite monotonically. This pattern is graphically illustrated 
by Figure F3.1, F3.2, F3.3, F3.4, F3.5 and F3.6. Secondly, low ESCORE stocks earn 
abnormally high and high ESCORE stocks earn abnormally low returns. Third, the 
hedge portfolio earns positive abnormal returns.  
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Table T3.7.Stock returns of the suspicious firms versus the rest of the sample 
– Buy-and-hold annual returns 
  N   Mean returns 
  
Rest of 
sample Suspicious  
Rest of 
sample Suspicious 
Suspicious - Rest 
of sample t-statistic 
Panel A: ESEO       
BHRRa 9,408 2,512  0.1052 -0.0596 -0.1648 -12.745*** 
BHSARa 9,408 2,512  0.0332 -0.0868 -0.1201 -10.085*** 
BHMARa 9,408 2,512  0.0254 -0.1164 -0.1417 -11.536*** 
BHAR1Fa 9,408 2,512  0.0313 -0.1096 -0.1408 -11.512*** 
BHAR3Fa 9,408 2,512  0.0153 -0.1075 -0.1228 -10.34*** 
BHAR4Fa 9,408 2,512  0.0157 -0.1042 -0.1199 -10.203*** 
Panel B: EDDEBT       
BHRRa 7,402 4,518  0.0889 0.0401 -0.0488 -4.731*** 
BHSARa 7,402 4,518  0.0248 -0.0196 -0.0444 -4.664*** 
BHMARa 7,402 4,518  0.0087 -0.0260 -0.0347 -3.515*** 
BHAR1Fa 7,402 4,518  0.0136 -0.0182 -0.0318 -3.248*** 
BHAR3Fa 7,402 4,518  0.0003 -0.0283 -0.0286 -3.046*** 
BHAR4Fa 7,402 4,518  0.0014 -0.0275 -0.0289 -3.108*** 
Panel C: EMA       
BHRRa 11,326 594  0.0791 -0.0948 -0.1739 -7.577*** 
BHSARa 11,326 594  0.0139 -0.1061 -0.1200 -5.656*** 
BHMARa 11,326 594  0.0009 -0.1067 -0.1076 -4.895*** 
BHAR1Fa 11,326 594  0.0072 -0.1059 -0.1132 -5.183*** 
BHAR3Fa 11,326 594  -0.0051 -0.1133 -0.1081 -5.124*** 
BHAR4Fa 11,326 594  -0.0043 -0.1105 -0.1062 -5.077*** 
Panel D: EOV       
BHRRa 9,344 2,576  0.0765 0.0485 -0.0280 -2.302** 
BHSARa 9,344 2,576  0.0145 -0.0159 -0.0304 -2.707*** 
BHMARa 9,344 2,576  0.0017 -0.0269 -0.0286 -2.459** 
BHAR1Fa 9,344 2,576  0.0072 -0.0188 -0.0260 -2.248** 
BHAR3Fa 9,344 2,576  -0.0074 -0.0221 -0.0147 -1.317 
BHAR4Fa 9,344 2,576  -0.0066 -0.0202 -0.0135 -1.222 
Panel E: EROA       
BHRRa 11,510 410  0.0688 0.1161 0.0473 1.72*  
BHSARa 11,510 410  0.0072 0.0298 0.0226 0.892 
BHMARa 11,510 410  -0.0055 0.0244 0.0299 1.139 
BHAR1Fa 11,510 410  0.0008 0.0224 0.0216 0.826 
BHAR3Fa 11,510 410  -0.0108 -0.0045 0.0062 0.247 
BHAR4Fa 11,510 410  -0.0095 -0.0107 -0.0011 -0.043 
Panel F: EDROA       
BHRRa 11,329 591  0.0674 0.1288 0.0614 3.074*** 
BHSARa 11,329 591  0.0057 0.0508 0.0452 2.503** 
BHMARa 11,329 591  -0.0073 0.0489 0.0561 2.974*** 
BHAR1Fa 11,329 591  -0.0016 0.0627 0.0644 3.475*** 
BHAR3Fa 11,329 591  -0.0132 0.0408 0.0540 3.075*** 
BHAR4Fa 11,329 591  -0.0122 0.0416 0.0538 3.075*** 
Panel G: EDIV       
BHRRa 11,261 659  0.0670 0.1299 0.0629 3.043*** 
BHSARa 11,261 659  0.0053 0.0524 0.0471 2.462** 
BHMARa 11,261 659  -0.0073 0.0442 0.0515 2.589*** 
BHAR1Fa 11,261 659  -0.0011 0.0469 0.0480 2.305** 
BHAR3Fa 11,261 659  -0.0125 0.0223 0.0347 1.819* 
BHAR4Fa 11,261 659  -0.0111 0.0170 0.0281 1.409 
Panel H: EDISTRESS       
BHRRa 10,045 1,875  0.0835 0.0007 -0.0827 -5.196*** 
BHSARa 10,045 1,875  0.0214 -0.0640 -0.0854 -5.806*** 
BHMARa 10,045 1,875  0.0088 -0.0755 -0.0842 -5.48*** 
BHAR1Fa 10,045 1,875  0.0152 -0.0715 -0.0867 -5.693*** 
BHAR3Fa 10,045 1,875  0.0024 -0.0800 -0.0824 -5.561*** 
BHAR4Fa 10,045 1,875  0.0034 -0.0788 -0.0822 -5.594*** 
Panel I: EDEBT       
BHRRa 9,016 2,904  0.0754 0.0550 -0.0205 -1.755* 
BHSARa 9,016 2,904  0.0091 0.0041 -0.0050 -0.464 
BHMARa 9,016 2,904  0.0003 -0.0193 -0.0196 -1.76* 
BHAR1Fa 9,016 2,904  0.0064 -0.0133 -0.0197 -1.777* 
BHAR3Fa 9,016 2,904  -0.0071 -0.0211 -0.0139 -1.299 
BHAR4Fa 9,016 2,904  -0.0065 -0.0191 -0.0126 -1.185 
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Table T3.7 (continued) 
  N   Mean returns 
  
Rest of 
sample Suspicious  
Rest of 
sample Suspicious 
Suspicious - Rest 
of sample t-statistic 
Panel J: ESIZE       
BHRRa 9,342 2,578  0.0744 0.0562 -0.0181 -1.333 
BHSARa 9,342 2,578  0.0095 0.0021 -0.0075 -0.585 
BHMARa 9,342 2,578  -0.0004 -0.0192 -0.0188 -1.431 
BHAR1Fa 9,342 2,578  0.0043 -0.0081 -0.0124 -0.949 
BHAR3Fa 9,342 2,578  -0.0094 -0.0147 -0.0054 -0.422 
BHAR4Fa 9,342 2,578  -0.0065 -0.0208 -0.0144 -1.138 
Panel K: ECYCLE       
BHRRa 11,594 326  0.0734 -0.0358 -0.1092 -3.159*** 
BHSARa 11,594 326  0.0105 -0.0830 -0.0934 -2.83*** 
BHMARa 11,594 326  -0.0018 -0.0995 -0.0977 -2.921*** 
BHAR1Fa 11,594 326  0.0043 -0.0961 -0.1004 -3.004*** 
BHAR3Fa 11,594 326  -0.0079 -0.1057 -0.0979 -3.017*** 
BHAR4Fa 11,594 326  -0.0072 -0.0946 -0.0875 -2.78*** 
Panel L: EAUDIT       
BHRRa 6,612 5,308  0.0977 0.0364 -0.0613 -6.057*** 
BHSARa 6,612 5,308  0.0177 -0.0042 -0.0219 -2.342** 
BHMARa 6,612 5,308  0.0175 -0.0319 -0.0495 -5.107*** 
BHAR1Fa 6,612 5,308  0.0207 -0.0222 -0.0429 -4.465*** 
BHAR3Fa 6,612 5,308  0.0045 -0.0293 -0.0337 -3.626*** 
BHAR4Fa 6,612 5,308  0.0066 -0.0297 -0.0363 -3.933*** 
Panel M: EBLOAT       
BHRRa 9,346 2,574  0.0733 0.0600 -0.0133 -1.049 
BHSARa 9,346 2,574  0.0105 -0.0013 -0.0118 -1.003 
BHMARa 9,346 2,574  -0.0013 -0.0162 -0.0149 -1.22 
BHAR1Fa 9,346 2,574  0.0049 -0.0105 -0.0154 -1.266 
BHAR3Fa 9,346 2,574  -0.0082 -0.0191 -0.0109 -0.929 
BHAR4Fa 9,346 2,574  -0.0072 -0.0181 -0.0108 -0.934 
Panel N: ECAP       
BHRRa 9,349 2,571  0.0793 0.0381 -0.0412 -3.095*** 
BHSARa 9,349 2,571  0.0155 -0.0195 -0.0349 -2.83*** 
BHMARa 9,349 2,571  0.0045 -0.0371 -0.0416 -3.242*** 
BHAR1Fa 9,349 2,571  0.0096 -0.0276 -0.0372 -2.923*** 
BHAR3Fa 9,349 2,571  -0.0047 -0.0319 -0.0273 -2.217** 
BHAR4Fa 9,349 2,571  -0.0030 -0.0333 -0.0303 -2.476** 
Panel O: EBT       
BHRRa 9,358 2,562  0.0925 -0.0101 -0.1026 -7.695*** 
BHSARa 9,358 2,562  0.0275 -0.0637 -0.0912 -7.359*** 
BHMARa 9,358 2,562  0.0177 -0.0854 -0.1031 -8.048*** 
BHAR1Fa 9,358 2,562  0.0238 -0.0798 -0.1036 -8.148*** 
BHAR3Fa 9,358 2,562  0.0095 -0.0838 -0.0933 -7.531*** 
BHAR4Fa 9,358 2,562  0.0103 -0.0823 -0.0926 -7.506*** 
Notes: The table reports the number of observations and returns of the suspicious firms versus the 
rest of the sample, together with the t-statistic under the null that the difference is zero. Definitions 




Table T3.8. Stock returns across ESCORE groups – Equally-weighted scheme 
ESCORE BHRRm   BHSARm   BHMARm   BHAR1Fm   BHAR3Fm   BHAR4Fm 
  Return t-statistic  Return t-statistic  Return t-statistic  Return t-statistic  Return t-statistic  Return t-statistic 
0 1.10 3.252***   0.48 3.694***   0.44 1.866*   0.50 2.109**   0.36 2.391**   0.33 2.086**  
1 0.91 2.669***   0.32 4.041***   0.25 1.127  0.29 1.299  0.14 1.26  0.18 1.553 
2 0.80 2.474**   0.23 3.678***   0.14 0.618  0.20 0.918  0.08 0.614  0.08 0.636 
3 0.55 1.688*   0.01 0.134  -0.11 -0.482  -0.04 -0.185  -0.17 -1.326  -0.16 -1.243 
4 0.20 0.549  -0.27 -2.709***   -0.45 -1.727*   -0.42 -1.604  -0.56 -3.399***   -0.46 -2.752***  
5 -0.19 -0.503  -0.61 -4.178***   -0.85 -2.805***   -0.77 -2.604***   -0.89 -4.036***   -0.80 -3.483***  
6 -0.35 -0.784  -0.72 -3.146***   -1.00 -2.795***   -0.97 -2.683***   -1.11 -3.791***   -1.09 -3.586***  
7 -0.11 -0.211  -0.52 -1.512  -0.76 -1.88*   -0.76 -1.863*   -0.80 -2.156**   -0.80 -2.075**  
8 -2.02 -2.573**   -2.31 -3.562***   -2.61 -3.591***   -2.59 -3.543***   -2.67 -3.998***   -2.49 -3.565***  
9 -0.84 -0.786  -0.83 -0.883  -1.38 -1.348  -1.31 -1.279  -1.55 -1.561  -1.56 -1.534 
Low (0) 1.10 3.252***   0.48 3.694***   0.44 1.866*   0.50 2.109**   0.36 2.391**   0.33 2.086**  
Medium (1-5) 0.55 1.683*   0.02 1.121  -0.10 -0.461  -0.05 -0.221  -0.18 -1.614  -0.14 -1.239 
High (6-9) -0.31 -0.742  -0.69 -3.662***   -0.97 -2.978***   -0.94 -2.873***   -1.05 -4.129***   -1.04 -3.923***  
Low - High 1.41 5.156***   1.17 4.584***   1.41 5.156***   1.43 5.241***   1.42 5.279***   1.37 5.102***  
Notes: The table reports the returns on different portfolios formed on the basis of ESCORE. Definitions of variables are in Section 3.8. * , * * , *** indicate significance at 10%, 




Figure F3.1. Buy-and-hold monthly raw returns across ESCORE groups – 
Equally-weighted scheme 
 
Notes: Definitions of variables are in Section 3.8. 
 
 
Figure F3.2. Buy-and-hold monthly size-adjusted returns across ESCORE 
groups – Equally-weighted scheme 
 


































Figure F3.3. Buy-and-hold monthly market-adjusted returns across ESCORE 
groups – Equally-weighted scheme 
 
Notes: Definitions of variables are in Section 3.8. 
 
 
Figure F3.4. Buy-and-hold monthly one-factor abnormal returns across 
ESCORE groups – Equally-weighted scheme 
 





































Figure F3.5. Buy-and-hold monthly three-factor abnormal returns across 
ESCORE groups – Equally-weighted scheme 
 
Notes: Definitions of variables are in Section 3.8. 
 
 
Figure F3.6. Buy-and-hold monthly four-factor abnormal returns across 
ESCORE groups – Equally-weighted scheme 
 




































Since the results are quite consistent across different return metrics, only the 
results based on abnormal returns estimated using the four-factor model are 
discussed. The portfolio of stocks with ESCORE of zero earns an abnormal return of 
0.33% per month (significant at 5% level). As ESCORE increases, abnormal returns 
decrease quite monotonically. The high ESCORE portfolio (includes all stocks with 
ESCORE of six or higher) earns an abnormal return of –1.04% (significant at 1% 
level). The hedge portfolio that takes long position in low ESCORE stocks and short 
position in high ESCORE stocks earns 1.37% abnormal return per month. To put the 
results in perspective, the findings are compared with other similar return anomalies 
documented in the literature, especially in the UK. Sloan (1996) documents an annual 
size-adjusted return of 10.4% on a hedge portfolio which takes long position in stocks 
with low and short in those with high accruals. Soares and Stark (2009) provide similar 
results showing that the accruals anomaly exists in the UK with the hedge portfolio 
earning an abnormal return (adjusted for size and book-to-market factors but without 
controlling for transaction costs) of 18.7% per year. The annualized return on the 
hedge portfolio based on ESCORE is 17.74% (1.0137^12 – 1), which is non-trivial in 
economic terms. Overall, the result strongly suggests that the market misprices the 
information contained in ESCORE, which is designed to capture the context of 
earnings management.  
3.5.3. Other ‘market anomalies’ in disguise?  
The results from the portfolio analyses strongly suggest that ESCORE is 
correlated with future returns. However, because of the way ESCORE is constructed, 
there are some other known ‘market anomalies’ that are associated with ESCORE, 
and hence could partly explain the returns predictive power of ESCORE. This section 
addresses such concern. 
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To see if ESCORE is indeed related to other known patterns in realized returns, 
Table T3.9 presents basic financial characteristics of stocks across ESCORE groups. 
Firm size, measured by either total assets or market capitalization, is negatively 
related with ESCORE. Firms with higher ESCORE are also more likely to issue 
seasoned equity and debt as well as have lower NOA. High ESCORE firms are also 
highly valued by the market evidenced by the monotonic increase of the market-to-
book ratio across the ESCORE groups. The decrease of ROA and DROA as 
ESCORE increases also suggests that high ESCORE stocks are typically less 
profitable. High ESCORE stocks are also more financially distressed as measured by 
the ZSCORE. 
The above observed patterns impose a concern whether ESCORE could 
predict future returns beyond the known return effects embedded in it. To start with, 
it is clear that the components of ESCORE is selected based on the literature of 
earnings management, and not from the literature of market anomalies. Therefore, 
the signals embedded in ESCORE do not necessarily include only those which are 




Table T3.9. Fundamental characteristics across ESCORE groups 
  ESCORE 
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
TA(£ million) 733 615 458 348 264 130 92 41 33 11 
SALE (£ million) 703 611 472 362 274 140 97 65 67 9 
NI (£ million) 41 32 23 16 10 2 -1 -1 -3 -1 
DIV (£ million) 18 15 12 9 6 2 1 1 1 0 
MVE (£ million) 689 576 443 349 270 134 94 61 25 17 
DSHARE 0.0054 0.0224 0.0445 0.0904 0.1763 0.2677 0.3677 0.4911 0.6565 0.9111 
DDEBT -0.2765 0.1760 0.5336 1.6761 2.3236 3.6770 4.2057 5.4630 7.7978 8.8561 
MTB 2.2047 2.3857 2.8669 3.2708 4.1842 4.3591 5.2342 6.4006 6.0342 5.9664 
ROA 0.0589 0.0552 0.0476 0.0169 -0.0360 -0.1153 -0.2325 -0.3791 -0.4571 -0.5874 
DROA 0.0335 0.0219 0.0185 0.0151 0.0074 -0.0018 -0.0071 -0.0346 -0.0026 -0.1953 
DIVDEF 0.0343 0.0286 0.0208 -0.0086 -0.0598 -0.1320 -0.2451 -0.3863 -0.4589 -0.5908 
ZSCORE 17.9433 16.6083 15.9328 13.6591 9.5750 7.0799 -1.1646 -4.3763 -8.2776 -12.5474 
DEBT 0.1668 0.1755 0.1676 0.1572 0.1439 0.1289 0.1225 0.1038 0.1010 0.0760 
NOA 0.5701 0.5603 0.5314 0.4906 0.4458 0.4340 0.3992 0.3501 0.3683 0.3702 
CAP 0.5874 0.5562 0.5030 0.4316 0.3667 0.3127 0.2840 0.2453 0.2187 0.1969 
BOOKTAX 0.0587 0.0831 0.1952 0.4172 1.0355 2.8103 3.8965 4.3297 4.0088 4.5332 
DAC 0.0070 0.0054 0.0127 0.0085 0.0037 0.0079 -0.0101 -0.0239 -0.0059 0.0125 
ESEO 0.0000 0.0437 0.1084 0.2230 0.3290 0.4608 0.5934 0.6810 0.7614 0.9615 
EDDEBT 0.0000 0.2674 0.4017 0.4746 0.4412 0.4718 0.4721 0.4526 0.5568 0.5000 
EMA 0.0000 0.0063 0.0191 0.0470 0.0818 0.1207 0.1503 0.1681 0.2841 0.5000 
ECYCLE 0.0000 0.0032 0.0062 0.0189 0.0400 0.0915 0.0886 0.1293 0.1591 0.3077 
EAUDIT 0.0000 0.2029 0.3921 0.5254 0.6209 0.6982 0.8054 0.8491 0.9773 0.9615 
Notes: The table reports the mean of selected variables across groups sorted by ESCORE. Definitions of variables are in Section 3.8.
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The chapter further argues that the predictive power of ESCORE comes from 
the context of earnings management which is revealed collectively by the composite 
ESCORE, not by the predictive power of the individual signals separately. In fact, 
some signals, including ESIZE and EBLOAT, even predict future returns, based on 
the established literature, in the opposite direction because stocks with ESIZE and 
EBLOAT of one (smaller stocks and those which have smaller NOA) are expected to 
earn higher (not lower) future returns based on the established evidence of the size 
effect (e.g. Banz, 1981) and the irrational market reaction to balance sheet bloat 
(Hirshleifer et al., 2004). Meanwhile, the literature is silent about whether other 
signals, including EROA, EDROA, EDIV, EMA, EDEBT, EDDEBT, ECYCLE, EAUDIT 
and EBT, could predict future returns25. The concern lies, therefore, mainly with the 
high market-to-book ratio, high likelihood of issuing seasoned equity, more financial 
distress and low profitability of high ESCORE stocks. It has been widely documented 
that abnormally low returns are associated with high market-to-book firms (e.g. Fama 
and French, 1992; Lakonishok et al., 1994), seasoned equity offers (Loughran and 
Ritter, 1995; Spiess and Affleck-Graves, 1995), firms with negative ZSCORE 
(Agarwal and Taffler, 2008), and firms with lower profitability (Ou and Penman, 1989; 
Piotroski, 2000; Fama and French, 2006). Those known patterns of returns are 
embedded in ESCORE through EOV, ESEO and EDISTRESS. In addition, because 
ESCORE is designed to capture the context of earnings management, it is also 
important to control for the documented market mispricing of discretionary accruals 
(Xie, 2001). To demonstrate that ESCORE is still associated with future returns after 
controlling for the above anomalies, the following regressions are estimated: 
                                                             
25
 The literature (e.g. Agrawal et al., 1992) also suggests that firms would typically suffer 
negative returns after an M&A. However, the documented negative returns are generally 
measured following the date the deal is completed. EMA is defined in this thesis as a dummy 
which turns on if a firm announces a share-for-share deal in a year. In some cases, the 
completion date could be a long time after the announcement date, hence the existing 
literature might not indicate that EMA is related to returns.  
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ܴܧ ௜ܶ,௧ାଵ௔ = ߙ + ߚଵܮ݊൫ܯܸܧ௜,௧൯ + ߚଶܯܶܤ௜,௧ + ߚଷܴܱܣ௜,௧ + ߚସܧܵܧ ௜ܱ,௧ +ߚହܧܦܫܴܵܶܧܵ ௜ܵ,௧ + ߚ଺ܱܰܣ௜,௧ + ߚ଻ܦܣܥ௜,௧ + ߛܧܵܥܱܴܧ௜,௧ + ߝ (E3.25) 
where: ܴܧ ௜ܶ,௧ାଵ௔  is annual buy-and-hold return of stock i measured from June year t+1 
to May year t+2 and is replaced by ܤܪܴܴ௜,௧ାଵ௔ , ܤܪܵܣܴ௜,௧ାଵ௔ , ܤܪܯܣܴ௜,௧ାଵ௔ , ܤܪܣܴ1ܨ௜,௧ାଵ௔ , ܤܪܣܴ3ܨ௜,௧ାଵ௔  and ܤܪܣܴ4ܨ௜,௧ାଵ௔ ; ܮ݋݃൫ܯܸܧ௜,௧൯ is natural logarithm of MVE of stock i at 
the end of year t.26 
If ESCORE could predict future stock returns beyond the anomalies embedded 
in it, ߛ in Equation (E3.25) is predicted to be negative. Table T3.10 presents the 
results of estimating Equation (E3.25) where BHRRa is the dependent variable. 
Specification 1 of the table reports the full specification of Equation (E3.25). The table 
also reports four other specifications where ESCORE and DAC are dropped one by 
one and both together as well as where only ESCORE and DAC are kept as 
explanatory variables. Panel A reports the results obtained from a pooled regression. 
To respond to the concern raised recently about the problems associated with 
regressions using panel data in which the residuals are both serially and cross-
sectionally correlated (Petersen, 2009; Gow et al., 2010), Panel B also reports the 
results of a regression using the methodology pioneered by Fama and MacBeth 
(1973) with the t-statistics calculated using corrected standard errors following the 
procedures introduced by Newey and West (1987). In particular, in the Fama-
Macbeth regressions, Equation (E3.25) is estimated in each of the sample years and 
the mean of the annual estimated coefficients are reported. The t-statistics, which are 
calculated based on the distributions of the annual estimated coefficients, are treated 
for serial correlations using Newey-West procedures. In a similar fashion, Table T3.11 
                                                             
26
 To mitigate any residual concerns about the potential relation between EMA and returns 
as discussed above, the chapter adds EMA to Equation (E3.25) and replicates all main 
analyses. Unreported results show that the main conclusions of the chapter are not 
qualitatively affected after controlling for EMA. 
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(T3.12, T3.13, T3.14 and T3.15) presents the results where BHSARa (BHMARa, 
BHAR1Fa, BHAR3Fa and BHAR4Fa, respectively) is the dependent variable. 
Looking at Specification 4 (i.e. returns regressed on all explanatory variables 
except ESCORE and DAC) across Table T3.10 to Table T3.15, all control variables 
have the predicted signs. DAC, added in Specification 3, is always negative and 
significant, which is in line with the existing literature (e.g. Xie, 2001). The main focus 
is on the coefficient on ESCORE. Looking at Specification 1 (i.e. the full regression), 
ESCORE is always negative and significant across the tables. Comparing 
Specification 1 to Specification 3, adding ESCORE generally increases the adjusted 
R2. Chapter 2 has shown that ESCORE, although being constructed using a different 
methodology, is highly correlated with DAC. Therefore, Specification 2 drops DAC 
from the regressions. As shown in the tables, ESCORE remains negative and 
significant after dropping DAC. It could be therefore concluded that ESCORE can 
predict stock returns beyond the existing anomalies. In Panel B of Table T3.15, 
Specification 1 shows that one unit increase in ESCORE pulls annual four-factor risk-
adjusted returns down by 1.40%. As a comparison with the portfolio analysis where 
there is no control for other market ‘anomalies’, the annualized buy-and-hold four-
factor risk-adjusted returns of the hedge portfolio reported in Table T3.8 is 17.74% 
(1.0137^12 – 1). The average ESCORE of the low ESCORE portfolio is 0 and that of 
the high ESCORE portfolio is 6.56 [(519x6 + 232x7 + 88x8 + 26x9) / 865]27, yielding 
a difference of –6.56. Therefore, after adjusting for other known market anomalies 
the four-factor risk-adjusted returns on the hedge portfolio shrink from 17.74% to 
9.18% per year (1.40 x 6.56), which is still highly significant in economic terms. 
                                                             
27
 See Table T2.10 for the number of observations in each ESCORE group. 
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  Spec. 1     Spec. 2     Spec. 3     Spec. 4     Spec. 5 
  Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic 
(1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10)   (11) (12) 
Panel A: Pooled regression 
INTERCEPT  0.3137 8.431***   0.3079 8.275***   0.2101 6.385***   0.1961 5.979***   0.1685 18.133***  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0075 -2.6***   -0.0064 -2.245**   -0.0032 -1.157  -0.0017 -0.629    
MTBi,t (-) -0.0044 -4.091***   -0.0046 -4.221***   -0.0051 -4.776***   -0.0054 -4.973***     
ROAi,t (+) 0.1881 6.16***   0.1547 5.244***   0.2034 6.677***   0.1666 5.651***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0920 -6.563***   -0.0951 -6.794***   -0.1251 -9.722***   -0.1311 -10.224***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) 0.0088 0.485  0.0154 0.857  -0.0165 -0.938  -0.0107 -0.61    
NOAi,t (-) -0.1326 -5.741***   -0.1387 -6.012***   -0.1112 -4.865***   -0.1165 -5.102***     
DACi,t (-) -0.1774 -4.189***      -0.1996 -4.727***      -0.1030 -2.59***  
ESCOREi,t (-) -0.0220 -5.936***   -0.0234 -6.328***         -0.0356 -12.425***  
Adjusted R2 (%)  2.73   2.58   2.44   2.26   1.32  
Panel B: Fama-MacBeth regression with Newey-West adjusted t-statistic 
INTERCEPT  0.2794 4.14***   0.2756 3.98***   0.1947 2.44**   0.1810 2.21**   0.1587 4.23***  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0059 -1.05  -0.0049 -0.86  -0.0021 -0.33  -0.0007 -0.11    
MTBi,t (-) -0.0025 -1.34  -0.0027 -1.4  -0.0030 -1.69  -0.0032 -1.8*     
ROAi,t (+) 0.1645 3.54***   0.1255 3.09***   0.1806 4.26***   0.1383 3.81***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0584 -3.56***   -0.0605 -3.41***   -0.0831 -3.67***   -0.0884 -3.65***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0282 -1.35  -0.0211 -1.03  -0.0484 -1.71  -0.0428 -1.54    
NOAi,t (-) -0.1291 -4.77***   -0.1359 -4.94***   -0.1107 -3.55***   -0.1162 -3.71***     
DACi,t (-) -0.1802 -3.47***      -0.2013 -3.47***      -0.0869 -2.21**  
ESCOREi,t (-) -0.0166 -2.1*    -0.0184 -2.24**                -0.0294 -2.84**  
Notes: Specification 1 (column 3 and 4) report the results of estimating the following equation:  ܤܪܴܴ௜,௧ାଵ௔ = ߙ + ߚଵܮ݋݃൫ܯܸܧ௜,௧൯ + ߚଶܯܶܤ௜,௧ + ߚଷܴܱܣ௜,௧ + ߚସܧܵܧ ௜ܱ,௧ + ߚହܧܦܫܴܵܶܧܵ ௜ܵ,௧ + ߚ଺ܱܰܣ௜,௧ + ߚ଻ܦܣܥ௜,௧ + ߛܧܵܥܱܴܧ௜,௧ + ߝ.  (E3.25) 
From Specification 1 as the full specification, in Specification 2 DAC is dropped, in Specification 3 ESCORE is dropped, in Specification 4 DAC and ESCORE are dropped, in 
Specification 5 Ln(MVE), MTB, ROA, ESEO, EDISTRESS, NOA are dropped from the explanatory variables. Panel A (B) reports the results from the pooled regression (Fama-
Macbeth regression in which the standard errors are adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West procedure). Column (2) exhibits the expected sign of the explanatory 
variables. ‘Spec.’ is abbreviation for ‘Specification’ and ‘Coef.’ is abbreviation for ‘Coefficient’. Definitions of variables are in Section 3.8. * , * * , *** indicate significance at 
10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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  Spec. 1     Spec. 2     Spec. 3     Spec. 4     Spec. 5 
  Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic 
(1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10)   (11) (12) 
Panel A: Pooled regression 
INTERCEPT  0.2853 8.283***   0.2796 8.117***   0.2044 6.713***   0.1911 6.295***   0.0822 9.559***  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0131 -4.926***   -0.0121 -4.558***   -0.0098 -3.796***   -0.0084 -3.266***     
MTBi,t (-) -0.0024 -2.414**   -0.0026 -2.552**   -0.0030 -2.989***   -0.0032 -3.191***     
ROAi,t (+) 0.1828 6.468***   0.1502 5.501***   0.1948 6.91***   0.1597 5.853***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0572 -4.41***   -0.0603 -4.651***   -0.0831 -6.977***   -0.0888 -7.482***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0227 -1.357  -0.0162 -0.971  -0.0424 -2.606***   -0.0369 -2.271**     
NOAi,t (-) -0.1228 -5.741***   -0.1287 -6.026***   -0.1060 -5.014***   -0.1112 -5.258***     
DACi,t (-) -0.1731 -4.416***      -0.1905 -4.874***      -0.0804 -2.185**  
ESCOREi,t (-) -0.0172 -5.006***   -0.0186 -5.415***         -0.0270 -10.168***  
Adjusted R2 (%)  2.20   2.04   1.99   1.80   0.89  
Panel B: Fama-MacBeth regression with Newey-West adjusted t-statistic 
INTERCEPT  0.2955 4.66***   0.2918 4.39***   0.2069 5.81***   0.1938 5.24***   0.0786 3.33***  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0135 -3.12***   -0.0127 -2.84**   -0.0097 -3.14***   -0.0084 -2.69**     
MTBi,t (-) -0.0023 -1.3  -0.0025 -1.36  -0.0028 -1.69  -0.0031 -1.8*     
ROAi,t (+) 0.1669 3.55***   0.1315 3.13***   0.1824 4.26***   0.1436 3.84***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0529 -3.22***   -0.0548 -3.08***   -0.0788 -3.45***   -0.0838 -3.43***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0281 -1.29  -0.0215 -1.01  -0.0493 -1.72  -0.0442 -1.57    
NOAi,t (-) -0.1300 -4.43***   -0.1358 -4.58***   -0.1106 -3.4***   -0.1153 -3.54***     
DACi,t (-) -0.1627 -3.08***      -0.1846 -3.15***      -0.0709 -1.83*  
ESCOREi,t (-) -0.0175 -2.38**    -0.0192 -2.5**                -0.0251 -3.15***  
Notes: Specification 1 (columns 3 and 4) report the results of estimating the following equation:  ܤܪܵܣܴ௜,௧ାଵ௔ = ߙ + ߚଵܮ݋݃൫ܯܸܧ௜,௧൯ + ߚଶܯܶܤ௜,௧ + ߚଷܴܱܣ௜,௧ + ߚସܧܵܧ ௜ܱ,௧ + ߚହܧܦܫܴܵܶܧܵ ௜ܵ,௧ + ߚ଺ܱܰܣ௜,௧ + ߚ଻ܦܣܥ௜,௧ + ߛܧܵܥܱܴܧ௜,௧ + ߝ.  (E3.25) 
From Specification 1 as the full specification, in Specification 2 DAC is dropped, in Specification 3 ESCORE is dropped, in Specification 4 DAC and ESCORE are dropped, in 
Specification 5 Ln(MVE), MTB, ROA, ESEO, EDISTRESS, NOA are dropped from the explanatory variables. Panel A (B) reports the results from the pooled regression (Fama-
Macbeth regression in which the standard errors are adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West procedure). Column (2) exhibits the expected sign of the explanatory 
variables. ‘Spec.’ is abbreviation for ‘Specification’ and ‘Coef.’ is abbreviation for ‘Coefficient’. Definitions of variables are in Section 3.8. * , * * , *** indicate significance at 
10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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  Spec. 1     Spec. 2     Spec. 3     Spec. 4     Spec. 5 
  Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic 
(1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10)   (11) (12) 
Panel A: Pooled regression 
INTERCEPT  0.1736 4.867***   0.1680 4.709***   0.0875 2.774***   0.0742 2.362**   0.0831 9.35***  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0042 -1.505  -0.0032 -1.146  -0.0006 -0.231  0.0008 0.296    
MTBi,t (-) -0.0031 -3.002***   -0.0033 -3.133***   -0.0037 -3.595***   -0.0039 -3.79***     
ROAi,t (+) 0.1570 5.364***   0.1249 4.416***   0.1698 5.814***   0.1349 4.774***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0791 -5.89***   -0.0822 -6.121***   -0.1067 -8.65***   -0.1123 -9.142***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0068 -0.395  -0.0004 -0.025  -0.0278 -1.651*   -0.0224 -1.329    
NOAi,t (-) -0.1049 -4.734***   -0.1107 -5.005***   -0.0870 -3.973***   -0.0921 -4.208***     
DACi,t (-) -0.1706 -4.203***      -0.1891 -4.673***      -0.0994 -2.611***  
ESCOREi,t (-) -0.0183 -5.147***   -0.0196 -5.538***         -0.0318 -11.598***  
Adjusted R2 (%)  2.21   2.07   1.99   1.81   1.16  
Panel B: Fama-MacBeth regression with Newey-West adjusted t-statistic 
INTERCEPT  0.1954 3.02***   0.1916 2.9**   0.1107 1.39  0.0970 1.18  0.0747 1.76*  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0059 -1.05  -0.0049 -0.86  -0.0021 -0.33  -0.0007 -0.11    
MTBi,t (-) -0.0025 -1.34  -0.0027 -1.4  -0.0030 -1.69  -0.0032 -1.8*     
ROAi,t (+) 0.1645 3.54***   0.1255 3.09***   0.1806 4.26***   0.1383 3.81***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0584 -3.56***   -0.0605 -3.41***   -0.0831 -3.67***   -0.0884 -3.65***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0282 -1.35  -0.0211 -1.03  -0.0484 -1.71  -0.0428 -1.54    
NOAi,t (-) -0.1291 -4.77***   -0.1359 -4.94***   -0.1107 -3.55***   -0.1162 -3.71***     
DACi,t (-) -0.1802 -3.47***      -0.2013 -3.47***      -0.0869 -2.21**  
ESCOREi,t (-) -0.0166 -2.1*    -0.0184 -2.24**                -0.0294 -2.84**  
Notes: Specification 1 (columns 3 and 4) report the results of estimating the following equation:  ܤܪܯܣ ௜ܴ,௧ାଵ௔ = ߙ + ߚଵܮ݋݃൫ܯܸܧ௜,௧൯ + ߚଶܯܶܤ௜,௧ + ߚଷܴܱܣ௜,௧ + ߚସܧܵܧ ௜ܱ,௧ + ߚହܧܦܫܴܵܶܧܵ ௜ܵ,௧ + ߚ଺ܱܰܣ௜,௧ + ߚ଻ܦܣܥ௜,௧ + ߛܧܵܥܱܴܧ௜,௧ + ߝ.  (E3.25) 
From Specification 1 as the full specification, in Specification 2 DAC is dropped, in Specification 3 ESCORE is dropped, in Specification 4 DAC and ESCORE are dropped, in 
Specification 5 Ln(MVE), MTB, ROA, ESEO, EDISTRESS, NOA are dropped from the explanatory variables. Panel A (B) reports the results from the pooled regression (Fama-
Macbeth regression in which the standard errors are adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West procedure). Column (2) exhibits the expected sign of the explanatory 
variables. ‘Spec.’ is abbreviation for ‘Specification’ and ‘Coef.’ is abbreviation for ‘Coefficient’. Definitions of variables are in Section 3.8. * , * * , *** indicate significance at 
10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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  Spec. 1     Spec. 2     Spec. 3     Spec. 4     Spec. 5 
  Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic 
(1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10)   (11) (12) 
Panel A: Pooled regression 
INTERCEPT  0.2022 5.707***   0.1962 5.537***   0.1230 3.929***   0.1090 3.493***   0.0858 9.707***  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0068 -2.485**   -0.0057 -2.099**   -0.0036 -1.34  -0.0021 -0.785    
MTBi,t (-) -0.0028 -2.684***   -0.0029 -2.825***   -0.0033 -3.233***   -0.0035 -3.439***     
ROAi,t (+) 0.1724 5.93***   0.1379 4.912***   0.1841 6.351***   0.1473 5.249***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0792 -5.932***   -0.0824 -6.18***   -0.1045 -8.531***   -0.1104 -9.051***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0121 -0.704  -0.0052 -0.305  -0.0314 -1.877*   -0.0256 -1.533    
NOAi,t (-) -0.1005 -4.568***   -0.1068 -4.859***   -0.0841 -3.866***   -0.0895 -4.115***     
DACi,t (-) -0.1828 -4.535***      -0.1998 -4.972***      -0.0995 -2.631***  
ESCOREi,t (-) -0.0168 -4.763***   -0.0183 -5.181***         -0.0306 -11.21***  
Adjusted R2 (%)  2.25   2.08   2.06   1.86   1.09  
Panel B: Fama-MacBeth regression with Newey-West adjusted t-statistic 
INTERCEPT  0.2244 3.42***   0.2205 3.25***   0.1487 2.01*   0.1347 1.77*   0.0773 2.12**  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0087 -1.39  -0.0078 -1.22  -0.0054 -0.8  -0.0040 -0.57    
MTBi,t (-) -0.0022 -1.18  -0.0024 -1.26  -0.0026 -1.51  -0.0029 -1.65    
ROAi,t (+) 0.1832 3.89***   0.1418 3.62***   0.1985 4.43***   0.1544 4.25***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0576 -3.69***   -0.0600 -3.51***   -0.0798 -3.56***   -0.0854 -3.55***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0324 -1.59  -0.0250 -1.27  -0.0501 -1.81*   -0.0444 -1.63    
NOAi,t (-) -0.1198 -4.53***   -0.1271 -4.73***   -0.1035 -3.52***   -0.1094 -3.71***     
DACi,t (-) -0.1919 -3.53***      -0.2110 -3.53***      -0.0854 -2.28**  
ESCOREi,t (-) -0.0148 -1.94*    -0.0167 -2.1*                -0.0275 -2.73**  
Notes: Specification 1 (columns 3 and 4) report the results of estimating the following equation:  ܤܪܣܴ1ܨ௜,௧ାଵ௔ = ߙ + ߚଵܮ݋݃൫ܯܸܧ௜,௧൯ + ߚଶܯܶܤ௜,௧ + ߚଷܴܱܣ௜,௧ + ߚସܧܵܧ ௜ܱ,௧ + ߚହܧܦܫܴܵܶܧܵ ௜ܵ,௧ + ߚ଺ܱܰܣ௜,௧ + ߚ଻ܦܣܥ௜,௧ + ߛܧܵܥܱܴܧ௜,௧ + ߝ.  (E3.25) 
From Specification 1 as the full specification, in Specification 2 DAC is dropped, in Specification 3 ESCORE is dropped, in Specification 4 DAC and ESCORE are dropped, in 
Specification 5 Ln(MVE), MTB, ROA, ESEO, EDISTRESS, NOA are dropped from the explanatory variables. Panel A (B) reports the results from the pooled regression (Fama-
Macbeth regression in which the standard errors are adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West procedure). Column (2) exhibits the expected sign of the explanatory 
variables. ‘Spec.’ is abbreviation for ‘Specification’ and ‘Coef.’ is abbreviation for ‘Coefficient’. Definitions of variables are in Section 3.8. * , * * , *** indicate significance at 
10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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  Spec. 1     Spec. 2     Spec. 3     Spec. 4     Spec. 5 
  Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic 
(1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10)   (11) (12) 
Panel A: Pooled regression 
INTERCEPT  0.1824 5.32***   0.1767 5.154***   0.1165 3.844***   0.1034 3.421***   0.0613 7.165***  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0068 -2.563**   -0.0058 -2.186**   -0.0041 -1.591  -0.0027 -1.055    
MTBi,t (-) -0.0015 -1.55  -0.0017 -1.689*   -0.0020 -2.019**   -0.0022 -2.22**     
ROAi,t (+) 0.1555 5.525***   0.1228 4.519***   0.1653 5.89***   0.1307 4.813***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0686 -5.31***   -0.0717 -5.553***   -0.0897 -7.568***   -0.0953 -8.069***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0250 -1.502  -0.0185 -1.114  -0.0411 -2.537**   -0.0357 -2.206**     
NOAi,t (-) -0.1096 -5.148***   -0.1156 -5.434***   -0.0960 -4.559***   -0.1010 -4.801***     
DACi,t (-) -0.1733 -4.44***      -0.1875 -4.819***      -0.0932 -2.548**  
ESCOREi,t (-) -0.0140 -4.101***   -0.0154 -4.509***         -0.0261 -9.873***  
Adjusted R2 (%)  1.94   1.78   1.80   1.61   0.85  
Panel B: Fama-MacBeth regression with Newey-West adjusted t-statistic 
INTERCEPT  0.2047 3.2***  0.2012 3.06***   0.1401 1.85*   0.1275 1.64  0.0531 2.04*  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0093 -1.51  -0.0084 -1.36  -0.0064 -0.94  -0.0051 -0.74    
MTBi,t (-) -0.0011 -0.82  -0.0013 -0.92  -0.0015 -1.21  -0.0017 -1.39    
ROAi,t (+) 0.1569 3.53***   0.1199 3.21***   0.1708 4.02***   0.1311 3.73***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0527 -3.55***   -0.0547 -3.4***   -0.0710 -3.26***   -0.0761 -3.26***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0389 -2.55**   -0.0324 -2.22**   -0.0543 -2.37**   -0.0493 -2.2**     
NOAi,t (-) -0.1154 -4.73***   -0.1217 -4.9***   -0.1014 -3.57***   -0.1064 -3.75***     
DACi,t (-) -0.1706 -3.21***      -0.1890 -3.29***      -0.0765 -2.14**  
ESCOREi,t (-) -0.0125 -1.73   -0.0142 -1.89*                -0.0229 -2.24**  
Notes: Specification 1 (columns 3 and 4) report the results of estimating the following equation:  ܤܪܣܴ3ܨ௜,௧ାଵ௔ = ߙ + ߚଵܮ݋݃൫ܯܸܧ௜,௧൯ + ߚଶܯܶܤ௜,௧ + ߚଷܴܱܣ௜,௧ + ߚସܧܵܧ ௜ܱ,௧ + ߚହܧܦܫܴܵܶܧܵ ௜ܵ,௧ + ߚ଺ܱܰܣ௜,௧ + ߚ଻ܦܣܥ௜,௧ + ߛܧܵܥܱܴܧ௜,௧ + ߝ.  (E3.25) 
From Specification 1 as the full specification, in Specification 2 DAC is dropped, in Specification 3 ESCORE is dropped, in Specification 4 DAC and ESCORE are dropped, in 
Specification 5 Ln(MVE), MTB, ROA, ESEO, EDISTRESS, NOA are dropped from the explanatory variables. Panel A (B) reports the results from the pooled regression (Fama-
Macbeth regression in which the standard errors are adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West procedure). Column (2) exhibits the expected sign of the explanatory 
variables. ‘Spec.’ is abbreviation for ‘Specification’ and ‘Coef.’ is abbreviation for ‘Coefficient’. Definitions of variables are in Section 3.8. * , * * , *** indicate significance at 
10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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  Spec. 1     Spec. 2     Spec. 3     Spec. 4     Spec. 5 
  Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic 
(1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10)   (11) (12) 
Panel A: Pooled regression 
INTERCEPT  0.1647 4.843***   0.1586 4.662***   0.0932 3.1***  0.0791 2.639***   0.0642 7.575***  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0045 -1.7*   -0.0034 -1.289  -0.0015 -0.602  0.0000 -0.016    
MTBi,t (-) -0.0012 -1.178  -0.0013 -1.327  -0.0017 -1.687*   -0.0019 -1.904*     
ROAi,t (+) 0.1380 4.946***   0.1030 3.822***   0.1486 5.341***   0.1115 4.141***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0653 -5.096***   -0.0686 -5.357***   -0.0882 -7.5***   -0.0941 -8.038***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0290 -1.755*   -0.0220 -1.336  -0.0464 -2.89***   -0.0406 -2.531**     
NOAi,t (-) -0.1191 -5.641***   -0.1255 -5.949***   -0.1043 -4.997***   -0.1097 -5.257***     
DACi,t (-) -0.1857 -4.799***      -0.2011 -5.213***      -0.1144 -3.155***  
ESCOREi,t (-) -0.0152 -4.485***   -0.0167 -4.925***         -0.0267 -10.216***  
Adjusted R2 (%)  1.95   1.76   1.79   1.56   0.94  
Panel B: Fama-MacBeth regression with Newey-West adjusted t-statistic 
INTERCEPT  0.1858 3.17***   0.1827 3.03***   0.1143 1.64  0.1012 1.42  0.0559 2.27**  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0069 -1.23  -0.0060 -1.07  -0.0038 -0.6  -0.0024 -0.37    
MTBi,t (-) -0.0009 -0.6  -0.0010 -0.7  -0.0012 -0.96  -0.0015 -1.13    
ROAi,t (+) 0.1486 3.84***   0.1059 3.18***   0.1635 4.48***   0.1178 3.87***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0519 -3.38***   -0.0544 -3.31***   -0.0724 -3.13***   -0.0781 -3.17***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0419 -3.78***   -0.0350 -3.37***   -0.0590 -3.11***   -0.0538 -2.93***     
NOAi,t (-) -0.1240 -5.43***   -0.1312 -5.56***   -0.1085 -3.98***   -0.1144 -4.15***     
DACi,t (-) -0.1917 -3.9***      -0.2119 -3.83***      -0.1030 -2.9**  
ESCOREi,t (-) -0.0140 -1.97*    -0.0158 -2.11*                -0.0237 -2.36**  
Notes: Specification 1 (columns 3 and 4) report the results of estimating the following equation:  ܤܪܣܴ4ܨ௜,௧ାଵ௔ = ߙ + ߚଵܮ݋݃൫ܯܸܧ௜,௧൯ + ߚଶܯܶܤ௜,௧ + ߚଷܴܱܣ௜,௧ + ߚସܧܵܧ ௜ܱ,௧ + ߚହܧܦܫܴܵܶܧܵ ௜ܵ,௧ + ߚ଺ܱܰܣ௜,௧ + ߚ଻ܦܣܥ௜,௧ + ߛܧܵܥܱܴܧ௜,௧ + ߝ.  (E3.25) 
From Specification 1 as the full specification, in Specification 2 DAC is dropped, in Specification 3 ESCORE is dropped, in Specification 4 DAC and ESCORE are dropped, in 
Specification 5 Ln(MVE), MTB, ROA, ESEO, EDISTRESS, NOA are dropped from the explanatory variables. Panel A (B) reports the results from the pooled regression (Fama-
Macbeth regression in which the standard errors are adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West procedure). Column (2) exhibits the expected sign of the explanatory 
variables. ‘Spec.’ is abbreviation for ‘Specification’ and ‘Coef.’ is abbreviation for ‘Coefficient’. Definitions of variables are in Section 3.8. * , * * , *** indicate significance at 





One issue with the above multivariate regression is the high correlation between 
the control variables and ESCORE, as highlighted in Table T3.9. The chapter 
responds to this issue in two ways. First, the control variables in Equation (E3.25) are 
dropped one at a time, one pair of a time, and all together. For brevity, only the results 
when all control variables are dropped (Specification 5 in Table T3.10, T3.11, T3.12, 
T3.13, T3.14 and T3.15) are reported. In all of those specifications, the main 
conclusions of the chapter remain qualitatively unchanged.  
Another way to deal with the issue is to exclude ESEO, EDISTRESS and EOV 
from the construction of ESCORE. Four compressed versions of ESCORE are 
calculated in which ESEO, EDISTRESS and EOV are dropped one by one from the 
construction of ESCORE, and all together. The portfolio analyses and multivariate 
regressions are then replicated. Unreported results confirm that none of the main 
results change qualitatively. The hedge portfolio, using ESCORE without ESEO, 
EDISTRESS and EOV, yields an average ܤܪܵܣܴ௠  ( ܤܪܯܣܴ௠ , ܤܪܣܴ1ܨ௠ , ܤܪܣܴ3ܨ௠ and ܤܪܣܴ4ܨ௠) of 0.96% (1.17%, 1.15%, 1.13% and 1.05%, respectively), 
all are statistically significant at conventional levels. Using the compressed ESCORE 
without ESEO, EDISTRESS and EOV to estimate Equation (E3.25) using Newey-
West-adjusted Fama-MacBeth regressions, the coefficient on ESCORE is –0.0171 (–
0.0159, –0.0146, –0.0124 and –0.0140) when ܤܪܵܣܴ௔  ( ܤܪܯܣܴ௔ , ܤܪܣܴ1ܨ௔ , ܤܪܣܴ3ܨ௔ and ܤܪܣܴ4ܨ௔, respectively) is the dependent variable, all are statistically 
significant at conventional levels. The chapter, therefore, concludes that the power of 
ESCORE to predict future returns go beyond the known pattern of returns related to 
other known market anomalies. 
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3.6. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS  
3.6.1. Value-weighted scheme  
The main tests report the results where the equally-weighted scheme is 
employed to form portfolios. The advantage of that approach is that it could avoid the 
influential returns on very large stocks, which exists in the sample as evidenced in 
the descriptive statistics (see Section 2.5.2). Nevertheless, the pitfall of the equally-
weighted scheme is that the portfolio returns could be largely influenced by returns 
on small stocks. Although the chapter already excludes all tiny stocks with market 
value of equity below £1 million, it is still necessary to check if investors could earn 
abnormal returns from applying ESCORE if they form portfolios on a value-weighted 
basis. Fama (1998) shows that many market anomalies shrink significantly in 
magnitude or even disappear when equally-weighted scheme is swapped with value-
weighted scheme or via versa. This section addresses this concern by replicating the 
main tests using value-weighted scheme to construct portfolios. 
Table T3.16, T3.17 and T3.18 present the summary statistics of estimating 
Equation (E3.4), (E3.5) and (E3.6), respectively, for portfolios formed based on the 
value-weighted scheme. In general, all the coefficients have the expected sign and 
are significant in most cases.  
The portfolio analyses are then replicated using value-weighted scheme. The 
results from portfolio analyses, as reported in Table T3.19, are not qualitatively 
different from those reported in the main tests. In particular, the hedge portfolio yields 
an average ܤܪܵܣܴ௠  (ܤܪܯܣܴ௠ , ܤܪܣܴ1ܨ௠ , ܤܪܣܴ3ܨ௠  and ܤܪܣܴ4ܨ௠ ) of 0.79% 
(1.05%, 1.05%, 1.06% and 0.78%, respectively), all are statistically significant at 
conventional levels. It is therefore unlikely that the main results of the chapter are 
affected by portfolio weighting schemes. 
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Table T3.16. Summary statistics of estimating the CAPM for value-weighted 
ESCORE portfolios 
ESCORE Intercept  Rm - Rf  R2 
 Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic   
0 0.0001 0.032  0.9929 15.074***   0.5294 
1 0.0030 1.448  0.9598 19.347***   0.6495 
2 0.0015 0.722  1.0700 21.849***   0.7027 
3 0.0002 0.126  0.9784 21.445***   0.6948 
4 -0.0006 -0.246  1.0232 16.409***   0.5714 
5 -0.0095 -2.806***   1.0224 12.691***   0.4436 
6 -0.0094 -1.664*  1.0774 8.013***   0.2412 
7 -0.0078 -1.538  1.0091 8.381***   0.2580 
8 -0.0263 -2.941***   1.1438 5.519***   0.1461 
9 -0.0131 -1.148  0.7878 3.162***   0.0781 
Low ESCORE (0) 0.0001 0.032  0.9929 15.074***   0.5294 
Medium ESCORE (1-5) 0.0009 0.551  1.0356 27.767***   0.7924 
High ESCORE (6-9) -0.0104 -2.19**   1.0010 8.826***   0.2783 
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients and the associated t-statistics obtained from 
running the following regression: ܤܪܴܴ௣,௝௠ െܴ ௝݂ = ߙ + ߚଵ(ܴ ௝݉ െܴ ௝݂) + ߝ (E3.4) 






Table T3.17. Summary statistics of estimating the Fama-French three-factor model for value-weighted ESCORE portfolios 
ESCORE Intercept   Rm - Rf   SMB   HML   R2 
 Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic     
0 -0.0012 -0.509  0.9020 15.379***   0.3953 5.615***   0.4250 6.625***   0.6446 
1 0.0018 1.097  0.8745 21.689***   0.4376 9.04***   0.3279 7.434***   0.7795 
2 0.0006 0.323  1.0024 23.122***   0.3963 7.615***   0.2078 4.382***   0.7781 
3 -0.0002 -0.09  0.9415 22.649***   0.3513 7.04***   -0.0295 -0.648  0.7587 
4 -0.0014 -0.597  0.9603 16.467***   0.4396 6.279***   0.1185 1.858*   0.6430 
5 -0.0105 -3.387***   0.9403 12.488***   0.5682 6.286***   0.1592 1.933*   0.5370 
6 -0.0110 -2.233**   0.9369 7.824***   1.1525 8.017***   0.0832 0.635  0.4268 
7 -0.0084 -1.719*   0.9489 7.975***   0.5428 3.8***  -0.0167 -0.128  0.3099 
8 -0.0277 -3.417***   0.9316 4.847***   1.6113 6.626***   -0.1719 -0.657  0.3167 
9 -0.0155 -1.39   0.7323 2.967***    0.8520 2.717***    -0.1501 -0.581   0.1445 
Low ESCORE (0) -0.0012 -0.509  0.9020 15.379***   0.3953 5.615***   0.4250 6.625***   0.6446 
Medium ESCORE (1-5) 0.0000 0.026  0.9719 33.407***   0.4056 11.615***   0.1619 5.086***   0.8797 
High ESCORE (6-9) -0.0119 -2.948***    0.8743 8.945***    1.0601 9.034***    0.0520 0.486   0.4894 
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients and the associated t-statistics obtained from running the following regression: ܤܪܴܴ௣,௝௠ െܴ ௝݂ = ߙ + ߚଵ(ܴ ௝݉ െܴ ௝݂) + ߚଶܵܯܤ௝ + ߚଷܪܯܮ௝ + ߝ (E3.5) 
Definitions of variables are in Section 3.8. * , ** , *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table T3.18. Summary statistics of estimating the augmented Fama-French four-factor model for value-weighted ESCORE portfolios 
ESCORE Intercept   Rm - Rf   SMB   HML   UMD   R2 
 Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic     
0 -0.0010 -0.4  0.8982 15.024***   0.3894 5.364***   0.4098 5.247***   -0.0200 -0.345  0.6448 
1 0.0020 1.184  0.8709 21.196***   0.4319 8.655***   0.3131 5.835***   -0.0193 -0.484  0.7797 
2 0.0020 1.079  0.9793 22.624***   0.3601 6.851***   0.1141 2.018**   -0.1226 -2.92***   0.7872 
3 0.0014 0.807  0.9156 22.235***   0.3108 6.214***   -0.1343 -2.497**   -0.1372 -3.434***   0.7722 
4 0.0006 0.234  0.9268 15.973***   0.3872 5.494***   -0.0172 -0.227  -0.1776 -3.156***   0.6600 
5 -0.0090 -2.82***   0.9154 12.018***   0.5292 5.721***   0.0579 0.582  -0.1325 -1.794*   0.5444 
6 -0.0074 -1.476  0.8769 7.316***   1.0585 7.272***   -0.1603 -1.024  -0.3186 -2.741***   0.4477 
7 -0.0085 -1.66*   0.9493 7.824***   0.5434 3.688***   -0.0152 -0.096  0.0020 0.017  0.3099 
8 -0.0227 -2.702***   0.8442 4.324***   1.4345 5.603***   -0.4139 -1.453  -0.4084 -2.048**   0.3327 
9 -0.0145 -1.271   0.7115 2.825***    0.8179 2.529**    -0.2414 -0.736   -0.1119 -0.455   0.1460 
Low ESCORE (0) -0.0010 -0.4  0.8982 15.024***   0.3894 5.364***   0.4098 5.247***   -0.0200 -0.345  0.6448 
Medium ESCORE (1-5) 0.0013 1.119  0.9501 33.414***   0.3715 10.759***   0.0735 1.979**   -0.1156 -4.192***   0.8895 
High ESCORE (6-9) -0.0088 -2.157**    0.8239 8.43***    0.9810 8.265***    -0.1530 -1.199   -0.2683 -2.83***    0.5091 
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients and the associated t-statistics obtained from running the following regression: ܤܪܴܴ௣,௝௠ െܴ ௝݂ = ߙ + ߚଵ(ܴ ௝݉ െܴ ௝݂) + ߚଶܵܯܤ௝ + ߚଷܪܯܮ௝ + ߚସܷܯܦ௝ + ߝ (E3.6) 
Definitions of variables are in Section 3.8. * , ** , *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table T3.19. Stock returns across ESCORE groups – Value-weighted scheme 
ESCORE BHRRm   BHSARm   BHMARm   BHAR1Fm   BHAR3Fm   BHAR4Fm 
  Return t-statistic   Return t-statistic   Return t-statistic   Return t-statistic   Return t-statistic   Return t-statistic 
0 0.66 1.667*   -0.13 -0.548  0.01 0.024  0.01 0.032  -0.12 -0.509  -0.10 -0.4 
1 0.95 2.721***   0.14 0.978  0.29 1.388  0.30 1.448  0.18 1.097  0.20 1.184 
2 0.83 2.227**   0.03 0.214  0.17 0.841  0.15 0.722  0.06 0.323  0.20 1.079 
3 0.67 1.972**   -0.11 -0.697  0.02 0.088  0.02 0.126  -0.02 -0.09  0.14 0.807 
4 0.60 1.521  -0.17 -0.732  -0.06 -0.216  -0.06 -0.246  -0.14 -0.597  0.06 0.234 
5 -0.28 -0.628  -0.92 -3.339***   -0.94 -2.799***   -0.95 -2.806***   -1.05 -3.387***   -0.90 -2.82***  
6 -0.25 -0.395  -0.84 -1.835*   -0.91 -1.625  -0.94 -1.664*   -1.10 -2.233**   -0.74 -1.476 
7 -0.12 -0.198  -0.53 -1.124  -0.77 -1.541  -0.78 -1.538  -0.84 -1.719*   -0.85 -1.66*  
8 -1.99 -2.072**   -2.25 -2.803***   -2.58 -2.904***   -2.63 -2.941***   -2.77 -3.417***   -2.27 -2.702***  
9 -0.83 -0.699  -0.72 -0.682  -1.37 -1.202  -1.31 -1.148  -1.55 -1.39  -1.45 -1.271 
Low (0) 0.66 1.667*    -0.13 -0.548   0.01 0.024   0.01 0.032   -0.12 -0.509   -0.10 -0.4 
Medium (1-5) 0.76 2.23**   -0.04 -0.519  0.10 0.633  0.09 0.551  0.00 0.026  0.13 1.119 
High (6-9) -0.38 -0.69   -0.92 -2.553**    -1.04 -2.202**    -1.04 -2.19**    -1.19 -2.948***    -0.88 -2.157**  
Low - High 1.05 2.167**    0.79 1.723*    1.05 2.167**    1.05 2.173**    1.06 2.427**    0.78 1.813*  
Notes: The table reports the returns on different portfolios formed on the basis of ESCORE. Definitions of variables are in Section 3.8. * , * * , *** indicate significance at 10%, 
5%, 1% levels, respectively.  
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3.6.2. Cumulative abnormal returns 
The multivariate regressions in the main tests use buy-and-hold returns. The 
approach replicates more closely the real investment practice where returns are 
compounded. Nevertheless, this section also employs the cumulative returns as a 
robustness check. In particular, cumulative returns are calculated as follows: 
ܥܴܴ௜,௧௔ = 	? ܤܪܴܴ௜,௝௠ଵଶ௝ୀଵ (݆ = Juneyear t …Mayyear t + 1)  (E3.26) 
ܥܵܣܴ௜,௧௔ = 	? (ܤܪܴܴ௜,௝௠ െ ܵܦܴௗ,௝௠ )ଵଶ௝ୀଵ (݅ א ݀,݆ = Juneyear t …Mayyear t + 1)  (E3.27) 
ܥܯܣܴ௜,௧௔ = 	? (ܤܪܴܴ௜,௝௠ െ ܨܶܵܧܣܮܮ ௝ܴ௠)ଵଶ௝ୀଵ (݆ = Juneyear t …Mayyear t + 1)  (E3.28) 
ܥܣܴ1ܨ௜,௧௔ = 	? ൣܤܪܴܴ௜,௝௠ െ ܧ(ܴ1ܨ௜,௝௠)൧ଵଶ௝ୀଵ (݆ = Juneyear t …Mayyear t + 1)  (E3.29) 
ܥܣܴ3ܨ௜,௧௔ = 	? ൣܤܪܴܴ௜,௝௠ െ ܧ(ܴ3ܨ௜,௝௠)൧ଵଶ௝ୀଵ (݆ = Juneyear t …Mayyear t + 1)  (E3.30) 
ܥܣܴ4ܨ௜,௧௔ = 	? ൣܤܪܴܴ௜,௝௠ െ ܧ(ܴ4ܨ௜,௝௠)൧ଵଶ௝ୀଵ (݆ = Juneyear t …Mayyear t + 1)  (E3.31) 
The cumulative returns as obtained above are used to first of all examine if the 
individual signals could pick out stocks with low returns. Table T3.20 presents 
evidence which are qualitatively the same as in the main test. 
Table T3.21, T3.22, T3.23, T3.24, T3.25 and T3.26 report the results of 
estimating Equation (E3.25) using cumulative returns. In the Fama-MacBeth 
regressions, the coefficient on ESCORE in Specification 1 is –0.0178 (–0.0169,            
–0.0154, –0.0131 and –0.0142) when ܥܵܣܴ௔  ( ܥܯܣܴ௔ , ܥܣܴ1ܨ௔ , ܥܣܴ3ܨ௔  and ܥܣܴ4ܨ௔, respectively) is the dependent variable, all are significant. In general, the 





Table T3.20. Stock returns of the suspicious firms versus the rest of the sample 
– Cumulative annual returns 
  N   Mean returns 
  
Rest of 







Panel A: ESEO             
CRRa 9,408 2,512  0.0918 -0.0710 -0.1628 -13.076*** 
CSARa 9,408 2,512  0.0245 -0.0947 -0.1193 -10.374*** 
CMARa 9,408 2,512  0.0166 -0.1235 -0.1401 -11.823*** 
CAR1Fa 9,408 2,512  0.0226 -0.1169 -0.1394 -11.822*** 
CAR3Fa 9,408 2,512  0.0077 -0.1156 -0.1233 -10.738*** 
CAR4Fa 9,408 2,512  0.0092 -0.1081 -0.1173 -10.319*** 
Panel B: EDDEBT       
CRRa 7,402 4,518  0.0775 0.0246 -0.0529 -5.58*** 
CSARa 7,402 4,518  0.0188 -0.0323 -0.0511 -5.829*** 
CMARa 7,402 4,518  0.0022 -0.0377 -0.0399 -4.383*** 
CAR1Fa 7,402 4,518  0.0075 -0.0302 -0.0376 -4.166*** 
CAR3Fa 7,402 4,518  -0.0045 -0.0408 -0.0363 -4.201*** 
CAR4Fa 7,402 4,518  -0.0018 -0.0380 -0.0362 -4.233*** 
Panel C: EMA       
CRRa 11,326 594  0.0668 -0.1211 -0.1879 -7.836*** 
CSARa 11,326 594  0.0062 -0.1312 -0.1374 -6.065*** 
CMARa 11,326 594  -0.0067 -0.1312 -0.1244 -5.41*** 
CAR1Fa 11,326 594  -0.0003 -0.1299 -0.1296 -5.648*** 
CAR3Fa 11,326 594  -0.0119 -0.1399 -0.1280 -5.775*** 
CAR4Fa 11,326 594  -0.0093 -0.1340 -0.1247 -5.69*** 
Panel D: EOV       
CRRa 9,344 2,576  0.0621 0.0406 -0.0216 -1.941* 
CSARa 9,344 2,576  0.0049 -0.0206 -0.0255 -2.483** 
CMARa 9,344 2,576  -0.0082 -0.0303 -0.0221 -2.077** 
CAR1Fa 9,344 2,576  -0.0026 -0.0220 -0.0194 -1.835* 
CAR3Fa 9,344 2,576  -0.0164 -0.0251 -0.0087 -0.852 
CAR4Fa 9,344 2,576  -0.0141 -0.0209 -0.0069 -0.681 
Panel E: EROA       
CRRa 11,510 410  0.0558 0.1059 0.0501 1.998** 
CSARa 11,510 410  -0.0015 0.0258 0.0274 1.18 
CMARa 11,510 410  -0.0141 0.0199 0.0340 1.413 
CAR1Fa 11,510 410  -0.0077 0.0185 0.0262 1.098 
CAR3Fa 11,510 410  -0.0187 -0.0057 0.0130 0.566 
CAR4Fa 11,510 410  -0.0157 -0.0104 0.0053 0.231 
Panel F: EDROA       
CRRa 11,329 591  0.0544 0.1161 0.0617 3.467*** 
CSARa 11,329 591  -0.0028 0.0414 0.0442 2.773*** 
CMARa 11,329 591  -0.0158 0.0416 0.0574 3.424*** 
CAR1Fa 11,329 591  -0.0100 0.0548 0.0648 3.944*** 
CAR3Fa 11,329 591  -0.0211 0.0349 0.0560 3.604*** 
CAR4Fa 11,329 591  -0.0182 0.0359 0.0541 3.54*** 
Panel G: EDIV       
CRRa 11,261 659  0.0536 0.1234 0.0698 3.813*** 
CSARa 11,261 659  -0.0036 0.0507 0.0543 3.183*** 
CMARa 11,261 659  -0.0162 0.0428 0.0590 3.315*** 
CAR1Fa 11,261 659  -0.0099 0.0457 0.0556 3.129*** 
CAR3Fa 11,261 659  -0.0208 0.0251 0.0459 2.677*** 
CAR4Fa 11,261 659  -0.0177 0.0209 0.0386 2.26** 
Panel H: EDISTRESS       
CRRa 10,045 1,875  0.0690 -0.0042 -0.0732 -4.908*** 
CSARa 10,045 1,875  0.0106 -0.0605 -0.0711 -5.166*** 
CMARa 10,045 1,875  -0.0012 -0.0758 -0.0745 -5.172*** 
CAR1Fa 10,045 1,875  0.0053 -0.0715 -0.0767 -5.379*** 
CAR3Fa 10,045 1,875  -0.0070 -0.0789 -0.0719 -5.196*** 
CAR4Fa 10,045 1,875  -0.0045 -0.0749 -0.0704 -5.148*** 
Panel I: EDEBT       
CRRa 9,016 2,904  0.0614 0.0455 -0.0159 -1.493 
CSARa 9,016 2,904  -0.0007 -0.0003 0.0004 0.038 
CMARa 9,016 2,904  -0.0094 -0.0241 -0.0147 -1.436 
CAR1Fa 9,016 2,904  -0.0032 -0.0179 -0.0147 -1.446 
CAR3Fa 9,016 2,904  -0.0162 -0.0248 -0.0086 -0.883 
CAR4Fa 9,016 2,904  -0.0139 -0.0206 -0.0067 -0.688 
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Table T3.20 (continued) 
  N   Mean returns 
  
Rest of 







Panel J: ESIZE       
CRRa 9,342 2,578  0.0631 0.0372 -0.0259 -2.134** 
CSARa 9,342 2,578  0.0019 -0.0096 -0.0115 -1.017 
CMARa 9,342 2,578  -0.0072 -0.0338 -0.0266 -2.267** 
CAR1Fa 9,342 2,578  -0.0022 -0.0236 -0.0214 -1.831* 
CAR3Fa 9,342 2,578  -0.0148 -0.0310 -0.0162 -1.431 
CAR4Fa 9,342 2,578  -0.0106 -0.0333 -0.0227 -2.028** 
Panel K: ECYCLE       
CRRa 11,594 326  0.0601 -0.0358 -0.0959 -2.916*** 
CSARa 11,594 326  0.0016 -0.0789 -0.0805 -2.583** 
CMARa 11,594 326  -0.0106 -0.0960 -0.0854 -2.7*** 
CAR1Fa 11,594 326  -0.0044 -0.0927 -0.0883 -2.783*** 
CAR3Fa 11,594 326  -0.0159 -0.1026 -0.0866 -2.815*** 
CAR4Fa 11,594 326  -0.0134 -0.0900 -0.0765 -2.581** 
Panel L: EAUDIT       
CRRa 6,612 5,308  0.0828 0.0259 -0.0569 -6.132*** 
CSARa 6,612 5,308  0.0073 -0.0104 -0.0177 -2.055** 
CMARa 6,612 5,308  0.0074 -0.0384 -0.0458 -5.138*** 
CAR1Fa 6,612 5,308  0.0113 -0.0294 -0.0407 -4.598*** 
CAR3Fa 6,612 5,308  -0.0037 -0.0365 -0.0327 -3.84*** 
CAR4Fa 6,612 5,308  -0.0003 -0.0345 -0.0343 -4.06*** 
Panel M: EBLOAT       
CRRa 9,346 2,574  0.0596 0.0498 -0.0099 -0.887 
CSARa 9,346 2,574  0.0012 -0.0069 -0.0081 -0.788 
CMARa 9,346 2,574  -0.0105 -0.0219 -0.0114 -1.043 
CAR1Fa 9,346 2,574  -0.0042 -0.0161 -0.0119 -1.098 
CAR3Fa 9,346 2,574  -0.0166 -0.0245 -0.0079 -0.76 
CAR4Fa 9,346 2,574  -0.0138 -0.0218 -0.0080 -0.796 
Panel N: ECAP       
CRRa 9,349 2,571  0.0690 0.0155 -0.0535 -4.452*** 
CSARa 9,349 2,571  0.0095 -0.0373 -0.0467 -4.192*** 
CMARa 9,349 2,571  -0.0013 -0.0552 -0.0539 -4.649*** 
CAR1Fa 9,349 2,571  0.0040 -0.0460 -0.0500 -4.359*** 
CAR3Fa 9,349 2,571  -0.0095 -0.0502 -0.0406 -3.681*** 
CAR4Fa 9,349 2,571  -0.0065 -0.0485 -0.0420 -3.847*** 
Panel O: EBT       
CRRa 9,358 2,562  0.0794 -0.0227 -0.1022 -8.133*** 
CSARa 9,358 2,562  0.0186 -0.0706 -0.0892 -7.633*** 
CMARa 9,358 2,562  0.0091 -0.0936 -0.1027 -8.503*** 
CAR1Fa 9,358 2,562  0.0154 -0.0878 -0.1032 -8.61*** 
CAR3Fa 9,358 2,562  0.0019 -0.0921 -0.0940 -8.071*** 
CAR4Fa 9,358 2,562  0.0043 -0.0879 -0.0921 -7.971*** 
Notes: The table reports the number of observations and returns of the suspicious firms versus the 
rest of the sample, together with the t-statistic under the null that the difference is zero. Definitions 









  Spec. 1     Spec. 2     Spec. 3     Spec. 4     Spec. 5 
  Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic 
(1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10)   (11) (12) 
Panel A: Pooled regression 
INTERCEPT  0.2702 7.972***   0.2638 7.783***   0.1658 5.531***   0.1508 5.044***   0.1548 18.264***  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0045 -1.709*   -0.0034 -1.282  -0.0002 -0.078  0.0014 0.552    
MTBi,t (-) -0.0041 -4.15***   -0.0042 -4.303***   -0.0048 -4.904***   -0.0050 -5.134***     
ROAi,t (+) 0.1989 7.151***   0.1627 6.053***   0.2143 7.721***   0.1747 6.503***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0887 -6.949***   -0.0921 -7.221***   -0.1221 -10.412***   -0.1285 -10.995***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) 0.0227 1.38  0.0300 1.824*   -0.0027 -0.169  0.0035 0.218    
NOAi,t (-) -0.1436 -6.823***   -0.1502 -7.144***   -0.1220 -5.857***   -0.1277 -6.135***     
DACi,t (-) -0.1921 -4.982***      -0.2146 -5.577***      -0.1234 -3.402***  
ESCOREi,t (-) -0.0222 -6.563***   -0.0237 -7.025***         -0.0353 -13.502***  
Adjusted R2 (%)  3.26   3.06   2.91   2.66   1.58  
Panel B: Fama-MacBeth regression with Newey-West adjusted t-statistic 
INTERCEPT  0.2285 4.14***   0.2249 4.07***   0.1438 2.15**   0.1295 1.89*   0.1452 4.7*** 
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0022 -0.52  -0.0012 -0.27  0.0015 0.29  0.0030 0.58    
MTBi,t (-) -0.0022 -1.31  -0.0024 -1.41  -0.0027 -1.69  -0.0030 -1.86*     
ROAi,t (+) 0.1692 3.84***   0.1249 3.18***   0.1839 4.4***  0.1371 3.72***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0533 -3.03***   -0.0558 -3.05***   -0.0790 -3.39***   -0.0849 -3.47***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0146 -0.73  -0.0075 -0.4  -0.0349 -1.37  -0.0295 -1.21    
NOAi,t (-) -0.1373 -7.14***   -0.1458 -7.5***   -0.1199 -5.12***   -0.1268 -5.39***     
DACi,t (-) -0.2000 -5.63***      -0.2179 -5.11***      -0.1126 -4.53***  
ESCOREi,t (-) -0.0169 -2.98***    -0.0188 -3.14***                -0.0292 -3.21***  
Notes: Specification 1 (columns 3 and 4) report the results of estimating the following equation:  ܥܴܴ௜,௧ାଵ௔ = ߙ + ߚଵܮ݋݃൫ܯܸܧ௜,௧൯ + ߚଶܯܶܤ௜,௧ + ߚଷܴܱܣ௜,௧ + ߚସܧܵܧ ௜ܱ,௧ + ߚହܧܦܫܴܵܶܧܵ ௜ܵ,௧ + ߚ଺ܱܰܣ௜,௧ + ߚ଻ܦܣܥ௜,௧ + ߛܧܵܥܱܴܧ௜,௧ + ߝ.  (E3.25) 
From Specification 1 as the full specification, in Specification 2 DAC is dropped, in Specification 3 ESCORE is dropped, in Specification 4 DAC and ESCORE are dropped, in 
Specification 5 Ln(MVE), MTB, ROA, ESEO, EDISTRESS, NOA are dropped from the explanatory variables. Panel A (B) reports the results from the pooled regression (Fama-
Macbeth regression in which the standard errors are adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West procedure). Column (2) exhibits the expected sign of the explanatory 
variables. ‘Spec.’ is abbreviation for ‘Specification’ and ‘Coef.’ is abbreviation for ‘Coefficient’. Definitions of variables are in Section 3.8. * , * * , *** indicate significance at 
10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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  Spec. 1     Spec. 2     Spec. 3     Spec. 4     Spec. 5 
  Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic 
(1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10)   (11) (12) 
Panel A: Pooled regression 
INTERCEPT  0.2657 8.455***   0.2597 8.26***   0.1809 6.51***   0.1668 6.018***   0.0724 9.221***  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0115 -4.742***   -0.0105 -4.31***   -0.0080 -3.413***   -0.0065 -2.791***     
MTBi,t (-) -0.0023 -2.564**   -0.0025 -2.723***   -0.0029 -3.221***   -0.0031 -3.456***     
ROAi,t (+) 0.1866 7.234***   0.1519 6.098***   0.1991 7.739***   0.1619 6.499***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0556 -4.698***   -0.0589 -4.977***   -0.0828 -7.613***   -0.0888 -8.194***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0065 -0.424  0.0004 0.029  -0.0271 -1.827*   -0.0213 -1.435    
NOAi,t (-) -0.1369 -7.018***   -0.1433 -7.348***   -0.1194 -6.186***   -0.1248 -6.467***     
DACi,t (-) -0.1837 -5.137***      -0.2019 -5.662***      -0.1020 -3.036***  
ESCOREi,t (-) -0.0180 -5.751***   -0.0195 -6.224***         -0.0265 -10.923***  
Adjusted R2 (%)  2.59   2.38   2.32   2.06   1.05  
Panel B: Fama-MacBeth regression with Newey-West adjusted t-statistic 
INTERCEPT  0.2622 5.07***   0.2586 4.81***   0.1736 5.62***   0.1600 5.19***   0.0685 3.35***  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0111 -2.78**   -0.0101 -2.5**   -0.0073 -2.42**   -0.0058 -1.98*     
MTBi,t (-) -0.0021 -1.26  -0.0023 -1.36  -0.0026 -1.67  -0.0029 -1.84*     
ROAi,t (+) 0.1706 3.85***   0.1299 3.22***   0.1847 4.41***   0.1415 3.76***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0483 -2.8**   -0.0506 -2.82**   -0.0752 -3.26***   -0.0807 -3.33***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0147 -0.71  -0.0081 -0.41  -0.0360 -1.39  -0.0310 -1.25    
NOAi,t (-) -0.1383 -6.64***   -0.1458 -6.88***   -0.1199 -4.95***   -0.1260 -5.16***     
DACi,t (-) -0.1830 -5.03***      -0.2016 -4.67***      -0.0969 -3.72***  
ESCOREi,t (-) -0.0178 -3.46***    -0.0197 -3.57***                -0.0246 -3.48***  
Notes: Specification 1 (columns 3 and 4) report the results of estimating the following equation:  ܥܵܣܴ௜,௧ାଵ௔ = ߙ + ߚଵܮ݋݃൫ܯܸܧ௜,௧൯ + ߚଶܯܶܤ௜,௧ + ߚଷܴܱܣ௜,௧ + ߚସܧܵܧ ௜ܱ,௧ + ߚହܧܦܫܴܵܶܧܵ ௜ܵ,௧ + ߚ଺ܱܰܣ௜,௧ + ߚ଻ܦܣܥ௜,௧ + ߛܧܵܥܱܴܧ௜,௧ + ߝ.  (E3.25) 
From Specification 1 as the full specification, in Specification 2 DAC is dropped, in Specification 3 ESCORE is dropped, in Specification 4 DAC and ESCORE are dropped, in 
Specification 5 Ln(MVE), MTB, ROA, ESEO, EDISTRESS, NOA are dropped from the explanatory variables. Panel A (B) reports the results from the pooled regression (Fama-
Macbeth regression in which the standard errors are adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West procedure). Column (2) exhibits the expected sign of the explanatory 
variables. ‘Spec.’ is abbreviation for ‘Specification’ and ‘Coef.’ is abbreviation for ‘Coefficient’. Definitions of variables are in Section 3.8. * , * * , *** indicate significance at 
10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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  Spec. 1     Spec. 2     Spec. 3     Spec. 4     Spec. 5 
  Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic 
(1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10)   (11) (12) 
Panel A: Pooled regression 
INTERCEPT  0.1373 4.207***   0.1312 4.019***   0.0494 1.71*   0.0351 1.218  0.0744 9.131***  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0013 -0.499  -0.0002 -0.068  0.0024 0.961  0.0039 1.588    
MTBi,t (-) -0.0029 -3.016***   -0.0030 -3.17***   -0.0035 -3.675***   -0.0037 -3.903***     
ROAi,t (+) 0.1684 6.287***   0.1335 5.158***   0.1814 6.789***   0.1437 5.558***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0757 -6.163***   -0.0790 -6.434***   -0.1039 -9.205***   -0.1100 -9.778***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) 0.0078 0.49  0.0147 0.933  -0.0137 -0.886  -0.0078 -0.503    
NOAi,t (-) -0.1173 -5.791***   -0.1237 -6.111***   -0.0991 -4.946***   -0.1046 -5.221***     
DACi,t (-) -0.1852 -4.988***      -0.2041 -5.512***      -0.1199 -3.439***  
ESCOREi,t (-) -0.0187 -5.745***   -0.0201 -6.206***         -0.0317 -12.597***  
Adjusted R2 (%)  2.67   2.46   2.40   2.15   1.39  
Panel B: Fama-MacBeth regression with Newey-West adjusted t-statistic 
INTERCEPT  0.1496 2.63**   0.1459 2.58**   0.0648 0.95  0.0506 0.72  0.0662 1.63 
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0022 -0.52  -0.0012 -0.27  0.0015 0.29  0.0030 0.58    
MTBi,t (-) -0.0022 -1.31  -0.0024 -1.41  -0.0027 -1.69  -0.0030 -1.86*     
ROAi,t (+) 0.1692 3.84***   0.1249 3.18***   0.1839 4.4***  0.1371 3.72***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0533 -3.03***   -0.0558 -3.05***   -0.0790 -3.39***   -0.0849 -3.47***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0146 -0.73  -0.0075 -0.4  -0.0349 -1.37  -0.0295 -1.21    
NOAi,t (-) -0.1373 -7.14***   -0.1458 -7.5***   -0.1199 -5.12***   -0.1268 -5.39***     
DACi,t (-) -0.2000 -5.63***      -0.2179 -5.11***      -0.1126 -4.53***  
ESCOREi,t (-) -0.0169 -2.98***    -0.0188 -3.14***                -0.0292 -3.21***  
Notes: Specification 1 (columns 3 and 4) report the results of estimating the following equation:  ܥܯܣ ௜ܴ,௧ାଵ௔ = ߙ + ߚଵܮ݋݃൫ܯܸܧ௜,௧൯ + ߚଶܯܶܤ௜,௧ + ߚଷܴܱܣ௜,௧ + ߚସܧܵܧ ௜ܱ,௧ + ߚହܧܦܫܴܵܶܧܵ ௜ܵ,௧ + ߚ଺ܱܰܣ௜,௧ + ߚ଻ܦܣܥ௜,௧ + ߛܧܵܥܱܴܧ௜,௧ + ߝ.  (E3.25) 
From Specification 1 as the full specification, in Specification 2 DAC is dropped, in Specification 3 ESCORE is dropped, in Specification 4 DAC and ESCORE are dropped, in 
Specification 5 Ln(MVE), MTB, ROA, ESEO, EDISTRESS, NOA are dropped from the explanatory variables. Panel A (B) reports the results from the pooled regression (Fama-
Macbeth regression in which the standard errors are adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West procedure). Column (2) exhibits the expected sign of the explanatory 
variables. ‘Spec.’ is abbreviation for ‘Specification’ and ‘Coef.’ is abbreviation for ‘Coefficient’. Definitions of variables are in Section 3.8. * , * * , *** indicate significance at 
10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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  Spec. 1     Spec. 2     Spec. 3     Spec. 4     Spec. 5 
  Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic 
(1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10)   (11) (12) 
Panel A: Pooled regression 
INTERCEPT  0.1614 4.984***   0.1550 4.783***   0.0793 2.77***   0.0644 2.255**   0.0777 9.612***  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0034 -1.365  -0.0023 -0.91  -0.0001 -0.021  0.0015 0.634    
MTBi,t (-) -0.0026 -2.733***   -0.0027 -2.897***   -0.0031 -3.353***   -0.0034 -3.592***     
ROAi,t (+) 0.1821 6.854***   0.1453 5.658***   0.1943 7.329***   0.1550 6.039***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0757 -6.206***   -0.0792 -6.493***   -0.1020 -9.105***   -0.1083 -9.704***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) 0.0037 0.237  0.0111 0.706  -0.0163 -1.064  -0.0101 -0.662    
NOAi,t (-) -0.1133 -5.636***   -0.1201 -5.975***   -0.0963 -4.844***   -0.1021 -5.133***     
DACi,t (-) -0.1954 -5.303***      -0.2131 -5.798***      -0.1197 -3.458***  
ESCOREi,t (-) -0.0175 -5.404***   -0.0190 -5.891***         -0.0307 -12.28***  
Adjusted R2 (%)  2.69   2.47   2.46   2.18   1.33  
Panel B: Fama-MacBeth regression with Newey-West adjusted t-statistic 
INTERCEPT  0.1740 3.27***   0.1704 3.17***   0.0971 1.56  0.0827 1.29  0.0696 2*  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0046 -0.88  -0.0035 -0.67  -0.0013 -0.22  0.0003 0.06    
MTBi,t (-) -0.0020 -1.1  -0.0022 -1.22  -0.0024 -1.44  -0.0027 -1.64    
ROAi,t (+) 0.1863 4.19***   0.1400 3.68***   0.2003 4.63***   0.1521 4.17***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0524 -3.32***   -0.0551 -3.34***   -0.0759 -3.42***   -0.0821 -3.5***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0178 -0.89  -0.0104 -0.55  -0.0360 -1.43  -0.0304 -1.26    
NOAi,t (-) -0.1286 -6.43***   -0.1376 -6.85***   -0.1131 -4.97***   -0.1203 -5.27***     
DACi,t (-) -0.2097 -5.67***      -0.2258 -5.2***      -0.1100 -4.57***  
ESCOREi,t (-) -0.0154 -2.83**    -0.0174 -3.02***                -0.0276 -3.12***  
Notes: Specification 1 (columns 3 and 4) report the results of estimating the following equation:  ܥܣܴ1ܨ௜,௧ାଵ௔ = ߙ + ߚଵܮ݋݃൫ܯܸܧ௜,௧൯ + ߚଶܯܶܤ௜,௧ + ߚଷܴܱܣ௜,௧ + ߚସܧܵܧ ௜ܱ,௧ + ߚହܧܦܫܴܵܶܧܵ ௜ܵ,௧ + ߚ଺ܱܰܣ௜,௧ + ߚ଻ܦܣܥ௜,௧ + ߛܧܵܥܱܴܧ௜,௧ + ߝ.  (E3.25) 
From Specification 1 as the full specification, in Specification 2 DAC is dropped, in Specification 3 ESCORE is dropped, in Specification 4 DAC and ESCORE are dropped, in 
Specification 5 Ln(MVE), MTB, ROA, ESEO, EDISTRESS, NOA are dropped from the explanatory variables. Panel A (B) reports the results from the pooled regression (Fama-
Macbeth regression in which the standard errors are adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West procedure). Column (2) exhibits the expected sign of the explanatory 
variables. ‘Spec.’ is abbreviation for ‘Specification’ and ‘Coef.’ is abbreviation for ‘Coefficient’. Definitions of variables are in Section 3.8. * , * * , *** indicate significance at 
10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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  Spec. 1     Spec. 2     Spec. 3     Spec. 4     Spec. 5 
  Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic 
(1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10)   (11) (12) 
Panel A: Pooled regression 
INTERCEPT  0.1381 4.422***   0.1320 4.224***   0.0677 2.452**   0.0536 1.947*   0.0553 7.093***  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0029 -1.192  -0.0018 -0.742  0.0000 0.004  0.0015 0.646    
MTBi,t (-) -0.0017 -1.826*   -0.0018 -1.989**   -0.0021 -2.375**   -0.0024 -2.611***     
ROAi,t (+) 0.1621 6.325***   0.1270 5.13***   0.1725 6.75***   0.1354 5.473***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0667 -5.671***   -0.0700 -5.955***   -0.0893 -8.265***   -0.0952 -8.85***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0072 -0.477  -0.0002 -0.016  -0.0244 -1.654*   -0.0186 -1.26    
NOAi,t (-) -0.1219 -6.285***   -0.1283 -6.621***   -0.1073 -5.597***   -0.1127 -5.879***     
DACi,t (-) -0.1860 -5.235***      -0.2012 -5.679***      -0.1161 -3.48***  
ESCOREi,t (-) -0.0150 -4.807***   -0.0164 -5.286***         -0.0267 -11.079***  
Adjusted R2 (%)  2.39   2.17   2.21   1.94   1.10  
Panel B: Fama-MacBeth regression with Newey-West adjusted t-statistic 
INTERCEPT  0.1485 2.91**   0.1451 2.82**   0.0820 1.29  0.0687 1.06  0.0472 2.14**  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0046 -0.87  -0.0036 -0.69  -0.0017 -0.28  -0.0002 -0.03    
MTBi,t (-) -0.0011 -0.85  -0.0013 -1.01  -0.0015 -1.28  -0.0017 -1.56    
ROAi,t (+) 0.1631 3.96***   0.1202 3.34***   0.1758 4.37***   0.1310 3.76***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0483 -3.27***   -0.0509 -3.35***   -0.0682 -3.27***   -0.0739 -3.39***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0225 -1.35  -0.0159 -1.02  -0.0384 -1.76*   -0.0335 -1.61    
NOAi,t (-) -0.1223 -7.17***   -0.1304 -7.55***   -0.1088 -5.22***   -0.1154 -5.52***     
DACi,t (-) -0.1923 -5.84***      -0.2078 -5.37***      -0.1043 -4.83***  
ESCOREi,t (-) -0.0131 -2.58**    -0.0150 -2.76**                -0.0235 -2.66**  
Notes: Specification 1 (columns 3 and 4) report the results of estimating the following equation:  ܥܣܴ3ܨ௜,௧ାଵ௔ = ߙ + ߚଵܮ݋݃൫ܯܸܧ௜,௧൯ + ߚଶܯܶܤ௜,௧ + ߚଷܴܱܣ௜,௧ + ߚସܧܵܧ ௜ܱ,௧ + ߚହܧܦܫܴܵܶܧܵ ௜ܵ,௧ + ߚ଺ܱܰܣ௜,௧ + ߚ଻ܦܣܥ௜,௧ + ߛܧܵܥܱܴܧ௜,௧ + ߝ.  (E3.25) 
From Specification 1 as the full specification, in Specification 2 DAC is dropped, in Specification 3 ESCORE is dropped, in Specification 4 DAC and ESCORE are dropped, in 
Specification 5 Ln(MVE), MTB, ROA, ESEO, EDISTRESS, NOA are dropped from the explanatory variables. Panel A (B) reports the results from the pooled regression (Fama-
Macbeth regression in which the standard errors are adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West procedure). Column (2) exhibits the expected sign of the explanatory 
variables. ‘Spec.’ is abbreviation for ‘Specification’ and ‘Coef.’ is abbreviation for ‘Coefficient’. Definitions of variables are in Section 3.8. * , * * , *** indicate significance at 
10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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  Spec. 1     Spec. 2     Spec. 3     Spec. 4     Spec. 5 
  Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic 
(1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10)   (11) (12) 
Panel A: Pooled regression 
INTERCEPT  0.1214 3.928***   0.1150 3.718***   0.0474 1.735*   0.0326 1.197  0.0581 7.536***  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0009 -0.36  0.0003 0.12  0.0022 0.939  0.0037 1.624    
MTBi,t (-) -0.0011 -1.263  -0.0013 -1.435  -0.0016 -1.842*   -0.0019 -2.092**     
ROAi,t (+) 0.1461 5.762***   0.1093 4.461***   0.1571 6.21***   0.1181 4.824***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0612 -5.258***   -0.0647 -5.558***   -0.0849 -7.944***   -0.0912 -8.561***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0106 -0.706  -0.0032 -0.217  -0.0286 -1.961**   -0.0225 -1.543    
NOAi,t (-) -0.1275 -6.648***   -0.1343 -7.002***   -0.1122 -5.915***   -0.1179 -6.214***     
DACi,t (-) -0.1952 -5.552***      -0.2111 -6.022***      -0.1331 -4.034***  
ESCOREi,t (-) -0.0157 -5.106***   -0.0173 -5.613***         -0.0266 -11.191***  
Adjusted R2 (%)  2.36   2.11   2.15   1.85   1.15  
Panel B: Fama-MacBeth regression with Newey-West adjusted t-statistic 
INTERCEPT  0.1335 2.87**   0.1305 2.79**   0.0618 1.06  0.0483 0.81  0.0499 2.4**  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0027 -0.55  -0.0017 -0.35  0.0005 0.09  0.0020 0.37    
MTBi,t (-) -0.0007 -0.57  -0.0009 -0.72  -0.0011 -0.96  -0.0014 -1.21    
ROAi,t (+) 0.1531 3.87***   0.1060 3.11***   0.1666 4.3***  0.1173 3.57***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0453 -3.08***   -0.0482 -3.2***   -0.0668 -3.15***   -0.0730 -3.28***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0246 -1.81*   -0.0178 -1.4  -0.0418 -2.24**   -0.0368 -2.09*     
NOAi,t (-) -0.1282 -7.8***   -0.1371 -8.26***   -0.1136 -5.53***   -0.1210 -5.86***     
DACi,t (-) -0.2076 -6.17***      -0.2246 -5.56***      -0.1254 -5.95***  
ESCOREi,t (-) -0.0142 -2.78**    -0.0161 -2.94***                -0.0235 -2.69**  
Notes: Specification 1 (columns 3 and 4) report the results of estimating the following equation:  ܥܣܴ4ܨ௜,௧ାଵ௔ = ߙ + ߚଵܮ݋݃൫ܯܸܧ௜,௧൯ + ߚଶܯܶܤ௜,௧ + ߚଷܴܱܣ௜,௧ + ߚସܧܵܧ ௜ܱ,௧ + ߚହܧܦܫܴܵܶܧܵ ௜ܵ,௧ + ߚ଺ܱܰܣ௜,௧ + ߚ଻ܦܣܥ௜,௧ + ߛܧܵܥܱܴܧ௜,௧ + ߝ.  (E3.25) 
From Specification 1 as the full specification, in Specification 2 DAC is dropped, in Specification 3 ESCORE is dropped, in Specification 4 DAC and ESCORE are dropped, in 
Specification 5 Ln(MVE), MTB, ROA, ESEO, EDISTRESS, NOA are dropped from the explanatory variables. Panel A (B) reports the results from the pooled regression (Fama-
Macbeth regression in which the standard errors are adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West procedure). Column (2) exhibits the expected sign of the explanatory 
variables. ‘Spec.’ is abbreviation for ‘Specification’ and ‘Coef.’ is abbreviation for ‘Coefficient’. Definitions of variables are in Section 3.8. * , * * , *** indicate significance at 
10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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3.6.3. Different versions of ESCORE 
This section tests if the more practice-oriented versions of ESCORE as 
specified in Chapter 2, namely ESCORE_FIXED and ESCORE_9 (see Section 
2.6.3), could yield abnormal returns. The rationale of this sub-test is twofold. On the 
one hand, the test provides assurance that the main conclusions of the chapter are 
not sensitive to the way ESCORE is constructed. On the other hand, 
ESCORE_FIXED and ESCORE_9 are deliberately designed to be easily calculated 
in practice. Hence, the results in this section would be helpful for investors who are 
interested in using the ESCORE model in real-life stock trading. The section employs 
both the equally-weighted and value-weighted schemes in portfolio formation as well 
as both the buy-and-hold and cumulative returns in this robustness test. The results 
are reported in Table T3.27 to Table T3.54. In general, the conclusions from the main 
section remain qualitatively unchanged. 
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Table T3.27. Stock returns across ESCORE_FIXED groups – Equally-weighted scheme 
ESCORE_FIXED BHRRm   BHSARm   BHMARm   BHAR1Fm   BHAR3Fm   BHAR4Fm 
  Return t-statistic   Return t-statistic   Return t-statistic   Return t-statistic   Return t-statistic   Return t-statistic 
0 1.10 3.128***   0.44 3.713***   0.44 1.846*   0.47 2.001**   0.34 2.279**   0.31 2.013**  
1 0.94 2.843***   0.33 3.96***   0.28 1.289  0.33 1.518  0.18 1.762*   0.21 1.994**  
2 0.74 2.339**   0.17 2.553**   0.08 0.355  0.15 0.689  0.03 0.215  0.03 0.269 
3 0.61 1.819*   0.08 1.089  -0.05 -0.21  0.01 0.044  -0.12 -0.894  -0.07 -0.496 
4 0.22 0.576  -0.26 -2.505**   -0.44 -1.628  -0.40 -1.491  -0.53 -3.086***   -0.50 -2.807***  
5 -0.02 -0.056  -0.46 -2.861***   -0.68 -2.245**   -0.64 -2.109**   -0.76 -3.233***   -0.68 -2.803***  
6 -0.39 -0.845  -0.73 -2.928***   -1.04 -2.812***   -1.01 -2.72***   -1.16 -3.771***   -1.09 -3.425***  
7 -0.40 -0.685  -0.78 -1.89*   -1.00 -2.046**   -1.02 -2.08**   -1.16 -2.662***   -1.09 -2.423**  
8 0.15 0.196  -0.10 -0.151  -0.32 -0.447  -0.31 -0.427  -0.56 -0.822  -0.48 -0.675 
9 -2.75 -2.572**   -2.56 -2.73***   -3.03 -3.072***   -3.03 -3.062***   -3.22 -3.275***   -3.17 -3.078***  
Low (0) 1.10 3.128***    0.44 3.713***    0.44 1.846*    0.47 2.001**    0.34 2.279**    0.31 2.013**  
Medium (1-5) 0.57 1.73*   0.03 1.618  -0.09 -0.404  -0.03 -0.155  -0.16 -1.467  -0.13 -1.135 
High (6-9) -0.38 -0.877   -0.74 -3.432***    -1.04 -3.084***    -1.03 -3.024***    -1.15 -4.225***    -1.08 -3.846***  
Low - High 1.48 5.283***    1.18 4.532***    1.48 5.283***    1.50 5.368***    1.49 5.386***    1.39 5.067***  
Notes: The table reports the returns on different portfolios formed on the basis of ESCORE_FIXED. Definitions of variables are in Section 3.8. * , * * , *** indicate significance 
at 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table T3.28. Stock returns across ESCORE_FIXED groups – Value-weighted scheme 
ESCORE_FIXED BHRRm   BHSARm   BHMARm   BHAR1Fm   BHAR3Fm   BHAR4Fm 
  Return t-statistic   Return t-statistic   Return t-statistic   Return t-statistic   Return t-statistic   Return t-statistic 
0 0.70 1.697*   -0.09 -0.35  0.04 0.148  0.06 0.18  -0.10 -0.367  -0.04 -0.151 
1 0.94 2.621***   0.14 0.93  0.28 1.36  0.28 1.344  0.16 0.958  0.25 1.447 
2 0.88 2.553**   0.08 0.607  0.23 1.234  0.22 1.21  0.15 0.926  0.27 1.579 
3 0.66 1.819*   -0.13 -0.808  0.00 0.01  -0.01 -0.042  -0.08 -0.451  0.08 0.436 
4 0.54 1.323  -0.23 -1.119  -0.12 -0.488  -0.15 -0.617  -0.21 -0.981  -0.14 -0.605 
5 0.16 0.305  -0.59 -1.755*   -0.50 -1.28  -0.56 -1.425  -0.63 -1.723*   -0.39 -1.054 
6 -0.59 -0.968  -1.02 -2.317**   -1.24 -2.374**   -1.26 -2.386**   -1.44 -3.063***   -1.15 -2.394**  
7 -0.23 -0.346  -0.74 -1.552  -0.83 -1.447  -0.86 -1.497  -1.11 -2.184**   -0.95 -1.802*  
8 0.92 0.871  0.52 0.557  0.45 0.454  0.42 0.427  0.12 0.128  0.49 0.49 
9 -3.11 -2.971***   -2.89 -3.114***   -3.39 -3.453***   -3.39 -3.438***   -3.61 -3.709***   -3.53 -3.466***  
Low (0) 0.70 1.697*    -0.09 -0.35   0.04 0.148   0.06 0.18   -0.10 -0.367   -0.04 -0.151 
Medium (1-5) 0.76 2.235**   -0.03 -0.472  0.10 0.668  0.09 0.567  0.01 0.063  0.13 1.134 
High (6-9) -0.50 -0.904   -0.94 -2.645***    -1.16 -2.51**    -1.18 -2.533**    -1.36 -3.483***    -1.07 -2.685***  
Low - High 1.20 2.443**    0.84 1.795*    1.20 2.443**    1.23 2.501**    1.26 2.761***    1.03 2.263**  
Notes: The table reports the returns on different portfolios formed on the basis of ESCORE_FIXED. Definitions of variables are in Section 3.8. * , * * , *** indicate significance 
at 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively.  
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  Spec. 1     Spec. 2     Spec. 3     Spec. 4     Spec. 5 
  Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic 
(1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10)   (11) (12) 
Panel A: Pooled regression 
INTERCEPT  0.3286 8.81***   0.3236 8.675***   0.2101 6.385***   0.1961 5.979***   0.1729 18.878***  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0082 -2.836***   -0.0072 -2.503**   -0.0032 -1.157  -0.0017 -0.629    
MTBi,t (-) -0.0044 -4.042***   -0.0045 -4.167***   -0.0051 -4.776***   -0.0054 -4.973***     
ROAi,t (+) 0.1802 5.887***   0.1474 4.988***   0.2034 6.677***   0.1666 5.651***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0865 -6.138***   -0.0893 -6.342***   -0.1251 -9.722***   -0.1311 -10.224***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) 0.0119 0.658  0.0185 1.027  -0.0165 -0.938  -0.0107 -0.61    
NOAi,t (-) -0.1358 -5.876***   -0.1418 -6.147***   -0.1112 -4.865***   -0.1165 -5.102***     
DACi,t (-) -0.1722 -4.067***      -0.1996 -4.727***      -0.1051 -2.644***  
ESCORE_FIXEDi,t (-) -0.0251 -6.705***   -0.0265 -7.126***         -0.0375 -13.251***  
Adjusted R2 (%)  2.81   2.67   2.44   2.26   1.49  
Panel B: Fama-MacBeth regression with Newey-West adjusted t-statistic 
INTERCEPT  0.2719 4.69***   0.2694 4.55***   0.1947 2.44**   0.1810 2.21**   0.1571 4.29***  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0058 -1.1  -0.0049 -0.92  -0.0021 -0.33  -0.0007 -0.11    
MTBi,t (-) -0.0026 -1.4  -0.0028 -1.46  -0.0030 -1.69  -0.0032 -1.8*     
ROAi,t (+) 0.1659 3.68***   0.1255 3.19***   0.1806 4.26***   0.1383 3.81***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0618 -3.57***   -0.0634 -3.44***   -0.0831 -3.67***   -0.0884 -3.65***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0307 -1.4  -0.0233 -1.07  -0.0484 -1.71  -0.0428 -1.54    
NOAi,t (-) -0.1241 -4.43***   -0.1312 -4.62***   -0.1107 -3.55***   -0.1162 -3.71***     
DACi,t (-) -0.1832 -3.55***      -0.2013 -3.47***      -0.0860 -2.14**  
ESCORE_FIXEDi,t (-) -0.0137 -2.16**    -0.0159 -2.4**                -0.0278 -2.83**  
Notes: Specification 1 (columns 3 and 4) report the results of estimating the following equation:  ܤܪܴܴ௜,௧ାଵ௔ = ߙ + ߚଵܮ݋݃൫ܯܸܧ௜,௧൯ + ߚଶܯܶܤ௜,௧ + ߚଷܴܱܣ௜,௧ + ߚସܧܵܧ ௜ܱ,௧ + ߚହܧܦܫܴܵܶܧܵ ௜ܵ,௧ + ߚ଺ܱܰܣ௜,௧ + ߚ଻ܦܣܥ௜,௧ + ߛܧܵܥܱܴܧ_ܨܫܺܧܦ௜,௧ + ߝ.  (E3.25) 
From Specification 1 as the full specification, in Specification 2 DAC is dropped, in Specification 3 ESCORE_FIXED is dropped, in Specification 4 DAC and ESCORE_FIXED are 
dropped, in Specification 5 Ln(MVE), MTB, ROA, ESEO, EDISTRESS, NOA are dropped from the explanatory variables. Panel A (B) reports the results from the pooled regression 
(Fama-Macbeth regression in which the standard errors are adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West procedure). Column (2) exhibits the expected sign of the 
explanatory variables. ‘Spec.’ is abbreviation for ‘Specification’ and ‘Coef.’ is abbreviation for ‘Coefficient’. Definitions of variables are in Section 3.8. * , ** , *** indicate 








  Spec. 1     Spec. 2     Spec. 3     Spec. 4     Spec. 5 
  Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic 
(1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10)   (11) (12) 
Panel A: Pooled regression 
INTERCEPT  0.2751 7.961***   0.2700 7.812***   0.2044 6.713***   0.1911 6.295***   0.0787 9.278***  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0128 -4.776***   -0.0118 -4.418***   -0.0098 -3.796***   -0.0084 -3.266***     
MTBi,t (-) -0.0025 -2.513**   -0.0027 -2.65***   -0.0030 -2.989***   -0.0032 -3.191***     
ROAi,t (+) 0.1810 6.382***   0.1478 5.398***   0.1948 6.91***   0.1597 5.853***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0600 -4.602***   -0.0629 -4.822***   -0.0831 -6.977***   -0.0888 -7.482***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0255 -1.524  -0.0188 -1.129  -0.0424 -2.606***   -0.0369 -2.271**     
NOAi,t (-) -0.1207 -5.639***   -0.1268 -5.932***   -0.1060 -5.014***   -0.1112 -5.258***     
DACi,t (-) -0.1741 -4.438***      -0.1905 -4.874***      -0.0809 -2.197**  
ESCORE_FIXEDi,t (-) -0.0149 -4.315***   -0.0164 -4.762***         -0.0259 -9.875***  
Adjusted R2 (%)  2.14   1.98   1.99   1.80   0.84  
Panel B: Fama-MacBeth regression with Newey-West adjusted t-statistic 
INTERCEPT  0.2864 4.7***  0.2839 4.48***   0.2069 5.81***   0.1938 5.24***   0.0748 3.2*** 
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0134 -3.12***   -0.0126 -2.87**   -0.0097 -3.14***   -0.0084 -2.69**     
MTBi,t (-) -0.0024 -1.37  -0.0026 -1.42  -0.0028 -1.69  -0.0031 -1.8*     
ROAi,t (+) 0.1683 3.67***   0.1316 3.22***   0.1824 4.26***   0.1436 3.84***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0565 -3.24***   -0.0579 -3.12***   -0.0788 -3.45***   -0.0838 -3.43***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0308 -1.36  -0.0239 -1.07  -0.0493 -1.72  -0.0442 -1.57    
NOAi,t (-) -0.1248 -4.17***   -0.1309 -4.34***   -0.1106 -3.4***   -0.1153 -3.54***     
DACi,t (-) -0.1655 -3.14***      -0.1846 -3.15***      -0.0696 -1.76*  
ESCORE_FIXEDi,t (-) -0.0146 -2.47**    -0.0166 -2.69**                -0.0229 -3.01***  
Notes: Specification 1 (columns 3 and 4) report the results of estimating the following equation:  ܤܪܵܣܴ௜,௧ାଵ௔ = ߙ + ߚଵܮ݋݃൫ܯܸܧ௜,௧൯ + ߚଶܯܶܤ௜,௧ + ߚଷܴܱܣ௜,௧ + ߚସܧܵܧ ௜ܱ,௧ + ߚହܧܦܫܴܵܶܧܵ ௜ܵ,௧ + ߚ଺ܱܰܣ௜,௧ + ߚ଻ܦܣܥ௜,௧ + ߛܧܵܥܱܴܧ_ܨܫܺܧܦ௜,௧ + ߝ.  (E3.25) 
From Specification 1 as the full specification, in Specification 2 DAC is dropped, in Specification 3 ESCORE_FIXED is dropped, in Specification 4 DAC and ESCORE_FIXED are 
dropped, in Specification 5 Ln(MVE), MTB, ROA, ESEO, EDISTRESS, NOA are dropped from the explanatory variables. Panel A (B) reports the results from the pooled regression 
(Fama-Macbeth regression in which the standard errors are adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West procedure). Column (2) exhibits the expected sign of the 
explanatory variables. ‘Spec.’ is abbreviation for ‘Specification’ and ‘Coef.’ is abbreviation for ‘Coefficient’. Definitions of variables are in Section 3.8. * , ** , *** indicate 
significance at 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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  Spec. 1     Spec. 2     Spec. 3     Spec. 4     Spec. 5 
  Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic 
(1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10)   (11) (12) 
Panel A: Pooled regression 
INTERCEPT  0.1695 4.736***   0.1645 4.597***   0.0875 2.774***   0.0742 2.362**   0.0815 9.291***  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0040 -1.461  -0.0031 -1.114  -0.0006 -0.231  0.0008 0.296    
MTBi,t (-) -0.0032 -3.062***   -0.0033 -3.191***   -0.0037 -3.595***   -0.0039 -3.79***     
ROAi,t (+) 0.1537 5.235***   0.1213 4.279***   0.1698 5.814***   0.1349 4.774***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0800 -5.918***   -0.0827 -6.126***   -0.1067 -8.65***   -0.1123 -9.142***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0082 -0.474  -0.0017 -0.097  -0.0278 -1.651*   -0.0224 -1.329    
NOAi,t (-) -0.1040 -4.694***   -0.1100 -4.97***   -0.0870 -3.973***   -0.0921 -4.208***     
DACi,t (-) -0.1702 -4.189***      -0.1891 -4.673***      -0.1003 -2.635***  
ESCORE_FIXEDi,t (-) -0.0173 -4.835***   -0.0188 -5.261***         -0.0315 -11.599***  
Adjusted R2 (%)  2.19   2.04   1.99   1.81   1.16  
Panel B: Fama-MacBeth regression with Newey-West adjusted t-statistic 
INTERCEPT  0.1879 3.46***   0.1853 3.34***   0.1107 1.39  0.0970 1.18  0.0731 1.77*  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0058 -1.1  -0.0049 -0.92  -0.0021 -0.33  -0.0007 -0.11    
MTBi,t (-) -0.0026 -1.4  -0.0028 -1.46  -0.0030 -1.69  -0.0032 -1.8*     
ROAi,t (+) 0.1659 3.68***   0.1255 3.19***   0.1806 4.26***   0.1383 3.81***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0618 -3.57***   -0.0634 -3.44***   -0.0831 -3.67***   -0.0884 -3.65***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0307 -1.4  -0.0233 -1.07  -0.0484 -1.71  -0.0428 -1.54    
NOAi,t (-) -0.1241 -4.43***   -0.1312 -4.62***   -0.1107 -3.55***   -0.1162 -3.71***     
DACi,t (-) -0.1832 -3.55***      -0.2013 -3.47***      -0.0860 -2.14**  
ESCORE_FIXEDi,t (-) -0.0137 -2.16**    -0.0159 -2.4**                -0.0278 -2.83**  
Notes: Specification 1 (columns 3 and 4) report the results of estimating the following equation:  ܤܪܯܣ ௜ܴ,௧ାଵ௔ = ߙ + ߚଵܮ݋݃൫ܯܸܧ௜,௧൯ + ߚଶܯܶܤ௜,௧ + ߚଷܴܱܣ௜,௧ + ߚସܧܵܧ ௜ܱ,௧ + ߚହܧܦܫܴܵܶܧܵ ௜ܵ,௧ + ߚ଺ܱܰܣ௜,௧ + ߚ଻ܦܣܥ௜,௧ + ߛܧܵܥܱܴܧ_ܨܫܺܧܦ௜,௧ + ߝ.  (E3.25) 
From Specification 1 as the full specification, in Specification 2 DAC is dropped, in Specification 3 ESCORE_FIXED is dropped, in Specification 4 DAC and ESCORE_FIXED are 
dropped, in Specification 5 Ln(MVE), MTB, ROA, ESEO, EDISTRESS, NOA are dropped from the explanatory variables. Panel A (B) reports the results from the pooled regression 
(Fama-Macbeth regression in which the standard errors are adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West procedure). Column (2) exhibits the expected sign of the 
explanatory variables. ‘Spec.’ is abbreviation for ‘Specification’ and ‘Coef.’ is abbreviation for ‘Coefficient’. Definitions of variables are in Section 3.8. * , ** , *** indicate 
significance at 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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  Spec. 1     Spec. 2     Spec. 3     Spec. 4     Spec. 5 
  Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic 
(1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10)   (11) (12) 
Panel A: Pooled regression 
INTERCEPT  0.1972 5.55***   0.1919 5.399***   0.1230 3.929***   0.1090 3.493***   0.0840 9.64***  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0067 -2.423**   -0.0056 -2.051**   -0.0036 -1.34  -0.0021 -0.785    
MTBi,t (-) -0.0028 -2.747***   -0.0030 -2.886***   -0.0033 -3.233***   -0.0035 -3.439***     
ROAi,t (+) 0.1696 5.816***   0.1348 4.787***   0.1841 6.351***   0.1473 5.249***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0803 -5.983***   -0.0833 -6.208***   -0.1045 -8.531***   -0.1104 -9.051***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0137 -0.793  -0.0066 -0.388  -0.0314 -1.877*   -0.0256 -1.533    
NOAi,t (-) -0.0995 -4.519***   -0.1059 -4.817***   -0.0841 -3.866***   -0.0895 -4.115***     
DACi,t (-) -0.1827 -4.528***      -0.1998 -4.972***      -0.1004 -2.655***  
ESCORE_FIXEDi,t (-) -0.0157 -4.405***   -0.0172 -4.861***         -0.0302 -11.189***  
Adjusted R2 (%)  2.22   2.05   2.06   1.86   1.08  
Panel B: Fama-MacBeth regression with Newey-West adjusted t-statistic 
INTERCEPT  0.2149 3.83***   0.2124 3.68***   0.1487 2.01*   0.1347 1.77*   0.0744 2.13**  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0086 -1.41  -0.0077 -1.25  -0.0054 -0.8  -0.0040 -0.57    
MTBi,t (-) -0.0023 -1.24  -0.0025 -1.32  -0.0026 -1.51  -0.0029 -1.65    
ROAi,t (+) 0.1851 4.03***   0.1422 3.75***   0.1985 4.43***   0.1544 4.25***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0615 -3.72***   -0.0634 -3.55***   -0.0798 -3.56***   -0.0854 -3.55***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0354 -1.65  -0.0277 -1.32  -0.0501 -1.81*   -0.0444 -1.63    
NOAi,t (-) -0.1147 -4.26***   -0.1223 -4.49***   -0.1035 -3.52***   -0.1094 -3.71***     
DACi,t (-) -0.1955 -3.62***      -0.2110 -3.53***      -0.0846 -2.2**  
ESCORE_FIXEDi,t (-) -0.0116 -1.96*    -0.0139 -2.23**                -0.0255 -2.68**  
Notes: Specification 1 (columns 3 and 4) report the results of estimating the following equation:  ܤܪܣܴ1ܨ௜,௧ାଵ௔ = ߙ + ߚଵܮ݋݃൫ܯܸܧ௜,௧൯ + ߚଶܯܶܤ௜,௧ + ߚଷܴܱܣ௜,௧ + ߚସܧܵܧ ௜ܱ,௧ + ߚହܧܦܫܴܵܶܧܵ ௜ܵ,௧ + ߚ଺ܱܰܣ௜,௧ + ߚ଻ܦܣܥ௜,௧ + ߛܧܵܥܱܴܧ_ܨܫܺܧܦ௜,௧ + ߝ.  (E3.25) 
From Specification 1 as the full specification, in Specification 2 DAC is dropped, in Specification 3 ESCORE_FIXED is dropped, in Specification 4 DAC and ESCORE_FIXED are 
dropped, in Specification 5 Ln(MVE), MTB, ROA, ESEO, EDISTRESS, NOA are dropped from the explanatory variables. Panel A (B) reports the results from the pooled regression 
(Fama-Macbeth regression in which the standard errors are adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West procedure). Column (2) exhibits the expected sign of the 
explanatory variables. ‘Spec.’ is abbreviation for ‘Specification’ and ‘Coef.’ is abbreviation for ‘Coefficient’. Definitions of variables are in Section 3.8. * , ** , *** indicate 
significance at 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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  Spec. 1     Spec. 2     Spec. 3     Spec. 4     Spec. 5 
  Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic 
(1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10)   (11) (12) 
Panel A: Pooled regression 
INTERCEPT  0.1683 4.892***   0.1632 4.742***   0.1165 3.844***   0.1034 3.421***   0.0567 6.723***  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0063 -2.352**   -0.0053 -1.982**   -0.0041 -1.591  -0.0027 -1.055    
MTBi,t (-) -0.0017 -1.67*   -0.0018 -1.808*   -0.0020 -2.019**   -0.0022 -2.22**     
ROAi,t (+) 0.1551 5.494***   0.1217 4.464***   0.1653 5.89***   0.1307 4.813***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0728 -5.604***   -0.0757 -5.827***   -0.0897 -7.568***   -0.0953 -8.069***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0287 -1.723*   -0.0220 -1.323  -0.0411 -2.537**   -0.0357 -2.206**     
NOAi,t (-) -0.1067 -5.008***   -0.1129 -5.303***   -0.0960 -4.559***   -0.1010 -4.801***     
DACi,t (-) -0.1755 -4.492***      -0.1875 -4.819***      -0.0935 -2.554**  
ESCORE_FIXEDi,t (-) -0.0110 -3.178***   -0.0124 -3.626***         -0.0246 -9.419***  
Adjusted R2 (%)  1.88   1.72   1.80   1.61   0.78  
Panel B: Fama-MacBeth regression with Newey-West adjusted t-statistic 
INTERCEPT  0.1903 3.27***   0.1877 3.16***   0.1401 1.85*   0.1275 1.64  0.0484 1.87*  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0089 -1.51  -0.0081 -1.36  -0.0064 -0.94  -0.0051 -0.74    
MTBi,t (-) -0.0012 -0.94  -0.0014 -1.05  -0.0015 -1.21  -0.0017 -1.39    
ROAi,t (+) 0.1602 3.69***   0.1214 3.34***   0.1708 4.02***   0.1311 3.73***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0582 -3.6***   -0.0599 -3.47***   -0.0710 -3.26***   -0.0761 -3.26***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0434 -2.62**   -0.0364 -2.28**   -0.0543 -2.37**   -0.0493 -2.2**     
NOAi,t (-) -0.1094 -4.23***   -0.1159 -4.41***   -0.1014 -3.57***   -0.1064 -3.75***     
DACi,t (-) -0.1760 -3.34***      -0.1890 -3.29***      -0.0759 -2.07*  
ESCORE_FIXEDi,t (-) -0.0083 -1.36   -0.0103 -1.61               -0.0203 -2.05*  
Notes: Specification 1 (columns 3 and 4) report the results of estimating the following equation:  ܤܪܣܴ3ܨ௜,௧ାଵ௔ = ߙ + ߚଵܮ݋݃൫ܯܸܧ௜,௧൯ + ߚଶܯܶܤ௜,௧ + ߚଷܴܱܣ௜,௧ + ߚସܧܵܧ ௜ܱ,௧ + ߚହܧܦܫܴܵܶܧܵ ௜ܵ,௧ + ߚ଺ܱܰܣ௜,௧ + ߚ଻ܦܣܥ௜,௧ + ߛܧܵܥܱܴܧ௜,௧_ܨܫܺܧܦ + ߝ.  (E3.25) 
From Specification 1 as the full specification, in Specification 2 DAC is dropped, in Specification 3 ESCORE_FIXED is dropped, in Specification 4 DAC and ESCORE_FIXED are 
dropped, in Specification 5 Ln(MVE), MTB, ROA, ESEO, EDISTRESS, NOA are dropped from the explanatory variables. Panel A (B) reports the results from the pooled regression 
(Fama-Macbeth regression in which the standard errors are adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West procedure). Column (2) exhibits the expected sign of the 
explanatory variables. ‘Spec.’ is abbreviation for ‘Specification’ and ‘Coef.’ is abbreviation for ‘Coefficient’. Definitions of variables are in Section 3.8. * , ** , *** indicate 








  Spec. 1     Spec. 2     Spec. 3     Spec. 4     Spec. 5 
  Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic 
(1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10)   (11) (12) 
Panel A: Pooled regression 
INTERCEPT  0.1490 4.367***   0.1435 4.205***   0.0932 3.1***  0.0791 2.639***   0.0590 7.059***  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0039 -1.466  -0.0028 -1.063  -0.0015 -0.602  0.0000 -0.016    
MTBi,t (-) -0.0013 -1.31  -0.0014 -1.46  -0.0017 -1.687*   -0.0019 -1.904*     
ROAi,t (+) 0.1377 4.918***   0.1018 3.766***   0.1486 5.341***   0.1115 4.141***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0699 -5.43***   -0.0730 -5.67***   -0.0882 -7.5***   -0.0941 -8.038***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0331 -2.001**   -0.0259 -1.57  -0.0464 -2.89***   -0.0406 -2.531**     
NOAi,t (-) -0.1159 -5.484***   -0.1225 -5.803***   -0.1043 -4.997***   -0.1097 -5.257***     
DACi,t (-) -0.1882 -4.858***      -0.2011 -5.213***      -0.1146 -3.158***  
ESCORE_FIXEDi,t (-) -0.0118 -3.454***   -0.0134 -3.937***         -0.0250 -9.674***  
Adjusted R2 (%)  1.89   1.69   1.79   1.56   0.85  
Panel B: Fama-MacBeth regression with Newey-West adjusted t-statistic 
INTERCEPT  0.1703 3.12***   0.1679 3.03***   0.1143 1.64  0.1012 1.42  0.0505 2.02*  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0065 -1.21  -0.0056 -1.05  -0.0038 -0.6  -0.0024 -0.37    
MTBi,t (-) -0.0010 -0.72  -0.0011 -0.82  -0.0012 -0.96  -0.0015 -1.13    
ROAi,t (+) 0.1522 4.09***   0.1076 3.39***   0.1635 4.48***   0.1178 3.87***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0578 -3.36***   -0.0601 -3.3***   -0.0724 -3.13***   -0.0781 -3.17***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0467 -3.62***   -0.0395 -3.2***   -0.0590 -3.11***   -0.0538 -2.93***     
NOAi,t (-) -0.1176 -4.72***   -0.1250 -4.89***   -0.1085 -3.98***   -0.1144 -4.15***     
DACi,t (-) -0.1974 -4.02***      -0.2119 -3.83***      -0.1022 -2.81**  
ESCORE_FIXEDi,t (-) -0.0095 -1.55   -0.0115 -1.78*                -0.0208 -2.13**  
Notes: Specification 1 (columns 3 and 4) report the results of estimating the following equation:  ܤܪܣܴ4ܨ௜,௧ାଵ௔ = ߙ + ߚଵܮ݋݃൫ܯܸܧ௜,௧൯ + ߚଶܯܶܤ௜,௧ + ߚଷܴܱܣ௜,௧ + ߚସܧܵܧ ௜ܱ,௧ + ߚହܧܦܫܴܵܶܧܵ ௜ܵ,௧ + ߚ଺ܱܰܣ௜,௧ + ߚ଻ܦܣܥ௜,௧ + ߛܧܵܥܱܴܧ_ܨܫܺܧܦ௜,௧ + ߝ.  (E3.25) 
From Specification 1 as the full specification, in Specification 2 DAC is dropped, in Specification 3 ESCORE_FIXED is dropped, in Specification 4 DAC and ESCORE_FIXED are 
dropped, in Specification 5 Ln(MVE), MTB, ROA, ESEO, EDISTRESS, NOA are dropped from the explanatory variables. Panel A (B) reports the results from the pooled regression 
(Fama-Macbeth regression in which the standard errors are adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West procedure). Column (2) exhibits the expected sign of the 
explanatory variables. ‘Spec.’ is abbreviation for ‘Specification’ and ‘Coef.’ is abbreviation for ‘Coefficient’. Definitions of variables are in Section 3.8. * , ** , *** indicate 








  Spec. 1     Spec. 2     Spec. 3     Spec. 4     Spec. 5 
  Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic 
(1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10)   (11) (12) 
Panel A: Pooled regression 
INTERCEPT  0.2840 8.359***   0.2785 8.195***   0.1658 5.531***   0.1508 5.044***   0.1590 19.031***  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0051 -1.953*   -0.0041 -1.551  -0.0002 -0.078  0.0014 0.552    
MTBi,t (-) -0.0040 -4.104***   -0.0042 -4.252***   -0.0048 -4.904***   -0.0050 -5.134***     
ROAi,t (+) 0.1912 6.857***   0.1555 5.776***   0.2143 7.721***   0.1747 6.503***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0835 -6.513***   -0.0866 -6.753***   -0.1221 -10.412***   -0.1285 -10.995***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) 0.0256 1.555  0.0328 1.997**   -0.0027 -0.169  0.0035 0.218    
NOAi,t (-) -0.1465 -6.961***   -0.1530 -7.281***   -0.1220 -5.857***   -0.1277 -6.135***     
DACi,t (-) -0.1873 -4.855***      -0.2146 -5.577***      -0.1254 -3.461***  
ESCORE_FIXEDi,t (-) -0.0250 -7.338***   -0.0266 -7.836***         -0.0371 -14.371***  
Adjusted R2 (%)  3.35   3.16   2.91   2.66   1.78  
Panel B: Fama-MacBeth regression with Newey-West adjusted t-statistic 
INTERCEPT  0.2221 4.82***   0.2192 4.75***   0.1438 2.15**   0.1295 1.89*   0.1433 4.77***  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0022 -0.55  -0.0012 -0.29  0.0015 0.29  0.0030 0.58    
MTBi,t (-) -0.0023 -1.37  -0.0025 -1.47  -0.0027 -1.69  -0.0030 -1.86*     
ROAi,t (+) 0.1696 3.97***   0.1243 3.25***   0.1839 4.4***  0.1371 3.72***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0564 -2.99***   -0.0586 -3.01***   -0.0790 -3.39***   -0.0849 -3.47***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0170 -0.81  -0.0096 -0.48  -0.0349 -1.37  -0.0295 -1.21    
NOAi,t (-) -0.1332 -6.49***   -0.1419 -6.86***   -0.1199 -5.12***   -0.1268 -5.39***     
DACi,t (-) -0.2018 -5.7***      -0.2179 -5.11***      -0.1122 -4.4***  
ESCORE_FIXEDi,t (-) -0.0144 -2.72**    -0.0166 -3.02***                -0.0276 -3.06***  
Notes: Specification 1 (columns 3 and 4) report the results of estimating the following equation:  ܥܴܴ௜,௧ାଵ௔ = ߙ + ߚଵܮ݋݃൫ܯܸܧ௜,௧൯ + ߚଶܯܶܤ௜,௧ + ߚଷܴܱܣ௜,௧ + ߚସܧܵܧ ௜ܱ,௧ + ߚହܧܦܫܴܵܶܧܵ ௜ܵ,௧ + ߚ଺ܱܰܣ௜,௧ + ߚ଻ܦܣܥ௜,௧ + ߛܧܵܥܱܴܧ_ܨܫܺܧܦ௜,௧ + ߝ.  (E3.25) 
From Specification 1 as the full specification, in Specification 2 DAC is dropped, in Specification 3 ESCORE_FIXED is dropped, in Specification 4 DAC and ESCORE_FIXED are 
dropped, in Specification 5 Ln(MVE), MTB, ROA, ESEO, EDISTRESS, NOA are dropped from the explanatory variables. Panel A (B) reports the results from the pooled regression 
(Fama-Macbeth regression in which the standard errors are adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West procedure). Column (2) exhibits the expected sign of the 
explanatory variables. ‘Spec.’ is abbreviation for ‘Specification’ and ‘Coef.’ is abbreviation for ‘Coefficient’. Definitions of variables are in Section 3.8. * , ** , *** indicate 
significance at 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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  Spec. 1     Spec. 2     Spec. 3     Spec. 4     Spec. 5 
  Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic 
(1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10)   (11) (12) 
Panel A: Pooled regression 
INTERCEPT  0.2542 8.064***   0.2488 7.889***   0.1809 6.51***   0.1668 6.018***   0.0685 8.844***  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0111 -4.558***   -0.0101 -4.137***   -0.0080 -3.413***   -0.0065 -2.791***     
MTBi,t (-) -0.0025 -2.683***   -0.0026 -2.841***   -0.0029 -3.221***   -0.0031 -3.456***     
ROAi,t (+) 0.1847 7.141***   0.1495 5.984***   0.1991 7.739***   0.1619 6.499***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0588 -4.941***   -0.0618 -5.196***   -0.0828 -7.613***   -0.0888 -8.194***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0096 -0.627  -0.0025 -0.163  -0.0271 -1.827*   -0.0213 -1.435    
NOAi,t (-) -0.1346 -6.892***   -0.1411 -7.232***   -0.1194 -6.186***   -0.1248 -6.467***     
DACi,t (-) -0.1850 -5.167***      -0.2019 -5.662***      -0.1024 -3.046***  
ESCORE_FIXEDi,t (-) -0.0155 -4.907***   -0.0171 -5.425***         -0.0253 -10.534***  
Adjusted R2 (%)  2.52   2.30   2.32   2.06   0.98  
Panel B: Fama-MacBeth regression with Newey-West adjusted t-statistic 
INTERCEPT  0.2543 4.71***   0.2516 4.52***   0.1736 5.62***   0.1600 5.19***   0.0648 3.09***  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0110 -2.68**   -0.0100 -2.41**   -0.0073 -2.42**   -0.0058 -1.98*     
MTBi,t (-) -0.0022 -1.32  -0.0023 -1.42  -0.0026 -1.67  -0.0029 -1.84*     
ROAi,t (+) 0.1709 3.96***   0.1294 3.29***   0.1847 4.41***   0.1415 3.76***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0516 -2.78**   -0.0535 -2.79**   -0.0752 -3.26***   -0.0807 -3.33***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0171 -0.8  -0.0102 -0.5  -0.0360 -1.39  -0.0310 -1.25    
NOAi,t (-) -0.1340 -6.16***   -0.1417 -6.43***   -0.1199 -4.95***   -0.1260 -5.16***     
DACi,t (-) -0.1845 -5.08***      -0.2016 -4.67***      -0.0960 -3.61***  
ESCORE_FIXEDi,t (-) -0.0152 -3.16***    -0.0173 -3.44***                -0.0226 -3.19***  
Notes: Specification 1 (columns 3 and 4) report the results of estimating the following equation:  ܥܵܣܴ௜,௧ାଵ௔ = ߙ + ߚଵܮ݋݃൫ܯܸܧ௜,௧൯ + ߚଶܯܶܤ௜,௧ + ߚଷܴܱܣ௜,௧ + ߚସܧܵܧ ௜ܱ,௧ + ߚହܧܦܫܴܵܶܧܵ ௜ܵ,௧ + ߚ଺ܱܰܣ௜,௧ + ߚ଻ܦܣܥ௜,௧ + ߛܧܵܥܱܴܧ_ܨܫܺܧܦ௜,௧ + ߝ.  (E3.25) 
From Specification 1 as the full specification, in Specification 2 DAC is dropped, in Specification 3 ESCORE_FIXED is dropped, in Specification 4 DAC and ESCORE_FIXED are 
dropped, in Specification 5 Ln(MVE), MTB, ROA, ESEO, EDISTRESS, NOA are dropped from the explanatory variables. Panel A (B) reports the results from the pooled regression 
(Fama-Macbeth regression in which the standard errors are adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West procedure). Column (2) exhibits the expected sign of the 
explanatory variables. ‘Spec.’ is abbreviation for ‘Specification’ and ‘Coef.’ is abbreviation for ‘Coefficient’. Definitions of variables are in Section 3.8. * , ** , *** indicate 
significance at 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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  Spec. 1     Spec. 2     Spec. 3     Spec. 4     Spec. 5 
  Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic 
(1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10)   (11) (12) 
Panel A: Pooled regression 
INTERCEPT  0.1321 4.036***   0.1267 3.869***   0.0494 1.71*   0.0351 1.218  0.0725 9.02***  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0011 -0.435  0.0000 -0.02  0.0024 0.961  0.0039 1.588    
MTBi,t (-) -0.0029 -3.089***   -0.0031 -3.241***   -0.0035 -3.675***   -0.0037 -3.903***     
ROAi,t (+) 0.1652 6.149***   0.1299 5.009***   0.1814 6.789***   0.1437 5.558***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0769 -6.221***   -0.0799 -6.467***   -0.1039 -9.205***   -0.1100 -9.778***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) 0.0062 0.388  0.0132 0.838  -0.0137 -0.886  -0.0078 -0.503    
NOAi,t (-) -0.1163 -5.736***   -0.1228 -6.063***   -0.0991 -4.946***   -0.1046 -5.221***     
DACi,t (-) -0.1850 -4.978***      -0.2041 -5.512***      -0.1208 -3.465***  
ESCORE_FIXEDi,t (-) -0.0175 -5.335***   -0.0191 -5.837***         -0.0312 -12.559***  
Adjusted R2 (%)  2.63   2.43   2.40   2.15   1.38  
Panel B: Fama-MacBeth regression with Newey-West adjusted t-statistic 
INTERCEPT  0.1431 3.01***   0.1403 2.97***   0.0648 0.95  0.0506 0.72  0.0644 1.62 
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0022 -0.55  -0.0012 -0.29  0.0015 0.29  0.0030 0.58    
MTBi,t (-) -0.0023 -1.37  -0.0025 -1.47  -0.0027 -1.69  -0.0030 -1.86*     
ROAi,t (+) 0.1696 3.97***   0.1243 3.25***   0.1839 4.4***  0.1371 3.72***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0564 -2.99***   -0.0586 -3.01***   -0.0790 -3.39***   -0.0849 -3.47***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0170 -0.81  -0.0096 -0.48  -0.0349 -1.37  -0.0295 -1.21    
NOAi,t (-) -0.1332 -6.49***   -0.1419 -6.86***   -0.1199 -5.12***   -0.1268 -5.39***     
DACi,t (-) -0.2018 -5.7***      -0.2179 -5.11***      -0.1122 -4.4***  
ESCORE_FIXEDi,t (-) -0.0144 -2.72**    -0.0166 -3.02***                -0.0276 -3.06***  
Notes: Specification 1 (columns 3 and 4) report the results of estimating the following equation:  ܥܯܣ ௜ܴ,௧ାଵ௔ = ߙ + ߚଵܮ݋݃൫ܯܸܧ௜,௧൯ + ߚଶܯܶܤ௜,௧ + ߚଷܴܱܣ௜,௧ + ߚସܧܵܧ ௜ܱ,௧ + ߚହܧܦܫܴܵܶܧܵ ௜ܵ,௧ + ߚ଺ܱܰܣ௜,௧ + ߚ଻ܦܣܥ௜,௧ + ߛܧܵܥܱܴܧ_ܨܫܺܧܦ௜,௧ + ߝ.  (E3.25) 
From Specification 1 as the full specification, in Specification 2 DAC is dropped, in Specification 3 ESCORE_FIXED is dropped, in Specification 4 DAC and ESCORE_FIXED are 
dropped, in Specification 5 Ln(MVE), MTB, ROA, ESEO, EDISTRESS, NOA are dropped from the explanatory variables. Panel A (B) reports the results from the pooled regression 
(Fama-Macbeth regression in which the standard errors are adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West procedure). Column (2) exhibits the expected sign of the 
explanatory variables. ‘Spec.’ is abbreviation for ‘Specification’ and ‘Coef.’ is abbreviation for ‘Coefficient’. Definitions of variables are in Section 3.8. * , ** , *** indicate 
significance at 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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  Spec. 1     Spec. 2     Spec. 3     Spec. 4     Spec. 5 
  Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic 
(1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10)   (11) (12) 
Panel A: Pooled regression 
INTERCEPT  0.1554 4.785***   0.1498 4.607***   0.0793 2.77***   0.0644 2.255**   0.0758 9.494***  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0032 -1.286  -0.0021 -0.845  -0.0001 -0.021  0.0015 0.634    
MTBi,t (-) -0.0026 -2.809***   -0.0028 -2.971***   -0.0031 -3.353***   -0.0034 -3.592***     
ROAi,t (+) 0.1794 6.729***   0.1421 5.52***   0.1943 7.329***   0.1550 6.039***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0771 -6.287***   -0.0803 -6.548***   -0.1020 -9.105***   -0.1083 -9.704***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) 0.0020 0.124  0.0094 0.602  -0.0163 -1.064  -0.0101 -0.662    
NOAi,t (-) -0.1121 -5.573***   -0.1190 -5.919***   -0.0963 -4.844***   -0.1021 -5.133***     
DACi,t (-) -0.1955 -5.299***      -0.2131 -5.798***      -0.1205 -3.482***  
ESCORE_FIXEDi,t (-) -0.0161 -4.947***   -0.0178 -5.478***         -0.0302 -12.22***  
Adjusted R2 (%)  2.66   2.43   2.46   2.18   1.32  
Panel B: Fama-MacBeth regression with Newey-West adjusted t-statistic 
INTERCEPT  0.1657 3.76***   0.1628 3.66***   0.0971 1.56  0.0827 1.29  0.0666 1.99*  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0045 -0.88  -0.0034 -0.68  -0.0013 -0.22  0.0003 0.06    
MTBi,t (-) -0.0020 -1.16  -0.0022 -1.28  -0.0024 -1.44  -0.0027 -1.64    
ROAi,t (+) 0.1872 4.34***   0.1399 3.8***  0.2003 4.63***   0.1521 4.17***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0560 -3.23***   -0.0584 -3.24***   -0.0759 -3.42***   -0.0821 -3.5***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0206 -0.99  -0.0129 -0.66  -0.0360 -1.43  -0.0304 -1.26    
NOAi,t (-) -0.1244 -6.02***   -0.1335 -6.43***   -0.1131 -4.97***   -0.1203 -5.27***     
DACi,t (-) -0.2120 -5.74***      -0.2258 -5.2***      -0.1097 -4.48***  
ESCORE_FIXEDi,t (-) -0.0125 -2.55**    -0.0148 -2.88**                -0.0257 -2.94***  
Notes: Specification 1 (columns 3 and 4) report the results of estimating the following equation:  ܥܣܴ1ܨ௜,௧ାଵ௔ = ߙ + ߚଵܮ݋݃൫ܯܸܧ௜,௧൯ + ߚଶܯܶܤ௜,௧ + ߚଷܴܱܣ௜,௧ + ߚସܧܵܧ ௜ܱ,௧ + ߚହܧܦܫܴܵܶܧܵ ௜ܵ,௧ + ߚ଺ܱܰܣ௜,௧ + ߚ଻ܦܣܥ௜,௧ + ߛܧܵܥܱܴܧ_ܨܫܺܧܦ௜,௧ + ߝ.  (E3.25) 
From Specification 1 as the full specification, in Specification 2 DAC is dropped, in Specification 3 ESCORE_FIXED is dropped, in Specification 4 DAC and ESCORE_FIXED are 
dropped, in Specification 5 Ln(MVE), MTB, ROA, ESEO, EDISTRESS, NOA are dropped from the explanatory variables. Panel A (B) reports the results from the pooled regression 
(Fama-Macbeth regression in which the standard errors are adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West procedure). Column (2) exhibits the expected sign of the 
explanatory variables. ‘Spec.’ is abbreviation for ‘Specification’ and ‘Coef.’ is abbreviation for ‘Coefficient’. Definitions of variables are in Section 3.8. * , ** , *** indicate 
significance at 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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  Spec. 1     Spec. 2     Spec. 3     Spec. 4     Spec. 5 
  Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic 
(1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10)   (11) (12) 
Panel A: Pooled regression 
INTERCEPT  0.1215 3.878***   0.1160 3.7***  0.0677 2.452**   0.0536 1.947*  0.0500 6.496***  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0022 -0.923  -0.0012 -0.481  0.0000 0.004  0.0015 0.646    
MTBi,t (-) -0.0018 -1.976**   -0.0019 -2.139**   -0.0021 -2.375**   -0.0024 -2.611***     
ROAi,t (+) 0.1620 6.3***  0.1260 5.074***   0.1725 6.75***   0.1354 5.473***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0717 -6.059***   -0.0748 -6.32***   -0.0893 -8.265***   -0.0952 -8.85***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0115 -0.759  -0.0043 -0.283  -0.0244 -1.654*   -0.0186 -1.26    
NOAi,t (-) -0.1185 -6.104***   -0.1251 -6.451***   -0.1073 -5.597***   -0.1127 -5.879***     
DACi,t (-) -0.1887 -5.305***      -0.2012 -5.679***      -0.1162 -3.483***  
ESCORE_FIXEDi,t (-) -0.0114 -3.625***   -0.0130 -4.151***         -0.0249 -10.463***  
Adjusted R2 (%)  2.31   2.08   2.21   1.94   0.99  
Panel B: Fama-MacBeth regression with Newey-West adjusted t-statistic 
INTERCEPT  0.1349 2.94***   0.1319 2.86**   0.0820 1.29  0.0687 1.06  0.0423 1.84*  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0043 -0.84  -0.0033 -0.65  -0.0017 -0.28  -0.0002 -0.03    
MTBi,t (-) -0.0012 -0.97  -0.0014 -1.14  -0.0015 -1.28  -0.0017 -1.56    
ROAi,t (+) 0.1653 4.14***   0.1212 3.47***   0.1758 4.37***   0.1310 3.76***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0538 -3.22***   -0.0562 -3.27***   -0.0682 -3.27***   -0.0739 -3.39***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0268 -1.51  -0.0200 -1.19  -0.0384 -1.76*   -0.0335 -1.61    
NOAi,t (-) -0.1170 -6.35***   -0.1252 -6.7***   -0.1088 -5.22***   -0.1154 -5.52***     
DACi,t (-) -0.1963 -6.02***      -0.2078 -5.37***      -0.1041 -4.64***  
ESCORE_FIXEDi,t (-) -0.0091 -1.77*    -0.0112 -2.06*                -0.0208 -2.34**  
Notes: Specification 1 (columns 3 and 4) report the results of estimating the following equation:  ܥܣܴ3ܨ௜,௧ାଵ௔ = ߙ + ߚଵܮ݋݃൫ܯܸܧ௜,௧൯ + ߚଶܯܶܤ௜,௧ + ߚଷܴܱܣ௜,௧ + ߚସܧܵܧ ௜ܱ,௧ + ߚହܧܦܫܴܵܶܧܵ ௜ܵ,௧ + ߚ଺ܱܰܣ௜,௧ + ߚ଻ܦܣܥ௜,௧ + ߛܧܵܥܱܴܧ௜,௧_ܨܫܺܧܦ + ߝ.  (E3.25) 
From Specification 1 as the full specification, in Specification 2 DAC is dropped, in Specification 3 ESCORE_FIXED is dropped, in Specification 4 DAC and ESCORE_FIXED are 
dropped, in Specification 5 Ln(MVE), MTB, ROA, ESEO, EDISTRESS, NOA are dropped from the explanatory variables. Panel A (B) reports the results from the pooled regression 
(Fama-Macbeth regression in which the standard errors are adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West procedure). Column (2) exhibits the expected sign of the 
explanatory variables. ‘Spec.’ is abbreviation for ‘Specification’ and ‘Coef.’ is abbreviation for ‘Coefficient’. Definitions of variables are in Section 3.8. * , ** , *** indicate 
significance at 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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  Spec. 1     Spec. 2     Spec. 3     Spec. 4     Spec. 5 
  Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic 
(1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10)   (11) (12) 
Panel A: Pooled regression 
INTERCEPT  0.1035 3.339***   0.0977 3.151***   0.0474 1.735*   0.0326 1.197  0.0523 6.87***  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0002 -0.069  0.0010 0.402  0.0022 0.939  0.0037 1.624    
MTBi,t (-) -0.0013 -1.425  -0.0014 -1.598  -0.0016 -1.842*   -0.0019 -2.092**     
ROAi,t (+) 0.1461 5.741***   0.1083 4.407***   0.1571 6.21***   0.1181 4.824***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0666 -5.686***   -0.0698 -5.962***   -0.0849 -7.944***   -0.0912 -8.561***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0152 -1.011  -0.0076 -0.507  -0.0286 -1.961**   -0.0225 -1.543    
NOAi,t (-) -0.1239 -6.45***   -0.1308 -6.818***   -0.1122 -5.915***   -0.1179 -6.214***     
DACi,t (-) -0.1981 -5.629***      -0.2111 -6.022***      -0.1332 -4.034***  
ESCORE_FIXEDi,t (-) -0.0119 -3.821***   -0.0136 -4.379***         -0.0247 -10.489***  
Adjusted R2 (%)  2.27   2.01   2.15   1.85   1.03  
Panel B: Fama-MacBeth regression with Newey-West adjusted t-statistic 
INTERCEPT  0.1188 2.73**   0.1161 2.66**   0.0618 1.06  0.0483 0.81  0.0443 2.01*  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0023 -0.5  -0.0013 -0.28  0.0005 0.09  0.0020 0.37    
MTBi,t (-) -0.0008 -0.68  -0.0010 -0.85  -0.0011 -0.96  -0.0014 -1.21    
ROAi,t (+) 0.1556 4.09***   0.1072 3.27***   0.1666 4.3***  0.1173 3.57***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0512 -3.02***   -0.0540 -3.11***   -0.0668 -3.15***   -0.0730 -3.28***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0293 -1.89*   -0.0223 -1.53  -0.0418 -2.24**   -0.0368 -2.09*     
NOAi,t (-) -0.1226 -6.67***   -0.1316 -7.07***   -0.1136 -5.53***   -0.1210 -5.86***     
DACi,t (-) -0.2120 -6.28***      -0.2246 -5.56***      -0.1251 -5.64***  
ESCORE_FIXEDi,t (-) -0.0099 -1.88*    -0.0120 -2.15**                -0.0207 -2.33**  
Notes: Specification 1 (columns 3 and 4) report the results of estimating the following equation:  ܥܣܴ4ܨ௜,௧ାଵ௔ = ߙ + ߚଵܮ݋݃൫ܯܸܧ௜,௧൯ + ߚଶܯܶܤ௜,௧ + ߚଷܴܱܣ௜,௧ + ߚସܧܵܧ ௜ܱ,௧ + ߚହܧܦܫܴܵܶܧܵ ௜ܵ,௧ + ߚ଺ܱܰܣ௜,௧ + ߚ଻ܦܣܥ௜,௧ + ߛܧܵܥܱܴܧ_ܨܫܺܧܦ௜,௧ + ߝ.  (E3.25) 
From Specification 1 as the full specification, in Specification 2 DAC is dropped, in Specification 3 ESCORE_FIXED is dropped, in Specification 4 DAC and ESCORE_FIXED are 
dropped, in Specification 5 Ln(MVE), MTB, ROA, ESEO, EDISTRESS, NOA are dropped from the explanatory variables. Panel A (B) reports the results from the pooled regression 
(Fama-Macbeth regression in which the standard errors are adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West procedure). Column (2) exhibits the expected sign of the 
explanatory variables. ‘Spec.’ is abbreviation for ‘Specification’ and ‘Coef.’ is abbreviation for ‘Coefficient’. Definitions of variables are in Section 3.8. * , ** , *** indicate 




Table T3.41. Stock returns across ESCORE_9 groups – Equally-weighted scheme 
ESCORE_9 BHRRm   BHSARm   BHMARm   BHAR1Fm   BHAR3Fm   BHAR4Fm 
  Returns t-statistic   Returns t-statistic   Returns t-statistic   Returns t-statistic   Returns t-statistic   Returns t-statistic 
0 1.04 3.159***   0.42 6.019***   0.38 1.721*   0.43 1.977**   0.30 2.636***   0.31 2.618***  
1 0.77 2.454**   0.23 4.33***   0.12 0.534  0.18 0.859  0.06 0.532  0.07 0.597 
2 0.23 0.689  -0.26 -4.504***   -0.42 -1.728*   -0.36 -1.504  -0.50 -3.468***   -0.46 -3.107***  
3 -0.07 -0.181  -0.52 -4.021***   -0.73 -2.524**   -0.71 -2.452**   -0.86 -4.546***   -0.81 -4.12***  
4 -0.54 -1.138  -0.89 -3.466***   -1.19 -3.282***   -1.20 -3.286***   -1.33 -4.387***   -1.17 -3.755***  
5 0.15 0.177  -0.21 -0.266  -0.50 -0.614  -0.51 -0.612  -0.50 -0.634  -0.61 -0.752 
6 0.73 0.387  1.19 0.696  0.72 0.417  0.80 0.46  0.97 0.563  0.83 0.484 
7 0.17 0.066  1.52 0.797  0.78 0.334  0.72 0.291  1.59 0.635  3.89 1.865 
Low (0) 1.04 3.159***    0.42 6.019***    0.38 1.721*    0.43 1.977**    0.30 2.636***    0.31 2.618***  
Medium (1-2) 0.55 1.698*   0.02 0.755  -0.11 -0.497  -0.05 -0.217  -0.18 -1.523  -0.16 -1.295 
High (3-7) -0.15 -0.383   -0.58 -4.862***    -0.81 -2.855***    -0.80 -2.792***    -0.94 -5.059***    -0.86 -4.521***  
Low - High 1.19 6.707***    1.00 6.105***    1.19 6.707***    1.23 7.024***    1.23 7.233***    1.17 6.897***  
 Notes: The table reports the returns on different portfolios formed on the basis of ESCORE_9. Definitions of variables are in Section 3.8. * , ** , ***  indicate significance at 
10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table T3.42. Stock returns across ESCORE_9 groups – Value-weighted scheme 
ESCORE_9 BHRRm   BHSARm   BHMARm   BHAR1Fm   BHAR3Fm   BHAR4Fm 
  Returns t-statistic   Returns t-statistic   Returns t-statistic   Returns t-statistic  Returns t-statistic  Returns t-statistic 
0 0.95 2.644***   0.16 1.096  0.30 1.446  0.29 1.402  0.19 1.1  0.32 1.805*  
1 0.81 2.324**   0.01 0.063  0.15 0.835  0.14 0.786  0.05 0.311  0.11 0.72 
2 0.68 1.893*   -0.11 -0.685  0.02 0.1  0.01 0.028  -0.05 -0.268  0.08 0.478 
3 0.39 0.767  -0.34 -1.181  -0.26 -0.708  -0.35 -0.947  -0.49 -1.601  -0.33 -1.047 
4 -0.54 -0.94  -1.08 -2.529**   -1.20 -2.391**   -1.19 -2.356**   -1.32 -2.837***   -1.05 -2.197**  
5 -0.33 -0.367  -0.75 -0.916  -0.99 -1.156  -0.98 -1.143  -1.03 -1.282  -1.18 -1.409 
6 0.73 0.376  1.17 0.664  0.73 0.409  0.85 0.478  1.04 0.589  0.95 0.537 
7 0.17 0.066  1.52 0.797  0.78 0.334  0.72 0.291  1.59 0.635  3.89 1.865 
Low (0) 0.95 2.644***    0.16 1.096   0.30 1.446   0.29 1.402   0.19 1.1   0.32 1.805*  
Medium (1-2) 0.72 2.138**   -0.07 -0.755  0.06 0.397  0.05 0.339  -0.03 -0.196  0.07 0.501 
High (3-7) 0.23 0.477   -0.50 -2.12**    -0.43 -1.324   -0.50 -1.534   -0.63 -2.392**    -0.45 -1.661*  
Low - High 0.73 2.482**    0.66 2.293**    0.73 2.482**    0.79 2.712***    0.82 2.978***    0.77 2.781***  
 Notes: The table reports the returns on different portfolios formed on the basis of ESCORE_9. Definitions of variables are in Section 3.8. * , ** , ***  indicate significance at 
10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively.  
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  Spec. 1     Spec. 2     Spec. 3     Spec. 4     Spec. 5 
  Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic 
(1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10)   (11) (12) 
Panel A: Pooled regression 
INTERCEPT  0.2411 7.177***   0.2286 6.821***   0.2101 6.385***   0.1961 5.979***   0.1549 18.887***  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0045 -1.593  -0.0031 -1.1  -0.0032 -1.157  -0.0017 -0.629    
MTBi,t (-) -0.0050 -4.615***   -0.0052 -4.8***   -0.0051 -4.776***   -0.0054 -4.973***     
ROAi,t (+) 0.2017 6.626***   0.1660 5.636***   0.2034 6.677***   0.1666 5.651***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0905 -6.03***   -0.0951 -6.347***   -0.1251 -9.722***   -0.1311 -10.224***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) 0.0091 0.491  0.0155 0.841  -0.0165 -0.938  -0.0107 -0.61    
NOAi,t (-) -0.0943 -4.073***   -0.0989 -4.275***   -0.1112 -4.865***   -0.1165 -5.102***     
DACi,t (-) -0.1935 -4.584***      -0.1996 -4.727***      -0.1102 -2.771***  
ESCORE_9i,t (-) -0.0270 -4.49***   -0.0279 -4.636***         -0.0594 -12.87***  
Adjusted R2 (%)  2.61   2.43   2.44   2.26   1.41  
Panel B: Fama-MacBeth regression with Newey-West adjusted t-statistic 
INTERCEPT  0.2232 3.14***   0.2107 2.89**   0.1947 2.44**   0.1810 2.21**   0.1453 4.51***  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0039 -0.65  -0.0026 -0.41  -0.0021 -0.33  -0.0007 -0.11    
MTBi,t (-) -0.0029 -1.64  -0.0031 -1.75*   -0.0030 -1.69  -0.0032 -1.8*     
ROAi,t (+) 0.1792 4.23***   0.1377 3.81***   0.1806 4.26***   0.1383 3.81***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0672 -3.79***   -0.0708 -3.76***   -0.0831 -3.67***   -0.0884 -3.65***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0361 -1.62  -0.0294 -1.34  -0.0484 -1.71  -0.0428 -1.54    
NOAi,t (-) -0.1044 -3.07***   -0.1091 -3.22***   -0.1107 -3.55***   -0.1162 -3.71***     
DACi,t (-) -0.1981 -3.5***      -0.2013 -3.47***      -0.0945 -2.24**  
ESCORE_9i,t (-) -0.0128 -1.39   -0.0140 -1.53               -0.0476 -3.47***  
Notes: Specification 1 (columns 3 and 4) report the results of estimating the following equation:  ܤܪܴܴ௜,௧ାଵ௔ = ߙ + ߚଵܮ݋݃൫ܯܸܧ௜,௧൯ + ߚଶܯܶܤ௜,௧ + ߚଷܴܱܣ௜,௧ + ߚସܧܵܧ ௜ܱ,௧ + ߚହܧܦܫܴܵܶܧܵ ௜ܵ,௧ + ߚ଺ܱܰܣ௜,௧ + ߚ଻ܦܣܥ௜,௧ + ߛܧܵܥܱܴܧ_9௜,௧ + ߝ.  (E3.25) 
From Specification 1 as the full specification, in Specification 2 DAC is dropped, in Specification 3 ESCORE_9 is dropped, in Specification 4 DAC and ESCORE_9 are dropped, in 
Specification 5 Ln(MVE), MTB, ROA, ESEO, EDISTRESS, NOA are dropped from the explanatory variables. Panel A (B) reports the results from the pooled regression (Fama-
Macbeth regression in which the standard errors are adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West procedure). Column (2) exhibits the expected sign of the explanatory 
variables. ‘Spec.’ is abbreviation for ‘Specification’ and ‘Coef.’ is abbreviation for ‘Coefficient’. Definitions of variables are in Section 3.8. * , * * , *** indicate significance at 








  Spec. 1     Spec. 2     Spec. 3     Spec. 4     Spec. 5 
  Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic 
(1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10)   (11) (12) 
Panel A: Pooled regression 
INTERCEPT  0.2219 7.133***   0.2098 6.76***   0.2044 6.713***   0.1911 6.295***   0.0697 9.184***  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0105 -4.046***   -0.0092 -3.544***   -0.0098 -3.796***   -0.0084 -3.266***     
MTBi,t (-) -0.0029 -2.889***   -0.0031 -3.082***   -0.0030 -2.989***   -0.0032 -3.191***     
ROAi,t (+) 0.1939 6.877***   0.1594 5.842***   0.1948 6.91***   0.1597 5.853***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0636 -4.579***   -0.0681 -4.907***   -0.0831 -6.977***   -0.0888 -7.482***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0281 -1.639  -0.0218 -1.278  -0.0424 -2.606***   -0.0369 -2.271**     
NOAi,t (-) -0.0965 -4.504***   -0.1010 -4.714***   -0.1060 -5.014***   -0.1112 -5.258***     
DACi,t (-) -0.1871 -4.785***      -0.1905 -4.874***      -0.0853 -2.317**  
ESCORE_9i,t (-) -0.0152 -2.728***   -0.0160 -2.881***         -0.0435 -10.167***  
Adjusted R2 (%)  2.05   1.86   1.99   1.80   0.89  
Panel B: Fama-MacBeth regression with Newey-West adjusted t-statistic 
INTERCEPT  0.2350 5.42***   0.2231 5.04***   0.2069 5.81***   0.1938 5.24***   0.0674 4.05***  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0114 -3.22***   -0.0101 -2.85**   -0.0097 -3.14***   -0.0084 -2.69**     
MTBi,t (-) -0.0028 -1.65  -0.0030 -1.75*   -0.0028 -1.69  -0.0031 -1.8*     
ROAi,t (+) 0.1809 4.23***   0.1430 3.83***   0.1824 4.26***   0.1436 3.84***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0616 -3.46***   -0.0649 -3.42***   -0.0788 -3.45***   -0.0838 -3.43***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0366 -1.53  -0.0304 -1.29  -0.0493 -1.72  -0.0442 -1.57    
NOAi,t (-) -0.1033 -2.96***   -0.1072 -3.08***   -0.1106 -3.4***   -0.1153 -3.54***     
DACi,t (-) -0.1808 -3.15***      -0.1846 -3.15***      -0.0762 -1.83*  
ESCORE_9i,t (-) -0.0137 -1.7   -0.0149 -1.85*                -0.0407 -3.99***  
Notes: Specification 1 (columns 3 and 4) report the results of estimating the following equation:  ܤܪܵܣܴ௜,௧ାଵ௔ = ߙ + ߚଵܮ݋݃൫ܯܸܧ௜,௧൯ + ߚଶܯܶܤ௜,௧ + ߚଷܴܱܣ௜,௧ + ߚସܧܵܧ ௜ܱ,௧ + ߚହܧܦܫܴܵܶܧܵ ௜ܵ,௧ + ߚ଺ܱܰܣ௜,௧ + ߚ଻ܦܣܥ௜,௧ + ߛܧܵܥܱܴܧ_9௜,௧ + ߝ.  (E3.25) 
From Specification 1 as the full specification, in Specification 2 DAC is dropped, in Specification 3 ESCORE_9 is dropped, in Specification 4 DAC and ESCORE_9 are dropped, in 
Specification 5 Ln(MVE), MTB, ROA, ESEO, EDISTRESS, NOA are dropped from the explanatory variables. Panel A (B) reports the results from the pooled regression (Fama-
Macbeth regression in which the standard errors are adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West procedure). Column (2) exhibits the expected sign of the explanatory 
variables. ‘Spec.’ is abbreviation for ‘Specification’ and ‘Coef.’ is abbreviation for ‘Coefficient’. Definitions of variables are in Section 3.8. * , * * , *** indicate significance at 








  Spec. 1     Spec. 2     Spec. 3     Spec. 4     Spec. 5 
  Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic 
(1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10)   (11) (12) 
Panel A: Pooled regression 
INTERCEPT  0.1070 3.321***   0.0950 2.956***   0.0875 2.774***   0.0742 2.362**   0.0655 8.332***  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0014 -0.519  -0.0001 -0.021  -0.0006 -0.231  0.0008 0.296    
MTBi,t (-) -0.0036 -3.488***   -0.0038 -3.673***   -0.0037 -3.595***   -0.0039 -3.79***     
ROAi,t (+) 0.1687 5.779***   0.1345 4.762***   0.1698 5.814***   0.1349 4.774***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0849 -5.902***   -0.0893 -6.218***   -0.1067 -8.65***   -0.1123 -9.142***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0118 -0.664  -0.0056 -0.317  -0.0278 -1.651*   -0.0224 -1.329    
NOAi,t (-) -0.0764 -3.442***   -0.0808 -3.644***   -0.0870 -3.973***   -0.0921 -4.208***     
DACi,t (-) -0.1853 -4.577***      -0.1891 -4.673***      -0.1044 -2.74***  
ESCORE_9i,t (-) -0.0170 -2.945***   -0.0178 -3.091***         -0.0492 -11.112***  
Adjusted R2 (%)  2.07   1.89   1.99   1.81   1.07  
Panel B: Fama-MacBeth regression with Newey-West adjusted t-statistic 
INTERCEPT  0.1392 2.01*   0.1267 1.78*   0.1107 1.39  0.0970 1.18  0.0613 1.8*  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0039 -0.65  -0.0026 -0.41  -0.0021 -0.33  -0.0007 -0.11    
MTBi,t (-) -0.0029 -1.64  -0.0031 -1.75*   -0.0030 -1.69  -0.0032 -1.8*     
ROAi,t (+) 0.1792 4.23***   0.1377 3.81***   0.1806 4.26***   0.1383 3.81***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0672 -3.79***   -0.0708 -3.76***   -0.0831 -3.67***   -0.0884 -3.65***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0361 -1.62  -0.0294 -1.34  -0.0484 -1.71  -0.0428 -1.54    
NOAi,t (-) -0.1044 -3.07***   -0.1091 -3.22***   -0.1107 -3.55***   -0.1162 -3.71***     
DACi,t (-) -0.1981 -3.5***      -0.2013 -3.47***      -0.0945 -2.24**  
ESCORE_9i,t (-) -0.0128 -1.39   -0.0140 -1.53               -0.0476 -3.47***  
Notes: Specification 1 (columns 3 and 4) report the results of estimating the following equation:  ܤܪܯܣ ௜ܴ,௧ାଵ௔ = ߙ + ߚଵܮ݋݃൫ܯܸܧ௜,௧൯ + ߚଶܯܶܤ௜,௧ + ߚଷܴܱܣ௜,௧ + ߚସܧܵܧ ௜ܱ,௧ + ߚହܧܦܫܴܵܶܧܵ ௜ܵ,௧ + ߚ଺ܱܰܣ௜,௧ + ߚ଻ܦܣܥ௜,௧ + ߛܧܵܥܱܴܧ_9௜,௧ + ߝ.  (E3.25) 
From Specification 1 as the full specification, in Specification 2 DAC is dropped, in Specification 3 ESCORE_9 is dropped, in Specification 4 DAC and ESCORE_9 are dropped, in 
Specification 5 Ln(MVE), MTB, ROA, ESEO, EDISTRESS, NOA are dropped from the explanatory variables. Panel A (B) reports the results from the pooled regression (Fama-
Macbeth regression in which the standard errors are adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West procedure). Column (2) exhibits the expected sign of the explanatory 
variables. ‘Spec.’ is abbreviation for ‘Specification’ and ‘Coef.’ is abbreviation for ‘Coefficient’. Definitions of variables are in Section 3.8. * , * * , *** indicate significance at 








  Spec. 1     Spec. 2     Spec. 3     Spec. 4     Spec. 5 
  Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic 
(1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10)   (11) (12) 
Panel A: Pooled regression 
INTERCEPT  0.1402 4.382***   0.1275 3.995***   0.1230 3.929***   0.1090 3.493***   0.0695 8.901***  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0042 -1.59  -0.0028 -1.064  -0.0036 -1.34  -0.0021 -0.785    
MTBi,t (-) -0.0032 -3.137***   -0.0034 -3.334***   -0.0033 -3.233***   -0.0035 -3.439***     
ROAi,t (+) 0.1832 6.319***   0.1469 5.238***   0.1841 6.351***   0.1473 5.249***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0853 -5.972***   -0.0900 -6.308***   -0.1045 -8.531***   -0.1104 -9.051***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0173 -0.982  -0.0107 -0.611  -0.0314 -1.877*   -0.0256 -1.533    
NOAi,t (-) -0.0747 -3.391***   -0.0794 -3.605***   -0.0841 -3.866***   -0.0895 -4.115***     
DACi,t (-) -0.1965 -4.887***      -0.1998 -4.972***      -0.1045 -2.761***  
ESCORE_9i,t (-) -0.0149 -2.609***   -0.0158 -2.766***         -0.0477 -10.854***  
Adjusted R2 (%)  2.12   1.92   2.06   1.86   1.02  
Panel B: Fama-MacBeth regression with Newey-West adjusted t-statistic 
INTERCEPT  0.1728 2.58**   0.1601 2.32**   0.1487 2.01*   0.1347 1.77*   0.0645 2.33**  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0070 -1.07  -0.0056 -0.84  -0.0054 -0.8  -0.0040 -0.57    
MTBi,t (-) -0.0025 -1.46  -0.0028 -1.6  -0.0026 -1.51  -0.0029 -1.65    
ROAi,t (+) 0.1972 4.42***   0.1537 4.25***   0.1985 4.43***   0.1544 4.25***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0667 -4.08***   -0.0707 -3.96***   -0.0798 -3.56***   -0.0854 -3.55***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0402 -1.84*   -0.0334 -1.56  -0.0501 -1.81*   -0.0444 -1.63    
NOAi,t (-) -0.0982 -3.07***   -0.1033 -3.24***   -0.1035 -3.52***   -0.1094 -3.71***     
DACi,t (-) -0.2082 -3.56***      -0.2110 -3.53***      -0.0929 -2.32**  
ESCORE_9i,t (-) -0.0104 -1.28   -0.0117 -1.43               -0.0444 -3.33***  
Notes: Specification 1 (columns 3 and 4) report the results of estimating the following equation:  ܤܪܣܴ1ܨ௜,௧ାଵ௔ = ߙ + ߚଵܮ݋݃൫ܯܸܧ௜,௧൯ + ߚଶܯܶܤ௜,௧ + ߚଷܴܱܣ௜,௧ + ߚସܧܵܧ ௜ܱ,௧ + ߚହܧܦܫܴܵܶܧܵ ௜ܵ,௧ + ߚ଺ܱܰܣ௜,௧ + ߚ଻ܦܣܥ௜,௧ + ߛܧܵܥܱܴܧ_9௜,௧ + ߝ.  (E3.25) 
From Specification 1 as the full specification, in Specification 2 DAC is dropped, in Specification 3 ESCORE_9 is dropped, in Specification 4 DAC and ESCORE_9 are dropped, in 
Specification 5 Ln(MVE), MTB, ROA, ESEO, EDISTRESS, NOA are dropped from the explanatory variables. Panel A (B) reports the results from the pooled regression (Fama-
Macbeth regression in which the standard errors are adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West procedure). Column (2) exhibits the expected sign of the explanatory 
variables. ‘Spec.’ is abbreviation for ‘Specification’ and ‘Coef.’ is abbreviation for ‘Coefficient’. Definitions of variables are in Section 3.8. * , * * , *** indicate significance at 
10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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  Spec. 1     Spec. 2     Spec. 3     Spec. 4     Spec. 5 
  Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic 
(1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10)   (11) (12) 
Panel A: Pooled regression 
INTERCEPT  0.1318 4.256***   0.1198 3.88***   0.1165 3.844***   0.1034 3.421***   0.0510 6.75***  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0047 -1.819*   -0.0034 -1.311  -0.0041 -1.591  -0.0027 -1.055    
MTBi,t (-) -0.0019 -1.932*   -0.0021 -2.123**   -0.0020 -2.019**   -0.0022 -2.22**     
ROAi,t (+) 0.1644 5.861***   0.1304 4.803***   0.1653 5.89***   0.1307 4.813***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0726 -5.253***   -0.0770 -5.579***   -0.0897 -7.568***   -0.0953 -8.069***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0285 -1.675*   -0.0224 -1.317  -0.0411 -2.537**   -0.0357 -2.206**     
NOAi,t (-) -0.0876 -4.109***   -0.0921 -4.317***   -0.0960 -4.559***   -0.1010 -4.801***     
DACi,t (-) -0.1844 -4.741***      -0.1875 -4.819***      -0.0984 -2.688***  
ESCORE_9i,t (-) -0.0133 -2.401**   -0.0141 -2.552**         -0.0432 -10.16***  
Adjusted R2 (%)  1.85   1.66   1.80   1.61   0.90  
Panel B: Fama-MacBeth regression with Newey-West adjusted t-statistic 
INTERCEPT  0.1617 2.36**   0.1502 2.15**   0.1401 1.85*   0.1275 1.64  0.0464 2.63**  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0078 -1.2  -0.0065 -0.99  -0.0064 -0.94  -0.0051 -0.74    
MTBi,t (-) -0.0014 -1.16  -0.0016 -1.33  -0.0015 -1.21  -0.0017 -1.39    
ROAi,t (+) 0.1696 4***   0.1305 3.73***   0.1708 4.02***   0.1311 3.73***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0585 -3.89***   -0.0620 -3.76***   -0.0710 -3.26***   -0.0761 -3.26***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0448 -2.58**   -0.0388 -2.3**   -0.0543 -2.37**   -0.0493 -2.2**     
NOAi,t (-) -0.0961 -3.12***   -0.1005 -3.28***   -0.1014 -3.57***   -0.1064 -3.75***     
DACi,t (-) -0.1862 -3.3***      -0.1890 -3.29***      -0.0844 -2.19**  
ESCORE_9i,t (-) -0.0099 -1.39   -0.0110 -1.54               -0.0401 -3.01***  
Notes: Specification 1 (columns 3 and 4) report the results of estimating the following equation:  ܤܪܣܴ3ܨ௜,௧ାଵ௔ = ߙ + ߚଵܮ݋݃൫ܯܸܧ௜,௧൯ + ߚଶܯܶܤ௜,௧ + ߚଷܴܱܣ௜,௧ + ߚସܧܵܧ ௜ܱ,௧ + ߚହܧܦܫܴܵܶܧܵ ௜ܵ,௧ + ߚ଺ܱܰܣ௜,௧ + ߚ଻ܦܣܥ௜,௧ + ߛܧܵܥܱܴܧ௜,௧_9 + ߝ.  (E3.25) 
From Specification 1 as the full specification, in Specification 2 DAC is dropped, in Specification 3 ESCORE_9 is dropped, in Specification 4 DAC and ESCORE_9 are dropped, in 
Specification 5 Ln(MVE), MTB, ROA, ESEO, EDISTRESS, NOA are dropped from the explanatory variables. Panel A (B) reports the results from the pooled regression (Fama-
Macbeth regression in which the standard errors are adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West procedure). Column (2) exhibits the expected sign of the explanatory 
variables. ‘Spec.’ is abbreviation for ‘Specification’ and ‘Coef.’ is abbreviation for ‘Coefficient’. Definitions of variables are in Section 3.8. * , * * , ** * indicate significance at 
10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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  Spec. 1     Spec. 2     Spec. 3     Spec. 4     Spec. 5 
  Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic 
(1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10)   (11) (12) 
Panel A: Pooled regression 
INTERCEPT  0.1091 3.552***   0.0963 3.142***   0.0932 3.1***  0.0791 2.639***   0.0527 7.046***  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0022 -0.846  -0.0007 -0.29  -0.0015 -0.602  0.0000 -0.016    
MTBi,t (-) -0.0016 -1.596  -0.0018 -1.803*   -0.0017 -1.687*   -0.0019 -1.904*     
ROAi,t (+) 0.1477 5.31***   0.1112 4.131***   0.1486 5.341***   0.1115 4.141***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0704 -5.133***   -0.0751 -5.484***   -0.0882 -7.5***   -0.0941 -8.038***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0333 -1.973**   -0.0267 -1.586  -0.0464 -2.89***   -0.0406 -2.531**     
NOAi,t (-) -0.0956 -4.521***   -0.1004 -4.746***   -0.1043 -4.997***   -0.1097 -5.257***     
DACi,t (-) -0.1979 -5.13***      -0.2011 -5.213***      -0.1195 -3.293***  
ESCORE_9i,t (-) -0.0138 -2.521**   -0.0147 -2.684***         -0.0437 -10.361***  
Adjusted R2 (%)  1.84   1.62   1.79   1.56   0.96  
Panel B: Fama-MacBeth regression with Newey-West adjusted t-statistic 
INTERCEPT  0.1379 2.2**   0.1260 1.98*   0.1143 1.64  0.1012 1.42  0.0482 2.79**  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0052 -0.89  -0.0039 -0.65  -0.0038 -0.6  -0.0024 -0.37    
MTBi,t (-) -0.0012 -0.9  -0.0014 -1.07  -0.0012 -0.96  -0.0015 -1.13    
ROAi,t (+) 0.1624 4.46***   0.1173 3.87***   0.1635 4.48***   0.1178 3.87***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0582 -3.63***   -0.0624 -3.57***   -0.0724 -3.13***   -0.0781 -3.17***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0481 -3.53***   -0.0418 -3.17***   -0.0590 -3.11***   -0.0538 -2.93***     
NOAi,t (-) -0.1023 -3.45***   -0.1075 -3.61***   -0.1085 -3.98***   -0.1144 -4.15***     
DACi,t (-) -0.2091 -3.86***      -0.2119 -3.83***      -0.1114 -2.88**  
ESCORE_9i,t (-) -0.0112 -1.52   -0.0124 -1.68               -0.0409 -3.04***  
Notes: Specification 1 (columns 3 and 4) report the results of estimating the following equation:  ܤܪܣܴ4ܨ௜,௧ାଵ௔ = ߙ + ߚଵܮ݋݃൫ܯܸܧ௜,௧൯ + ߚଶܯܶܤ௜,௧ + ߚଷܴܱܣ௜,௧ + ߚସܧܵܧ ௜ܱ,௧ + ߚହܧܦܫܴܵܶܧܵ ௜ܵ,௧ + ߚ଺ܱܰܣ௜,௧ + ߚ଻ܦܣܥ௜,௧ + ߛܧܵܥܱܴܧ_9௜,௧ + ߝ.  (E3.25) 
From Specification 1 as the full specification, in Specification 2 DAC is dropped, in Specification 3 ESCORE_9 is dropped, in Specification 4 DAC and ESCORE_9 are dropped, in 
Specification 5 Ln(MVE), MTB, ROA, ESEO, EDISTRESS, NOA are dropped from the explanatory variables. Panel A (B) reports the results from the pooled regression (Fama-
Macbeth regression in which the standard errors are adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West procedure). Column (2) exhibits the expected sign of the explanatory 
variables. ‘Spec.’ is abbreviation for ‘Specification’ and ‘Coef.’ is abbreviation for ‘Coefficient’. Definitions of variables are in Section 3.8. * , * * , *** indicate significance at 








  Spec. 1     Spec. 2     Spec. 3     Spec. 4     Spec. 5 
  Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic 
(1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10)   (11) (12) 
Panel A: Pooled regression 
INTERCEPT  0.1948 6.364***   0.1813 5.935***   0.1658 5.531***   0.1508 5.044***   0.1400 18.705***  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0014 -0.529  0.0002 0.062  -0.0002 -0.078  0.0014 0.552    
MTBi,t (-) -0.0047 -4.739***   -0.0049 -4.956***   -0.0048 -4.904***   -0.0050 -5.134***     
ROAi,t (+) 0.2127 7.67***   0.1742 6.488***   0.2143 7.721***   0.1747 6.503***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0897 -6.565***   -0.0947 -6.936***   -0.1221 -10.412***   -0.1285 -10.995***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) 0.0212 1.257  0.0281 1.672*   -0.0027 -0.169  0.0035 0.218    
NOAi,t (-) -0.1062 -5.035***   -0.1112 -5.272***   -0.1220 -5.857***   -0.1277 -6.135***     
DACi,t (-) -0.2089 -5.43***      -0.2146 -5.577***      -0.1302 -3.589***  
ESCORE_9i,t (-) -0.0252 -4.602***   -0.0261 -4.773***         -0.0579 -13.751***  
Adjusted R2 (%)  0.03   2.84   2.91   2.66   1.64  
Panel B: Fama-MacBeth regression with Newey-West adjusted t-statistic 
INTERCEPT  0.1698 2.86**   0.1569 2.59**   0.1438 2.15**   0.1295 1.89*   0.1302 4.9*** 
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0001 -0.03  0.0014 0.29  0.0015 0.29  0.0030 0.58    
MTBi,t (-) -0.0027 -1.63  -0.0029 -1.79*   -0.0027 -1.69  -0.0030 -1.86*     
ROAi,t (+) 0.1832 4.39***   0.1367 3.73***   0.1839 4.4***  0.1371 3.72***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0633 -3.27***   -0.0674 -3.36***   -0.0790 -3.39***   -0.0849 -3.47***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0231 -1.09  -0.0165 -0.81  -0.0349 -1.37  -0.0295 -1.21    
NOAi,t (-) -0.1136 -4.39***   -0.1196 -4.59***   -0.1199 -5.12***   -0.1268 -5.39***     
DACi,t (-) -0.2162 -5.28***      -0.2179 -5.11***      -0.1197 -4.46***  
ESCORE_9i,t (-) -0.0122 -1.54   -0.0136 -1.76*                -0.0457 -3.49***  
Notes: Specification 1 (columns 3 and 4) report the results of estimating the following equation:  ܥܴܴ௜,௧ାଵ௔ = ߙ + ߚଵܮ݋݃൫ܯܸܧ௜,௧൯ + ߚଶܯܶܤ௜,௧ + ߚଷܴܱܣ௜,௧ + ߚସܧܵܧ ௜ܱ,௧ + ߚହܧܦܫܴܵܶܧܵ ௜ܵ,௧ + ߚ଺ܱܰܣ௜,௧ + ߚ଻ܦܣܥ௜,௧ + ߛܧܵܥܱܴܧ_9௜,௧ + ߝ.  (E3.25) 
From Specification 1 as the full specification, in Specification 2 DAC is dropped, in Specification 3 ESCORE_9 is dropped, in Specification 4 DAC and ESCORE_9 are dropped, in 
Specification 5 Ln(MVE), MTB, ROA, ESEO, EDISTRESS, NOA are dropped from the explanatory variables. Panel A (B) reports the results from the pooled regression (Fama-
Macbeth regression in which the standard errors are adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West procedure). Column (2) exhibits the expected sign of the explanatory 
variables. ‘Spec.’ is abbreviation for ‘Specification’ and ‘Coef.’ is abbreviation for ‘Coefficient’. Definitions of variables are in Section 3.8. * , * * , *** indicate significance at 
10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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  Spec. 1     Spec. 2     Spec. 3     Spec. 4     Spec. 5 
  Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic 
(1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10)   (11) (12) 
Panel A: Pooled regression 
INTERCEPT  0.1978 6.968***   0.1850 6.528***   0.1809 6.51***   0.1668 6.018***   0.0596 8.6*** 
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0087 -3.682***   -0.0073 -3.091***   -0.0080 -3.413***   -0.0065 -2.791***     
MTBi,t (-) -0.0028 -3.116***   -0.0030 -3.339***   -0.0029 -3.221***   -0.0031 -3.456***     
ROAi,t (+) 0.1982 7.705***   0.1615 6.488***   0.1991 7.739***   0.1619 6.499***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0639 -5.04***   -0.0686 -5.419***   -0.0828 -7.613***   -0.0888 -8.194***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0132 -0.847  -0.0066 -0.425  -0.0271 -1.827*   -0.0213 -1.435    
NOAi,t (-) -0.1102 -5.634***   -0.1150 -5.877***   -0.1194 -6.186***   -0.1248 -6.467***     
DACi,t (-) -0.1986 -5.567***      -0.2019 -5.662***      -0.1067 -3.173***  
ESCORE_9i,t (-) -0.0147 -2.891***   -0.0156 -3.068***         -0.0423 -10.821***  
Adjusted R2 (%)  0.02   2.14   2.32   2.06   1.03  
Panel B: Fama-MacBeth regression with Newey-West adjusted t-statistic 
INTERCEPT  0.1992 5.25***   0.1868 4.95***   0.1736 5.62***   0.1600 5.19***   0.0565 3.61***  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0088 -2.58**   -0.0074 -2.19**   -0.0073 -2.42**   -0.0058 -1.98*     
MTBi,t (-) -0.0025 -1.62  -0.0028 -1.78*   -0.0026 -1.67  -0.0029 -1.84*     
ROAi,t (+) 0.1839 4.4***  0.1411 3.77***   0.1847 4.41***   0.1415 3.76***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0583 -3.04***   -0.0620 -3.11***   -0.0752 -3.26***   -0.0807 -3.33***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0238 -1.06  -0.0175 -0.81  -0.0360 -1.39  -0.0310 -1.25    
NOAi,t (-) -0.1127 -4.25***   -0.1179 -4.43***   -0.1199 -4.95***   -0.1260 -5.16***     
DACi,t (-) -0.1993 -4.77***      -0.2016 -4.67***      -0.1017 -3.64***  
ESCORE_9i,t (-) -0.0131 -1.88*    -0.0144 -2.14**                -0.0388 -3.83***  
Notes: Specification 1 (columns 3 and 4) report the results of estimating the following equation:  ܥܵܣܴ௜,௧ାଵ௔ = ߙ + ߚଵܮ݋݃൫ܯܸܧ௜,௧൯ + ߚଶܯܶܤ௜,௧ + ߚଷܴܱܣ௜,௧ + ߚସܧܵܧ ௜ܱ,௧ + ߚହܧܦܫܴܵܶܧܵ ௜ܵ,௧ + ߚ଺ܱܰܣ௜,௧ + ߚ଻ܦܣܥ௜,௧ + ߛܧܵܥܱܴܧ_9௜,௧ + ߝ.  (E3.25) 
From Specification 1 as the full specification, in Specification 2 DAC is dropped, in Specification 3 ESCORE_9 is dropped, in Specification 4 DAC and ESCORE_9 are dropped, in 
Specification 5 Ln(MVE), MTB, ROA, ESEO, EDISTRESS, NOA are dropped from the explanatory variables. Panel A (B) reports the results from the pooled regression (Fama-
Macbeth regression in which the standard errors are adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West procedure). Column (2) exhibits the expected sign of the explanatory 
variables. ‘Spec.’ is abbreviation for ‘Specification’ and ‘Coef.’ is abbreviation for ‘Coefficient’. Definitions of variables are in Section 3.8. * , * * , *** indicate significance at 
10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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  Spec. 1     Spec. 2     Spec. 3     Spec. 4     Spec. 5 
  Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic 
(1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10)   (11) (12) 
Panel A: Pooled regression 
INTERCEPT  0.0675 2.292**   0.0546 1.856*   0.0494 1.71*   0.0351 1.218  0.0556 7.732***  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) 0.0016 0.662  0.0031 1.256  0.0024 0.961  0.0039 1.588    
MTBi,t (-) -0.0034 -3.565***   -0.0036 -3.783***   -0.0035 -3.675***   -0.0037 -3.903***     
ROAi,t (+) 0.1804 6.753***   0.1434 5.546***   0.1814 6.789***   0.1437 5.558***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0835 -6.348***   -0.0883 -6.718***   -0.1039 -9.205***   -0.1100 -9.778***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) 0.0013 0.082  0.0080 0.495  -0.0137 -0.886  -0.0078 -0.503    
NOAi,t (-) -0.0892 -4.393***   -0.0940 -4.63***   -0.0991 -4.946***   -0.1046 -5.221***     
DACi,t (-) -0.2006 -5.414***      -0.2041 -5.512***      -0.1246 -3.57***  
ESCORE_9i,t (-) -0.0158 -3.003***   -0.0168 -3.175***         -0.0481 -11.87***  
Adjusted R2 (%)  0.02   2.23   2.40   2.15   1.25  
Panel B: Fama-MacBeth regression with Newey-West adjusted t-statistic 
INTERCEPT  0.0909 1.52  0.0779 1.28  0.0648 0.95  0.0506 0.72  0.0513 1.48 
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0001 -0.03  0.0014 0.29  0.0015 0.29  0.0030 0.58    
MTBi,t (-) -0.0027 -1.63  -0.0029 -1.79*   -0.0027 -1.69  -0.0030 -1.86*     
ROAi,t (+) 0.1832 4.39***   0.1367 3.73***   0.1839 4.4***  0.1371 3.72***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0633 -3.27***   -0.0674 -3.36***   -0.0790 -3.39***   -0.0849 -3.47***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0231 -1.09  -0.0165 -0.81  -0.0349 -1.37  -0.0295 -1.21    
NOAi,t (-) -0.1136 -4.39***   -0.1196 -4.59***   -0.1199 -5.12***   -0.1268 -5.39***     
DACi,t (-) -0.2162 -5.28***      -0.2179 -5.11***      -0.1197 -4.46***  
ESCORE_9i,t (-) -0.0122 -1.54   -0.0136 -1.76*                -0.0457 -3.49***  
Notes: Specification 1 (columns 3 and 4) report the results of estimating the following equation:  ܥܯܣ ௜ܴ,௧ାଵ௔ = ߙ + ߚଵܮ݋݃൫ܯܸܧ௜,௧൯ + ߚଶܯܶܤ௜,௧ + ߚଷܴܱܣ௜,௧ + ߚସܧܵܧ ௜ܱ,௧ + ߚହܧܦܫܴܵܶܧܵ ௜ܵ,௧ + ߚ଺ܱܰܣ௜,௧ + ߚ଻ܦܣܥ௜,௧ + ߛܧܵܥܱܴܧ_9௜,௧ + ߝ.  (E3.25) 
From Specification 1 as the full specification, in Specification 2 DAC is dropped, in Specification 3 ESCORE_9 is dropped, in Specification 4 DAC and ESCORE_9 are dropped, in 
Specification 5 Ln(MVE), MTB, ROA, ESEO, EDISTRESS, NOA are dropped from the explanatory variables. Panel A (B) reports the results from the pooled regression (Fama-
Macbeth regression in which the standard errors are adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West procedure). Column (2) exhibits the expected sign of the explanatory 
variables. ‘Spec.’ is abbreviation for ‘Specification’ and ‘Coef.’ is abbreviation for ‘Coefficient’. Definitions of variables are in Section 3.8. * , * * , *** indicate significance at 








  Spec. 1     Spec. 2     Spec. 3     Spec. 4     Spec. 5 
  Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic 
(1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10)   (11) (12) 
Panel A: Pooled regression 
INTERCEPT  0.0958 3.276***   0.0823 2.818***   0.0793 2.77***   0.0644 2.255**   0.0603 8.44***  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0007 -0.29  0.0008 0.332  -0.0001 -0.021  0.0015 0.634    
MTBi,t (-) -0.0031 -3.252***   -0.0033 -3.481***   -0.0031 -3.353***   -0.0034 -3.592***     
ROAi,t (+) 0.1934 7.296***   0.1547 6.028***   0.1943 7.329***   0.1550 6.039***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0835 -6.393***   -0.0885 -6.782***   -0.1020 -9.105***   -0.1083 -9.704***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0027 -0.166  0.0043 0.269  -0.0163 -1.064  -0.0101 -0.662    
NOAi,t (-) -0.0873 -4.334***   -0.0924 -4.583***   -0.0963 -4.844***   -0.1021 -5.133***     
DACi,t (-) -0.2098 -5.708***      -0.2131 -5.798***      -0.1244 -3.591***  
ESCORE_9i,t (-) -0.0144 -2.749***   -0.0153 -2.93***         -0.0471 -11.696***  
Adjusted R2 (%)  0.03   2.25   2.46   2.18   1.21  
Panel B: Fama-MacBeth regression with Newey-West adjusted t-statistic 
INTERCEPT  0.1195 2.15**   0.1063 1.86*   0.0971 1.56  0.0827 1.29  0.0552 1.94*  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0027 -0.48  -0.0011 -0.19  -0.0013 -0.22  0.0003 0.06    
MTBi,t (-) -0.0023 -1.39  -0.0026 -1.58  -0.0024 -1.44  -0.0027 -1.64    
ROAi,t (+) 0.1997 4.61***   0.1517 4.17***   0.2003 4.63***   0.1521 4.17***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0625 -3.58***   -0.0668 -3.65***   -0.0759 -3.42***   -0.0821 -3.5***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0261 -1.23  -0.0192 -0.95  -0.0360 -1.43  -0.0304 -1.26    
NOAi,t (-) -0.1074 -4.32***   -0.1138 -4.57***   -0.1131 -4.97***   -0.1203 -5.27***     
DACi,t (-) -0.2244 -5.34***      -0.2258 -5.2***      -0.1170 -4.56***  
ESCORE_9i,t (-) -0.0103 -1.48   -0.0117 -1.72               -0.0431 -3.4***  
Notes: Specification 1 (columns 3 and 4) report the results of estimating the following equation:  ܥܣܴ1ܨ௜,௧ାଵ௔ = ߙ + ߚଵܮ݋݃൫ܯܸܧ௜,௧൯ + ߚଶܯܶܤ௜,௧ + ߚଷܴܱܣ௜,௧ + ߚସܧܵܧ ௜ܱ,௧ + ߚହܧܦܫܴܵܶܧܵ ௜ܵ,௧ + ߚ଺ܱܰܣ௜,௧ + ߚ଻ܦܣܥ௜,௧ + ߛܧܵܥܱܴܧ_9௜,௧ + ߝ.  (E3.25) 
From Specification 1 as the full specification, in Specification 2 DAC is dropped, in Specification 3 ESCORE_9 is dropped, in Specification 4 DAC and ESCORE_9 are dropped, in 
Specification 5 Ln(MVE), MTB, ROA, ESEO, EDISTRESS, NOA are dropped from the explanatory variables. Panel A (B) reports the results from the pooled regression (Fama-
Macbeth regression in which the standard errors are adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West procedure). Column (2) exhibits the expected sign of the explanatory 
variables. ‘Spec.’ is abbreviation for ‘Specification’ and ‘Coef.’ is abbreviation for ‘Coefficient’. Definitions of variables are in Section 3.8. * , * * , *** indicate significance at 
10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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  Spec. 1     Spec. 2     Spec. 3     Spec. 4     Spec. 5 
  Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic 
(1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10)   (11) (12) 
Panel A: Pooled regression 
INTERCEPT  0.0832 2.95***   0.0704 2.5**   0.0677 2.452**   0.0536 1.947*   0.0435 6.317***  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0006 -0.258  0.0008 0.351  0.0000 0.004  0.0015 0.646    
MTBi,t (-) -0.0021 -2.278**   -0.0023 -2.502**   -0.0021 -2.375**   -0.0024 -2.611***     
ROAi,t (+) 0.1717 6.718***   0.1351 5.462***   0.1725 6.75***   0.1354 5.473***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0719 -5.711***   -0.0766 -6.093***   -0.0893 -8.265***   -0.0952 -8.85***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0116 -0.75  -0.0050 -0.326  -0.0244 -1.654*   -0.0186 -1.26    
NOAi,t (-) -0.0988 -5.088***   -0.1036 -5.332***   -0.1073 -5.597***   -0.1127 -5.879***     
DACi,t (-) -0.1981 -5.591***      -0.2012 -5.679***      -0.1210 -3.627***  
ESCORE_9i,t (-) -0.0135 -2.673***   -0.0144 -2.851***         -0.0433 -11.168***  
Adjusted R2 (%)  0.02   2.01   2.21   1.94   1.12  
Panel B: Fama-MacBeth regression with Newey-West adjusted t-statistic 
INTERCEPT  0.1024 1.8*   0.0902 1.56  0.0820 1.29  0.0687 1.06  0.0384 2.34**  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0029 -0.52  -0.0014 -0.26  -0.0017 -0.28  -0.0002 -0.03    
MTBi,t (-) -0.0014 -1.22  -0.0017 -1.49  -0.0015 -1.28  -0.0017 -1.56    
ROAi,t (+) 0.1752 4.34***   0.1306 3.76***   0.1758 4.37***   0.1310 3.76***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0552 -3.47***   -0.0592 -3.57***   -0.0682 -3.27***   -0.0739 -3.39***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0288 -1.57  -0.0227 -1.3  -0.0384 -1.76*   -0.0335 -1.61    
NOAi,t (-) -0.1033 -4.57***   -0.1092 -4.82***   -0.1088 -5.22***   -0.1154 -5.52***     
DACi,t (-) -0.2064 -5.47***      -0.2078 -5.37***      -0.1117 -4.85***  
ESCORE_9i,t (-) -0.0099 -1.6   -0.0112 -1.87*                -0.0393 -3.15***  
Notes: Specification 1 (columns 3 and 4) report the results of estimating the following equation:  ܥܣܴ3ܨ௜,௧ାଵ௔ = ߙ + ߚଵܮ݋݃൫ܯܸܧ௜,௧൯ + ߚଶܯܶܤ௜,௧ + ߚଷܴܱܣ௜,௧ + ߚସܧܵܧ ௜ܱ,௧ + ߚହܧܦܫܴܵܶܧܵ ௜ܵ,௧ + ߚ଺ܱܰܣ௜,௧ + ߚ଻ܦܣܥ௜,௧ + ߛܧܵܥܱܴܧ௜,௧_9 + ߝ.  (E3.25) 
From Specification 1 as the full specification, in Specification 2 DAC is dropped, in Specification 3 ESCORE_9 is dropped, in Specification 4 DAC and ESCORE_9 are dropped, in 
Specification 5 Ln(MVE), MTB, ROA, ESEO, EDISTRESS, NOA are dropped from the explanatory variables. Panel A (B) reports the results from the pooled regression (Fama-
Macbeth regression in which the standard errors are adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West procedure). Column (2) exhibits the expected sign of the explanatory 
variables. ‘Spec.’ is abbreviation for ‘Specification’ and ‘Coef.’ is abbreviation for ‘Coefficient’. Definitions of variables are in Section 3.8. * , * * , *** indicate significance at 








  Spec. 1     Spec. 2     Spec. 3     Spec. 4     Spec. 5 
  Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic   Coef. t-statistic 
(1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10)   (11) (12) 
Panel A: Pooled regression 
INTERCEPT  0.0635 2.277**   0.0501 1.798*   0.0474 1.735*   0.0326 1.197  0.0458 6.729***  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) 0.0015 0.659  0.0030 1.309  0.0022 0.939  0.0037 1.624    
MTBi,t (-) -0.0016 -1.74*   -0.0018 -1.978**   -0.0016 -1.842*   -0.0019 -2.092**     
ROAi,t (+) 0.1562 6.177***   0.1178 4.813***   0.1571 6.21***   0.1181 4.824***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0668 -5.364***   -0.0718 -5.766***   -0.0849 -7.944***   -0.0912 -8.561***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0153 -0.998  -0.0084 -0.548  -0.0286 -1.961**   -0.0225 -1.543    
NOAi,t (-) -0.1034 -5.38***   -0.1084 -5.638***   -0.1122 -5.915***   -0.1179 -6.214***     
DACi,t (-) -0.2079 -5.93***      -0.2111 -6.022***      -0.1379 -4.179***  
ESCORE_9i,t (-) -0.0140 -2.815***   -0.0150 -3.003***         -0.0429 -11.191***  
Adjusted R2 (%)  0.02   1.92   2.15   1.85   1.15  
Panel B: Fama-MacBeth regression with Newey-West adjusted t-statistic 
INTERCEPT  0.0844 1.62  0.0721 1.37  0.0618 1.06  0.0483 0.81  0.0408 2.58**  
Ln(MVEi,t) (-) -0.0009 -0.17  0.0006 0.12  0.0005 0.09  0.0020 0.37    
MTBi,t (-) -0.0011 -0.9  -0.0013 -1.14  -0.0011 -0.96  -0.0014 -1.21    
ROAi,t (+) 0.1661 4.26***   0.1170 3.55***   0.1666 4.3***  0.1173 3.57***     
ESEOi,t (-) -0.0521 -3.26***   -0.0565 -3.37***   -0.0668 -3.15***   -0.0730 -3.28***     
EDISTRESSi,t (-) -0.0307 -1.93*   -0.0245 -1.61  -0.0418 -2.24**   -0.0368 -2.09*     
NOAi,t (-) -0.1071 -4.84***   -0.1137 -5.11***   -0.1136 -5.53***   -0.1210 -5.86***     
DACi,t (-) -0.2231 -5.66***      -0.2246 -5.56***      -0.1335 -5.75***  
ESCORE_9i,t (-) -0.0114 -1.69   -0.0127 -1.95*                -0.0393 -3.1***  
Notes: Specification 1 (columns 3 and 4) report the results of estimating the following equation:  ܥܣܴ4ܨ௜,௧ାଵ௔ = ߙ + ߚଵܮ݋݃൫ܯܸܧ௜,௧൯ + ߚଶܯܶܤ௜,௧ + ߚଷܴܱܣ௜,௧ + ߚସܧܵܧ ௜ܱ,௧ + ߚହܧܦܫܴܵܶܧܵ ௜ܵ,௧ + ߚ଺ܱܰܣ௜,௧ + ߚ଻ܦܣܥ௜,௧ + ߛܧܵܥܱܴܧ_9௜,௧ + ߝ.  (E3.25) 
From Specification 1 as the full specification, in Specification 2 DAC is dropped, in Specification 3 ESCORE_9 is dropped, in Specification 4 DAC and ESCORE_9 are dropped, in 
Specification 5 Ln(MVE), MTB, ROA, ESEO, EDISTRESS, NOA are dropped from the explanatory variables. Panel A (B) reports the results from the pooled regression (Fama-
Macbeth regression in which the standard errors are adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West procedure). Column (2) exhibits the expected sign of the explanatory 
variables. ‘Spec.’ is abbreviation for ‘Specification’ and ‘Coef.’ is abbreviation for ‘Coefficient’. Definitions of variables are in Section 3.8. * , * * , *** indicate significance at 
10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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3.7. CONCLUSIONS  
Chapter 2 has demonstrated that ESCORE, a model which accumulates fifteen 
individual financial-statement-based earnings management signals, is able to reveal 
the context of earnings management. This chapter goes further showing that 
ESCORE could reliably predict future stock returns. Stocks with low ESCORE (i.e. 
those which are less susceptible to earnings management) are shown to earn 
significantly higher than the high ESCORE (i.e. more susceptible) counterpart in one 
year after portfolio formation. The returns earned by the trading strategy designed 
based on ESCORE are shown to be abnormal after controlling for the risk loading on 
the market, size, book-to-market and momentum factors and after controlling for other 
known market anomalies embedded in ESCORE. The results are robust after various 
modifications made to the methodologies. 
The chapter proposes a behavioural-based explanation for the observed 
pattern of anomalous returns earned from ESCORE-based trading strategy. In 
particular, the chapter argues that investors are systematically biased under the 
influence of the base rate fallacy. It has been widely documented in the psychology 
literature that human-beings make erroneous assessment of probability by 
systematically ignoring the base rate and focusing too much on detailed information 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1982). The base rate fallacy causes investors to focus too 
much on specific information acquired from financial statements, in the media and 
elsewhere. Therefore, they are more likely to misprice the information contained in 
the context of earnings management. Metonymically, if “there’s no smoke without 
fire”, the market seems to fail to extrapolate that there is a ‘fire’ (i.e. earnings 
management exists) from observing the ‘smoke’ (the context of earnings 
management captured by ESCORE). The chapter provides evidence that a trading 
strategy which could exploit the sub-optimal behaviour of investors under the 
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influence of the base rate fallacy could yield returns which are abnormally higher than 
a fair compensation for risk. This is a very interesting and important finding which 
further our understanding on how the market reacts to earnings management. The 
chapter is also a significant contribution to the market anomaly literature which 
original evidence of abnormal returns earned based on published information. While 
the existing literature suggests aggressive (conservative) earnings management is 
related to negative (positive) future stock returns (e.g. Xie, 2001), the chapter 
suggests that the presence of earnings management, regardless of the direction, 
affects stock returns negatively because any deviation from the ‘true’ earnings could 
distort the usefulness of reported earnings. In addition, the chapter could potentially 
be of significant interest to investment practitioners as a practical tool to screen out 
the information about the context of earnings management which is currently 
mispriced by the market, hence earn economically large abnormal returns. Last but 
not least, the chapter has illustrated the relevant usage of ESCORE in helping 
accounting and finance researcher to pursue research questions which would have 
been not possible to pursue without an empirical proxy of the general context of 
earnings management. This opens up a lot of opportunities for future research to 
pursue. The next chapter is another example of how researchers could use ESCORE 
to control for the context in which earnings management occurs. 
3.8. DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES USED IN CHAPTER 3 
DAC is discretionary accruals as defined in Chapter 2 (see Section 2.8). 
ESCORE, ESCORE_FIXED and ESCORE_9 are three versions of the aggregate 
index which accumulates individual signals of earnings management as defined in 
Chapter 2 (see Section 2.8). 
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۰۶܀܀ܑ,ܒܕ is monthly buy-and-hold raw returns of stock i in month j, calculated as the 
percentage change in the Returns Index downloaded from Datastream at the end of 
each month.  
۰۶܀܀ܘ,ܒܕ  is monthly buy-and-hold raw returns of portfolio p in month j, calculated as 
the equally-weighted BHRR୧,୨୫ of all stocks belong to portfolio p.  
۰۶܀܀ܑ,ܜ܉  is annual buy-and-hold raw returns of stock i in year t, calculated as 
BHRR୧,୲ୟ = 	? (1 + BHRR୧,୨୫)ଵଶ୨ୀଵ െ 1(j = Juneyear t …Mayyear t + 1). 
۱܀܀ܑ,ܜ܉  is annual cumulative raw returns of stock i in year t, calculated as CRR୧,୲ୟ =	? BHRR୧,୨୫ଵଶ୨ୀଵ (j = Juneyear t …Mayyear t + 1). 
܁۲܀܌,ܒܕ  is the average monthly BHRR୧,୨୫ of all stocks in size decile d in month j (݆ =Juneyear t …Mayyear t + 1), where the deciles are determined by sorting stocks by 
market value of equity at the end of year t–1.  
۰۶܁ۯ܀ܑ,ܒܕ  is monthly buy-and-hold size-adjusted returns of stock i in month j, 
calculated as the difference between BHRR୧,୨୫  and the SDRୢ,୨୫  of the corresponding 
size decile to which stock i belongs. 
۰۶܁ۯ܀ܘ,ܒܕ  is monthly buy-and-hold size-adjusted returns of portfolio p in month j, 
calculated as the equally-weighted BHSAR୧,୨୫ of all stocks belong to portfolio p.  
۰۶܁ۯ܀ܑ,ܜ܉  is annual buy-and-hold size-adjusted returns of stock i in year t, calculated 
as BHSAR୧,୲ୟ = 	? (1 + BHRR୧,୨୫)ଵଶ୨ୀଵ െ 	? ൫1 + SDRୢ,୨୫ ൯ଵଶ୨ୀଵ (i א d,j =Juneyear t …Mayyear t + 1). 
۱܁ۯ܀ܑ,ܜ܉  is annual cumulative size-adjusted returns of stock i in year t, calculated as 
CSAR୧,୲ୟ = 	? (BHRR୧,୨୫ െ SDRୢ,୨୫ )ଵଶ୨ୀଵ (i א d,j = Juneyear t …Mayyear t + 1). 
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۴܂܁۳ۯۺۺ܀ܒ࢓ is the monthly returns on the FTSE All Shares Index in month j. 
۰۶ۻۯ܀ܑ,ܒܕ  is monthly buy-and-hold market-adjusted returns of stock i in month j, 
calculated as the difference between BHRR୧,୨୫ and FTSEALLR୨௠. 
۰۶ۻۯ܀ܘ,ܒܕ  is monthly buy-and-hold market-adjusted returns of portfolio p in month j, 
calculated as the equally-weighted BHMAR୧୫ of all stocks belong to portfolio p.  
۰۶ۻۯ܀ܑ,ܜ܉  is annual buy-and-hold market-adjusted returns of stock i in year t, 
calculated as BHMAR୧,୲ୟ = 	? (1 + BHRR୧,୨୫)ଵଶ୨ୀଵ െ 	? ൫1 + FTSEALLR୨୫൯ଵଶ୨ୀଵ (j =Juneyear t …Mayyear t + 1). 
۱ۻۯ܀ܑ,ܜ܉  is annual cumulative market-adjusted returns of stock i in year t, calculated 
as CMAR୧,୲ୟ = 	? (BHRR୧,୨୫ െ FTSEALLR୨୫)ଵଶ୨ୀଵ (j = Juneyear t …Mayyear t + 1). 
۰۶ۯ܀૚۴ܘ,ܒܕ = BHRR୮,୨୫ െ [Rf୨ + Ⱦ෠ଵ,୮ଵ୊ ൫Rm୨ െRf୨൯]  is monthly buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns of portfolio p in month j adjusted for the market factor; where: Ⱦ෠ଵ,୮ଵ୊  is the 
estimated intercept from the regression BHRR୮,୨୫ െRf୨ = Ƚ + Ⱦଵ(Rm୨ െ Rf୨) + ɂ ; Rf୨ , 
Rm୨ are, respectively, the risk-free rate and returns on the market portfolio in month 
j, all taken from Gregory et al. (2013). 
۳(܀૚۴ܑ
,ܒܕ) = Rf୨ + Ⱦ෠ଵ,୧ଵ୊(Rm୨ െRf୨) is monthly buy-and-hold expected returns of stock i 
in month j adjusted for the market factor; where: Ⱦ෠ଵ,୧ଵ୊ is the estimated coefficient from 
the regression BHRR୧,୨୫ െRf୨ = Ƚ + Ⱦଵ(Rm୨ െRf୨) + ɂ; Rf୨, Rm୨ are, respectively, the 





,ܜ܉  is annual buy-and-hold abnormal returns of stock i in year t adjusted for 
the market factor, calculated as BHAR1F୧,୲ୟ = 	? (1 + BHRR୧,୨୫)ଵଶ୨ୀଵ െ 	? ൣ1 +ଵଶ୨ୀଵ
E(R1F୧,୨୫)൧(j = Juneyear t …Mayyear t + 1). 
۱ۯ܀૚۴ܑ
,ܜ܉  is annual cumulative abnormal returns of stock i in year t adjusted for the 
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THE CONTAGION OF AGGRESSIVE EARNINGS 





It is well established that certain actions could spread through a network via 
mechanisms which are deeply rooted in the way people behave and societies operate 
collectively (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003; Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2009). Looking at this 
through the lens of the board of directors setting, very interesting research avenues 
open up. Directors are generally allowed to serve on more than one board, partly 
because the source for such high-profile job market is limited. Besides, appointment 
of outside directors would allow firms to flexibly pool together necessary expertise 
and experience at the board level to run the business. It is, therefore, a ‘small world’ 
where it would be very likely that directors know each other well, a setting which 
intensifies the likelihood of spreading behaviour. If the spread of behaviour is shown 
to be irrational or pernicious, it would be costly to the society because sub-optimal 
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decisions, by definition, destroy value. It necessitates research which could provide 
evidence of the spread of corporate decisions from one firm to another through the 
network of board directors. The literature on this topic is growing fast in recent years 
(e.g. Chiu et al., 2013; Brown and Drake, 2014; Cai et al., 2014 etc.). 
Chiu et al. (2013) use a sample of US firms during the period from 1997 to 2002 
and find that earnings management which later results in restatements is contagious 
from one firm to another through board interlocks. They also document that the 
contagion effect is stronger if the interlocked directors hold important positions which 
could influence financial reporting practices. The evidence presented by Chiu et al. 
(2013) is very interesting and contributes significantly to our knowledge of how board 
interlocks spread earnings management across firms. Nevertheless, there is still a lot 
to be done to help us better understand the nature and mechanism behind the 
documented contagion of earnings management.  
This chapter extends the evidence in Chiu et al. (2013) to further ask the 
following important questions. First, what particular methods of earnings 
management (i.e. accruals and/or real earnings management) are contagious via 
board interlock? Earnings management which later results in restatements typically 
involves accruals-based violations of GAAP. Hence, it is interesting to know if board 
interlocks would spread real earnings management, which often does not violate 
GAAP and thus does not necessarily result in restatements. Second, the chapter also 
investigates which characteristics of the shared directors could have an impact on the 
contagion effect. On this issue, the chapter extends existing evidence by further 
looking at the effects on earnings management contagion of the interlocked directors’ 
gender, age, and nationality beside their financial-related positions. This is an 
important investigation as it would help us better understand what really drives the 
contagion of earnings management.  
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Using a sample of UK listed firms during the period 2005 to 2012, the chapter 
presents empirical evidence consistent with board interlocks spreading aggressive 
accruals and real earnings management from one firm to another. The focus on 
aggressive earnings management ensures the chapter could provide insights into the 
type of earnings management which could potentially be most harmful for financial 
statement users. The chapter employs the modified-Jones model (Dechow et al., 
1995) to proxy for accruals earnings management and Roychowdhury’s (2006) 
models for real earnings management. Accruals aggressors are then defined as those 
with too high discretionary accruals compared to their peers in the same industry and 
year. Similarly, firms with too low abnormal cash flows, too high abnormal production 
costs, and too low abnormal discretionary expenses are defined as aggressors via 
manipulation of sales, production level, and discretionary expenses, respectively. For 
each of the above four methods of earnings management (one based on accruals 
and three on real activities), the following test of the contagion effect is done. When 
a firm is identified as an aggressor in a year, the period covering that year and two 
years afterwards is defined as the contagious period and the aggressive firm is 
defined as a ‘contagious’ firm during that period. Any firms which have an interlock 
with the contagious firm during the contagious period is defined as ‘exposed’ firms. 
The central hypothesis is that exposed firms are more likely to be aggressors too. 
Logistic regressions are employed to test the hypothesis.  
It is found that being linked with a firm which is aggressive using accruals 
management during the contagious period makes an exposed firm more likely to be 
an accruals aggressor. Similarly, a firm which shares a director with a contagious firm 
which is aggressively managing earnings via manipulation of production activities 
(discretionary expenses) is also found to be more likely to be an aggressive 
manipulator of production activities (discretionary expenses, respectively). The 
chapter does not find evidence that sales manipulation is contagious via the board 
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network. Moreover, the contagion of aggressive practices is found to be stronger if 
the interlocked director is male, older, British, or charged with duties which could 
influence financial reporting. The evidence is also shown to be robust after controlling 
for the issues of endogenous matching (i.e. firms which are aggressive might have 
appointed the same directors) and common firm characteristics (i.e. the exposed and 
contagious firms are both aggressive because they share some common 
characteristics). 
The chapter makes some major contributions. First, the evidence of the spread 
of aggressive accounting practices across UK firms via the board network is original 
and of significant importance to both practitioners and regulators, especially in the 
setting of the current pressures to reform corporate governance structure in response 
to recent accounting scandals. In the post-‘Brexit’29  era, the pressure to reform 
corporate governance system in the UK is more real than ever. The pressure is now 
coming from the very top level of the country as MacLellan (2016) reports the 
following statement from Mrs Theresa May, the UK’s newest Prime Minister at the 
time this thesis is submitted:  
 
The people who run big businesses are supposed to be accountable to 
outsiders, to non-executive directors... In practice, they are drawn from the 
same, narrow social and professional circles as the executive team… We're 
going to change that system. 
 
In that context, the evidence provided in this chapter that the ‘small world’ of 
corporate directors could spread aggressive earnings management around would 
add additional rationales for the efforts to reform corporate governance system. Being 
                                                             
29
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aggressive in financial reporting, by definition, is a deviation from optimal practices 
which would inflate reported earnings and hence would typically bias financial 
information users’ decision. While aggressive accruals earnings management simply 
inflate earnings through adopting aggressive accounting policies and estimations (i.e. 
only ‘cooking the books’), being aggressive using real earnings management usually 
destroy real values. For example, if an aggressor is cutting down on staff training and 
R&D expenses to report higher earnings, the firm would lose in the long term as it will 
become less efficient and competitive. The spread of aggressive accounting practices 
via board network as evidenced in this chapter implies that allowing the ‘small world’ 
of board directors to serve in several companies would be harmful for the efficient 
flow of capital in particular and for the wealth of the economy in general. 
Academically, the evidence extends the contagion of restatements initiated by Chiu 
et al. (2013) by showing that both accruals and real earnings management are 
contagious. The chapter also provides new evidence that gender, age, and nationality 
of the interlocked directors do play a role in driving the contagion effect. Moreover, 
using a sample of restatements, such as the GAO’s release of restatements as used 
in Chiu et al. (2013), introduces a sample selection bias (e.g. Dechow et al., 2010). 
In particular, GAO does not select firms randomly for investigation due to their limited 
resources. As a result, many manipulators might not have been covered in GAO 
sample (Type II error). This might be a particularly important issue in this kind of 
research because focusing only on restated firms would not allow the full network of 
directors to be mapped. Instead, the sample used in this chapter covers all UK listed 
firms, which is an important advantage as the chapter could map the full network of 
UK directors. 
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the relevant 
literature followed by the development of testable hypotheses in Section 4.3. Section 
4.4 presents the data selection criteria and Section 4.5 explains the methodologies 
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employed. Section 4.6 reports the main results while some additional tests are 
reported in Section 4.7. Section 4.8 concludes and highlights key contributions of the 
chapter. Section 4.9 provides the definitions of all variables used in this chapter. 
4.2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
4.2.1. Theoretical backgrounds: Why would corporate decisions spread from 
one company to another through the board network? 
Theoretically, there are well-established grounds for the spread of behaviour 
within a network. The sociology literature suggests at least four major theories to 
explain why people in a same network tend to mimic each other, a phenomenon 
called localized conformity. First, the sanctions on deviants theory proposes that 
deviation from the norm of a network would be costly, hence people tend to be 
reluctant to act differently when they belong to a group or network (Akerlof, 1976; 
Bendor and Mookherjee, 1987; Hirshleifer and Rasmusen, 1989; Kuran, 1989 etc.). 
Second, the theory of positive payoff externalities suggests that being in conformity 
with the majority would create a positive payoff for both the individuals and the group 
(Dybvig and Spatt, 1983; Farrell and Saloner, 1986; Arthur, 1989; Hung and Plott, 
2001 etc.). Third, following the conformity preference theory, people with a preference 
to conform tend to attract more support from the network to which they belong, hence 
one would inherently prefer to conform with others in the network (Jones, 1984). 
Finally, the communication theory implies that if communication is effective and 
costless, individuals within a network would communicate with each other so that 
everyone with adopt the optimal course of action (Rogers, 1983).  
Overall, the sociology literature reviewed above has established that people in 
the same network systematically mimic each other. It is interesting to know if in the 
setting of board rooms, board directors would conform to each other’s action. The 
seminal work of Bikhchandani et al. (1992) revolutionarily propose a theory of 
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information cascade which is built upon the foundation of the localized conformity 
theory. An information cascade occurs when in equilibrium one would follow the 
action of those ahead of her/him and disregard her/his own information. The ones 
who are followed are often those with more expertise or experience. For example, in 
a board meeting where directors are discussing about a financial matter, the financial 
expertise and experience of a few directors would likely to cascade and the rest of 
the board are likely to follow the actions of the experts. The theory is closely linked 
with the herding mentality which is very well documented in the psychological 
literature (e.g. Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003; Belhoula and Naoui, 2011; Mabrouk Houda 
and Mohamed, 2013; Philippas et al., 2013; Weisberg, 2013; Zhou and Anderson, 
2013; Yao et al., 2014). Herding behaviour has been shown to be ubiquitous in all 
aspects of human decision-making process, including in the board setting (González 
et al., 2006).  
Taken together, existing theories suggest that certain actions could spread 
through a network via mechanisms which are deeply rooted in the way people behave 
and societies operate collectively. Looking at this under the lens of the board of 
directors setting, very interesting research avenues open up. The prevailing Anglo-
Saxon model of corporate governance allows directors to sit in the board of several 
companies, partly because the source for such high-profile job market is limited. It is, 
therefore, a ‘small world’ where it would be very likely that directors know each other 
well, a setting which intensifies the likelihood of spread of behaviour. If the spread of 
behaviour is shown to be irrational or pernicious, it would be costly to the society 
because sub-optimal decisions, by definition, destroy value. It necessitates research 
which could bring about evidence of the spread of corporate decisions from one firm 
to another through the network of board directors. This body of the literature is very 
promising with a lot of potential to contribute to our knowledge and influence policy at 
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the world-level; hence the literature is young but is growing very fast. The next two 
sub-sections will review some key findings emerged from this literature. 
4.2.2. The characteristics and roles of board interlocks 
A board interlock exists when a director serves on the boards of at least two 
companies. Board interlocks could be created by both executive and non-executive 
directors. Many executive directors, especially in larger companies, often serve on 
the boards of other companies. Alternatively, an interlock could be created by a firm 
appointing a non-executive director. Corporate governance codes, especially in the 
US and UK, generally require the boards to have some outside directors. It makes 
board interlocks a very common phenomena. Interlocked directors seem to benefit 
firms in gathering and assessing information about business opportunities 
(Haunschild and Beckman, 1998; Fick, 2003; Connelly and Van Slyke, 2012). Burt 
(1980) finds that larger firms tend to have greater and more diverse network of board 
directors. Palmer (1983) analyses data on interlocks which are disrupted accidentally 
and concludes that interlocked directors generally provide a vehicle for formal 
coordination. Research also suggests that board interlock represents connections 
between local city-based groups (Koenig et al., 1979; Kono et al., 1998). Renneboog 
and Zhao (2011) suggest that board interlocks are form to facilitate information 
sharing as well as for managers to accumulate power. Despite the popularity of board 
interlocks, there is also evidence suggesting that the practice might be harmful for 
companies (Connelly and Van Slyke, 2012; Mizruchi, 1996). Devos et al. (2009) find 
that the presence of board interlocks is associated with lower firms’ performance and 
suboptimal chief executive officers’ compensation packages. Hallock (1997) provides 
evidence that chief executive officers who also serve as director at other companies 
tend to lead larger firms and enjoy better compensation packages. Kang (2008) 
suggests that directors who are interlocked with firms being accused of financial 
reporting frauds would suffer from reputational penalty. Krishnan et al. (2011) find that 
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non-executive directors are usually socially connected to the chief executives of the 
firms through, for example, past employment, alumni network, professional 
membership or religious organization. It suggests that the world of interlocked 
directors is a very ‘small’ world.  
It has also been very well documented that interlocked directors play a 
significant and important role in all aspects of corporate decisions. Cai and Sevilir 
(2012) document a significantly higher returns obtained by acquirers in M&A deals 
where there is a board connection between the acquirer and the target before the 
deal announcement. Their evidence suggests that board interlocks provide acquirers 
with information advantage about the true value of the targets. Palmer et al. (1995) 
find that having interlocked directors on board also makes a firm less likely to be a 
target for a predatory M&A. Renneboog and Zhao (2014) present evidence 
suggesting interlocked directors make it more likely for an M&A to be completed 
successfully with shorter negotiation time. Cai et al. (2014) find that interlocked 
directors facilitate information sharing, hence help constrain quarterly earnings 
forecasts guidance. Johansen and Pettersson (2013) find that director interlocks play 
a significant role in the decision of auditor appointment.  
4.2.3. Evidence of the spread of corporate decisions through the board 
network 
Within the strand of research examining the role and characteristics of board 
interlocks, a recent niche looks particularly at whether interlocked directors would 
spread certain behaviour or practices from one company to another. Brown and Drake 
(2014) present evidence in line with the hypothesis that tax avoidance strategies 
spread around through the network of ‘elite’ directors and top executives. Cai et al. 
(2014)  document empirical evidence that disclosure policies diffuse between firms 
which share a common director. Bizjak et al. (2009) find that being interlocked with a 
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director who have prior experience of backdating stock options would make a firm 
more likely to backdate its stock options. Brown (2011) presents evidence in line with 
aggressive corporate tax reporting also spreads through the board network via the 
use of corporate-owned life insurance shelter. Davis (1991) suggests that the use of 
Poison Pill, a takeover defence to protect the targets, spread through the inter-
corporate network. Stuart and Yim (2010) find evidence that directors with private 
equity experience, through their social ties with the key players in the private equity 
ecosystem, would make a public firm more likely to be the target for a private-equity-
based deal. Engelberg et al. (2012) find that firms with board connections with banks 
enjoy lower interest rates. Haunschild (1993) present evidence that firms imitate M&A 
activities of other firms which they are interlocked with.  
From the literature reviewed above, it is quite established that board interlock 
would serve as a channel through which a company might mimic certain actions or 
behaviour from another company. Building on that, recent attempts from accounting 
researchers have provided evidence that the contagion of behaviour via the board 
network is also observable in the financial reporting function. Chiu et al. (2013) find 
that earnings management behaviour, proxied by subsequent earnings restatement, 
is contagious between firms which share a common board director. Chiu et al. (2013) 
argue that the earnings management practice that later requires a restatement is 
unobservable to outsiders at the time it occurs, but it is observable to the insiders, 
including the directors. Therefore, at the time the earnings management practice 
occurs, it is observed by the directors under (arguably false) impression that it is a 
low cost practice. If those directors are also serving on the boards of other companies, 
they may then diffuse bad financial reporting practices to those companies. The 
contagion effect is found to be stronger if the interlocked director holds leadership or 
accounting-related role on the board. The key mechanism for such earnings 
management contagion is herding behaviour resulting from the influence of an 
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interlocked director perceiving lower cost of manipulating earnings upon observing 
such behaviour from another firm which he or she is also serving as a director. 
The insights provided by the literature on the role of interlocked directors in 
spreading certain corporate behaviour and practices are striking and very informative 
for policy-makers, especially with the increasing stricter regulations imposed in the 
US in recent years regarding the composition of boards and what directors could and 
could not do. Nevertheless, as an emerging field, the agenda is still full of 
opportunities for further research to contribute. One immediate direction is to 
investigate other behaviour spread in other contexts (apart from the US where most 
of the existing studies tend to focus on). Another dimension which is still under-
researched is to investigate the underlying mechanism of the spread of behaviour. In 
addition, more exploration of which situations would intensify or diminish the spread 
of behaviour would also be a fruitful avenue for meaningful contributions. This chapter 
will contribute to the existing literature by responding to the above identified gaps. 
The next section will refine these research ideas into testable hypotheses. 
4.3. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
The evidence presented by Chiu et al. (2013) is very interesting and invites 
further research to investigate if other financial reporting practices are also 
contagious. Moreover, the contagion of restatements is silent regarding what 
particular methods to manage earnings are contagious. Assuming the interlocked 
directors would bring earnings management practices to the exposed firms because 
they had observed the high benefit and/or low cost of those practices at the 
contagious firms, it is reasonable to expect the directors to implement the particular 
methods of earnings management engaged by the contagious firms at the exposed 
firms. To manage earnings, it is not always necessary to ‘cook the book’ as managers 
could manage real activities to influence reported earnings (Roychowdhury, 2006). 
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The chapter argues that if an interlocked director observed aggressive accruals 
earnings management at the contagious firm, it would be likely for the director to 
influence the board at the exposed firm to adopt aggressive accruals earnings 
management rather than other methods. Similarly, if a firm is interlocked with a real 
earnings aggressor, it is more likely to manage earnings aggressively using real 
earnings management methods. Testing this intuition would bring about evidence 
which could significantly extend our knowledge of the mechanism behind the 
contagion effect of earnings management. The first hypothesis is therefore: 
H1: Exposure via board links to an accruals (real earnings) aggressor 
increases the likelihood of the exposed firm being an accruals (real 
earnings, respectively) aggressor. 
If the contagion of aggressive earnings management through board interlocks 
does exist, there are several factors which could restrain or intensify the contagion 
effect. Firstly, existing evidence suggests that the gender of directors plays a role in 
determining the extent of earnings management. For example, Arun et al. (2015) finds 
that female directors would restrain earnings management. Kyaw et al. (2015) find 
that gender diversity plays an important role in mitigating earnings management, 
especially in countries where gender equality is well respected. Srinidhi et al. (2011) 
find that having female directors on the boards would improve earnings quality. 
Similar evidence is obtained in the particular context of high-technology firms 
(Gavious et al., 2012). Francis et al. (2015) also find that an appointment of female 
directors would generally make a firm more conservative in external financial 
reporting. It is therefore reasonable to expect, if the contagion of aggressive earnings 
management does exist, the effect would be more pronounced if the interlocked 
directors are male. An investigation of the effect of gender on the spread of earnings 
management via board interlock is important because corporate governance 
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regulations in most parts of the world, including in the UK, is increasingly placing 
pressure on boards to have more female directors.  
Secondly, evidence in the psychology literature suggests that experts who are 
respected as opinion leaders have greater influence over other team members 
(Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Rogers, 1983). Opinion leaders are likely to be older 
directors who generally have more experience and recognized reputation. The 
evidence of the impact of directors’ age on earnings management is, however, rather 
mixed. Davidson et al. (2007) find that firms with older chief executive officers manage 
earnings upwards in the year prior to the executive’s retire. On the contrary, Huang 
et al. (2012b) document a positive relationship between directors’ age and financial 
reporting quality measured by the likelihood of meeting or beating analysts’ 
consensus earnings forecast and financial restatements. Based on the literature, it is 
expected that the contagion of aggressive earnings management, if it indeed exists, 
would be affected by the age of the involved interlocked directors. 
Thirdly, if a director is to be successful in influencing the exposed firm to adopt 
aggressive earnings management, his/her connections with and influence over the 
other directors on the board would be crucial. In fact, it has been shown that even 
when a firm declares a director as ‘independent’, he or she might not in many cases 
‘truly independent’ as a result of the complex, formal and informal, network links 
established through educational background, work history, or social group (Hwang 
and Kim, 2009; Crespí-Cladera and Pascual-Fuster, 2014). Hoitash (2011) provides 
evidence that the existence of outside directors who are socially tied with 
management is likely to affect financial reporting quality. Within UK listed firms, 
directors who are British would be dominant in terms of number. Hence, British 
directors tend to know each other well because of their common involvement in 
various formal and informal networks (Renneboog and Zhao, 2011). It is therefore 
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expected that the spread of earnings management would be more pronounced 
through a British interlocked director.  
Finally, the literature generally suggests that earnings management is 
significantly affected by directors with financial background and those who hold 
positions which could influence financial reporting function. Xie et al. (2003) and 
Bédard et al. (2004) find that directors who serve on the audit committees and have 
financial expertise could mitigate accruals earnings management. Similar evidence is 
reported by Carcello et al. (2006) and Badolato et al. (2014) which look at other types 
of earnings management, including real earnings and accounting irregularities. 
Overall, the existing literature suggests that in the board room setting, directors who 
have expertise in and/or holds position related to financial reporting would have more 
influence on firm’s financial reporting practices. Hence, the contagion of aggressive 
earnings management via an interlocked director who holds a position which could 
influence financial reporting function, such as chief executive officer, chief financial 
officer, chairman or audit committee member, is expected to be greater.  
Following the arguments outlined above, the second hypothesis is developed 
as follows: 
H2: Exposure via board links to an accruals (real earnings) aggressor 
through a male, older, British director, or one who holds important 
financial-reporting-related position increases the likelihood of the 
exposed firm being an accruals (real earnings, respectively) aggressor. 
4.4. SAMPLE SELECTION 
The chapter starts from an initial sample including all firms listed on the LSE as 
at the end of 2012 which includes 1,814 firms. The sample covers the period from 
2005 to 2012. The sample selection approach means firms which are listed on the 
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LSE at some stages during the 2005-2012 period but delisted before 2012 are 
excluded. It is fully acknowledged that this approach would introduce survivorship 
bias into the sample. However, it is for practical purpose that the sample has to 
exclude delisted firms because it is very difficult to locate original annual reports of 
delisted firms which are needed for data on corporate governance and compensation. 
Nevertheless, it could be argued that the results of the chapter are not sensitive to 
the exclusion of delisted firms because there are no established reasons why 
directors serving on the boards of those delisted firms would have more or less 
incentives and/or pressures to spread aggressive earnings management.  
Financial and utilities firms are then excluded. Financial data is sourced from 
Datastream. The chapter also deletes observations with market value of equity 
smaller than £1 million as well as those with negative book-to-market ratio. The 
following steps are then applied to arrive at the final sample. First, only observations 
which have enough data to estimate discretionary accruals using the modified-Jones 
model and Roychowdhury’s (2006) measures of real earnings management (as 
described in Section 2.5.1 in Chapter 2) are retained. Of the remained firms, those 
without a Stock Exchange Daily Official List code (SEDOL hereafter) are deleted. 
Data on external auditor, M&A, compensation, membership in board sub-committees 
and managerial roles are collected from Bloomberg and matched with data from 
Datastream via SEDOL. For each firms, details of board directors, including name, 
appointment and resignation dates, are hand collected from Key Note. To get data 
from Key Note, a search for the company’s name is conducted, and on the resulting 
list a check on a trial-and-error basis is done until the SEDOL is matched. If a firm’s 
SEDOL cannot be matched with any firm in the Key Note’s search result list, the firm 
is excluded from the sample. Bloomberg only provides details of board of directors 
and compensation for a limited number of years and include a lot of missing data. 
Hence, to maintain the largest possible sample, the original annual reports of each 
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firm in each year are also downloaded from Key Note. Where membership in board 
sub-committees and managerial roles, compensation are missing from Bloomberg, 
data is supplemented from the hand-collected data directly from annual reports. 
Finally, the sample excludes all observations without enough data to calculate all 
variables used in this chapter as described in Section 4.9. The process yields a 
sample of 2,365 observations, including 473 unique firms across 31 Datastream level-
six industries, which is quite comparable to prior studies using UK data on board 
directors (e.g. Beekes et al., 2004; Peasnell et al., 2005). All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to mitigate the influence of outliers.  
4.5. METHODOLOGIES 
4.5.1. Indicators of aggressive earnings management 
The chapter employs the modified-Jones model (Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 
1995) to estimate discretionary accruals and Roychowdhury’s (2006) three measures 
of real earnings management as described in Section 2.5.1. Using the above four 
measures of earnings management, the chapter then sorts each of them into 10 
deciles in each industry-year and define the membership in the top deciles as 
indicators of the ‘aggressors’, i.e. those with too high DAC, DCF, DPROD, DDISEXP, 
and denote them as AGDAC, AGDCF, AGDPROD, AGDDISEXP, respectively. 
4.5.2. Contagious board interlocks 
The key variable of interest used in this chapter is the indicator of a firm being 
exposed through a board link with an aggressive firm during the contagious period. 
The hypothesis is if a firm has such link, it would be more likely to be an aggressive 
firm as well. The following explains how the indicator of exposed firms is constructed. 
Only accruals earnings management is used to illustrate because the same 
procedures are applicable for all other measures of real earnings management. If firm 
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c is an accruals aggressor in year cy (i.e. AGDAC of firm c in year y is equal to one), 
the period from year y to y+2 (inclusive) is defined as the ‘contagious period’ and firm 
c is defined as a ‘contagious firm’ during this period. Following Chiu et al. (2013), the 
chapter allows the contagious period to extend two years after the recorded 
aggressive earnings management because it might take time for the interlocked 
directors to bring the aggressive financial reporting practices from the contagious 
firms to the exposed firms.  
A dummy, denoted ILW_AGDAC, is then created as follows. During the 
contagious period, if another firm e has a board link with the contagious firm c, firm e 
is defined as an ‘exposed’ firm and the indicator ILW_AGDAC is set to one, zero 
otherwise. For the purpose of determining board links, a director is considered as 
serving on a firm’s board in a year if he or she is listed as a director of the firm in that 
year in Key Note, regardless of the appointment and resignation date. The approach 
means a director might be on a firm’s board for less than a full year30. Figure F4.1 
further illustrates the procedures described above. Similar procedures are then 
applied to create ILW_AGDCF, ILW_AGDPROD and ILW_AGDDISEXP. 
Figure F4.1. Contagious board interlocks 
 
Notes: Definitions of variables are in Section 4.9. 
                                                             
30
 All main analyses in this chapter are replicated and unreported results show that requiring 
directors to serve on the boards of directors for at least 6 months in a fiscal year would not 




4.5.3. Control variables 
Using the above indicators of aggressive earnings management as dependent 
variables, the regressions control for factors that prior research has identified as 
determinants of earnings management. The following sub-sections describe the 
construction of those control variables. 
4.5.3.1. Industry-year adjustment 
Because the measures earnings management are estimated within each 
industry-year, it is a common approach in the literature that the control variables are 
also adjusted for the corresponding industry-year mean (e.g. Roychowdhury, 2006; 
Houmes and Skantz, 2010). Following the literature, except for the dummies, all other 
control variables used in this chapter are added to the regression after adjusted for 
the corresponding mean of the industry-year as follows: 
ܽܥܱܴܱܰܶܮ௜,௧ = ܥܱܴܱܰܶܮ௜,௧ െ ܥܱܴܱܰܶܮതതതതതതതതതതതതതത௧,௞ (݅ א ݇) (E4.1) 
where: ܽܥܱܴܱܰܶܮ௜,௧ is the industry-year adjusted control variable of firm i in year t 
(the lowercase letter ‘a’ is used to represent industry-year adjusted control variable); ܥܱܴܱܰܶܮ௜,௧ is the actual value of the control variable of firm i in year t; ܥܱܴܱܰܶܮതതതതതതതതതതതതതത௧,௞ 
is the corresponding mean of the control variable of all firms in industry k in year t; 
k=1…31 are the 31 unique Datastream level-six industry remained in the sample. 
4.5.3.2. Corporate governance and performance-linked executive 
compensation 
The literature, as reviewed in Section 2.5.5.2 in Chapter 2, is well established 
that corporate governance and performance-linked executive compensation 
packages significantly affect earnings management. Following the literature, the 
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chapter controls for the characteristics of the board of directors which could drive 
aggressive earnings management by adding to the regressions the number of board 
links (denoted aBOLINK), number of directors on board (aBOSIZE), percentage of 
non-executive directors on board (aBOIND), number of directors on audit committee 
(aAUCOMSIZE), percentage of non-executive directors on audit committee 
(aAUCOMIND) and an indicator which is equal to one if the chief executive officer is 
also the chairman of a company, zero otherwise (DUALITY).  
The chapter also considers four components of executive compensation which 
are typically linked to performance, namely bonus, stocks, options and long-term 
incentive pay awarded during the year. Data is collected manually from each sample 
firm’s annual reports. For each executive director, the four components are summed 
up to get the total performance-linked compensation for each individual. Because 
performance-linked executive compensation is generally quite small compared to 
sales (which is used as the deflator for this variable), it is multiplied by 1,000 before 
proceeding to avoid too small values. TOTCOMPEN is then calculated as the average 
of the total performance-linked compensation across all executive directors scaled by 
sales. aTOTCOMPEN, which is used as the control variable in the regressions, is 
finally arrived at by demeaning TOTCOMPEN within the industry-year using the 
procedures described in Section 4.5.3.1.  
4.5.3.3. Firm’s fundamentals 
Following the literature reviewed in Section 2.4 of Chapter 2, this chapter also 
controls for factors that have been shown to be related to earnings management. In 
particular, the multivariate regressions control for firm size [using aLn(MVE)], market-
to-book ratio (aMTB), profitability (aROA), debt ratio (aDEBT), balance sheet bloat 
(aNOA), tangible assets (aCAP), book-tax difference (aBOOKTAX), seasonal equity 
offers (ESEO), non-Big-5 auditors (EAUDIT), announcement of an M&A deal (EMA), 
 222 
 
and financial distress (EDISTRESS). All of these variables are as defined in Chapter 
2 with the prefix ‘a’ indicating the variable has been demeaned within each industry-
year using the procedures outlined in Section 4.5.3.1. In addition to the above 
variables, this chapter also controls for R&D expense which is one of the strong 
determinants of earnings management as suggested by the literature (Bange and De 
Bondt, 1998; Francis et al., 2004; Osma and Young, 2009; Athanasakou and Olsson, 
2012; Nogara, 2013). RD is defined as research and development expenses divided 
by sales31. aRD is then used in the regressions after RD is demeaned within each 
industry using the procedures described in Section 4.5.3.1. Noted that aNOA and 
EAUDIT are only used in accruals earnings management regressions. 
4.5.4. Empirical models 
To test hypothesis H1, the following logistic regressions are estimated: 
ܮ݋݃݅ݐ൫ ௜ܻ,௧൯ = ߙ + ߚଵܫܮܹ_ܻ ௜,௧ + ߚଶܽܤܱܮܫܰܭ௜,௧ + ߚଷܽܤܱܵܫܼܧ௜,௧ + ߚସܽܤܱܫܰܦ௜,௧ +ߚହܽܣܷܥܱܯܵܫܼܧ௜,௧ + ߚ଺ܽܣܷܥܱܯܫܰܦ௜,௧ + ߚ଻ܽܦܷܣܮܫܶ ௜ܻ,௧ +ߚ଼ܱܽܶܶܥܱܯܲܧ ௜ܰ,௧ + ߚଽܽܮ݊(ܯܸܧ) ௜,௧ିଵ + ߚଵ଴ܽܯܶܤ௜,௧ିଵ +ߚଵଵܴܱܽܣ௜,௧ + ߚଵଶܽܦܧܤ ௜ܶ,௧ିଵ + ߚଵଷܱܽܰܣ௜,௧ିଵ + ߚଵସܴܽܦ௜,௧ +ߚଵହܽܥܣ ௜ܲ,௧ + ߚଵ଺ܽܤܱܱܭܶܣ ௜ܺ,௧ + ߚଵ଻ܧܵܧ ௜ܱ,௧ + ߚଵ଼ܧܣܷܦܫ ௜ܶ,௧ +ߚଵଽܧܯܣ௜,௧ + ߚଶ଴ܧܦܫܴܵܶܧܵ ௜ܵ,௧ + ߝ (E4.2) 
where: ௜ܻ,௧ is the indicator of aggressive earnings management (Y is replaced in each 
regression by an indicator of aggressive earnings management, i.e. AGDAC, 
AGDCF, AGDPROD and AGDDISEXP) of firm i in year t; ܫܮܹ_ܻ ௜,௧ is one if firm i in 
year t has an interlock with a contagious firm during the contagious period, zero 
                                                             
31
 If R&D expense is missing from Datastream, it is assumed that the firm does not invest in 
R&D, hence a value of zero is used. 
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otherwise; all control variables are as defined in Section 4.5.3 (note that aNOA and 
EAUDIT are only included when the dependent variable is AGDAC). 
The coefficient of interest is ILW_Y, which is the indicator of the exposed firm 
being interlocked with a contagious firm during the year the contagious firm is 
identified as an aggressive firm and two following years. Ifߚଵ in Equation (E4.2) is 
significantly positive, it would suggest the likelihood of a firm being aggressive 
increases if the firm is interlocked with a contagious firm during the contagious period, 
i.e. the evidence is in support of H1.  
For hypothesis H2, the chapter tests the impact of gender, age, nationality, and 
financial-reporting-related positions of interlocked directors on the contagion of 
aggressive earnings management separately. First, to test the impact of the gender 
of interlocked directors on the contagion effect, ILW_Y is decomposed into 
ILW_Y_MALE and ILW_Y_FEMALE and the following regressions are estimated: 
ܮ݋݃݅ݐ(ܻ) = ߙ + ߚଵܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܯܣܮܧ + ߚଶܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܨܧܯܣܮܧ + 	?ߚ௞ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௞ + ߝ (E4.3) 
where: Y is replaced in each regression by an indicator of aggressive earnings 
management, i.e. AGDAC, AGDCF, AGDPROD and AGDDISEXP; ILW_Y_MALE is 
one if a firm has an interlock with a contagious firm during the contagious period and 
the interlocked director is male, zero otherwise; ILW_Y_FEMALE is one if a firm has 
an interlock with a contagious firm during the contagious period and the interlocked 
director is female, zero otherwise; Controlk is the set of control variables which have 
been shown in the literature to be determinants of earnings management as outlined 




If the contagion effect is more pronounced through male interlocked directors, ߚଵ  in the above regressions would be significantly positive and ߚଶ  would be 
insignificant. 
Second, ILW_Y is interacted with ILW_Y_AGE, the variable capturing the age 
of the interlocked director: 
ܮ݋݃݅ݐ(ܻ) = ߙ + ߚଵܫܮܹ_ܻ × ܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܣܩܧ + 	?ߚ௞ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௞ + ߝ (E4.4) 
where: Y is replaced in each regression by an indicator of aggressive earnings 
management, i.e. AGDAC, AGDCF, AGDPROD and AGDDISEXP; ILW_Y_AGE is 
age of the interlocked director at fiscal year-end (rounded to the nearest whole 
number of years) if a firm has an interlock with a contagious firm during the contagious 
period, zero otherwise; Controlk is the set of control variables which have been shown 
in the literature to be determinants of earnings management as outlined in Section 
4.5.3; time and firm subscripts are the same as in (E4.2) and suppressed for 
simplicity. 
If ߚଵ  in the above regressions are positive and statistically significant, it is 
evidence that the older the interlocked director, the stronger the spread of aggressive 
earnings management. 
Third, ILW_Y is decomposed into ILW_Y_BRIT, which is one if the interlocked 
director is British and zero otherwise, and ILW_Y_NONBRIT, which is one if the 
interlocked director is not British and zero otherwise. The following regressions are 
then estimated: 
ܮ݋݃݅ݐ(ܻ) = ߙ + ߚଵܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܤܴܫܶ + ߚଶܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܰ ܱܰܤܴܫܶ + 	?ߚ௞ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௞ + ߝ (E4.5) 
where: Y is replaced in each regression by an indicator of aggressive earnings 
management, i.e. AGDAC, AGDCF, AGDPROD and AGDDISEXP; ILW_Y_BRIT is 
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one if a firm has an interlock with a contagious firm during the contagious period and 
the interlocked director is British, zero otherwise; ILW_Y_NONBRIT is one if a firm 
has an interlock with a contagious firm during the contagious period and the 
interlocked director is not British, zero otherwise; Controlk is the set of control 
variables which have been shown in the literature to be determinants of earnings 
management as outlined in Section 4.5.3; time and firm subscripts are the same as 
in (E4.2) and suppressed for simplicity. 
H2 predicts ߚଵ in the above regressions to be significantly positive and ߚଶ to be 
insignificant. 
Finally, ILW_Y is decomposed into ILW_Y_FINEX and ILW_Y_NOFINEX and 
the following regressions are estimated: 
ܮ݋݃݅ݐ(ܻ) = ߙ + ߚଵܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܨܫܰܧܺ + ߚଶܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܰ ܱܨܫܰܧܺ + 	?ߚ௞ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௞ + ߝ (E4.6) 
where: Y is replaced in each regression by an indicator of aggressive earnings 
management, i.e. AGDAC, AGDCF, AGDPROD and AGDDISEXP; ILW_Y_FINEX is 
one if a firm has an interlock with a contagious firm during the contagious period and 
the interlocked director is a chairman, chief executive officer, chief financial officer or 
member of audit committee of the exposed firm, zero otherwise; ILW_Y_NOFINEX is 
one if a firm has an interlock with a contagious firm during the contagious period and 
the interlocked director is not a chairman, chief executive officer, chief financial officer 
or member of audit committee of the exposed firm, zero otherwise; Controlk is the set 
of control variables which have been shown in the literature to be determinants of 
earnings management as outlined in Section 4.5.3; time and firm subscripts are the 
same as in (E4.2) and suppressed for simplicity. 
In a similar fashion, ILW_Y_FINCO and ILW_Y_NOFINCO are used in the 
following regressions:  
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ܮ݋݃݅ݐ(ܻ) = ߙ + ߚଵܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܨܫܰܥܱ + ߚଶܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܰ ܱܨܫܰܥܱ + 	?ߚ௞ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௞ + ߝ (E4.7) 
where: Y is replaced in each regression by an indicator of aggressive earnings 
management, i.e. AGDAC, AGDCF, AGDPROD and AGDDISEXP; ILW_Y_FINCO is 
one if a firm has an interlock with a contagious firm during the contagious period and 
the interlocked director is a chairman, chief executive officer, chief financial officer or 
member of audit committee of the contagious firm, zero otherwise; ILW_Y_NOFINCO 
is one if a firm has an interlock with a contagious firm during the contagious period 
and the interlocked director is not a chairman, chief executive officer, chief financial 
officer or member of audit committee of the contagious firm, zero otherwise; Controlk 
is the set of control variables which have been shown in the literature to be 
determinants of earnings management as outlined in Section 4.5.3; time and firm 
subscripts are the same as in (E4.2) and suppressed for simplicity. 
H2 predicts ߚଵ in (E4.6) and (E4.7) to be positive and ߚଶ to be insignificant. 
4.6. RESULTS 
4.6.1. Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Table T4.1 reports some descriptive statistics of the sample. The means of 
MVE, TA, SALE and IB are all remarkably higher than even the 75th percentile. Since 
those variables capture firm size, it suggests the sample comprises some very large 
firms and have very few small firms. Recall that the sample selection procedures 
would filter out firms which are delisted or do not provide enough information needed 
for this chapter (see Section 4.4) which are typically small firms. As a result, firms 
which are remained in the sample tends to be larger firms. Again, it is acknowledged 
that the sample does have some bias towards larger and survived firms. AGDAC, 
AGDCF, AGDPROD and AGDDISEXP are all approximately 10% because of the way 
aggressors are defined. An average board in the sample has 6.58 directors, of which 
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54.47% are non-executive. Board interlock is, although not prevalent, remarkably 
observable in the sample. While there are firms with no board link, the highest number 
of links is 9, leaving the average number of links at 0.805932. Compared to, for 
example, Renneboog and Zhao (2011) who report the average number of interlock in 
UK listed firms of 4.02 over the period 1996-2007, the average board link reported in 
Table T4.1 is remarkably smaller. This might be the result of stricter regulations in the 
post-2003 in the UK with regard to how many board directorships a director could 
hold33. Note also that the definition of number of board link in this chapter is not the 
same as the number of interlocks. A firm might have two or more interlocks with a 
same firm but through different directors, in which case the number of board links as 
defined in this chapter is still one. Besides, the sample employed in this chapter 
excludes financial institutions and banks, which are typically large companies with 
many board connections (Burt, 1980). On average, 11.12% (10.49%, 10.57% and 
10.99%) of sample firms have a board link with an accruals (sales, production, 
discretionary expenses, respectively) aggressor during the contagious period.  
The correlations between the main variables are reported in Table T4.2. There 
is initial evidence that the indicators of aggressive earnings management (AGDAC, 
AGDCF, AGDPROD, AGDDISEXP) and the indicator of interlock with an aggressive 
earnings management firm (ILW_AGDAC, ILW_AGDCF, ILW_AGDPROD, 
ILW_AGDDISEXP) are positively correlated. Besides, there is no too high correlation 
between the explanatory variables that would cause a concern. 
  
                                                             
32
 Unreported results show that at director level, 90% of the directors serve on only one 
board during the sample period. Of the remained directors who serve on multiple boards, 
the majority serve only two boards (8.4%). Only three directors serve on five boards in a year, 
which is the maximum in the sample. 
33
 From 2003, the Higgs report regulates that full-time executive directors should hold only 
one non-executive directorship (but not chairmanship) at another FTSE-100 company. There 
is, however, no maximum directorships a director could hold. 
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Table T4.1. Descriptive statistics (n = 2,365) 





DAC 0.0041 0.1214 -0.4614 -0.0455 0.0083 0.0638 0.3828
DCF -0.0276 0.1560 -0.4639 -0.1103 -0.0293 0.0428 0.5728
DPROD -0.0210 0.2468 -0.9236 -0.1251 -0.0102 0.0982 0.7381
DDISEXP 0.0246 0.2698 -1.0443 -0.0698 0.0466 0.1651 0.7089
AGDAC 0.1011 0.3015 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
AGDCF 0.1011 0.3015 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
AGDPROD 0.1011 0.3015 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
AGDDISEXP 0.1011 0.3015 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
ILWAGDAC 0.1112 0.3145 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
ILWAGDCF 0.1049 0.3064 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
ILWAGDPROD 0.1057 0.3075 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
ILWAGDDISEXP 0.1099 0.3129 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
BOLINK 0.8059 1.1843 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 9.0000
BOSIZE 6.5822 2.1773 2.0000 5.0000 6.0000 8.0000 19.0000
BOIND 0.5447 0.1511 0.1667 0.4286 0.5556 0.6667 0.9231
AUCOMSIZE 3.2744 1.3009 1.0000 2.0000 3.0000 4.0000 17.0000
AUCOMIND 0.9400 0.1509 0.1667 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
DUALITY 0.0626 0.2423 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
TOTCOMPEN 17.0128 89.0377 0.0000 0.0238 0.6834 2.8843 743.9283
MVE (£ million) 1,187 5,966 1 14 54 310 85,497
TA (£ million) 993 4,312 0 17 69 334 64,006
SALE (£ million) 837 4,017 0 13 54 320 134,634
IB (£ million) 76 447 -1,426 -1 2 18 6,204
MTB 3.1293 4.1061 0.1781 1.0416 1.8549 3.4249 28.3414
ROA 0.0027 0.2124 -0.9023 -0.0278 0.0482 0.1005 0.4922
DEBT 0.1441 0.1465 0.0000 0.0025 0.1111 0.2344 0.5952
NOA 0.4988 0.2356 -0.1338 0.3484 0.5449 0.6755 0.8975
RD 0.3319 2.0859 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0203 18.5968
CAP 0.3591 0.3307 0.0078 0.1043 0.2399 0.5419 1.4623
BOOKTAX 1.7615 9.1012 0.0002 0.0098 0.0318 0.1427 75.6739
ZSCORE 18.5874 39.3351 -112.1051 4.2458 12.6525 24.5762 230.7747
ESEO 0.2338 0.4234 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
EAUDIT 0.4495 0.4975 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000
MA 0.0474 0.2124 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
Notes: The table reports the mean, standard deviation, minimum, 25th, 50th (the median), 75th 





Table T4.2. Correlations 
Variable   5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 
AGDAC 1 0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.10 -0.10 -0.08 -0.07 0.05 0.02 -0.15 0.03 0.07 -0.10 -0.11 0.01 -0.05 0.02 0.08 0.16 0.02 0.04 
AGDCF 2 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.05 -0.14 -0.08 -0.07 -0.06 0.01 0.06 -0.19 0.07 -0.38 -0.09 -0.16 0.09 -0.09 0.05 0.20 0.09 0.02 0.35 
AGDPROD 3 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.05 -0.02 -0.06 -0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.08 -0.06 -0.09 0.01 -0.07 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.11 
AGDDISEXP 4 -0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.05 0.07 0.03 0.02 -0.13 -0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 
ILWAGDAC 5 1.00                       
ILWAGDCF 6 0.34 1.00                      
ILWAGDPROD 7 0.15 0.37 1.00                     
ILWAGDDISEXP 8 0.10 0.18 0.50 1.00                    
aBOLINK 9 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.24 1.00                   
aBOSIZE 10 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.23 1.00                  
aBOIND 11 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.09 0.25 0.28 1.00                 
aAUCOMSIZE 12 0.09 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.11 0.48 0.36 1.00                
aAUCOMIND 13 0.10 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.17 0.37 -0.03 1.00               
DUALITY 14 -0.01 -0.01 -0.05 -0.05 0.00 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.14 1.00              
aTOTCOMPEN 15 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.09 -0.01 -0.04 0.00 0.01 1.00             
aLn(MVE)i,t-1 16 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.23 0.65 0.39 0.48 0.23 -0.08 -0.09 1.00            
aMTBi,t-1 17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.03 -0.03 0.05 0.09 1.00           
aROAi,t 18 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 0.10 0.22 0.07 0.10 0.04 0.01 -0.22 0.34 0.05 1.00          
aDEBTi,t-1 19 0.03 0.02 0.10 0.09 0.14 0.21 0.17 0.17 0.03 -0.08 -0.05 0.20 -0.03 0.09 1.00         
aNOAi,t-1 20 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.04 -0.01 0.04 -0.10 0.04 -0.15 0.05 0.34 1.00        
aRDi,t 21 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 0.03 -0.01 0.42 -0.06 0.04 -0.19 -0.08 -0.13 1.00       
aCAPi,t 22 0.04 0.04 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.14 0.12 0.13 -0.06 -0.05 0.13 -0.02 0.15 0.22 0.15 -0.05 1.00      
aBOOKTAXi,t 23 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.03 -0.02 -0.09 -0.05 -0.05 0.00 -0.02 0.60 -0.10 0.04 -0.24 -0.07 -0.05 0.34 -0.08 1.00     
ESEOi,t 24 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.06 -0.13 -0.06 -0.09 -0.05 0.03 0.04 -0.24 0.00 -0.33 0.06 0.03 0.00 -0.10 0.03 1.00    
EAUDITi,t 25 -0.08 -0.08 -0.14 -0.17 -0.21 -0.33 -0.26 -0.20 -0.17 0.10 0.06 -0.49 -0.02 -0.16 -0.15 -0.01 0.03 -0.14 0.07 0.16 1.00   
EMAi,t 26 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.20 0.04 1.00  
EDISTRESSi,t 27 -0.01 -0.01 -0.05 -0.03 -0.10 -0.16 -0.08 -0.07 -0.04 -0.03 0.13 -0.27 0.03 -0.59 -0.12 -0.19 0.12 -0.13 0.18 0.18 0.15 -0.01 1.00 
Notes: The table reports Pearson correlation coefficients between selected variables. Definitions of variables are in Section 4.9. Values reported in italic indicate the 
corresponding coefficients are not significant at 5% level. 
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4.6.2. Main results 
The results of testing H1 are reported in Table T4.3. It could be observed that 
the control variables generally have the predicted sign. With regard to the contagion 
of aggressive accruals earnings management, the evidence is in support of the 
hypothesis H1 with a significantly positive coefficient of AGDAC on ILW_AGDAC 
(0.5329, significant at 5% level). In terms of economic significance, the marginal effect 
of ILW_AGDAC is 3.29% while the unconditional probability of being an aggressive 
firm is only 10% suggesting interlock with an aggressive accruals earnings 
management firm during the contagious period increases the likelihood that the 
exposed firm is also an accruals aggressive firm by an economically significant 
magnitude. Similarly, it could also be observed that real earnings management is 
contagious via manipulation of production activities (coefficient of AGDPROD on 
ILW_AGDPROD is 0.3870, significant at 10% level) and discretionary expenses 
(coefficient of AGDDISEXP on ILW_AGDDISEXP is 0.4633, significant at 5% level), 
but not via sales manipulation (coefficient of AGDCF on ILW_AGDCF is 0.1127, 
statistically insignificant). In terms of economic magnitude, being linked with an 
aggressor which manipulates production activities (discretionary expenses) during 
the contagious period would increase the likelihood of the exposed firm also being an 
aggressive manipulator of production activities (discretionary expenses) by 3.69% 
(4.39%), which is remarkable given the unconditional probability of being an 
aggressor is 10% by definition. Overall, the evidence suggests that board interlock 
does spread aggressive earnings management practices from one firm to another. 
The evidence significantly adds to the existing knowledge on the contagion effect via 
board interlocks. While the contagion of restatements documented in Chiu et al. 
(2013) could be present even when the exposed and contagious firms apply 
completely different methods of managing earnings, the chapter shows that the 
interlocked directors would bring the particular earnings management choices (i.e. 
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accruals and real earnings management) to the exposed firms upon observing those 
aggressive practices at the contagious firms. 
Table T4.4 reports the results of testing whether gender of the interlocked 
directors would affect the spread of aggressive earnings management. Looking at the 
spread of aggressive accruals earnings management, the coefficient of AGDAC on 
ILW_AGDAC_MALE is 0.5844 and is statistically significant at 5% level, while the 
coefficient on ILW_AGDAC_FEMALE is insignificant. Similar evidence is observed 
for production activities and discretionary expenses manipulation. The coefficient of 
AGDPROD (AGDDISEXP) on ILW_AGDPROD_MALE (ILW_AGDDISEXP_MALE) is 
0.4598 (0.5745) and is significant at 10% (5%) level, while ILW_AGDPROD_FEMALE 
(ILW_AGDDISEXP_FEMALE) does not seem to statistically affect AGDPROD 
(AGDDISEXP). The evidence is in support of the hypothesis showing that male 
interlocked director is the main channel through which aggressive earnings 
management spreads across firms.  
The results of examining the impact of age of the interlocked directors on the 
contagion effect are reported in Table T4.5. In the regression with AGDAC as the 
dependent variable, ILW_AGDAC is interacted with ILW_AGDAC_AGE (which 
captures the age of the interlocked director). The interaction term is statistically 
significant (0.0095, significant at 5% level) suggesting the older the interlocked 
director, the stronger the spread of aggressive accruals earnings management. 
Similar evidence is observed for the contagion of aggressive manipulation of 
production activities and discretionary expenses, but not for sales manipulation. The 
evidence, therefore, suggests that the older the interlocked directors are, the stronger 
the spread of aggressive earnings management. 
Table T4.6 reports the results of the examination of the effect of the interlocked 
directors’ nationality on the contagion effect. In the regression where AGDAC 
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(AGDPROD, AGDDISEXP) is the dependent variable, the coefficient on 
ILW_AGDAC_BRIT (ILW_AGDPROD_BRIT, ILW_AGDDISEXP_BRIT) is 0.5861 
(0.5124, 0.5413), all are significant at 5% level. Meanwhile, the corresponding 
coefficients on ILW_AGDAC_NONBRIT, ILW_AGDPROD_NONBRIT, and 
ILW_AGDDISEXP_NONBRIT are all statistically insignificant. Therefore, hypothesis 
that in the UK context being British makes an interlocked director more able to spread 
aggressive earnings management behaviour could not be rejected. 
Next, the chapter tests whether interlocked directors who hold financial-
reporting-related positions would have an impact on the contagion effect and the 
results are reported in Table T4.7 and T4.8. In Table T4.7, it could be observed that 
the coefficients on the indicator of interlock with an aggressive firm manipulating 
accruals (production activities and discretionary expenses) via a director charged with 
financial-reporting-related responsibilities at the exposed firm, i.e. 
ILWAGDAC_FINEX (ILWAGDPROD_FINEX, ILWAGDDISEXP_FINEX) are 
significantly positive while the coefficients on the indicator of interlock with an 
aggressive firm via a director not charged with financial-reporting-related 
responsibilities at the exposed firm are all statistically insignificant. Similar evidence 
could be observed if the interlocked directors assume financial-reporting-related 
positions at the contagious firms as reported in Table T4.8. Overall, the evidence 
suggests that the contagion effect is mainly driven by directors who are charged with 
financial-reporting-related responsibilities. 
In general, the evidence strongly suggests the existence of the contagion effect 
with respect to aggressive earnings management behaviour across the network of 
board directors. The contagion effect is stronger when the interlocked directors are 
male, older, British, or charged with duties which could influence financial reporting 
practices. Hence, based on the reported results, both hypotheses H1 and H2 could 
not be rejected. 
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Y=AGDAC   Y=AGDCF   Y=AGDPROD   Y=AGDDISEXP 
Coefficient Chi-square   Coefficient Chi-square   Coefficient Chi-square   Coefficient Chi-square 
(1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10) 
INTERCEPT +/- -3.1113 440.893***   -2.9892 582.284***   -2.4934 567.096***   -2.56 583.793*** 
ILW_Yi,t + 0.5329 5.388**  0.1127 0.177  0.387 2.748*   0.4633 4.43** 
aBOLINKi,t +/ - 0.0299 0.151  0.0442 0.273  -0.1288 2.707*   -0.1812 5.406** 
aBOSIZEi,t - -0.0257 0.237  -0.1014 3.139*   0.0319 0.461  -0.0257 0.28 
aBOINDi,t - -0.6156 0.993  -0.6328 0.913  -1.2513 4.291**  -0.2017 0.113 
aAUCOMSIZEi,t - -0.0143 0.028  0.0278 0.099  -0.018 0.056  -0.0763 1.046 
aAUCOMINDi,t - -0.259 0.248  -0.2197 0.147  0.1738 0.103  0.4271 0.541 
DUALITYi,t + 0.2707 1.11  0.1434 0.229  0.241 0.794  0.0259 0.008 
aTOTCOMPENi,t + 0.0002 0.096  -0.0005 0.454  -0.0006 0.561  0.0016 4.137** 
aLn(MVE)i,t-1 +/ - -0.1855 9.09***  -0.0757 1.422  0.0646 1.39  0.056 1.058 
aMTBi,t-1 +/ - 0.001 0.007  0.0353 9.382***  -0.0032 0.074  -0.0366 7.828*** 
aROAi,t +/ - 3.039 45.572***  -2.8144 38.588***  -0.2626 0.38  2.2268 22.61*** 
aDEBTi,t-1 +/ - -1.2495 4.194**  -0.8519 1.846  -0.998 3.055*   0.7888 2.343 
aNOAi,t-1 - -1.1384 14.301***          
aRDi,t +/ - -0.0041 0.036  0.0365 2.554  -0.0052 0.064  -0.0982 33.555*** 
aCAPi,t +/ - -0.048 0.029  -0.2712 0.742  -0.706 5.588**  -0.5772 4.049** 
aBOOKTAXi,t +/ - 0.0043 0.373  -0.0134 4.37**  0.0008 0.016  0.0005 0.005 
ESEOi,t + 0.7099 17.474***  0.4907 7.412***  0.1168 0.445  0.3001 2.969*  
EAUDITi,t + 0.6653 14.888***          
EMAi,t + -0.0982 0.096  0.0985 0.086  0.2943 0.979  0.0096 0.001 
EDISTRESSi,t + 0.5423 5.352**   1.0388 23.96***   0.7253 11.207***   0.7094 9.278*** 
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients together with the chi-square statistics of the following logistic regressions: ܮ݋݃݅ݐ(ܻ) = ߙ + ߚଵܫܮܹ_ܻ + 	?ߚ௞ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௞ +ߝ; where Y is replaced by AGDAC (columns 3 and 4), AGDCF (columns 5 and 6), AGDPROD (columns 7 and 8), AGDDISEXP (columns 9 and 10); Controlk include the variables 
described in Section 4.5.3. Column (2) exhibits the expected sign of the explanatory variables (where the sign “+/-“  indicates the existing literature is not conclusive regarding 




Table T4.4. Aggressive earnings management and gender of interlocked directors 
  Y=AGDAC   Y=AGDCF   Y=AGDPROD   Y=AGDDISEXP 
  Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square 
Intercept -3.1088 440.402***  -3.0083 577.864***  -2.4955 566.706***  -2.5586 583.716*** 
ILW_Y_MALEi,t 0.5844 5.885**  0.2863 1.073  0.4598 3.418*   0.5745 5.846** 
ILW_Y_FEMALEi,t 0.1443 0.048  -1.3686 2.295  -0.0350 0.003  0.0039 0 
aBOLINKi,t 0.0237 0.093  0.0258 0.089  -0.1379 3.003*   -0.1876 5.741** 
aBOSIZEi,t -0.0266 0.255  -0.1047 3.335*   0.0318 0.459  -0.0285 0.344 
aBOINDi,t -0.6093 0.971  -0.6907 1.082  -1.2616 4.358**  -0.1983 0.109 
aAUCOMSIZEi,t -0.0070 0.007  0.0314 0.125  -0.0150 0.039  -0.0772 1.067 
aAUCOMINDi,t -0.2528 0.236  -0.1645 0.082  0.1880 0.12  0.4361 0.564 
DUALITYi,t 0.2675 1.083  0.1330 0.196  0.2397 0.785  0.0165 0.003 
aTOTCOMPENi,t 0.0002 0.077  -0.0006 0.703  -0.0006 0.618  0.0016 4.121** 
aLn(MVE)i,t-1 -0.1866 9.176***  -0.0739 1.349  0.0654 1.418  0.0574 1.11 
aMTBi,t-1 0.0009 0.006  0.0353 9.211***  -0.0033 0.08  -0.0368 7.958*** 
aROAi,t 3.0431 45.634***  -2.8738 39.83***  -0.2698 0.4  2.2201 22.41*** 
aDEBTi,t-1 -1.2694 4.309**  -0.9287 2.174  -0.9931 3.019*   0.7935 2.377 
aNOAi,t-1 -1.1429 14.411***          
aRDi,t -0.0042 0.037  0.0365 2.576  -0.0053 0.066  -0.0988 33.958*** 
aCAPi,t -0.0365 0.017  -0.2357 0.558  -0.6958 5.414**  -0.5650 3.881** 
aBOOKTAXi,t 0.0047 0.434  -0.0136 4.492**  0.0010 0.023  0.0005 0.004 
ESEOi,t 0.7133 17.609***  0.5037 7.786***  0.1188 0.459  0.2951 2.867*  
EAUDITi,t 0.6610 14.671***          
EMAi,t -0.1023 0.104  0.1140 0.116  0.2930 0.969  0.0090 0.001 
EDISTRESSi,t 0.5379 5.259**   1.0417 24.134***   0.7258 11.234***   0.7008 9.048*** 
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients together with the chi-square statistics of the following logistic regressions: ܮ݋݃݅ݐ(ܻ) = ߙ + ߚଵܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܯܣܮܧ +ߚଶܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܨܧܯܣܮܧ + 	?ߚ௞ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௞ + ߝ; where Y is replaced by AGDAC (columns 2 and 3), AGDCF (columns 4 and 5), AGDPROD (columns 6 and 7), AGDDISEXP (columns 8 
and 9); Controlk include the variables described in Section 4.5.3. Definitions of variables are in Section 4.9. * , ** , *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table T4.5. Aggressive earnings management and age of interlocked directors 
  Y=AGDAC   Y=AGDCF   Y=AGDPROD   Y=AGDDISEXP 
  Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square 
Intercept -3.1056 443.004***  -3.0004 580.456***  -2.4968 574.213***  -2.5729 589.261*** 
ILW_Yi,t*ILW_Y_AGEi,t 0.0095 5.485**  0.0036 0.589  0.0077 3.544*   0.0102 7.072*** 
aBOLINKi,t 0.0276 0.127  0.0350 0.167  -0.1379 3.011*   -0.1940 6.076** 
aBOSIZEi,t -0.0257 0.239  -0.1017 3.155*   0.0320 0.464  -0.0252 0.27 
aBOINDi,t -0.6119 0.98  -0.6511 0.964  -1.2595 4.344**  -0.1980 0.109 
aAUCOMSIZEi,t -0.0042 0.003  0.0276 0.097  -0.0151 0.04  -0.0767 1.05 
aAUCOMINDi,t -0.2397 0.212  -0.2124 0.138  0.1885 0.121  0.4344 0.559 
DUALITYi,t 0.2711 1.114  0.1430 0.227  0.2397 0.785  0.0337 0.013 
aTOTCOMPENi,t 0.0002 0.068  -0.0005 0.484  -0.0006 0.616  0.0016 4.182** 
aLn(MVE)i,t-1 -0.1876 9.285***  -0.0760 1.434  0.0645 1.383  0.0556 1.041 
aMTBi,t-1 0.0009 0.007  0.0354 9.377***  -0.0034 0.084  -0.0368 7.964*** 
aROAi,t 3.0372 45.44***  -2.8167 38.762***  -0.2651 0.388  2.2459 22.927*** 
aDEBTi,t-1 -1.2890 4.446**  -0.8412 1.808  -0.9937 3.025*   0.7967 2.397 
aNOAi,t-1 -1.1429 14.417***          
aRDi,t -0.0041 0.035  0.0368 2.599  -0.0049 0.058  -0.0978 33.285*** 
aCAPi,t -0.0362 0.016  -0.2708 0.742  -0.6978 5.465**  -0.5762 4.032** 
aBOOKTAXi,t 0.0050 0.489  -0.0135 4.444**  0.0010 0.022  0.0005 0.004 
ESEOi,t 0.7166 17.787***  0.4918 7.449***  0.1187 0.459  0.3008 2.98*  
EAUDITi,t 0.6626 14.747***          
EMAi,t -0.1024 0.104  0.0962 0.082  0.2937 0.974  0.0131 0.002 
EDISTRESSi,t 0.5371 5.25**   1.0407 24.055***   0.7264 11.266***   0.7150 9.435*** 
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients together with the chi-square statistics of the following logistic regressions: ܮ݋݃݅ݐ(ܻ) = ߙ + ߚଵ(ܫܮܹ_ܻ × ܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܣܩܧ) +	?ߚ௞ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௞ + ߝ; where Y is replaced by AGDAC (columns 2 and 3), AGDCF (columns 4 and 5), AGDPROD (columns 6 and 7), AGDDISEXP (columns 8 and 9); Controlk include 
the variables described in Section 4.5.3. Definitions of variables are in Section 4.9. * , * * , *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table T4.6. Aggressive earnings management and nationality of interlocked directors 
  Y=AGDAC   Y=AGDCF   Y=AGDPROD   Y=AGDDISEXP 
  Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square 
Intercept -3.1094 440.508***  -3.0061 578.522***  -2.4966 566.763***  -2.5592 583.65*** 
ILW_Y_BRITi,t 0.5861 5.567**  0.3538 1.616  0.5124 4.242**  0.5413 5.531** 
ILW_Y_NONBRITi,t 0.2970 0.339  -1.5371 3.131*   -0.2617 0.18  -0.0850 0.018 
aBOLINKi,t 0.0253 0.106  0.0259 0.09  -0.1398 3.107*   -0.1850 5.605** 
aBOSIZEi,t -0.0256 0.235  -0.1067 3.464*   0.0339 0.52  -0.0262 0.292 
aBOINDi,t -0.6017 0.946  -0.7112 1.146  -1.2697 4.409**  -0.2006 0.112 
aAUCOMSIZEi,t -0.0121 0.02  0.0345 0.151  -0.0160 0.045  -0.0771 1.064 
aAUCOMINDi,t -0.2647 0.258  -0.1629 0.081  0.1954 0.129  0.4329 0.556 
DUALITYi,t 0.2707 1.109  0.1263 0.177  0.2370 0.768  0.0214 0.005 
aTOTCOMPENi,t 0.0002 0.089  -0.0006 0.761  -0.0006 0.657  0.0016 4.16** 
aLn(MVE)i,t-1 -0.1849 9.016***  -0.0742 1.36  0.0637 1.345  0.0563 1.069 
aMTBi,t-1 0.0010 0.008  0.0353 9.202***  -0.0030 0.063  -0.0369 7.908*** 
aROAi,t 3.0477 45.694***  -2.8841 40.163***  -0.2824 0.437  2.2328 22.666*** 
aDEBTi,t-1 -1.2616 4.262**  -0.9570 2.288  -1.0050 3.082*   0.8325 2.593 
aNOAi,t-1 -1.1431 14.399***          
aRDi,t -0.0042 0.037  0.0371 2.67  -0.0054 0.07  -0.0976 33.079*** 
aCAPi,t -0.0363 0.016  -0.1811 0.322  -0.6810 5.182**  -0.5692 3.932** 
aBOOKTAXi,t 0.0045 0.401  -0.0137 4.6**  0.0011 0.026  0.0006 0.006 
ESEOi,t 0.7102 17.483***  0.5046 7.807***  0.1208 0.475  0.2991 2.95*  
EAUDITi,t 0.6632 14.785***          
EMAi,t -0.1041 0.107  0.1055 0.099  0.2952 0.983  0.0116 0.001 
EDISTRESSi,t 0.5416 5.332**   1.0358 23.871***   0.7238 11.178***   0.7074 9.234*** 
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients together with the chi-square statistics of the following logistic regressions: ܮ݋݃݅ݐ(ܻ) = ߙ + ߚଵܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܤܴܫܶ +ߚଶܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܰ ܱܰܤܴܫܶ + 	?ߚ௞ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௞ + ߝ; where Y is replaced by AGDAC (columns 2 and 3), AGDCF (columns 4 and 5), AGDPROD (columns 6 and 7), AGDDISEXP (columns 
8 and 9); Controlk include the variables described in Section 4.5.3. Definitions of variables are in Section 4.9. * , * * , *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table T4.7. Aggressive earnings management and positions of interlocked directors at the exposed firms 
  Y=AGDAC   Y=AGDCF   Y=AGDPROD   Y=AGDDISEXP 
  Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square 
Intercept -3.1108 439.862***  -2.9896 582.228***  -2.4934 567.04***  -2.5599 583.81*** 
ILW_Y_FINEXi,t 0.5378 5.024**  0.2148 0.601  0.3694 2.277  0.4534 3.792*  
ILW_Y_NOFINEXi,t 0.4917 0.6  -0.7159 0.759  0.5365 0.713  0.5311 0.927 
aBOLINKi,t 0.0295 0.146  0.0450 0.283  -0.1282 2.682  -0.1809 5.384** 
aBOSIZEi,t -0.0255 0.233  -0.1012 3.124*   0.0318 0.458  -0.0258 0.282 
aBOINDi,t -0.6126 0.978  -0.6245 0.887  -1.2486 4.271**  -0.2049 0.117 
aAUCOMSIZEi,t -0.0144 0.029  0.0216 0.059  -0.0175 0.053  -0.0760 1.036 
aAUCOMINDi,t -0.2600 0.25  -0.2273 0.158  0.1725 0.101  0.4274 0.542 
DUALITYi,t 0.2717 1.114  0.1399 0.218  0.2420 0.8  0.0259 0.008 
aTOTCOMPENi,t 0.0002 0.096  -0.0005 0.541  -0.0006 0.562  0.0016 4.136** 
aLn(MVE)i,t-1 -0.1855 9.092***  -0.0699 1.205  0.0642 1.373  0.0560 1.057 
aMTBi,t-1 0.0010 0.007  0.0354 9.383***  -0.0031 0.069  -0.0366 7.822*** 
aROAi,t 3.0393 45.571***  -2.8469 39.11***  -0.2618 0.378  2.2275 22.622*** 
aDEBTi,t-1 -1.2494 4.193**  -0.8857 1.986  -0.9981 3.056*   0.7908 2.353 
aNOAi,t-1 -1.1381 14.291***          
aRDi,t -0.0041 0.036  0.0392 2.868*   -0.0052 0.064  -0.0983 33.556*** 
aCAPi,t -0.0475 0.028  -0.2755 0.764  -0.7078 5.616**  -0.5775 4.054** 
aBOOKTAXi,t 0.0044 0.374  -0.0136 4.49**  0.0008 0.016  0.0005 0.004 
ESEOi,t 0.7097 17.461***  0.4934 7.471***  0.1164 0.441  0.2989 2.938*  
EAUDITi,t 0.6647 14.827***          
EMAi,t -0.0979 0.095  0.1035 0.096  0.2937 0.975  0.0100 0.001 
EDISTRESSi,t 0.5422 5.348**   1.0329 23.637***   0.7260 11.225***   0.7099 9.288*** 
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients together with the chi-square statistics of the following logistic regressions: ܮ݋݃݅ݐ(ܻ) = ߙ + ߚଵܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܨܫܰܧܺ +ߚଶܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܰ ܱܨܫܰܧܺ + 	?ߚ௞ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௞ + ߝ; where Y is replaced by AGDAC (columns 2 and 3), AGDCF (columns 4 and 5), AGDPROD (columns 6 and 7), AGDDISEXP (columns 
8 and 9); Controlk include the variables described in Section 4.5.3. Definitions of variables are in Section 4.9. * , * * , *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table T4.8. Aggressive earnings management and positions of interlocked directors at the contagious firms 
  Y=AGDAC   Y=AGDCF   Y=AGDPROD   Y=AGDDISEXP 
  Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square 
Intercept -3.1127 440.109***  -2.9894 582.136***  -2.4939 566.859***  -2.5661 582.512*** 
ILW_Y_FINCOi,t 0.5160 4.569**  0.0846 0.092  0.4084 2.819*   0.6142 7.068*** 
ILW_Y_NOFINCOi,t 0.6580 1.292  0.4144 0.269  0.1774 0.055  -0.6424 0.728 
aBOLINKi,t 0.0293 0.144  0.0442 0.273  -0.1307 2.764*   -0.1986 6.292** 
aBOSIZEi,t -0.0250 0.223  -0.1018 3.163*   0.0322 0.469  -0.0259 0.286 
aBOINDi,t -0.6159 0.994  -0.6391 0.93  -1.2525 4.297**  -0.1658 0.076 
aAUCOMSIZEi,t -0.0134 0.025  0.0287 0.105  -0.0179 0.056  -0.0714 0.923 
aAUCOMINDi,t -0.2603 0.25  -0.2107 0.135  0.1723 0.101  0.4242 0.531 
DUALITYi,t 0.2708 1.111  0.1408 0.221  0.2420 0.801  0.0251 0.007 
aTOTCOMPENi,t 0.0002 0.096  -0.0005 0.425  -0.0006 0.562  0.0016 4.085** 
aLn(MVE)i,t-1 -0.1856 9.097***  -0.0754 1.413  0.0635 1.337  0.0504 0.851 
aMTBi,t-1 0.0009 0.007  0.0354 9.426***  -0.0032 0.073  -0.0374 8.04*** 
aROAi,t 3.0331 45.306***  -2.8208 38.697***  -0.2526 0.349  2.3017 23.812*** 
aDEBTi,t-1 -1.2481 4.183**  -0.8549 1.86  -0.9809 2.919*   0.8786 2.875*  
aNOAi,t-1 -1.1429 14.364***          
aRDi,t -0.0042 0.037  0.0363 2.52  -0.0051 0.061  -0.0971 32.756*** 
aCAPi,t -0.0450 0.025  -0.2730 0.75  -0.7052 5.574**  -0.5961 4.304** 
aBOOKTAXi,t 0.0044 0.375  -0.0134 4.39**  0.0009 0.017  0.0007 0.008 
ESEOi,t 0.7091 17.42***  0.4907 7.413***  0.1191 0.462  0.3050 3.073*  
EAUDITi,t 0.6687 14.923***          
EMAi,t -0.0960 0.092  0.1005 0.09  0.2954 0.986  -0.0038 0 
EDISTRESSi,t 0.5406 5.314**   1.0372 23.868***   0.7253 11.21***   0.7084 9.256*** 
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients together with the chi-square statistics of the following logistic regressions: ܮ݋݃݅ݐ(ܻ) = ߙ + ߚଵܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܨܫܰܥܱ +ߚଶܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܰ ܱܨܫܰܥܱ + 	?ߚ௞ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௞ + ߝ; where Y is replaced by AGDAC (columns 2 and 3), AGDCF (columns 4 and 5), AGDPROD (columns 6 and 7), AGDDISEXP (columns 
8 and 9); Controlk include the variables described in Section 4.5.3. Definitions of variables are in Section 4.9. * , * *, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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4.7. ADDITIONAL TESTS 
4.7.1. An alternative explanation: Aggressive firms would target the same 
pool of directors 
An aggressive firm might purposely appoint directors with reputation of being 
aggressive in financial reporting, or those who do not have the capability and 
expertise to detect earnings management (or those who do not even care to speak 
up if they discover earnings management). Hence the exposed firm might employ 
aggressive directors from the same pool of people as does the contagious firm, 
leading to the two sharing an interlock director rather than because the interlocked 
director bringing aggressive reporting practices from one firm to the other. This 
endogenous matching is difficult to be directly controlled for because of the lack of a 
theoretical model and data to capture the tendency of board directors to be 
aggressive or to tolerate aggressiveness (Chiu et al., 2013). Instead, the endogenous 
matching is indirectly controlled for by introducing two indicators as follows. 
The first indicator, ILW_Y_NEW, is a dummy which is one if a firm has an 
interlock with a contagious firm during the contagious period and the interlocked 
director is within the first year of his/her directorship at the exposed firm, zero 
otherwise. Equation (E4.2), (E4.3), (E4.4), (E4.5), (E4.6) and (E4.7) are then re-
estimated with ILW_Y_NEW being added to the right hand side. If an exposed firm is 
an aggressive firm and only employs the director for his or her aggressive reputation, 
ILW_Y_NEW would be positive and statistically significant. If ILW_Y_NEW is 
insignificant when added into the regressions besides ILW_Y, and ILW_Y remains 
positive and statistically significant, it is evidence that endogenous matching has little 
incremental effect on board contagion effect. The results as reported in Table T4.9, 
T4.10, T4.11, T4.12, T4.13 and T4.14 tend to support the contagion effect over the 
endogenous director appointment matching as an alternative explanation. 
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Table T4.9. Aggressive earnings management and interlocked directors – Controlling for directors who are in the first year of service 
  Y=AGDAC   Y=AGDCF   Y=AGDPROD   Y=AGDDISEXP 
  Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square 
Intercept -3.1115 440.793***  -2.9890 581.667***  -2.4920 566.329***  -2.5617 583.393*** 
ILW_Yi,t 0.5289 4.934**  0.1165 0.156  0.4945 4.171**  0.5229 5.08** 
ILW_Y_NEWi,t 0.0419 0.004  -0.0177 0.001  -0.9293 1.481  -0.4156 0.512 
aBOLINKi,t 0.0297 0.148  0.0444 0.274  -0.1284 2.688  -0.1789 5.258** 
aBOSIZEi,t -0.0256 0.236  -0.1014 3.14*   0.0322 0.468  -0.0246 0.258 
aBOINDi,t -0.6185 0.997  -0.6322 0.91  -1.2511 4.285**  -0.1946 0.106 
aAUCOMSIZEi,t -0.0142 0.028  0.0277 0.098  -0.0187 0.061  -0.0763 1.043 
aAUCOMINDi,t -0.2581 0.246  -0.2199 0.148  0.1862 0.118  0.4319 0.554 
DUALITYi,t 0.2707 1.11  0.1434 0.229  0.2332 0.743  0.0317 0.012 
aTOTCOMPENi,t 0.0002 0.096  -0.0005 0.455  -0.0006 0.556  0.0016 4.138** 
aLn(MVE)i,t-1 -0.1855 9.087***  -0.0757 1.422  0.0644 1.381  0.0550 1.017 
aMTBi,t-1 0.0010 0.007  0.0353 9.383***  -0.0037 0.1  -0.0370 7.964*** 
aROAi,t 3.0405 45.485***  -2.8147 38.569***  -0.2581 0.368  2.2280 22.675*** 
aDEBTi,t-1 -1.2501 4.196**  -0.8518 1.846  -1.0045 3.08*   0.7749 2.252 
aNOAi,t-1 -1.1390 14.3***          
aRDi,t -0.0041 0.035  0.0365 2.555  -0.0044 0.046  -0.0986 33.681*** 
aCAPi,t -0.0483 0.029  -0.2716 0.742  -0.7175 5.73**  -0.5806 4.096** 
aBOOKTAXi,t 0.0043 0.373  -0.0134 4.37**  0.0007 0.01  0.0004 0.003 
ESEOi,t 0.7103 17.47***  0.4905 7.398***  0.1155 0.434  0.3026 3.016*  
EAUDITi,t 0.6651 14.873***          
EMAi,t -0.0994 0.098  0.0987 0.086  0.2931 0.969  0.0184 0.003 
EDISTRESSi,t 0.5428 5.357**   1.0384 23.885***   0.7229 11.102***   0.7100 9.289*** 
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients together with the chi-square statistics of the following logistic regressions: ܮ݋݃݅ݐ(ܻ) = ߙ + ߚଵܫܮܹ_ܻ +ߚଶܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܰ ܧܹ + 	?ߚ௞ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௞ + ߝ; where Y is replaced by AGDAC (columns 2 and 3), AGDCF (columns 4 and 5), AGDPROD (columns 6 and 7), AGDDISEXP (columns 8 and 




Table T4.10. Aggressive earnings management and gender of interlocked directors – Controlling for directors who are in the first year 
of service 
  Y=AGDAC   Y=AGDCF   Y=AGDPROD   Y=AGDDISEXP 
  Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square 
Intercept -3.1087 440.166***  -3.0075 577.795***  -2.4945 565.861***  -2.5604 583.309*** 
ILW_Y_MALEi,t 0.5856 5.429**  0.3360 1.209  0.5880 5.154**  0.6468 6.669*** 
ILW_Y_FEMALEi,t 0.1442 0.048  -1.3690 2.297  0.0025 0  0.0455 0.008 
ILW_Y_NEWi,t -0.0110 0  -0.2138 0.131  -0.9889 1.665  -0.4636 0.633 
aBOLINKi,t 0.0238 0.093  0.0274 0.101  -0.1395 3.059*   -0.1854 5.598** 
aBOSIZEi,t -0.0267 0.255  -0.1055 3.375*   0.0321 0.465  -0.0274 0.318 
aBOINDi,t -0.6085 0.963  -0.6848 1.061  -1.2636 4.365**  -0.1912 0.102 
aAUCOMSIZEi,t -0.0070 0.007  0.0305 0.117  -0.0152 0.04  -0.0771 1.062 
aAUCOMINDi,t -0.2530 0.236  -0.1648 0.082  0.2045 0.142  0.4426 0.581 
DUALITYi,t 0.2675 1.083  0.1329 0.196  0.2310 0.729  0.0231 0.006 
aTOTCOMPENi,t 0.0002 0.077  -0.0006 0.72  -0.0006 0.625  0.0016 4.114** 
aLn(MVE)i,t-1 -0.1866 9.177***  -0.0735 1.337  0.0653 1.416  0.0562 1.063 
aMTBi,t-1 0.0009 0.006  0.0353 9.221***  -0.0040 0.112  -0.0373 8.126*** 
aROAi,t 3.0427 45.495***  -2.8799 39.925***  -0.2658 0.388  2.2211 22.476*** 
aDEBTi,t-1 -1.2693 4.308**  -0.9302 2.181  -1.0005 3.045*   0.7792 2.283 
aNOAi,t-1 -1.1428 14.397***          
aRDi,t -0.0042 0.037  0.0368 2.607  -0.0044 0.046  -0.0992 34.11*** 
aCAPi,t -0.0364 0.017  -0.2399 0.576  -0.7049 5.515**  -0.5672 3.91** 
aBOOKTAXi,t 0.0047 0.434  -0.0137 4.545**  0.0009 0.017  0.0004 0.003 
ESEOi,t 0.7132 17.584***  0.5020 7.726***  0.1177 0.449  0.2974 2.909*  
EAUDITi,t 0.6611 14.67***          
EMAi,t -0.1020 0.103  0.1173 0.122  0.2920 0.96  0.0182 0.003 
EDISTRESSi,t 0.5377 5.251**   1.0379 23.892***   0.7238 11.139***   0.7014 9.056*** 
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients together with the chi-square statistics of the following logistic regressions: ܮ݋݃݅ݐ(ܻ) = ߙ + ߚଵܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܯܣܮܧ +ߚଶܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܨܧܯܣܮܧ + ߚଷܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܰ ܧܹ + 	?ߚ௞ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௞ + ߝ; where Y is replaced by AGDAC (columns 2 and 3), AGDCF (columns 4 and 5), AGDPROD (columns 6 and 7), 
AGDDISEXP (columns 8 and 9); Controlk include the variables described in Section 4.5.3. Definitions of variables are in Section 4.9. * , * *, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 
1% levels, respectively. 
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Table T4.11. Aggressive earnings management and age of interlocked directors – Controlling for directors who are in the first year of 
service 
  Y=AGDAC   Y=AGDCF   Y=AGDPROD   Y=AGDDISEXP 
  Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square 
Intercept -3.1059 442.767***  -2.9999 580.281***  -2.4944 573.124***  -2.5737 589.229*** 
ILW_Yi,t*ILW_Y_AGEi,t 0.0094 5.032**  0.0041 0.614  0.0098 5.254**  0.0114 8.053*** 
ILW_Y_NEWi,t 0.0483 0.005  -0.1199 0.042  -0.9791 1.643  -0.4903 0.724 
aBOLINKi,t 0.0273 0.124  0.0359 0.175  -0.1392 3.054*   -0.1913 5.898** 
aBOSIZEi,t -0.0257 0.237  -0.1021 3.175*   0.0322 0.469  -0.0241 0.247 
aBOINDi,t -0.6151 0.985  -0.6479 0.953  -1.2617 4.353**  -0.1888 0.099 
aAUCOMSIZEi,t -0.0043 0.003  0.0271 0.093  -0.0150 0.039  -0.0765 1.042 
aAUCOMINDi,t -0.2389 0.211  -0.2128 0.138  0.2084 0.148  0.4431 0.581 
DUALITYi,t 0.2712 1.114  0.1430 0.227  0.2308 0.727  0.0397 0.018 
aTOTCOMPENi,t 0.0002 0.067  -0.0005 0.492  -0.0006 0.626  0.0016 4.181** 
aLn(MVE)i,t-1 -0.1875 9.279***  -0.0758 1.427  0.0643 1.375  0.0543 0.994 
aMTBi,t-1 0.0009 0.007  0.0354 9.383***  -0.0041 0.119  -0.0373 8.154*** 
aROAi,t 3.0390 45.364***  -2.8204 38.794***  -0.2635 0.383  2.2454 22.964*** 
aDEBTi,t-1 -1.2894 4.448**  -0.8414 1.809  -0.9964 3.024*   0.7832 2.307 
aNOAi,t-1 -1.1435 14.42***          
aRDi,t -0.0040 0.033  0.0369 2.621  -0.0040 0.038  -0.0982 33.412*** 
aCAPi,t -0.0367 0.017  -0.2732 0.753  -0.7069 5.566**  -0.5788 4.069** 
aBOOKTAXi,t 0.0050 0.488  -0.0135 4.469**  0.0008 0.017  0.0004 0.003 
ESEOi,t 0.7170 17.789***  0.4907 7.41***  0.1176 0.448  0.3037 3.035*  
EAUDITi,t 0.6624 14.733***          
EMAi,t -0.1038 0.107  0.0981 0.086  0.2919 0.959  0.0245 0.006 
EDISTRESSi,t 0.5376 5.256**   1.0385 23.894***   0.7233 11.141***   0.7149 9.425*** 
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients together with the chi-square statistics of the following logistic regressions: ܮ݋݃݅ݐ(ܻ) = ߙ + ߚଵ(ܫܮܹ_ܻ × ܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܣܩܧ) +ߚଶܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܰ ܧܹ + 	?ߚ௞ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௞ + ߝ; where Y is replaced by AGDAC (columns 2 and 3), AGDCF (columns 4 and 5), AGDPROD (columns 6 and 7), AGDDISEXP (columns 8 and 




Table T4.12. Aggressive earnings management and nationality of interlocked directors – Controlling for directors who are in the first 
year of service 
  Y=AGDAC   Y=AGDCF   Y=AGDPROD   Y=AGDDISEXP 
  Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square 
Intercept -3.1095 440.417***  -3.0055 578.452***  -2.4960 565.815***  -2.5613 583.18*** 
ILW_Y_BRITi,t 0.5827 5.148**  0.3928 1.646  0.6478 6.227**  0.6101 6.31** 
ILW_Y_NONBRITi,t 0.2942 0.329  -1.5283 3.079*   -0.2206 0.127  -0.0466 0.006 
ILW_Y_NEWi,t 0.0349 0.003  -0.1744 0.086  -1.0260 1.788  -0.4531 0.604 
aBOLINKi,t 0.0251 0.104  0.0273 0.1  -0.1421 3.189*   -0.1831 5.477** 
aBOSIZEi,t -0.0255 0.234  -0.1072 3.49*   0.0346 0.542  -0.0251 0.268 
aBOINDi,t -0.6042 0.948  -0.7072 1.131  -1.2733 4.425**  -0.1928 0.103 
aAUCOMSIZEi,t -0.0121 0.02  0.0336 0.143  -0.0161 0.045  -0.0769 1.058 
aAUCOMINDi,t -0.2640 0.257  -0.1641 0.082  0.2167 0.159  0.4399 0.574 
DUALITYi,t 0.2707 1.109  0.1263 0.177  0.2276 0.707  0.0279 0.009 
aTOTCOMPENi,t 0.0002 0.088  -0.0007 0.774  -0.0006 0.668  0.0016 4.16** 
aLn(MVE)i,t-1 -0.1849 9.014***  -0.0739 1.348  0.0630 1.316  0.0551 1.02 
aMTBi,t-1 0.0010 0.007  0.0353 9.216***  -0.0035 0.088  -0.0373 8.054*** 
aROAi,t 3.0489 45.606***  -2.8888 40.226***  -0.2802 0.43  2.2342 22.738*** 
aDEBTi,t-1 -1.2621 4.263**  -0.9590 2.297  -1.0162 3.128*   0.8191 2.499 
aNOAi,t-1 -1.1435 14.397***          
aRDi,t -0.0042 0.036  0.0373 2.699  -0.0045 0.049  -0.0979 33.206*** 
aCAPi,t -0.0366 0.017  -0.1844 0.333  -0.6901 5.276**  -0.5723 3.974** 
aBOOKTAXi,t 0.0045 0.401  -0.0138 4.646**  0.0009 0.019  0.0005 0.005 
ESEOi,t 0.7105 17.477***  0.5035 7.768***  0.1208 0.473  0.3022 3.009*  
EAUDITi,t 0.6630 14.771***          
EMAi,t -0.1051 0.109  0.1084 0.105  0.2947 0.977  0.0219 0.005 
EDISTRESSi,t 0.5420 5.336**   1.0328 23.674***   0.7205 11.042***   0.7079 9.241*** 
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients together with the chi-square statistics of the following logistic regressions: ܮ݋݃݅ݐ(ܻ) = ߙ + ߚଵܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܤܴܫܶ +ߚଶܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܰ ܱܰܤܴܫܶ + ߚଷܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܰ ܧܹ + 	?ߚ௞ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௞ + ߝ; where Y is replaced by AGDAC (columns 2 and 3), AGDCF (columns 4 and 5), AGDPROD (columns 6 and 7), 
AGDDISEXP (columns 8 and 9); Controlk include the variables described in Section 4.5.3. Definitions of variables are in Section 4.9. * , * *, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 
1% levels, respectively. 
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Table T4.13. Aggressive earnings management and positions of interlocked directors at the exposed firms – Controlling for directors 
who are in the first year of service 
  Y=AGDAC   Y=AGDCF   Y=AGDPROD   Y=AGDDISEXP 
  Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square 
Intercept -3.1110 439.769***  -2.9902 581.517***  -2.4920 566.296***  -2.5616 583.401*** 
ILW_Y_FINEXi,t 0.5338 4.634**  0.1979 0.436  0.4833 3.607*   0.5156 4.419** 
ILW_Y_NOFINEXi,t 0.4874 0.584  -0.7481 0.777  0.5820 0.833  0.5701 1.062 
ILW_Y_NEWi,t 0.0423 0.004  0.0884 0.023  -0.9226 1.454  -0.4129 0.505 
aBOLINKi,t 0.0293 0.144  0.0440 0.269  -0.1280 2.67  -0.1787 5.244** 
aBOSIZEi,t -0.0254 0.232  -0.1009 3.107*   0.0321 0.467  -0.0247 0.259 
aBOINDi,t -0.6155 0.982  -0.6264 0.892  -1.2493 4.27**  -0.1971 0.108 
aAUCOMSIZEi,t -0.0143 0.028  0.0219 0.06  -0.0185 0.059  -0.0761 1.036 
aAUCOMINDi,t -0.2591 0.248  -0.2265 0.157  0.1851 0.117  0.4323 0.554 
DUALITYi,t 0.2718 1.115  0.1395 0.216  0.2339 0.747  0.0318 0.012 
aTOTCOMPENi,t 0.0002 0.095  -0.0005 0.537  -0.0006 0.556  0.0016 4.137** 
aLn(MVE)i,t-1 -0.1855 9.088***  -0.0698 1.204  0.0641 1.369  0.0549 1.016 
aMTBi,t-1 0.0010 0.007  0.0354 9.383***  -0.0037 0.097  -0.0370 7.958*** 
aROAi,t 3.0409 45.484***  -2.8462 39.083***  -0.2577 0.366  2.2286 22.683*** 
aDEBTi,t-1 -1.2500 4.195**  -0.8876 1.994  -1.0051 3.083*   0.7764 2.258 
aNOAi,t-1 -1.1387 14.29***          
aRDi,t -0.0041 0.034  0.0392 2.863*   -0.0044 0.046  -0.0986 33.669*** 
aCAPi,t -0.0478 0.029  -0.2735 0.752  -0.7182 5.742**  -0.5808 4.099** 
aBOOKTAXi,t 0.0044 0.374  -0.0136 4.471**  0.0007 0.01  0.0004 0.003 
ESEOi,t 0.7101 17.456***  0.4946 7.492***  0.1152 0.431  0.3018 2.993*  
EAUDITi,t 0.6645 14.811***          
EMAi,t -0.0991 0.097  0.1022 0.093  0.2926 0.966  0.0185 0.003 
EDISTRESSi,t 0.5426 5.353**   1.0341 23.661***   0.7233 11.111***   0.7104 9.296*** 
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients together with the chi-square statistics of the following logistic regressions: ܮ݋݃݅ݐ(ܻ) = ߙ + ߚଵܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܨܫܰܧܺ +ߚଶܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܰ ܱܨܫܰܧܺ + ߚଷܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܰ ܧܹ + 	?ߚ௞ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௞ + ߝ; where Y is replaced by AGDAC (columns 2 and 3), AGDCF (columns 4 and 5), AGDPROD (columns 6 and 7), 
AGDDISEXP (columns 8 and 9); Controlk include the variables described in Section 4.5.3. Definitions of variables are in Section 4.9. * , * * , ***  indicate significance at 10%, 
5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table T4.14. Aggressive earnings management and positions of interlocked directors at the contagious firms – Controlling for directors 
who are in the first year of service 
  Y=AGDAC   Y=AGDCF   Y=AGDPROD   Y=AGDDISEXP 
  Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square 
Intercept -3.1128 440.04***  -2.9892 581.51***  -2.4927 566.021***  -2.5682 582.011*** 
ILW_Y_FINCOi,t 0.5137 4.296**  0.0895 0.087  0.5184 4.234**  0.6793 7.822*** 
ILW_Y_NOFINCOi,t 0.6532 1.224  0.4201 0.268  0.2649 0.122  -0.5871 0.606 
ILW_Y_NEWi,t 0.0272 0.002  -0.0234 0.002  -0.9343 1.495  -0.4422 0.58 
aBOLINKi,t 0.0291 0.143  0.0444 0.275  -0.1303 2.749*   -0.1959 6.116** 
aBOSIZEi,t -0.0249 0.223  -0.1019 3.164*   0.0326 0.48  -0.0245 0.257 
aBOINDi,t -0.6177 0.994  -0.6383 0.926  -1.2529 4.293**  -0.1574 0.069 
aAUCOMSIZEi,t -0.0134 0.025  0.0286 0.104  -0.0187 0.06  -0.0713 0.918 
aAUCOMINDi,t -0.2597 0.249  -0.2109 0.136  0.1845 0.116  0.4294 0.544 
DUALITYi,t 0.2708 1.111  0.1409 0.221  0.2343 0.75  0.0323 0.012 
aTOTCOMPENi,t 0.0002 0.096  -0.0005 0.425  -0.0006 0.557  0.0016 4.078** 
aLn(MVE)i,t-1 -0.1856 9.094***  -0.0754 1.411  0.0632 1.325  0.0492 0.81 
aMTBi,t-1 0.0009 0.007  0.0354 9.427***  -0.0037 0.1  -0.0378 8.18*** 
aROAi,t 3.0342 45.177***  -2.8213 38.678***  -0.2464 0.333  2.3044 23.914*** 
aDEBTi,t-1 -1.2485 4.184**  -0.8548 1.859  -0.9874 2.949*   0.8578 2.728*  
aNOAi,t-1 -1.1432 14.362***          
aRDi,t -0.0042 0.036  0.0363 2.522  -0.0043 0.043  -0.0974 32.891*** 
aCAPi,t -0.0452 0.026  -0.2735 0.752  -0.7169 5.719**  -0.6003 4.365** 
aBOOKTAXi,t 0.0044 0.375  -0.0134 4.392**  0.0007 0.011  0.0006 0.006 
ESEOi,t 0.7093 17.408***  0.4904 7.397***  0.1182 0.454  0.3081 3.133*  
EAUDITi,t 0.6685 14.904***          
EMAi,t -0.0968 0.093  0.1008 0.09  0.2946 0.979  0.0062 0 
EDISTRESSi,t 0.5409 5.315**   1.0368 23.793***   0.7231 11.109***   0.7093 9.276*** 
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients together with the chi-square statistics of the following logistic regressions: ܮ݋݃݅ݐ(ܻ) = ߙ + ߚଵܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܨܫܰܥܱ +ߚଶܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܰ ܱܨܫܰܥܱ + ߚଷܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܰ ܧܹ + 	?ߚ௞ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௞ + ߝ; where Y is replaced by AGDAC (columns 2 and 3), AGDCF (columns 4 and 5), AGDPROD (columns 6 and 7), 
AGDDISEXP (columns 8 and 9); Controlk include the variables described in Section 4.5.3. Definitions of variables are in Section 4.9. * , * *, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 
1% levels, respectively. 
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Secondly, the second indicator is designed to identify interlocked directors who 
are relatively new at the exposed firm. In particular, ILW_Y_NEW2 is created as a 
dummy which is one if a firm has an interlock with a contagious firm during the 
contagious period and the interlocked director is within two years into his/her 
directorship at the exposed firm, zero otherwise. Table T4.15, T4.16, T4.17, T4.18, 
T4.19 and T4.20 report the results of re-estimating Equation (E4.2), (E4.3), (E4.4), 
(E4.5), (E4.6) and (E4.7) with ILW_Y_NEW2 being added to the right hand side. 
Again, the results support the explanation that the observed evidence is more likely 
to be the spread of aggressive earnings management through board interlocks rather 
than deliberate appointments of aggressive directors by the exposed firms. 
4.7.2. Another alternative: Shared common characteristics 
The contagious and exposed firms might share some common characteristics 
which make them both aggressive and cause them to have a common director. The 
control variables introduced in the main regressions are able to capture the 
characteristics which might suggest a higher likelihood of the exposed firms being 
aggressive, but they fail to capture the common characteristics of the pair (i.e. the 
exposed and contagious firms). This section introduces a set of dummies which 
capture the common characteristics of the pair which might suggest aggressive 




Table T4.15. Aggressive earnings management and interlocked directors – Controlling for directors who are in the first two years of 
service 
  Y=AGDAC   Y=AGDCF   Y=AGDPROD   Y=AGDDISEXP 
  Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square 
Intercept -3.1066 439.893***  -2.9920 581.506***  -2.4917 566.805***  -2.5612 583.013*** 
ILW_Yi,t 0.3506 1.796  -0.1228 0.151  0.4618 3.665*   0.5343 5.417** 
ILW_Y_NEW2i,t 0.7948 3.066*   0.8685 2.758*   -0.7263 0.894  -0.5859 0.816 
aBOLINKi,t 0.0250 0.104  0.0392 0.212  -0.1274 2.655  -0.1785 5.256** 
aBOSIZEi,t -0.0233 0.194  -0.1018 3.165*   0.0315 0.448  -0.0235 0.236 
aBOINDi,t -0.6056 0.958  -0.6011 0.823  -1.2449 4.24**  -0.1954 0.106 
aAUCOMSIZEi,t -0.0131 0.024  0.0237 0.072  -0.0168 0.049  -0.0752 1.016 
aAUCOMINDi,t -0.2803 0.289  -0.2466 0.185  0.1812 0.111  0.4348 0.561 
DUALITYi,t 0.2834 1.216  0.1588 0.28  0.2357 0.759  0.0381 0.017 
aTOTCOMPENi,t 0.0002 0.095  -0.0005 0.509  -0.0005 0.539  0.0016 4.197** 
aLn(MVE)i,t-1 -0.1848 8.96***  -0.0715 1.264  0.0635 1.343  0.0535 0.961 
aMTBi,t-1 0.0015 0.017  0.0361 9.759***  -0.0034 0.083  -0.0361 7.542*** 
aROAi,t 3.0686 45.993***  -2.8318 38.927***  -0.2565 0.363  2.2178 22.434*** 
aDEBTi,t-1 -1.3039 4.519**  -0.8584 1.865  -0.9971 3.044*   0.7816 2.294 
aNOAi,t-1 -1.1037 13.293***          
aRDi,t -0.0032 0.021  0.0351 2.35  -0.0046 0.05  -0.0985 33.68*** 
aCAPi,t -0.0516 0.033  -0.2385 0.57  -0.7151 5.704**  -0.5797 4.084** 
aBOOKTAXi,t 0.0039 0.297  -0.0136 4.531**  0.0009 0.02  0.0005 0.004 
ESEOi,t 0.7102 17.439***  0.4895 7.34***  0.1152 0.433  0.2987 2.944*  
EAUDITi,t 0.6534 14.322***          
EMAi,t -0.0952 0.09  0.1209 0.13  0.2909 0.956  0.0267 0.007 
EDISTRESSi,t 0.5479 5.434**   1.0421 24.054***   0.7258 11.208***   0.7151 9.428*** 
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients together with the chi-square statistics of the following logistic regressions: ܮ݋݃݅ݐ(ܻ) = ߙ + ߚଵܫܮܹ_ܻ +ߚଷܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܰ ܧܹ2 + 	?ߚ௞ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௞ + ߝ; where Y is replaced by AGDAC (columns 2 and 3), AGDCF (columns 4 and 5), AGDPROD (columns 6 and 7), AGDDISEXP (columns 8 




Table T4.16. Aggressive earnings management and gender of interlocked directors – Controlling for directors who are in the first two 
years of service 
  Y=AGDAC   Y=AGDCF   Y=AGDPROD   Y=AGDDISEXP 
  Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square 
Intercept -3.1055 439.614***  -3.0095 577.201***  -2.4939 566.438***  -2.5597 582.937*** 
ILW_Y_MALEi,t 0.3858 1.896  0.0737 0.051  0.5533 4.593**  0.6540 6.985*** 
ILW_Y_FEMALEi,t 0.1536 0.055  -1.4296 2.571  -0.0190 0.001  0.0579 0.013 
ILW_Y_NEW2i,t 0.7608 2.689  0.7641 2.108  -0.7939 1.06  -0.6199 0.905 
aBOLINKi,t 0.0220 0.079  0.0236 0.074  -0.1379 3.008*   -0.1849 5.593** 
aBOSIZEi,t -0.0238 0.203  -0.1051 3.357*   0.0313 0.444  -0.0263 0.292 
aBOINDi,t -0.6027 0.948  -0.6516 0.962  -1.2560 4.311**  -0.1918 0.102 
aAUCOMSIZEi,t -0.0095 0.012  0.0270 0.092  -0.0132 0.03  -0.0763 1.04 
aAUCOMINDi,t -0.2765 0.281  -0.1943 0.114  0.1987 0.134  0.4460 0.589 
DUALITYi,t 0.2814 1.198  0.1468 0.238  0.2336 0.745  0.0292 0.01 
aTOTCOMPENi,t 0.0002 0.084  -0.0006 0.736  -0.0006 0.602  0.0016 4.184** 
aLn(MVE)i,t-1 -0.1853 9.004***  -0.0707 1.231  0.0643 1.371  0.0544 0.994 
aMTBi,t-1 0.0014 0.016  0.0359 9.523***  -0.0036 0.091  -0.0363 7.652*** 
aROAi,t 3.0696 46.008***  -2.8816 39.945***  -0.2644 0.384  2.2096 22.201*** 
aDEBTi,t-1 -1.3120 4.565**  -0.9329 2.183  -0.9916 3.002*   0.7884 2.34 
aNOAi,t-1 -1.1073 13.367***          
aRDi,t -0.0033 0.022  0.0351 2.362  -0.0047 0.051  -0.0992 34.138*** 
aCAPi,t -0.0457 0.026  -0.2111 0.446  -0.7038 5.51**  -0.5675 3.916** 
aBOOKTAXi,t 0.0041 0.326  -0.0138 4.622**  0.0012 0.031  0.0005 0.004 
ESEOi,t 0.7118 17.5***  0.5036 7.743***  0.1169 0.445  0.2927 2.82*  
EAUDITi,t 0.6518 14.233***          
EMAi,t -0.0975 0.094  0.1289 0.148  0.2892 0.943  0.0266 0.007 
EDISTRESSi,t 0.5455 5.384**   1.0430 24.136***   0.7266 11.245***   0.7067 9.203*** 
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients together with the chi-square statistics of the following logistic regressions: ܮ݋݃݅ݐ(ܻ) = ߙ + ߚଵܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܯܣܮܧ +ߚଶܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܨܧܯܣܮܧ + ߚସܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܰ ܧܹ2 + 	?ߚ௞ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௞ + ߝ; where Y is replaced by AGDAC (columns 2 and 3), AGDCF (columns 4 and 5), AGDPROD (columns 6 and 7), 
AGDDISEXP (columns 8 and 9); Controlk include the variables described in Section 4.5.3. Definitions of variables are in Section 4.9. * , * *, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 
1% levels, respectively. 
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Table T4.17. Aggressive earnings management and age of interlocked directors – Controlling for directors who are in the first two years 
of service 
  Y=AGDAC   Y=AGDCF   Y=AGDPROD   Y=AGDDISEXP 
  Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square 
Intercept -3.1034 442.317***  -3.0028 580.147***  -2.4943 573.602***  -2.5726 588.442*** 
ILW_Yi,t*ILW_Y_AGEi,t 0.0063 1.848  0.0002 0.001  0.0091 4.648**  0.0115 8.353*** 
ILW_Y_NEW2i,t 0.7930 3.06*   0.7546 2.172  -0.7697 1.005  -0.6383 0.987 
aBOLINKi,t 0.0234 0.09  0.0319 0.137  -0.1374 2.994*   -0.1908 5.893** 
aBOSIZEi,t -0.0233 0.194  -0.1014 3.14*   0.0314 0.447  -0.0231 0.226 
aBOINDi,t -0.6020 0.946  -0.6166 0.864  -1.2546 4.302**  -0.1910 0.101 
aAUCOMSIZEi,t -0.0069 0.007  0.0232 0.068  -0.0131 0.03  -0.0753 1.014 
aAUCOMINDi,t -0.2690 0.266  -0.2440 0.181  0.2014 0.138  0.4470 0.591 
DUALITYi,t 0.2838 1.219  0.1589 0.28  0.2336 0.745  0.0467 0.025 
aTOTCOMPENi,t 0.0002 0.074  -0.0005 0.508  -0.0006 0.601  0.0016 4.245** 
aLn(MVE)i,t-1 -0.1861 9.083***  -0.0728 1.311  0.0634 1.334  0.0528 0.937 
aMTBi,t-1 0.0014 0.016  0.0360 9.732***  -0.0037 0.097  -0.0363 7.658*** 
aROAi,t 3.0673 45.889***  -2.8230 38.802***  -0.2607 0.375  2.2334 22.671*** 
aDEBTi,t-1 -1.3304 4.697**  -0.8363 1.78  -0.9899 2.994*   0.7931 2.368 
aNOAi,t-1 -1.1064 13.351***          
aRDi,t -0.0032 0.021  0.0352 2.374  -0.0043 0.043  -0.0981 33.371*** 
aCAPi,t -0.0448 0.025  -0.2478 0.618  -0.7054 5.555**  -0.5774 4.05** 
aBOOKTAXi,t 0.0043 0.364  -0.0137 4.609**  0.0011 0.029  0.0005 0.004 
ESEOi,t 0.7143 17.628***  0.4889 7.328***  0.1173 0.448  0.2992 2.951*  
EAUDITi,t 0.6520 14.249***          
EMAi,t -0.0977 0.095  0.1120 0.112  0.2905 0.952  0.0338 0.011 
EDISTRESSi,t 0.5450 5.376**   1.0431 24.105***   0.7264 11.255***   0.7201 9.573*** 
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients together with the chi-square statistics of the following logistic regressions: ܮ݋݃݅ݐ(ܻ) = ߙ + ߚଵ(ܫܮܹ_ܻ × ܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܣܩܧ) +ߚଷܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܰ ܧܹ2 + 	?ߚ௞ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௞ + ߝ; where Y is replaced by AGDAC (columns 2 and 3), AGDCF (columns 4 and 5), AGDPROD (columns 6 and 7), AGDDISEXP (columns 8 




Table T4.18. Aggressive earnings management and nationality of interlocked directors – Controlling for directors who are in the first 
two years of service 
  Y=AGDAC   Y=AGDCF   Y=AGDPROD   Y=AGDDISEXP 
  Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square 
Intercept -3.1054 439.661***  -3.0058 578.354***  -2.4952 566.468***  -2.5606 582.813*** 
ILW_Y_BRITi,t 0.3980 2.005  0.1564 0.226  0.6082 5.552**  0.6235 6.718*** 
ILW_Y_NONBRITi,t 0.1562 0.089  -1.5737 3.34*   -0.2334 0.143  -0.0460 0.005 
ILW_Y_NEW2i,t 0.7823 2.964*   0.6908 1.687  -0.8183 1.125  -0.6316 0.943 
aBOLINKi,t 0.0213 0.074  0.0234 0.073  -0.1398 3.113*   -0.1826 5.471** 
aBOSIZEi,t -0.0234 0.195  -0.1065 3.455*   0.0335 0.508  -0.0240 0.246 
aBOINDi,t -0.5930 0.916  -0.6778 1.04  -1.2639 4.359**  -0.1941 0.105 
aAUCOMSIZEi,t -0.0115 0.018  0.0308 0.12  -0.0142 0.035  -0.0757 1.026 
aAUCOMINDi,t -0.2858 0.3  -0.1887 0.108  0.2061 0.143  0.4429 0.581 
DUALITYi,t 0.2829 1.211  0.1410 0.22  0.2304 0.725  0.0343 0.014 
aTOTCOMPENi,t 0.0002 0.088  -0.0007 0.787  -0.0006 0.641  0.0016 4.228** 
aLn(MVE)i,t-1 -0.1842 8.896***  -0.0711 1.242  0.0624 1.29  0.0535 0.962 
aMTBi,t-1 0.0015 0.017  0.0359 9.543***  -0.0031 0.068  -0.0363 7.594*** 
aROAi,t 3.0755 46.081***  -2.8922 40.285***  -0.2776 0.422  2.2226 22.464*** 
aDEBTi,t-1 -1.3140 4.575**  -0.9453 2.225  -1.0057 3.076*   0.8265 2.548 
aNOAi,t-1 -1.1081 13.38***          
aRDi,t -0.0033 0.023  0.0360 2.496  -0.0048 0.054  -0.0978 33.186*** 
aCAPi,t -0.0414 0.021  -0.1629 0.261  -0.6884 5.265**  -0.5707 3.952** 
aBOOKTAXi,t 0.0040 0.317  -0.0139 4.713**  0.0012 0.035  0.0006 0.006 
ESEOi,t 0.7101 17.43***  0.5004 7.649***  0.1200 0.468  0.2980 2.93*  
EAUDITi,t 0.6524 14.277***          
EMAi,t -0.1002 0.1  0.1220 0.132  0.2916 0.958  0.0309 0.009 
EDISTRESSi,t 0.5472 5.416**   1.0381 23.929***   0.7243 11.177***   0.7134 9.392*** 
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients together with the chi-square statistics of the following logistic regressions: ܮ݋݃݅ݐ(ܻ) = ߙ + ߚଵܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܤܴܫܶ +ߚଶܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܰ ܱܰܤܴܫܶ + ߚସܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܰ ܧܹ2 + 	?ߚ௞ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௞ + ߝ; where Y is replaced by AGDAC (columns 2 and 3), AGDCF (columns 4 and 5), AGDPROD (columns 6 and 7), 
AGDDISEXP (columns 8 and 9); Controlk include the variables described in Section 4.5.3. Definitions of variables are in Section 4.9. * , * *, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 
1% levels, respectively. 
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Table T4.19. Aggressive earnings management and positions of interlocked directors at the exposed firms – Controlling for directors 
who are in the first two years of service 
  Y=AGDAC   Y=AGDCF   Y=AGDPROD   Y=AGDDISEXP 
  Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square 
Intercept -3.1074 438.912***  -2.9925 581.368***  -2.4917 566.74***  -2.5612 583.035*** 
ILW_Y_FINEXi,t 0.3413 1.539  -0.0189 0.003  0.4453 3.107*   0.5267 4.718** 
ILW_Y_NOFINEXi,t 0.4156 0.425  -0.9359 1.254  0.5987 0.877  0.5848 1.117 
ILW_Y_NEW2i,t 0.8004 3.072*   0.8649 2.718*   -0.7231 0.887  -0.5840 0.81 
aBOLINKi,t 0.0255 0.108  0.0402 0.221  -0.1266 2.626  -0.1782 5.241** 
aBOSIZEi,t -0.0236 0.199  -0.1017 3.158*   0.0314 0.446  -0.0236 0.237 
aBOINDi,t -0.6100 0.967  -0.5910 0.793  -1.2425 4.222**  -0.1981 0.109 
aAUCOMSIZEi,t -0.0130 0.023  0.0172 0.037  -0.0164 0.047  -0.0750 1.009 
aAUCOMINDi,t -0.2788 0.286  -0.2540 0.196  0.1798 0.11  0.4352 0.562 
DUALITYi,t 0.2820 1.201  0.1552 0.267  0.2366 0.765  0.0382 0.017 
aTOTCOMPENi,t 0.0002 0.096  -0.0006 0.599  -0.0005 0.54  0.0016 4.196** 
aLn(MVE)i,t-1 -0.1848 8.958***  -0.0659 1.069  0.0631 1.326  0.0535 0.961 
aMTBi,t-1 0.0015 0.017  0.0361 9.77***  -0.0033 0.078  -0.0361 7.54*** 
aROAi,t 3.0683 45.988***  -2.8636 39.433***  -0.2558 0.361  2.2185 22.444*** 
aDEBTi,t-1 -1.3047 4.524**  -0.8901 1.998  -0.9980 3.049*   0.7831 2.301 
aNOAi,t-1 -1.1039 13.295***          
aRDi,t -0.0032 0.022  0.0378 2.667  -0.0046 0.05  -0.0986 33.669*** 
aCAPi,t -0.0523 0.034  -0.2400 0.576  -0.7166 5.727**  -0.5799 4.087** 
aBOOKTAXi,t 0.0039 0.295  -0.0138 4.662**  0.0009 0.02  0.0005 0.004 
ESEOi,t 0.7104 17.45***  0.4923 7.405***  0.1147 0.429  0.2979 2.922*  
EAUDITi,t 0.6543 14.329***          
EMAi,t -0.0959 0.091  0.1287 0.148  0.2902 0.951  0.0268 0.007 
EDISTRESSi,t 0.5482 5.439**  1.0357 23.704***  0.7263 11.221***  0.7156 9.436*** 
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients together with the chi-square statistics of the following logistic regressions: ܮ݋݃݅ݐ(ܻ) = ߙ + ߚଵܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܨܫܰܧܺ +ߚଶܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܰ ܱܨܫܰܧܺ + ߚସܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܰ ܧܹ2 + 	?ߚ௞ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௞ + ߝ; where Y is replaced by AGDAC (columns 2 and 3), AGDCF (columns 4 and 5), AGDPROD (columns 6 and 7), 
AGDDISEXP (columns 8 and 9); Controlk include the variables described in Section 4.5.3. Definitions of variables are in Section 4.9. * , * * , ***  indicate significance at 10%, 
5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table T4.20. Aggressive earnings management and positions of interlocked directors at the contagious firms – Controlling for directors 
who are in the first two years of service 
  Y=AGDAC   Y=AGDCF   Y=AGDPROD   Y=AGDDISEXP 
  Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square 
Intercept -3.1085 439.088***  -2.9920 581.375***  -2.4921 566.608***  -2.5673 581.683*** 
ILW_Y_FINCOi,t 0.3251 1.401  -0.1452 0.201  0.4825 3.706*   0.6964 8.357*** 
ILW_Y_NOFINCOi,t 0.5224 0.787  0.1410 0.029  0.2576 0.116  -0.5950 0.621 
ILW_Y_NEW2i,t 0.8027 3.116*   0.8616 2.714*   -0.7248 0.891  -0.6428 0.979 
aBOLINKi,t 0.0241 0.096  0.0391 0.21  -0.1291 2.71*   -0.1961 6.152** 
aBOSIZEi,t -0.0224 0.18  -0.1019 3.173*   0.0318 0.456  -0.0235 0.235 
aBOINDi,t -0.6049 0.955  -0.6066 0.837  -1.2454 4.241**  -0.1540 0.066 
aAUCOMSIZEi,t -0.0120 0.02  0.0244 0.076  -0.0167 0.049  -0.0699 0.885 
aAUCOMINDi,t -0.2825 0.293  -0.2387 0.173  0.1794 0.109  0.4316 0.549 
DUALITYi,t 0.2839 1.22  0.1573 0.274  0.2367 0.765  0.0388 0.017 
aTOTCOMPENi,t 0.0002 0.094  -0.0005 0.484  -0.0005 0.54  0.0016 4.148** 
aLn(MVE)i,t-1 -0.1849 8.963***  -0.0715 1.264  0.0625 1.291  0.0473 0.746 
aMTBi,t-1 0.0014 0.016  0.0361 9.794***  -0.0034 0.083  -0.0370 7.801*** 
aROAi,t 3.0609 45.703***  -2.8381 39.01***  -0.2469 0.334  2.2922 23.644*** 
aDEBTi,t-1 -1.3027 4.508**  -0.8602 1.873  -0.9810 2.917*   0.8695 2.809*  
aNOAi,t-1 -1.1094 13.395***          
aRDi,t -0.0033 0.022  0.0349 2.336  -0.0045 0.048  -0.0974 32.875*** 
aCAPi,t -0.0473 0.028  -0.2397 0.576  -0.7138 5.682**  -0.5980 4.333** 
aBOOKTAXi,t 0.0039 0.3  -0.0137 4.546**  0.0010 0.022  0.0006 0.007 
ESEOi,t 0.7091 17.374***  0.4889 7.325***  0.1175 0.449  0.3038 3.051*  
EAUDITi,t 0.6580 14.412***          
EMAi,t -0.0920 0.084  0.1231 0.134  0.2910 0.956  0.0091 0.001 
EDISTRESSi,t 0.5459 5.394**   1.0402 23.94***   0.7257 11.209***   0.7145 9.419*** 
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients together with the chi-square statistics of the following logistic regressions: ܮ݋݃݅ݐ(ܻ) = ߙ + ߚଵܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܨܫܰܥܱ +ߚଶܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܰ ܱܨܫܰܥܱ + ߚସܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܰ ܧܹ2 + 	?ߚ௞ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௞ + ߝ; where Y is replaced by AGDAC (columns 2 and 3), AGDCF (columns 4 and 5), AGDPROD (columns 6 and 7), 
AGDDISEXP (columns 8 and 9); Controlk include the variables described in Section 4.5.3. Definitions of variables are in Section 4.9. * , * * , ***  indicate significance at 10%, 
5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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4.7.2.1. Similar general context of earnings management 
Using ESCORE as developed in Chapter 2, this section first introduces 
ESEX_Y_PAIR, a dummy that turns on if ESCORE of the contagious firm is equal to 
ESCORE of the exposed firm. If the two firms have the same ESCORE, it could be 
argued that they both have a similar context to manage earnings aggressively. If the 
shared common characteristics could drive the spread of aggressive earnings 
management, the coefficient on ESEX_Y_PAIR would be significant and it would 
subsume the significance of the coefficient on ILW_Y. If, in contrast, the coefficient 
on ILW_Y remains significantly positive and the coefficient on ESEX_Y_PAIR is not 
significant, the evidence would suggest that the contagion of aggressive earnings 
management is mainly driven by the network of director rather than the shared 
characteristics of the exposed and contagious firms. Table T4.21, T4.22, T4.23, 
T4.24, T4.25 and T4.26 report the results of re-estimating Equation (E4.2), (E4.3), 
(E4.4), (E4.5), (E4.6) and (E4.7) with ESEX_Y_PAIR being added to the right hand 
side. The results indicate that the main conclusions of the chapter do not change 
qualitatively after controlling for the common context of earnings management shared 
by the exposed and contagious firms. 
The second specification introduces ESSI_Y_PAIR which allows for the pair to 
have similar contexts of earnings management. ESSI_Y_PAIR is designed to be 
equal to one if ESCORE of the contagious firm is equal to, or larger or smaller than 
ESCORE of the exposed firm but not more than one unit, zero otherwise. 
ESSI_Y_PAIR would allow for more or less similar contexts of earnings management 
between the exposed and contagious firms to be controlled for. Equation (E4.2), 
(E4.3), (E4.4), (E4.5), (E4.6) and (E4.7) are then re-estimated with ESSI_Y_PAIR 
being added to the right hand side. The results, as reported in Table T4.27, T4.28, 
T4.29, T4.30, T4.31 and T4.32, confirm that controlling for the common 
characteristics shared by the exposed and contagious firms using this specification 
would not qualitatively change any of the main conclusions of the chapter. 
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Table T4.21. Aggressive earnings management and interlocked directors – Controlling for the pair having the same ESCORE 
  Y=AGDAC   Y=AGDCF   Y=AGDPROD   Y=AGDDISEXP 
  Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square 
Intercept -3.1118 439.611***  -2.9893 582.639***  -2.4937 567.009***  -2.5599 583.777*** 
ILW_Yi,t 0.3168 1.352  0.1675 0.361  0.3337 1.673  0.4425 3.203*  
ESEX_Y_PAIRi,t 0.7434 2.968*    -0.5225 0.382   0.2616 0.273   0.0851 0.036 
aBOLINKi,t 0.0215 0.076  0.0448 0.281  -0.1290 2.708*   -0.1813 5.409** 
aBOSIZEi,t -0.0279 0.279  -0.1011 3.127*   0.0321 0.465  -0.0257 0.282 
aBOINDi,t -0.6206 1.002  -0.6306 0.907  -1.2440 4.238**  -0.2008 0.112 
aAUCOMSIZEi,t -0.0031 0.001  0.0278 0.098  -0.0182 0.058  -0.0760 1.035 
aAUCOMINDi,t -0.2576 0.244  -0.2253 0.155  0.1709 0.099  0.4252 0.536 
DUALITYi,t 0.2796 1.189  0.1506 0.252  0.2410 0.794  0.0256 0.008 
aTOTCOMPENi,t 0.0002 0.046  -0.0005 0.488  -0.0006 0.559  0.0016 4.127** 
aLn(MVE)i,t-1 -0.1829 8.792***  -0.0740 1.359  0.0645 1.383  0.0561 1.06 
aMTBi,t-1 0.0005 0.002  0.0359 9.655***  -0.0033 0.076  -0.0366 7.827*** 
aROAi,t 2.9923 44.113***  -2.8139 38.553***  -0.2665 0.391  2.2262 22.588*** 
aDEBTi,t-1 -1.2826 4.397**  -0.8420 1.802  -1.0028 3.082*   0.7863 2.327 
aNOAi,t-1 -1.1389 14.233***          
aRDi,t -0.0051 0.054  0.0364 2.529  -0.0052 0.065  -0.0983 33.593*** 
aCAPi,t -0.0208 0.005  -0.2713 0.743  -0.7066 5.59**  -0.5756 4.021** 
aBOOKTAXi,t 0.0051 0.503  -0.0134 4.393**  0.0009 0.021  0.0005 0.005 
ESEOi,t 0.7210 17.972***  0.4878 7.319***  0.1166 0.443  0.3007 2.982* 
EAUDITi,t 0.6652 14.885***          
EMAi,t -0.0913 0.083  0.0975 0.084  0.2973 0.999  0.0106 0.001 
EDISTRESSi,t 0.5365 5.22**  1.0445 24.191***  0.7257 11.216***  0.7081 9.237*** 
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients together with the chi-square statistics of the following logistic regressions: ܮ݋݃݅ݐ(ܻ) = ߙ + ߚଵܫܮܹ_ܻ +ߚଶܧܵܧܺ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + 	?ߚ௞ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௞ + ߝ; where Y is replaced by AGDAC (columns 2 and 3), AGDCF (columns 4 and 5), AGDPROD (columns 6 and 7), AGDDISEXP (columns 8 
and 9); Controlk include the variables described in Section 4.5.3. Definitions of variables are in Section 4.9. * , ** , *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table T4.22. Aggressive earnings management and gender of interlocked directors – Controlling for the pair having the same ESCORE 
  Y=AGDAC   Y=AGDCF   Y=AGDPROD   Y=AGDDISEXP 
  Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square 
Intercept -3.1104 439.338***  -3.0095 578.205***  -2.4956 566.642***  -2.5585 583.723*** 
ILW_Y_MALEi,t 0.3642 1.622  0.3550 1.529  0.4091 2.228  0.5495 4.408** 
ILW_Y_FEMALEi,t 0.0164 0.001  -1.3561 2.231  -0.0672 0.012  -0.0264 0.003 
ESEX_Y_PAIRi,t 0.7212 2.774*    -0.6349 0.551   0.2365 0.222   0.1049 0.055 
aBOLINKi,t 0.0168 0.045  0.0261 0.092  -0.1378 2.992*   -0.1877 5.747** 
aBOSIZEi,t -0.0285 0.291  -0.1045 3.322*   0.0320 0.462  -0.0286 0.347 
aBOINDi,t -0.6142 0.98  -0.6906 1.082  -1.2541 4.303**  -0.1965 0.107 
aAUCOMSIZEi,t 0.0021 0.001  0.0314 0.125  -0.0152 0.04  -0.0768 1.054 
aAUCOMINDi,t -0.2536 0.236  -0.1694 0.087  0.1849 0.116  0.4335 0.557 
DUALITYi,t 0.2769 1.165  0.1420 0.223  0.2398 0.785  0.0159 0.003 
aTOTCOMPENi,t 0.0001 0.037  -0.0006 0.765  -0.0006 0.611  0.0016 4.106** 
aLn(MVE)i,t-1 -0.1838 8.865***  -0.0718 1.274  0.0652 1.408  0.0574 1.11 
aMTBi,t-1 0.0005 0.002  0.0359 9.526***  -0.0034 0.083  -0.0369 7.963*** 
aROAi,t 2.9972 44.201***  -2.8752 39.838***  -0.2721 0.407  2.2194 22.388*** 
aDEBTi,t-1 -1.2972 4.481**  -0.9186 2.124  -0.9973 3.043*   0.7904 2.357 
aNOAi,t-1 -1.1421 14.314***          
aRDi,t -0.0051 0.054  0.0365 2.559  -0.0053 0.066  -0.0989 34.013*** 
aCAPi,t -0.0120 0.002  -0.2334 0.547  -0.6965 5.42**  -0.5631 3.851** 
aBOOKTAXi,t 0.0054 0.552  -0.0136 4.529**  0.0011 0.028  0.0005 0.005 
ESEOi,t 0.7231 18.054***  0.5012 7.701***  0.1187 0.459  0.2958 2.881*  
EAUDITi,t 0.6626 14.749***          
EMAi,t -0.0938 0.088  0.1141 0.116  0.2956 0.986  0.0103 0.001 
EDISTRESSi,t 0.5336 5.161**  1.0495 24.455***  0.7263 11.243***  0.6990 8.991*** 
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients together with the chi-square statistics of the following logistic regressions: ܮ݋݃݅ݐ(ܻ) = ߙ + ߚଵܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܯܣܮܧ +ߚଶܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܨܧܯܣܮܧ + ߚଷܧܵܧܺ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + 	?ߚ௞ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௞ + ߝ; where Y is replaced by AGDAC (columns 2 and 3), AGDCF (columns 4 and 5), AGDPROD (columns 6 and 7), 
AGDDISEXP (columns 8 and 9); Controlk include the variables described in Section 4.5.3. Definitions of variables are in Section 4.9. * , * * , *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 




Table T4.23. Aggressive earnings management and age of interlocked directors – Controlling for the pair having the same ESCORE 
  Y=AGDAC   Y=AGDCF   Y=AGDPROD   Y=AGDDISEXP 
  Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square 
Intercept -3.1087 441.851***  -3.0013 580.671***  -2.4974 574.246***  -2.5728 589.226*** 
ILW_Yi,t*ILW_Y_AGEi,t 0.0056 1.367  0.0048 0.96  0.0070 2.369  0.0103 5.807** 
ESEX_Y_PAIRi,t 0.7405 2.931*    -0.6196 0.529   0.2184 0.191   -0.0149 0.001 
aBOLINKi,t 0.0199 0.065  0.0349 0.166  -0.1377 2.996*   -0.1940 6.075** 
aBOSIZEi,t -0.0278 0.277  -0.1015 3.15*   0.0322 0.468  -0.0252 0.27 
aBOINDi,t -0.6161 0.986  -0.6513 0.965  -1.2524 4.291**  -0.1982 0.109 
aAUCOMSIZEi,t 0.0026 0.001  0.0277 0.097  -0.0156 0.042  -0.0768 1.051 
aAUCOMINDi,t -0.2475 0.225  -0.2166 0.143  0.1841 0.115  0.4350 0.56 
DUALITYi,t 0.2798 1.191  0.1513 0.254  0.2399 0.786  0.0338 0.013 
aTOTCOMPENi,t 0.0001 0.035  -0.0005 0.534  -0.0006 0.607  0.0016 4.183** 
aLn(MVE)i,t-1 -0.1842 8.911***  -0.0739 1.356  0.0644 1.376  0.0556 1.041 
aMTBi,t-1 0.0005 0.002  0.0360 9.7***  -0.0035 0.087  -0.0368 7.965*** 
aROAi,t 2.9924 44.088***  -2.8192 38.807***  -0.2664 0.391  2.2459 22.928*** 
aDEBTi,t-1 -1.3065 4.554**  -0.8313 1.763  -0.9984 3.052*   0.7973 2.398 
aNOAi,t-1 -1.1411 14.292***          
aRDi,t -0.0050 0.053  0.0367 2.586  -0.0050 0.058  -0.0978 33.262*** 
aCAPi,t -0.0128 0.002  -0.2690 0.732  -0.6992 5.481**  -0.5764 4.033** 
aBOOKTAXi,t 0.0055 0.58  -0.0135 4.472**  0.0010 0.025  0.0005 0.004 
ESEOi,t 0.7248 18.158***  0.4888 7.354***  0.1185 0.457  0.3007 2.977*  
EAUDITi,t 0.6640 14.819***          
EMAi,t -0.0936 0.087  0.0960 0.082  0.2961 0.989  0.0130 0.002 
EDISTRESSi,t 0.5340 5.172**  1.0478 24.354***  0.7271 11.282***  0.7152 9.434*** 
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients together with the chi-square statistics of the following logistic regressions: ܮ݋݃݅ݐ(ܻ) = ߙ + ߚଵ(ܫܮܹ_ܻ × ܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܣܩܧ) +ߚଶܧܵܧܺ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + 	?ߚ௞ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௞ + ߝ; where Y is replaced by AGDAC (columns 2 and 3), AGDCF (columns 4 and 5), AGDPROD (columns 6 and 7), AGDDISEXP (columns 8 




Table T4.24. Aggressive earnings management and nationality of interlocked directors – Controlling for the pair having the same 
ESCORE 
  Y=AGDAC   Y=AGDCF   Y=AGDPROD   Y=AGDDISEXP 
  Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square 
Intercept -3.1105 439.324***  -3.0071 579.002***  -2.4966 566.72***  -2.5592 583.651*** 
ILW_Y_BRITi,t 0.3619 1.525  0.4361 2.265  0.4717 2.916*   0.5308 4.193** 
ILW_Y_NONBRITi,t 0.1417 0.073  -1.5292 3.079*   -0.2767 0.201  -0.0911 0.021 
ESEX_Y_PAIRi,t 0.7283 2.831*    -0.7213 0.709   0.1802 0.127   0.0399 0.008 
aBOLINKi,t 0.0179 0.052  0.0264 0.094  -0.1396 3.095*   -0.1850 5.604** 
aBOSIZEi,t -0.0276 0.274  -0.1067 3.464*   0.0339 0.519  -0.0263 0.293 
aBOINDi,t -0.6085 0.96  -0.7126 1.151  -1.2633 4.36**  -0.2002 0.111 
aAUCOMSIZEi,t -0.0018 0  0.0348 0.154  -0.0162 0.045  -0.0769 1.058 
aAUCOMINDi,t -0.2628 0.253  -0.1679 0.086  0.1925 0.125  0.4319 0.553 
DUALITYi,t 0.2801 1.192  0.1359 0.204  0.2372 0.768  0.0213 0.005 
aTOTCOMPENi,t 0.0002 0.044  -0.0007 0.835  -0.0006 0.65  0.0016 4.155** 
aLn(MVE)i,t-1 -0.1827 8.762***  -0.0719 1.278  0.0636 1.341  0.0563 1.069 
aMTBi,t-1 0.0005 0.002  0.0359 9.561***  -0.0030 0.066  -0.0369 7.909*** 
aROAi,t 3.0000 44.209***  -2.8871 40.213***  -0.2835 0.44  2.2326 22.66*** 
aDEBTi,t-1 -1.2905 4.441**  -0.9471 2.237  -1.0078 3.098*   0.8311 2.581 
aNOAi,t-1 -1.1424 14.305***          
aRDi,t -0.0051 0.055  0.0370 2.639  -0.0054 0.07  -0.0976 33.089*** 
aCAPi,t -0.0125 0.002  -0.1743 0.298  -0.6821 5.194**  -0.5686 3.921** 
aBOOKTAXi,t 0.0052 0.524  -0.0138 4.648**  0.0011 0.03  0.0006 0.007 
ESEOi,t 0.7210 17.968***  0.5015 7.704***  0.1205 0.472  0.2993 2.955*  
EAUDITi,t 0.6635 14.801***          
EMAi,t -0.0959 0.091  0.1049 0.098  0.2971 0.995  0.0120 0.001 
EDISTRESSi,t 0.5362 5.209**  1.0440 24.223***  0.7243 11.19***  0.7068 9.212*** 
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients together with the chi-square statistics of the following logistic regressions: ܮ݋݃݅ݐ(ܻ) = ߙ + ߚଵܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܤܴܫܶ +ߚଶܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܰ ܱܰܤܴܫܶ + ߚଷܧܵܧܺ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + 	?ߚ௞ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௞ + ߝ; where Y is replaced by AGDAC (columns 2 and 3), AGDCF (columns 4 and 5), AGDPROD (columns 6 and 7), 
AGDDISEXP (columns 8 and 9); Controlk include the variables described in Section 4.5.3. Definitions of variables are in Section 4.9. * , * *, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 
1% levels, respectively. 
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Table T4.25. Aggressive earnings management and positions of interlocked directors at the exposed firms – Controlling for the pair 
having the same ESCORE 
  Y=AGDAC   Y=AGDCF   Y=AGDPROD   Y=AGDDISEXP 
  Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square 
Intercept -3.1108 438.841***  -2.9896 582.612***  -2.4937 566.938***  -2.5598 583.796*** 
ILW_Y_FINEXi,t 0.3266 1.364  0.2577 0.81  0.3104 1.308  0.4324 2.791*  
ILW_Y_NOFINEXi,t 0.2240 0.112  -0.6415 0.591  0.5072 0.633  0.5107 0.825 
ESEX_Y_PAIRi,t 0.7473 2.985*    -0.4483 0.277   0.2739 0.297   0.0855 0.036 
aBOLINKi,t 0.0205 0.069  0.0454 0.288  -0.1281 2.676  -0.1809 5.386** 
aBOSIZEi,t -0.0275 0.27  -0.1011 3.125*   0.0320 0.462  -0.0258 0.284 
aBOINDi,t -0.6135 0.974  -0.6241 0.886  -1.2408 4.214**  -0.2041 0.116 
aAUCOMSIZEi,t -0.0033 0.002  0.0220 0.061  -0.0178 0.055  -0.0756 1.026 
aAUCOMINDi,t -0.2600 0.248  -0.2288 0.16  0.1692 0.097  0.4254 0.537 
DUALITYi,t 0.2821 1.205  0.1460 0.237  0.2421 0.801  0.0256 0.008 
aTOTCOMPENi,t 0.0002 0.045  -0.0006 0.56  -0.0006 0.56  0.0016 4.126** 
aLn(MVE)i,t-1 -0.1829 8.795***  -0.0687 1.165  0.0641 1.364  0.0560 1.058 
aMTBi,t-1 0.0005 0.002  0.0359 9.619***  -0.0031 0.071  -0.0366 7.821*** 
aROAi,t 2.9928 44.116***  -2.8465 39.077***  -0.2658 0.389  2.2269 22.599*** 
aDEBTi,t-1 -1.2826 4.397**  -0.8762 1.942  -1.0030 3.084*   0.7883 2.336 
aNOAi,t-1 -1.1381 14.21***          
aRDi,t -0.0051 0.053  0.0388 2.81*   -0.0052 0.064  -0.0984 33.593*** 
aCAPi,t -0.0192 0.005  -0.2751 0.762  -0.7090 5.626**  -0.5759 4.025** 
aBOOKTAXi,t 0.0051 0.505  -0.0136 4.52**  0.0009 0.021  0.0005 0.005 
ESEOi,t 0.7208 17.955***  0.4907 7.386***  0.1160 0.439  0.2995 2.951*  
EAUDITi,t 0.6639 14.797***          
EMAi,t -0.0900 0.081  0.1016 0.092  0.2967 0.995  0.0109 0.001 
EDISTRESSi,t 0.5361 5.212**  1.0373 23.808***  0.7265 11.237***  0.7086 9.247*** 
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients together with the chi-square statistics of the following logistic regressions: ܮ݋݃݅ݐ(ܻ) = ߙ + ߚଵܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܨܫܰܧܺ +ߚଶܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܰ ܱܨܫܰܧܺ + ߚଷܧܵܧܺ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + 	?ߚ௞ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௞ + ߝ; where Y is replaced by AGDAC (columns 2 and 3), AGDCF (columns 4 and 5), AGDPROD (columns 6 and 7), 
AGDDISEXP (columns 8 and 9); Controlk include the variables described in Section 4.5.3. Definitions of variables are in Section 4.9. * , * * , ***  indicate significance at 10%, 
5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table T4.26. Aggressive earnings management and positions of interlocked directors at the contagious firms – Controlling for the pair 
having the same ESCORE 
  Y=AGDAC   Y=AGDCF   Y=AGDPROD   Y=AGDDISEXP 
  Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square 
Intercept -3.1131 438.808***  -2.9896 582.454***  -2.4941 566.768***  -2.5660 582.497*** 
ILW_Y_FINCOi,t 0.3016 1.144  0.1375 0.229  0.3546 1.737  0.5979 5.375** 
ILW_Y_NOFINCOi,t 0.4339 0.508  0.5124 0.412  0.1504 0.039  -0.6579 0.746 
ESEX_Y_PAIRi,t 0.7425 2.959*    -0.5536 0.421   0.2513 0.251   0.0647 0.021 
aBOLINKi,t 0.0209 0.072  0.0450 0.284  -0.1306 2.757*   -0.1986 6.29** 
aBOSIZEi,t -0.0272 0.265  -0.1017 3.159*   0.0323 0.473  -0.0259 0.287 
aBOINDi,t -0.6206 1.002  -0.6374 0.925  -1.2456 4.247**  -0.1649 0.075 
aAUCOMSIZEi,t -0.0024 0.001  0.0287 0.105  -0.0182 0.058  -0.0711 0.915 
aAUCOMINDi,t -0.2588 0.246  -0.2162 0.142  0.1698 0.098  0.4230 0.528 
DUALITYi,t 0.2795 1.188  0.1476 0.242  0.2419 0.799  0.0247 0.007 
aTOTCOMPENi,t 0.0002 0.046  -0.0005 0.456  -0.0006 0.56  0.0016 4.078** 
aLn(MVE)i,t-1 -0.1830 8.793***  -0.0734 1.34  0.0636 1.338  0.0505 0.852 
aMTBi,t-1 0.0005 0.002  0.0360 9.721***  -0.0033 0.076  -0.0374 8.046*** 
aROAi,t 2.9868 43.843***  -2.8211 38.682***  -0.2574 0.363  2.3012 23.8*** 
aDEBTi,t-1 -1.2805 4.381**  -0.8466 1.821  -0.9877 2.958*   0.8760 2.854*  
aNOAi,t-1 -1.1429 14.285***          
aRDi,t -0.0051 0.055  0.0361 2.495  -0.0051 0.062  -0.0972 32.784*** 
aCAPi,t -0.0185 0.004  -0.2736 0.754  -0.7061 5.581**  -0.5950 4.284** 
aBOOKTAXi,t 0.0051 0.504  -0.0135 4.414**  0.0010 0.021  0.0007 0.009 
ESEOi,t 0.7204 17.932***  0.4876 7.314***  0.1186 0.458  0.3054 3.082*  
EAUDITi,t 0.6684 14.907***          
EMAi,t -0.0893 0.079  0.0997 0.088  0.2981 1.004  -0.0032 0 
EDISTRESSi,t 0.5351 5.189**  1.0433 24.117***  0.7257 11.22***  0.7073 9.22*** 
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients together with the chi-square statistics of the following logistic regressions: ܮ݋݃݅ݐ(ܻ) = ߙ + ߚଵܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܨܫܰܥܱ +ߚଶܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܰ ܱܨܫܰܥܱ + ߚଷܧܵܧܺ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + 	?ߚ௞ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௞ + ߝ where Y is replaced by AGDAC (columns 2 and 3), AGDCF (columns 4 and 5), AGDPROD (columns 6 and 7), 
AGDDISEXP (columns 8 and 9); Controlk include the variables described in Section 4.5.3. Definitions of variables are in Section 4.9. * , * * , ***  indicate significance at 10%, 
5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table T4.27. Aggressive earnings management and interlocked directors – Controlling for the pair having similar ESCORE 
  Y=AGDAC   Y=AGDCF   Y=AGDPROD   Y=AGDDISEXP 
  Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square 
Intercept -3.1127 440.939***  -2.9897 581.812***  -2.4934 566.943***  -2.5586 583.694*** 
ILW_Yi,t 0.6128 4.398**  0.0201 0.004  0.3853 1.451  0.3130 0.83 
ESSI_Y_PAIRi,t -0.1740 0.185   0.2454 0.249   0.0034 0   0.2403 0.346 
aBOLINKi,t 0.0318 0.17  0.0446 0.278  -0.1289 2.706*   -0.1818 5.439** 
aBOSIZEi,t -0.0256 0.236  -0.1022 3.182*   0.0319 0.46  -0.0261 0.289 
aBOINDi,t -0.6216 1.013  -0.6307 0.907  -1.2511 4.282**  -0.1950 0.106 
aAUCOMSIZEi,t -0.0157 0.034  0.0282 0.101  -0.0180 0.056  -0.0763 1.044 
aAUCOMINDi,t -0.2550 0.24  -0.2236 0.153  0.1737 0.103  0.4177 0.517 
DUALITYi,t 0.2719 1.118  0.1423 0.225  0.2410 0.794  0.0245 0.007 
aTOTCOMPENi,t 0.0002 0.111  -0.0005 0.487  -0.0006 0.561  0.0016 4.135** 
aLn(MVE)i,t-1 -0.1850 9.048***  -0.0765 1.448  0.0646 1.39  0.0549 1.014 
aMTBi,t-1 0.0011 0.009  0.0353 9.348***  -0.0032 0.074  -0.0364 7.751*** 
aROAi,t 3.0506 45.686***  -2.8207 38.722***  -0.2628 0.38  2.2175 22.352*** 
aDEBTi,t-1 -1.2519 4.206**  -0.8620 1.887  -0.9980 3.054*   0.7962 2.381 
aNOAi,t-1 -1.1302 14.048***          
aRDi,t -0.0041 0.035  0.0364 2.54  -0.0052 0.064  -0.0982 33.488*** 
aCAPi,t -0.0538 0.036  -0.2685 0.725  -0.7059 5.581**  -0.5647 3.855** 
aBOOKTAXi,t 0.0041 0.336  -0.0134 4.346**  0.0008 0.016  0.0006 0.007 
ESEOi,t 0.7078 17.354***  0.4906 7.406***  0.1168 0.445  0.2986 2.945*  
EAUDITi,t 0.6681 14.98***          
EMAi,t -0.1007 0.101  0.0995 0.088  0.2944 0.979  0.0218 0.005 
EDISTRESSi,t 0.5436 5.373**  1.0349 23.721***  0.7253 11.205***  0.7057 9.18*** 
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients together with the chi-square statistics of the following logistic regressions: ܮ݋݃݅ݐ(ܻ) = ߙ + ߚଵܫܮܹ_ܻ +ߚଶܧܵܵܫ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + 	?ߚ௞ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௞ + ߝ; where Y is replaced by AGDAC (columns 2 and 3), AGDCF (columns 4 and 5), AGDPROD (columns 6 and 7), AGDDISEXP (columns 8 and 




Table T4.28. Aggressive earnings management and gender of interlocked directors – Controlling for the pair having similar ESCORE 
  Y=AGDAC   Y=AGDCF   Y=AGDPROD   Y=AGDDISEXP 
  Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square 
Intercept -3.1101 440.52***  -3.0085 577.643***  -2.4955 566.527***  -2.5572 583.665*** 
ILW_Y_MALEi,t 0.6797 4.962**  0.2127 0.399  0.4599 1.924  0.4205 1.403 
ILW_Y_FEMALEi,t 0.2102 0.098  -1.4187 2.434  -0.0349 0.003  -0.1567 0.076 
ESSI_Y_PAIRi,t -0.2005 0.243   0.1931 0.157   -0.0002 0   0.2468 0.363 
aBOLINKi,t 0.0255 0.107  0.0262 0.092  -0.1379 3.001*   -0.1882 5.776** 
aBOSIZEi,t -0.0266 0.254  -0.1053 3.363*   0.0318 0.458  -0.0291 0.357 
aBOINDi,t -0.6163 0.995  -0.6862 1.068  -1.2616 4.349**  -0.1892 0.099 
aAUCOMSIZEi,t -0.0079 0.009  0.0317 0.128  -0.0150 0.039  -0.0773 1.069 
aAUCOMINDi,t -0.2469 0.225  -0.1693 0.087  0.1880 0.12  0.4249 0.535 
DUALITYi,t 0.2687 1.092  0.1322 0.193  0.2397 0.785  0.0146 0.002 
aTOTCOMPENi,t 0.0002 0.091  -0.0006 0.733  -0.0006 0.617  0.0016 4.12** 
aLn(MVE)i,t-1 -0.1862 9.144***  -0.0746 1.374  0.0654 1.418  0.0562 1.064 
aMTBi,t-1 0.0010 0.008  0.0353 9.197***  -0.0033 0.08  -0.0367 7.881*** 
aROAi,t 3.0565 45.788***  -2.8776 39.905***  -0.2698 0.399  2.2108 22.158*** 
aDEBTi,t-1 -1.2730 4.329**  -0.9360 2.204  -0.9931 3.019*   0.8012 2.418 
aNOAi,t-1 -1.1341 14.152***          
aRDi,t -0.0041 0.035  0.0365 2.565  -0.0053 0.066  -0.0988 33.935*** 
aCAPi,t -0.0433 0.023  -0.2347 0.553  -0.6958 5.41**  -0.5520 3.684*  
aBOOKTAXi,t 0.0045 0.393  -0.0136 4.461**  0.0010 0.023  0.0006 0.007 
ESEOi,t 0.7111 17.487***  0.5034 7.771***  0.1188 0.459  0.2933 2.836*  
EAUDITi,t 0.6637 14.76***          
EMAi,t -0.1056 0.11  0.1156 0.119  0.2930 0.968  0.0225 0.005 
EDISTRESSi,t 0.5387 5.271**  1.0383 23.919***  0.7258 11.231***  0.6969 8.946*** 
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients together with the chi-square statistics of the following logistic regressions: ܮ݋݃݅ݐ(ܻ) = ߙ + ߚଵܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܯܣܮܧ +ߚଶܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܨܧܯܣܮܧ + ߚଷܧܵܵܫ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + 	?ߚ௞ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௞ + ߝ; where Y is replaced by AGDAC (columns 2 and 3), AGDCF (columns 4 and 5), AGDPROD (columns 6 and 7), 
AGDDISEXP (columns 8 and 9); Controlk include the variables described in Section 4.5.3. Definitions of variables are in Section 4.9. * , * *, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 




Table T4.29. Aggressive earnings management and age of interlocked directors – Controlling for the pair having similar ESCORE 
  Y=AGDAC   Y=AGDCF   Y=AGDPROD   Y=AGDDISEXP 
  Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square 
Intercept -3.1058 443.121***  -3.0008 580.315***  -2.4965 572.6***  -2.5730 589.435*** 
ILW_Yi,t*ILW_Y_AGEi,t 0.0108 4.421**  0.0028 0.24  0.0079 2.214  0.0096 3.048*  
ESSI_Y_PAIRi,t -0.1619 0.16   0.1344 0.08   -0.0183 0.002   0.0579 0.024 
aBOLINKi,t 0.0293 0.143  0.0356 0.172  -0.1378 3.007*   -0.1942 6.083** 
aBOSIZEi,t -0.0257 0.239  -0.1020 3.171*   0.0321 0.465  -0.0253 0.272 
aBOINDi,t -0.6183 1.001  -0.6482 0.956  -1.2608 4.344**  -0.1959 0.106 
aAUCOMSIZEi,t -0.0040 0.002  0.0276 0.097  -0.0150 0.039  -0.0768 1.052 
aAUCOMINDi,t -0.2320 0.199  -0.2166 0.143  0.1892 0.122  0.4302 0.547 
DUALITYi,t 0.2724 1.124  0.1430 0.227  0.2396 0.784  0.0330 0.013 
aTOTCOMPENi,t 0.0002 0.075  -0.0005 0.497  -0.0006 0.616  0.0016 4.181** 
aLn(MVE)i,t-1 -0.1875 9.284***  -0.0766 1.452  0.0645 1.384  0.0552 1.026 
aMTBi,t-1 0.0010 0.008  0.0354 9.366***  -0.0034 0.085  -0.0367 7.928*** 
aROAi,t 3.0472 45.529***  -2.8179 38.78***  -0.2646 0.386  2.2443 22.875*** 
aDEBTi,t-1 -1.2947 4.479**  -0.8443 1.82  -0.9937 3.025*   0.7975 2.4 
aNOAi,t-1 -1.1366 14.232***          
aRDi,t -0.0040 0.033  0.0366 2.58  -0.0049 0.058  -0.0978 33.275*** 
aCAPi,t -0.0409 0.021  -0.2709 0.741  -0.6980 5.468**  -0.5734 3.979** 
aBOOKTAXi,t 0.0049 0.467  -0.0135 4.434**  0.0010 0.022  0.0005 0.005 
ESEOi,t 0.7155 17.726***  0.4913 7.43***  0.1187 0.458  0.3002 2.969*  
EAUDITi,t 0.6644 14.807***          
EMAi,t -0.1051 0.11  0.0959 0.082  0.2933 0.97  0.0158 0.002 
EDISTRESSi,t 0.5372 5.25**  1.0384 23.899***  0.7261 11.252***  0.7143 9.414*** 
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients together with the chi-square statistics of the following logistic regressions: ܮ݋݃݅ݐ(ܻ) = ߙ + ߚଵ(ܫܮܹ_ܻ × ܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܣܩܧ) +ߚଶܧܵܵܫ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + 	?ߚ௞ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௞ + ߝ; where Y is replaced by AGDAC (columns 2 and 3), AGDCF (columns 4 and 5), AGDPROD (columns 6 and 7), AGDDISEXP (columns 8 and 
9); Controlk include the variables described in Section 4.5.3. Definitions of variables are in Section 4.9. * , ** , *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table T4.30. Aggressive earnings management and nationality of interlocked directors – Controlling for the pair having similar ESCORE 
  Y=AGDAC   Y=AGDCF   Y=AGDPROD   Y=AGDDISEXP 
  Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square 
Intercept -3.1108 440.633***  -3.0063 578.359***  -2.4965 566.668***  -2.5581 583.546*** 
ILW_Y_BRITi,t 0.6838 4.746**  0.2980 0.766  0.5193 2.436  0.4139 1.348 
ILW_Y_NONBRITi,t 0.3650 0.479  -1.5713 3.224*  -0.2554 0.155  -0.1832 0.076 
ESSI_Y_PAIRi,t -0.2011 0.243   0.1433 0.085   -0.0131 0.001   0.1969 0.229 
aBOLINKi,t 0.0270 0.121  0.0262 0.092  -0.1397 3.103*   -0.1852 5.616** 
aBOSIZEi,t -0.0256 0.234  -0.1070 3.478*   0.0340 0.521  -0.0266 0.3 
aBOINDi,t -0.6084 0.968  -0.7069 1.132  -1.2707 4.405**  -0.1940 0.105 
aAUCOMSIZEi,t -0.0134 0.025  0.0346 0.152  -0.0160 0.045  -0.0770 1.062 
aAUCOMINDi,t -0.2598 0.249  -0.1664 0.084  0.1956 0.13  0.4240 0.533 
DUALITYi,t 0.2718 1.117  0.1258 0.175  0.2370 0.767  0.0204 0.005 
aTOTCOMPENi,t 0.0002 0.104  -0.0007 0.783  -0.0006 0.656  0.0016 4.155** 
aLn(MVE)i,t-1 -0.1842 8.955***  -0.0749 1.382  0.0637 1.345  0.0554 1.03 
aMTBi,t-1 0.0011 0.009  0.0353 9.191***  -0.0030 0.063  -0.0368 7.85*** 
aROAi,t 3.0621 45.841***  -2.8866 40.209***  -0.2819 0.435  2.2254 22.462*** 
aDEBTi,t-1 -1.2653 4.281**  -0.9632 2.313  -1.0052 3.084*   0.8372 2.617 
aNOAi,t-1 -1.1344 14.143***          
aRDi,t -0.0041 0.036  0.0371 2.664  -0.0054 0.07  -0.0976 33.049*** 
aCAPi,t -0.0420 0.022  -0.1817 0.324  -0.6812 5.183**  -0.5597 3.785*  
aBOOKTAXi,t 0.0043 0.361  -0.0137 4.575**  0.0011 0.026  0.0007 0.008 
ESEOi,t 0.7079 17.354***  0.5044 7.797***  0.1208 0.475  0.2975 2.921*  
EAUDITi,t 0.6662 14.888***          
EMAi,t -0.1075 0.114  0.1071 0.102  0.2949 0.979  0.0221 0.005 
EDISTRESSi,t 0.5430 5.354**  1.0333 23.7***  0.7237 11.172***  0.7047 9.161*** 
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients together with the chi-square statistics of the following logistic regressions: ܮ݋݃݅ݐ(ܻ) = ߙ + ߚଵܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܤܴܫܶ +ߚଶܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܰ ܱܰܤܴܫܶ + ߚଷܧܵܵܫ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + 	?ߚ௞ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௞ + ߝ where Y is replaced by AGDAC (columns 2 and 3), AGDCF (columns 4 and 5), AGDPROD (columns 6 and 7), 
AGDDISEXP (columns 8 and 9); Controlk include the variables described in Section 4.5.3. Definitions of variables are in Section 4.9. * , * *, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 
1% levels, respectively. 
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Table T4.31. Aggressive earnings management and positions of interlocked directors at the exposed firms – Controlling for the pair 
having similar ESCORE 
  Y=AGDAC   Y=AGDCF   Y=AGDPROD   Y=AGDDISEXP 
  Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square 
Intercept -3.1124 439.791***  -2.9904 581.862***  -2.4934 566.897***  -2.5584 583.649*** 
ILW_Y_FINEXi,t 0.6157 4.257**  0.1008 0.091  0.3674 1.251  0.3019 0.733 
ILW_Y_NOFINEXi,t 0.5845 0.766  -0.8877 1.038  0.5345 0.634  0.3850 0.399 
ESSI_Y_PAIRi,t -0.1731 0.182   0.3159 0.409   0.0039 0   0.2411 0.348 
aBOLINKi,t 0.0315 0.167  0.0455 0.289  -0.1282 2.681  -0.1814 5.413** 
aBOSIZEi,t -0.0255 0.233  -0.1021 3.174*   0.0318 0.457  -0.0262 0.291 
aBOINDi,t -0.6195 1.001  -0.6188 0.871  -1.2484 4.262**  -0.1986 0.109 
aAUCOMSIZEi,t -0.0157 0.034  0.0215 0.058  -0.0175 0.053  -0.0759 1.033 
aAUCOMINDi,t -0.2557 0.242  -0.2356 0.169  0.1725 0.101  0.4179 0.518 
DUALITYi,t 0.2725 1.12  0.1385 0.213  0.2420 0.8  0.0244 0.007 
aTOTCOMPENi,t 0.0002 0.11  -0.0006 0.6  -0.0006 0.562  0.0016 4.134** 
aLn(MVE)i,t-1 -0.1850 9.049***  -0.0704 1.22  0.0642 1.373  0.0549 1.013 
aMTBi,t-1 0.0011 0.009  0.0354 9.355***  -0.0031 0.069  -0.0364 7.745*** 
aROAi,t 3.0508 45.685***  -2.8572 39.309***  -0.2619 0.378  2.2180 22.359*** 
aDEBTi,t-1 -1.2517 4.205**  -0.9012 2.051  -0.9980 3.055*   0.7983 2.391 
aNOAi,t-1 -1.1300 14.044***          
aRDi,t -0.0041 0.035  0.0393 2.88*   -0.0052 0.064  -0.0983 33.492*** 
aCAPi,t -0.0535 0.036  -0.2724 0.745  -0.7077 5.609**  -0.5650 3.859** 
aBOOKTAXi,t 0.0041 0.337  -0.0135 4.448**  0.0008 0.016  0.0006 0.007 
ESEOi,t 0.7077 17.344***  0.4935 7.467***  0.1164 0.442  0.2973 2.91*  
EAUDITi,t 0.6676 14.924***          
EMAi,t -0.1005 0.1  0.1053 0.099  0.2938 0.974  0.0221 0.005 
EDISTRESSi,t 0.5435 5.37**  1.0277 23.327***  0.7260 11.223***  0.7062 9.191*** 
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients together with the chi-square statistics of the following logistic regressions: ܮ݋݃݅ݐ(ܻ) = ߙ + ߚଵܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܨܫܰܧܺ +ߚଶܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܰ ܱܨܫܰܧܺ + ߚଷܧܵܵܫ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + 	?ߚ௞ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௞ + ߝ; where Y is replaced by AGDAC (columns 2 and 3), AGDCF (columns 4 and 5), AGDPROD (columns 6 and 7), 
AGDDISEXP (columns 8 and 9); Controlk include the variables described in Section 4.5.3. Definitions of variables are in Section 4.9. * , * * , *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 
1% levels, respectively. 
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Table T4.32. Aggressive earnings management and positions of interlocked directors at the contagious firms – Controlling for the pair 
having similar ESCORE 
  Y=AGDAC   Y=AGDCF   Y=AGDPROD   Y=AGDDISEXP 
  Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square 
Intercept -3.1140 440.186***  -2.9897 581.743***  -2.4938 566.721***  -2.5648 582.248*** 
ILW_Y_FINCOi,t 0.5957 3.882**  0.0025 0  0.4166 1.546  0.4917 1.933 
ILW_Y_NOFINCOi,t 0.7331 1.477  0.2918 0.117  0.1818 0.057  -0.7469 0.898 
ESSI_Y_PAIRi,t -0.1725 0.181   0.2277 0.212   -0.0150 0.001   0.1917 0.219 
aBOLINKi,t 0.0311 0.163  0.0445 0.276  -0.1306 2.763*   -0.1985 6.288** 
aBOSIZEi,t -0.0249 0.222  -0.1025 3.199*   0.0323 0.47  -0.0262 0.293 
aBOINDi,t -0.6220 1.014  -0.6363 0.922  -1.2534 4.296**  -0.1607 0.072 
aAUCOMSIZEi,t -0.0148 0.03  0.0289 0.107  -0.0179 0.056  -0.0717 0.929 
aAUCOMINDi,t -0.2562 0.243  -0.2155 0.141  0.1725 0.101  0.4180 0.516 
DUALITYi,t 0.2720 1.12  0.1401 0.218  0.2420 0.8  0.0244 0.007 
aTOTCOMPENi,t 0.0002 0.111  -0.0005 0.457  -0.0006 0.561  0.0016 4.081** 
aLn(MVE)i,t-1 -0.1852 9.055***  -0.0761 1.437  0.0635 1.336  0.0498 0.828 
aMTBi,t-1 0.0010 0.008  0.0354 9.387***  -0.0032 0.074  -0.0373 7.989*** 
aROAi,t 3.0449 45.423***  -2.8261 38.805***  -0.2517 0.346  2.2915 23.54*** 
aDEBTi,t-1 -1.2504 4.195**  -0.8635 1.894  -0.9806 2.918*   0.8793 2.877*  
aNOAi,t-1 -1.1346 14.107***          
aRDi,t -0.0041 0.036  0.0362 2.511  -0.0051 0.061  -0.0971 32.732*** 
aCAPi,t -0.0508 0.032  -0.2702 0.734  -0.7055 5.574**  -0.5864 4.145** 
aBOOKTAXi,t 0.0041 0.338  -0.0134 4.366**  0.0008 0.017  0.0008 0.01 
ESEOi,t 0.7070 17.3***  0.4906 7.407***  0.1191 0.462  0.3037 3.05*  
EAUDITi,t 0.6713 15.012***          
EMAi,t -0.0986 0.096  0.1009 0.09  0.2951 0.984  0.0054 0 
EDISTRESSi,t 0.5419 5.336**  1.0337 23.646***  0.7252 11.204***  0.7049 9.163*** 
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients together with the chi-square statistics of the following logistic regressions: ܮ݋݃݅ݐ(ܻ) = ߙ + ߚଵܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܨܫܰܥܱ +ߚଶܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܰ ܱܨܫܰܥܱ + ߚଷܧܵܵܫ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + 	?ߚ௞ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௞ + ߝ; where Y is replaced by AGDAC (columns 2 and 3), AGDCF (columns 4 and 5), AGDPROD (columns 6 and 7), 
AGDDISEXP (columns 8 and 9); Controlk include the variables described in Section 4.5.3. Definitions of variables are in Section 4.9. * , * *, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 
1% levels, respectively. 
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4.7.2.2. Individual contexts of earnings management 
Using the aggregate ESCORE as in the previous sub-section is, however, not 
ideal because the pair might have similar context of earnings management, but the 
particular causes of such context might be different. This section, therefore, also uses 
fifteen individual components of ESCORE separately. For illustration, 
EDEBT_Y_PAIR is created as a dummy which is one if both the exposed and 
contagious firms have EDEBT34 of one, zero otherwise. The same procedures are 
applied to the other fourteen components of ESCORE to create ESEO_Y_PAIR, 
EDDEBT_Y_PAIR, EMA_Y_PAIR, EOV_Y_PAIR, EROA_Y_PAIR, 
EDROA_Y_PAIR, EDIV_Y_PAIR, EDISTRESS_Y_PAIR, ESIZE_Y_PAIR, 
ECYCLE_Y_PAIR, EAUDIT_Y_PAIR, EBLOAT_Y_PAIR, ECAP_Y_PAIR and 
EBT_Y_PAIR. Equation (E4.2), (E4.3), (E4.4), (E4.5), (E4.6) and (E4.7) are then re-
estimated with the above fifteen pair dummy controls being added to the right hand 
side. If the contagious and exposed firms do not share a characteristic in any year 
during the sample period (i.e. the pair dummy is zero throughout), the corresponding 
dummy is dropped from the regression to avoid perfect multi-collinearity. As shown in 
Table T4.33, T4.34, T4.35, T4.36, T4.37 and T4.38, none of the main conclusions of 
the chapter change qualitatively using after controlling for the individual contexts of 
earnings management shared by the exposed and contagious firms. 
                                                             
34




Table T4.33. Aggressive earnings management and interlocked directors – Controlling for the pair having similar individual signals of 
earnings management 
  Y=AGDAC   Y=AGDCF   Y=AGDPROD   Y=AGDDISEXP 
  Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square 
Intercept -3.1407 427.758***  -3.0113 568.097***  -2.5058 566.68***  -2.5610 575.6*** 
ILW_Yi,t 0.6273 4.637**  0.3205 1.073  0.5516 4.749**  0.5381 4.651** 
EDEBT_Y_PAIRi,t 0.3152 0.232  0.9190 1.055  -13.4832 0  -13.2231 0 
EDDEBT_Y_PAIRi,t -14.5858 0.001  -13.4335 0.001  -0.3958 0.364  -2.0352 3.81*  
ESEO_Y_PAIRi,t 0.5775 0.321  0.7643 0.701  -14.0661 0  0.6520 0.871 
EMA_Y_PAIRi,t -14.4562 0  -0.6032 0  -14.0225 0    
EOV_Y_PAIRi,t 0.3205 0.238  -2.1243 1.864  0.9558 1.297  1.1490 1.724 
EROA_Y_PAIRi,t            
EDROA_Y_PAIRi,t            
EDIV_Y_PAIRi,t -14.3182 0          
EDISTRESS_Y_PAIRi,t 1.5453 1.631  -1.9405 3.419*   14.6854 0  28.3291 0.001 
ESIZE_Y_PAIRi,t          -13.8988 0 
ECYCLE_Y_PAIRi,t       -13.5699 0    
EAUDIT_Y_PAIRi,t -0.6966 1.654          
EBLOAT_Y_PAIRi,t -1.3049 0.74          
ECAP_Y_PAIRi,t -1.9452 1.94  -12.8886 0  -13.0494 0  -0.3538 0.082 
EBT_Y_PAIRi,t 1.8123 2.856*    0.9960 1.412   -14.2123 0   -11.7365 0 
aBOLINKi,t 0.0361 0.211  0.0274 0.101  -0.1205 2.364  -0.1856 5.467** 
aBOSIZEi,t -0.0302 0.32  -0.1023 3.161*   0.0361 0.584  -0.0300 0.38 
aBOINDi,t -0.5589 0.809  -0.7006 1.111  -1.3259 4.75**  -0.2396 0.156 
aAUCOMSIZEi,t -0.0154 0.032  0.0270 0.091  -0.0220 0.082  -0.0743 0.984 
aAUCOMINDi,t -0.2147 0.168  -0.1158 0.04  0.2006 0.137  0.4753 0.66 
DUALITYi,t 0.3081 1.431  0.1346 0.198  0.2244 0.686  0.0124 0.002 
aTOTCOMPENi,t 0.0000 0.003  -0.0003 0.169  -0.0006 0.553  0.0014 3.146*  
aLn(MVE)i,t-1 -0.1850 8.868***  -0.0720 1.26  0.0592 1.161  0.0604 1.204 




Table T4.33. (continued) 
  Y=AGDAC   Y=AGDCF   Y=AGDPROD   Y=AGDDISEXP 
  Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square 
aROAi,t 3.1292 46.851***  -2.6922 34.91***  -0.2830 0.441  2.2653 23.072*** 
aDEBTi,t-1 -1.2201 3.922**  -0.8161 1.695  -1.0201 3.163*   0.8545 2.705 
aNOAi,t-1 -1.1248 13.744***          
aRDi,t -0.0084 0.153  0.0344 2.231  -0.0046 0.05  -0.1015 35.202*** 
aCAPi,t -0.0619 0.046  -0.3208 1.015  -0.7150 5.619**  -0.5861 4.067** 
aBOOKTAXi,t 0.0053 0.533  -0.0142 4.942**  0.0007 0.013  0.0007 0.009 
ESEOi,t 0.7183 17.279***  0.5083 7.766***  0.1603 0.832  0.2880 2.615 
EAUDITi,t 0.7066 15.818***          
EMAi,t -0.0784 0.06  0.0721 0.046  0.3071 1.057  0.0286 0.007 
EDISTRESSi,t 0.4870 4.06**  1.1080 26.574***  0.7153 10.9***  0.6641 7.855*** 
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients together with the chi-square statistics of the following logistic regressions: ܮ݋݃݅ݐ(ܻ) = ߙ + ߚଵܫܮW_Y+ߚଶܧܦܧܤܶ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଷܧܦܦܧܤܶ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚସܧܵܧܱ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚହܧܯܣ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚ଺ܧܱܸ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚ଻ܧܴܱܣ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚ଼ܧܦܴܱܣ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଽܧܦܫܸ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ +ߚଵ଴ܧܦܫܴܵܶܧܵܵ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵଵܧܵܫܼܧ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵଶܧܥܻܥܮܧ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵଷܧܣܷܦܫܶ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵସܧܤܮܱܣܶ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵହܧܥܣܲ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵ଺ܧܤܶ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ +	?ߚ௞ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௞ + ߝ; where Y is replaced by AGDAC (columns 2 and 3), AGDCF (columns 4 and 5), AGDPROD (columns 6 and 7), AGDDISEXP (columns 8 and 9); Controlk include 





Table T4.34. Aggressive earnings management and gender of interlocked directors – Controlling for the pair having similar individual 
signals of earnings management 
  Y=AGDAC   Y=AGDCF   Y=AGDPROD   Y=AGDDISEXP 
  Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square 
Intercept -3.1407 427.564***  -3.0326 563.934***  -2.5080 566.274***  -2.5593 575.325*** 
ILW_Y_MALEi,t 0.7007 5.183**  0.5420 2.932*   0.6386 5.709**  0.6710 6.363** 
ILW_Y_FEMALEi,t 0.2228 0.105  -1.3894 1.993  0.0491 0.006  0.0066 0 
EDEBT_Y_PAIRi,t 0.2509 0.144  0.7211 0.642  -13.5493 0  -13.8233 0 
EDDEBT_Y_PAIRi,t -14.5381 0.001  -13.5606 0.001  -0.4169 0.404  -2.1068 4.04** 
ESEO_Y_PAIRi,t 0.5909 0.329  0.8626 0.871  -13.9258 0  0.7312 1.061 
EMA_Y_PAIRi,t -14.4724 0  -0.6419 0  -14.0687 0    
EOV_Y_PAIRi,t 0.3073 0.218  -2.2227 2.034  0.9988 1.407  1.1931 1.83 
EROA_Y_PAIRi,t            
EDROA_Y_PAIRi,t            
EDIV_Y_PAIRi,t -13.9169 0          
EDISTRESS_Y_PAIRi,t 1.3657 1.2  -2.0622 3.783*   14.5138 0  29.5278 0.001 
ESIZE_Y_PAIRi,t          -14.9602 0 
ECYCLE_Y_PAIRi,t       -13.6220 0    
EAUDIT_Y_PAIRi,t -0.7360 1.824          
EBLOAT_Y_PAIRi,t -1.2221 0.649          
ECAP_Y_PAIRi,t -1.8582 1.765  -13.0187 0  -13.1404 0  -0.4599 0.141 
EBT_Y_PAIRi,t 1.9699 3.179*    1.0370 1.571   -14.2721 0   -12.4030 0 
aBOLINKi,t 0.0292 0.134  0.0057 0.004  -0.1308 2.696  -0.1918 5.797** 
aBOSIZEi,t -0.0316 0.349  -0.1066 3.412*   0.0362 0.587  -0.0339 0.48 
aBOINDi,t -0.5480 0.776  -0.7414 1.24  -1.3487 4.9**  -0.2462 0.165 
aAUCOMSIZEi,t -0.0079 0.008  0.0272 0.092  -0.0176 0.053  -0.0754 1.007 
aAUCOMINDi,t -0.2091 0.159  -0.0749 0.017  0.2234 0.169  0.4912 0.704 
DUALITYi,t 0.3052 1.404  0.1181 0.151  0.2231 0.678  -0.0007 0 
aTOTCOMPENi,t -0.0001 0.005  -0.0004 0.328  -0.0006 0.622  0.0014 3.179*  
aLn(MVE)i,t-1 -0.1862 8.96***  -0.0665 1.072  0.0603 1.199  0.0626 1.296 




Table T4.34. (continued) 
  Y=AGDAC   Y=AGDCF   Y=AGDPROD   Y=AGDDISEXP 
  Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square 
aROAi,t 3.1287 46.748***  -2.7428 35.907***  -0.2970 0.483  2.2615 22.947*** 
aDEBTi,t-1 -1.2331 3.995**  -0.9244 2.147  -1.0137 3.115*   0.8625 2.761* 
aNOAi,t-1 -1.1298 13.858***          
aRDi,t -0.0083 0.147  0.0351 2.33  -0.0047 0.051  -0.1023 35.667*** 
aCAPi,t -0.0477 0.027  -0.2887 0.816  -0.7017 5.393**  -0.5721 3.871** 
aBOOKTAXi,t 0.0054 0.564  -0.0146 5.227**  0.0009 0.021  0.0007 0.008 
ESEOi,t 0.7199 17.356***  0.5258 8.264***  0.1615 0.843  0.2809 2.48 
EAUDITi,t 0.7077 15.845***          
EMAi,t -0.0820 0.066  0.0739 0.048  0.3019 1.019  0.0231 0.005 
EDISTRESSi,t 0.4799 3.933**  1.1166 26.972***  0.7166 10.951***  0.6563 7.662*** 
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients together with the chi-square statistics of the following logistic regressions: ܮ݋݃݅ݐ(ܻ) = ߙ + ߚଵܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܯܣܮܧ +ߚଶܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܨܧܯܣܮܧ + ߚଷܧܦܧܤܶ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚସܧܦܦܧܤܶ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚହܧܵܧܱ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚ଺ܧܯܣ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚ଻ܧܱܸ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚ଼ܧܴܱܣ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଽܧܦܴܱܣ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ +ߚଵ଴ܧܦܫܸ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵଵܧܦܫܴܵܶܧܵܵ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵଶܧܵܫܼܧ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵଷܧܥܻܥܮܧ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵସܧܣܷܦܫܶ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵହܧܤܮܱܣܶ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵ଺ܧܥܣܲ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ +ߚଵ଻ܧܤܶ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + 	?ߚ௞ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௞ + ߝ; where Y is replaced by AGDAC (columns 2 and 3), AGDCF (columns 4 and 5), AGDPROD (columns 6 and 7), AGDDISEXP (columns 8 
and 9); Controlk include the variables described in Section 4.5.3. Definitions of variables are in Section 4.9. * , ** , *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table T4.35. Aggressive earnings management and age of interlocked directors – Controlling for the pair having similar individual 
signals of earnings management 
  Y=AGDAC   Y=AGDCF   Y=AGDPROD   Y=AGDDISEXP 
  Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square 
Intercept -3.1335 430.257***  -3.0218 569.242***  -2.5049 573.488***  -2.5738 581.803*** 
ILW_Yi,t*ILW_Y_AGEi,t 0.0109 4.497**  0.0075 1.956  0.0103 5.437**  0.0119 7.825*** 
EDEBT_Y_PAIRi,t 0.3033 0.212  0.8617 0.918  -13.4796 0  -13.7622 0 
EDDEBT_Y_PAIRi,t -14.5618 0.001  -13.5239 0.001  -0.3830 0.345  -2.1632 4.271** 
ESEO_Y_PAIRi,t 0.6538 0.403  0.7332 0.662  -13.9097 0  0.7143 1.088 
EMA_Y_PAIRi,t -14.4779 0  -0.6220 0  -14.1001 0    
EOV_Y_PAIRi,t 0.3190 0.234  -2.1773 1.958  0.9434 1.262  1.0347 1.398 
EROA_Y_PAIRi,t            
EDROA_Y_PAIRi,t            
EDIV_Y_PAIRi,t -13.7081 0          
EDISTRESS_Y_PAIRi,t 1.2830 1.061  -1.9142 3.45*   14.5725 0  29.4243 0.001 
ESIZE_Y_PAIRi,t          -14.8459 0 
ECYCLE_Y_PAIRi,t       -13.6355 0    
EAUDIT_Y_PAIRi,t -0.6983 1.64          
EBLOAT_Y_PAIRi,t -1.1736 0.572          
ECAP_Y_PAIRi,t -1.8121 1.617  -12.9481 0  -13.1039 0  -0.4442 0.131 
EBT_Y_PAIRi,t 2.0134 3.319*    0.9870 1.387   -14.2334 0   -12.3905 0 
aBOLINKi,t 0.0325 0.169  0.0173 0.039  -0.1291 2.633  -0.1994 6.184** 
aBOSIZEi,t -0.0301 0.318  -0.1032 3.215*   0.0360 0.582  -0.0306 0.392 
aBOINDi,t -0.5444 0.767  -0.7192 1.169  -1.3448 4.875**  -0.2399 0.156 
aAUCOMSIZEi,t -0.0054 0.004  0.0264 0.087  -0.0168 0.049  -0.0747 0.989 
aAUCOMINDi,t -0.1987 0.144  -0.1075 0.035  0.2292 0.179  0.4894 0.698 
DUALITYi,t 0.3076 1.427  0.1301 0.184  0.2226 0.675  0.0185 0.004 
aTOTCOMPENi,t -0.0001 0.01  -0.0003 0.198  -0.0006 0.622  0.0014 3.214*  
aLn(MVE)i,t-1 -0.1877 9.115***  -0.0706 1.212  0.0592 1.159  0.0609 1.223 





Table T4.35. (continued) 
  Y=AGDAC   Y=AGDCF   Y=AGDPROD   Y=AGDDISEXP 
  Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square 
aROAi,t 3.1203 46.441***  -2.7025 35.266***  -0.2950 0.478  2.2869 23.461*** 
aDEBTi,t-1 -1.2477 4.089**  -0.8252 1.736  -1.0067 3.073*   0.8701 2.812*  
aNOAi,t-1 -1.1258 13.764***          
aRDi,t -0.0083 0.15  0.0354 2.365  -0.0042 0.041  -0.1010 34.815*** 
aCAPi,t -0.0440 0.023  -0.3172 0.996  -0.7008 5.4**  -0.5869 4.066** 
aBOOKTAXi,t 0.0057 0.611  -0.0143 5.035**  0.0009 0.021  0.0007 0.008 
ESEOi,t 0.7206 17.394***  0.5120 7.877***  0.1598 0.826  0.2862 2.574 
EAUDITi,t 0.7056 15.762***          
EMAi,t -0.0789 0.061  0.0700 0.043  0.3037 1.032  0.0370 0.012 
EDISTRESSi,t 0.4813 3.965**  1.1104 26.698***  0.7153 10.928***  0.6704 8.008*** 
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients together with the chi-square statistics of the following logistic regressions: ܮ݋݃݅ݐ(ܻ) = ߙ + ߚଵ(ܫܮܹ_ܻ × ܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܣܩܧ) +ߚଶܧܦܧܤܶ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଷܧܦܦܧܤܶ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚସܧܵܧܱ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚହܧܯܣ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚ଺ܧܱܸ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚ଻ܧܴܱܣ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚ଼ܧܦܴܱܣ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଽܧܦܫܸ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ +ߚଵ଴ܧܦܫܴܵܶܧܵܵ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵଵܧܵܫܼܧ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵଶܧܥܻܥܮܧ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵଷܧܣܷܦܫܶ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵସܧܤܮܱܣܶ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵହܧܥܣܲ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵ଺ܧܤܶ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ +	?ߚ௞ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௞ + ߝ; where Y is replaced by AGDAC (columns 2 and 3), AGDCF (columns 4 and 5), AGDPROD (columns 6 and 7), AGDDISEXP (columns 8 and 9); Controlk include 





Table T4.36. Aggressive earnings management and nationality of interlocked directors – Controlling for the pair having similar 
individual signals of earnings management 
  Y=AGDAC   Y=AGDCF   Y=AGDPROD   Y=AGDDISEXP 
  Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square 
Intercept -3.1414 427.518***  -3.0301 564.843***  -2.5071 566.476***  -2.5600 575.47*** 
ILW_Y_BRITi,t 0.6823 4.598**  0.6251 3.865**  0.6685 6.16**  0.6307 5.817** 
ILW_Y_NONBRITi,t 0.4453 0.678  -1.5787 2.774*   -0.0341 0.003  -0.0273 0.002 
EDEBT_Y_PAIRi,t 0.2930 0.199  0.7454 0.652  -13.6202 0  -13.7790 0 
EDDEBT_Y_PAIRi,t -14.5355 0.001  -13.5667 0.001  -0.4309 0.431  -2.0909 4.003** 
ESEO_Y_PAIRi,t 0.5367 0.275  0.9447 1.09  -13.8248 0  0.6863 0.958 
EMA_Y_PAIRi,t -14.4722 0  -0.7058 0  -14.0967 0    
EOV_Y_PAIRi,t 0.3211 0.239  -2.3158 2.138  0.9082 1.161  1.0542 1.436 
EROA_Y_PAIRi,t            
EDROA_Y_PAIRi,t            
EDIV_Y_PAIRi,t -14.1376 0          
EDISTRESS_Y_PAIRi,t 1.4564 1.394  -2.1797 4.245**  14.4079 0  29.4571 0.001 
ESIZE_Y_PAIRi,t          -14.9406 0 
ECYCLE_Y_PAIRi,t       -13.6329 0    
EAUDIT_Y_PAIRi,t -0.7269 1.775          
EBLOAT_Y_PAIRi,t -1.2070 0.616          
ECAP_Y_PAIRi,t -1.8987 1.845  -12.8640 0  -13.1626 0  -0.4331 0.124 
EBT_Y_PAIRi,t 1.8652 2.952*    0.9965 1.457   -14.3026 0   -12.3579 0 
aBOLINKi,t 0.0323 0.166  0.0046 0.003  -0.1301 2.689  -0.1890 5.651** 
aBOSIZEi,t -0.0303 0.321  -0.1084 3.533*   0.0368 0.609  -0.0313 0.411 
aBOINDi,t -0.5434 0.761  -0.7744 1.352  -1.3497 4.907**  -0.2370 0.152 
aAUCOMSIZEi,t -0.0133 0.024  0.0312 0.121  -0.0188 0.06  -0.0755 1.013 
aAUCOMINDi,t -0.2200 0.176  -0.0781 0.018  0.2318 0.182  0.4823 0.679 
DUALITYi,t 0.3076 1.426  0.1123 0.136  0.2207 0.664  0.0056 0 
aTOTCOMPENi,t 0.0000 0.003  -0.0005 0.369  -0.0006 0.639  0.0014 3.18*  
aLn(MVE)i,t-1 -0.1850 8.859***  -0.0660 1.051  0.0586 1.132  0.0611 1.232 




Table T4.36. (continued) 
  Y=AGDAC   Y=AGDCF   Y=AGDPROD   Y=AGDDISEXP 
  Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square 
aROAi,t 3.1304 46.833***  -2.7634 36.431***  -0.2945 0.475  2.2719 23.17*** 
aDEBTi,t-1 -1.2258 3.952**  -0.9630 2.307  -1.0119 3.1*  0.9073 3.026*  
aNOAi,t-1 -1.1276 13.802***          
aRDi,t -0.0086 0.158  0.0360 2.451  -0.0046 0.051  -0.1008 34.649*** 
aCAPi,t -0.0524 0.033  -0.2182 0.46  -0.6965 5.321**  -0.5820 4.007** 
aBOOKTAXi,t 0.0053 0.543  -0.0148 5.405**  0.0010 0.024  0.0008 0.012 
ESEOi,t 0.7179 17.265***  0.5238 8.2***  0.1597 0.824  0.2842 2.543 
EAUDITi,t 0.7093 15.898***          
EMAi,t -0.0817 0.065  0.0622 0.034  0.3072 1.057  0.0384 0.013 
EDISTRESSi,t 0.4838 4**   1.1123 26.772***  0.7159 10.939***  0.6627 7.825*** 
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients together with the chi-square statistics of the following logistic regressions: ܮ݋݃݅ݐ(ܻ) = ߙ + ߚଵܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܤܴܫܶ +ߚଶܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܰ ܱܰܤܴܫܶ + ߚଷܧܦܧܤܶ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚସܧܦܦܧܤܶ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚହܧܵܧܱ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚ଺ܧܯܣ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚ଻ܧܱܸ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚ଼ܧܴܱܣ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ +ߚଽܧܦܴܱܣ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵ଴ܧܦܫܸ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵଵܧܦܫܴܵܶܧܵܵ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵଶܧܵܫܼܧ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵଷܧܥܻܥܮܧ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵସܧܣܷܦܫܶ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵହܧܤܮܱܣܶ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ +ߚଵ଺ܧܥܣܲ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵ଻ܧܤܶ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + 	?ߚ௞ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௞ + ߝ; where Y is replaced by AGDAC (columns 2 and 3), AGDCF (columns 4 and 5), AGDPROD (columns 6 and 7), 
AGDDISEXP (columns 8 and 9); Controlk include the variables described in Section 4.5.3. Definitions of variables are in Section 4.9. * , * * , *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 
1% levels, respectively. 
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Table T4.37. Aggressive earnings management and positions of interlocked directors at the exposed firms – Controlling for the pair 
having similar individual signals of earnings management 
  Y=AGDAC   Y=AGDCF   Y=AGDPROD   Y=AGDDISEXP 
  Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square 
Intercept -3.1404 427.66***  -3.0153 567.396***  -2.5061 566.572***  -2.5612 575.85*** 
ILW_Y_FINEXi,t 0.6379 4.336**  0.4078 1.708  0.5242 4.015**  0.5049 3.728*  
ILW_Y_NOFINEXi,t 0.5626 0.724  -1.2733 1.231  0.8326 1.567  0.7891 1.775 
EDEBT_Y_PAIRi,t 0.3086 0.221  1.1156 1.696  -13.5369 0  -13.0929 0.001 
EDDEBT_Y_PAIRi,t -14.5786 0.001  -13.4674 0.001  -0.4238 0.412  -2.0311 3.802*  
ESEO_Y_PAIRi,t 0.5813 0.324  0.8521 0.864  -14.1484 0  0.6084 0.744 
EMA_Y_PAIRi,t -14.4592 0  -0.6361 0  -13.9708 0    
EOV_Y_PAIRi,t 0.3194 0.236  -1.2979 0.823  0.9617 1.315  1.1816 1.81 
EROA_Y_PAIRi,t            
EDROA_Y_PAIRi,t            
EDIV_Y_PAIRi,t -14.3289 0          
EDISTRESS_Y_PAIRi,t 1.5304 1.58  -2.0187 3.576*   14.7730 0  28.0488 0.001 
ESIZE_Y_PAIRi,t          -14.1499 0 
ECYCLE_Y_PAIRi,t       -13.5165 0    
EAUDIT_Y_PAIRi,t -0.7034 1.666          
EBLOAT_Y_PAIRi,t -1.3065 0.741          
ECAP_Y_PAIRi,t -1.9468 1.938  -13.0673 0  -13.0210 0  -0.3263 0.07 
EBT_Y_PAIRi,t 1.8301 2.839*    1.2435 2.162   -14.1840 0   -11.5530 0 
aBOLINKi,t 0.0355 0.203  0.0213 0.06  -0.1196 2.331  -0.1851 5.45** 
aBOSIZEi,t -0.0300 0.314  -0.1011 3.09*   0.0359 0.577  -0.0300 0.379 
aBOINDi,t -0.5535 0.789  -0.7284 1.195  -1.3173 4.682**  -0.2453 0.163 
aAUCOMSIZEi,t -0.0155 0.032  0.0212 0.056  -0.0216 0.08  -0.0735 0.963 
aAUCOMINDi,t -0.2165 0.171  -0.1050 0.033  0.1973 0.132  0.4762 0.663 
DUALITYi,t 0.3097 1.441  0.1263 0.173  0.2256 0.694  0.0126 0.002 
aTOTCOMPENi,t 0.0000 0.002  -0.0004 0.222  -0.0006 0.556  0.0014 3.134*  
aLn(MVE)i,t-1 -0.1850 8.87***  -0.0651 1.026  0.0583 1.126  0.0600 1.189 




Table T4.37. (continued) 
  Y=AGDAC   Y=AGDCF   Y=AGDPROD   Y=AGDDISEXP 
  Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square 
aROAi,t 3.1300 46.856***  -2.7125 35.261***  -0.2790 0.428  2.2670 23.09*** 
aDEBTi,t-1 -1.2191 3.914**  -0.8506 1.828  -1.0223 3.178*   0.8586 2.731*  
aNOAi,t-1 -1.1243 13.729***          
aRDi,t -0.0084 0.151  0.0365 2.487  -0.0046 0.05  -0.1018 35.355*** 
aCAPi,t -0.0611 0.045  -0.3135 0.965  -0.7187 5.68**  -0.5883 4.096** 
aBOOKTAXi,t 0.0053 0.529  -0.0144 5.13**  0.0008 0.013  0.0007 0.009 
ESEOi,t 0.7179 17.252***  0.5092 7.743***  0.1601 0.83  0.2850 2.558 
EAUDITi,t 0.7066 15.817***          
EMAi,t -0.0781 0.06  0.0816 0.058  0.3088 1.07  0.0296 0.008 
EDISTRESSi,t 0.4867 4.053**  1.1172 27.078***  0.7163 10.924***  0.6672 7.922*** 
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients together with the chi-square statistics of the following logistic regressions: ܮ݋݃݅ݐ(ܻ) = ߙ + ߚଵܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܨܫܰܧܺ +ߚଶܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܰ ܱܨܫܰܧܺ + ߚଷܧܦܧܤܶ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚସܧܦܦܧܤܶ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚହܧܵܧܱ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚ଺ܧܯܣ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚ଻ܧܱܸ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚ଼ܧܴܱܣ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ +ߚଽܧܦܴܱܣ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵ଴ܧܦܫܸ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵଵܧܦܫܴܵܶܧܵܵ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵଶܧܵܫܼܧ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵଷܧܥܻܥܮܧ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵସܧܣܷܦܫܶ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵହܧܤܮܱܣܶ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ +ߚଵ଺ܧܥܣܲ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵ଻ܧܤܶ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + 	?ߚ௞ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௞ + ߝ; where Y is replaced by AGDAC (columns 2 and 3), AGDCF (columns 4 and 5), AGDPROD (columns 6 and 7), 
AGDDISEXP (columns 8 and 9); Controlk include the variables described in Section 4.5.3. Definitions of variables are in Section 4.9. * , * * , *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 





Table T4.38. Aggressive earnings management and positions of interlocked directors at the contagious firms – Controlling for the pair 
having similar individual signals of earnings management 
  Y=AGDAC   Y=AGDCF   Y=AGDPROD   Y=AGDDISEXP 
  Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square 
Intercept -3.1414 427.404***  -3.0113 568.091***  -2.5058 566.681***  -2.5666 574.415*** 
ILW_Y_FINCOi,t 0.5643 3.261*   0.3237 1.047  0.5483 4.331**  0.6761 6.843*** 
ILW_Y_NOFINCOi,t 0.9766 2.425  0.2773 0.084  0.5843 0.585  -0.6008 0.562 
EDEBT_Y_PAIRi,t 0.3697 0.314  0.9199 1.059  -13.4802 0  -13.2331 0 
EDDEBT_Y_PAIRi,t -14.6364 0.001  -13.4387 0.001  -0.3952 0.363  -2.0183 3.741*  
ESEO_Y_PAIRi,t 0.5619 0.301  0.7702 0.696  -14.0689 0  0.7814 1.215 
EMA_Y_PAIRi,t -14.4552 0  -0.5542 0  -14.0555 0    
EOV_Y_PAIRi,t 0.2830 0.18  -2.1344 1.846  0.9588 1.297  1.0215 1.356 
EROA_Y_PAIRi,t            
EDROA_Y_PAIRi,t            
EDIV_Y_PAIRi,t -14.2514 0          
EDISTRESS_Y_PAIRi,t 1.6869 1.886  -1.9483 3.35*   14.6890 0  27.9433 0.001 
ESIZE_Y_PAIRi,t          -14.0542 0 
ECYCLE_Y_PAIRi,t       -13.5669 0    
EAUDIT_Y_PAIRi,t -0.6366 1.333          
EBLOAT_Y_PAIRi,t -1.3922 0.813          
ECAP_Y_PAIRi,t -2.1352 2.274  -12.8861 0  -13.0805 0  0.1145 0.008 
EBT_Y_PAIRi,t 1.7912 2.8*   1.0011 1.404   -14.2099 0   -11.7836 0 
aBOLINKi,t 0.0358 0.208  0.0273 0.1  -0.1203 2.341  -0.2018 6.285** 
aBOSIZEi,t -0.0277 0.268  -0.1022 3.159*   0.0360 0.583  -0.0311 0.408 
aBOINDi,t -0.5550 0.798  -0.7000 1.109  -1.3264 4.752**  -0.2008 0.109 
aAUCOMSIZEi,t -0.0143 0.028  0.0269 0.09  -0.0220 0.082  -0.0691 0.859 
aAUCOMINDi,t -0.2177 0.173  -0.1168 0.041  0.2013 0.138  0.4637 0.625 
DUALITYi,t 0.3106 1.454  0.1349 0.199  0.2242 0.685  0.0114 0.001 
aTOTCOMPENi,t 0.0000 0.003  -0.0003 0.17  -0.0006 0.553  0.0014 3.053*  
aLn(MVE)i,t-1 -0.1852 8.878***  -0.0720 1.26  0.0593 1.163  0.0568 1.059 




Table T4.38. (continued) 
  Y=AGDAC   Y=AGDCF   Y=AGDPROD   Y=AGDDISEXP 
  Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square 
aROAi,t 3.1196 46.573***  -2.6911 34.795***  -0.2846 0.443  2.3337 24.126*** 
aDEBTi,t-1 -1.2201 3.918**  -0.8153 1.691  -1.0221 3.157*   0.9440 3.269*  
aNOAi,t-1 -1.1411 14.049***          
aRDi,t -0.0085 0.155  0.0344 2.234  -0.0046 0.05  -0.1004 34.391*** 
aCAPi,t -0.0563 0.038  -0.3206 1.014  -0.7156 5.618**  -0.6013 4.278** 
aBOOKTAXi,t 0.0054 0.56  -0.0142 4.943**  0.0007 0.013  0.0009 0.016 
ESEOi,t 0.7172 17.203***  0.5085 7.768***  0.1600 0.827  0.2899 2.651 
EAUDITi,t 0.7113 15.97***          
EMAi,t -0.0762 0.057  0.0713 0.045  0.3075 1.059  0.0148 0.002 
EDISTRESSi,t 0.4813 3.962**  1.1083 26.574***  0.7153 10.898***  0.6671 7.925*** 
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients together with the chi-square statistics of the following logistic regressions: ܮ݋݃݅ݐ(ܻ) = ߙ + ߚଵܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܨܫܰܥܱ +ߚଶܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܰ ܱܨܫܰܥܱ + ߚଷܧܦܧܤܶ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚସܧܦܦܧܤܶ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚହܧܵܧܱ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚ଺ܧܯܣ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚ଻ܧܱܸ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚ଼ܧܴܱܣ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ +ߚଽܧܦܴܱܣ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵ଴ܧܦܫܸ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵଵܧܦܫܴܵܶܧܵܵ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵଶܧܵܫܼܧ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵଷܧܥܻܥܮܧ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵସܧܣܷܦܫܶ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵହܧܤܮܱܣܶ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ +ߚଵ଺ܧܥܣܲ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵ଻ܧܤܶ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + 	?ߚ௞ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௞ + ߝ; where Y is replaced by AGDAC (columns 2 and 3), AGDCF (columns 4 and 5), AGDPROD (columns 6 and 7), 
AGDDISEXP (columns 8 and 9); Controlk include the variables described in Section 4.5.3. Definitions of variables are in Section 4.9. * , * * , ***  indicate significance at 10%, 
5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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The specification designed above to address the shared individual contexts of 
earnings management might suffer from multi-collinearity issue because some of the 
control variables are also used to define the common characteristics. For example, 
ESEO is used as a control variable, but it is also used to define ESEO_PAIR. To 
mitigate this concern, Equation (E4.2), (E4.3), (E4.4), (E4.5), (E4.6) and (E4.7) are 
re-estimated with the fifteen pair dummy controls being added to the right hand side 
(i.e. similar to the previous specification), but only corporate governance and 
compensation variables are retained as control variables. Again, the results, as 
presented in Table T4.39, T4.40, T4.41, T4.42, T4.43 and T4.44, indicate that the 
main conclusions of the chapter do not change qualitatively under this specification. 
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Table T4.39. Aggressive earnings management and interlocked directors – Controlling for the pair having similar individual signals of 
earnings management (no fundamentals as control variables) 
  Y=AGDAC   Y=AGDCF   Y=AGDPROD   Y=AGDDISEXP 
  Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square 
Intercept -2.3686 794.494***   -2.3262 763.284***   -2.2599 816.766***   -2.2558 823.931*** 
ILW_Yi,t 0.3760 1.856  0.1624 0.335  0.4669 3.54*   0.4533 3.533*  
EDEBT_Y_PAIRi,t 0.3833 0.357  1.1330 2.072  -13.5681 0.000  -12.7219 0.000 
EDDEBT_Y_PAIRi,t -14.1524 0.001  -13.7974 0.001  -0.5015 0.600  -1.9616 3.574*  
ESEO_Y_PAIRi,t 0.7344 0.584  0.9160 1.105  -14.1285 0.000  0.7592 1.324 
EMA_Y_PAIRi,t -14.4715 0.000  -0.0290 0.000  -13.9368 0.000    
EOV_Y_PAIRi,t 0.6216 0.926  -1.8629 2.037  0.7774 0.865  0.9996 1.350 
EROA_Y_PAIRi,t            
EDROA_Y_PAIRi,t            
EDIV_Y_PAIRi,t -14.1619 0.000          
EDISTRESS_Y_PAIRi,t 1.3281 1.324  -0.0143 0.000  15.2338 0.000  28.6370 0.001 
ESIZE_Y_PAIRi,t          -12.7041 0.000 
ECYCLE_Y_PAIRi,t       -13.8975 0.000    
EAUDIT_Y_PAIRi,t 0.0252 0.002          
EBLOAT_Y_PAIRi,t -0.8984 0.378          
ECAP_Y_PAIRi,t -1.3062 0.920  -13.9508 0.000  -13.5683 0.000  -0.1995 0.030 
EBT_Y_PAIRi,t 1.2012 1.396   1.5733 5.157**   -13.9046 0.000   -13.1486 0.000 
aBOLINKi,t -0.0425 0.324  -0.0672 0.719  -0.1399 3.401*   -0.1602 4.533** 
aBOSIZEi,t -0.1222 6.827***  -0.2422 23.807***  0.0166 0.162  0.0220 0.289 
aBOINDi,t -1.3089 4.843**  -0.9789 2.681  -1.3717 5.412**  0.0544 0.009 
aAUCOMSIZEi,t -0.1184 2.023  -0.0025 0.001  -0.0227 0.096  -0.0764 1.050 
aAUCOMINDi,t -0.5667 1.335  -0.2024 0.163  0.1407 0.072  0.1321 0.057 
DUALITYi,t 0.4402 3.278*   -0.0297 0.011  0.1966 0.544  0.0152 0.003 
aTOTCOMPENi,t -0.0001 0.033  0.0011 3.866**  -0.0001 0.015  -0.0006 0.947 
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients together with the chi-square statistics of the following logistic regressions: ܮ݋݃݅ݐ(ܻ) = ߙ + ߚଵܫܮܹ_ܻ +ߚଶܧܦܧܤܶ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଷܧܦܦܧܤܶ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚସܧܵܧܱ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚହܧܯܣ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚ଺ܧܱܸ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚ଻ܧܴܱܣ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚ଼ܧܦܴܱܣ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଽܧܦܫܸ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ +ߚଵ଴ܧܦܫܴܵܶܧܵܵ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵଵܧܵܫܼܧ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵଶܧܥܻܥܮܧ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵଷܧܣܷܦܫܶ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵସܧܤܮܱܣܶ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵହܧܥܣܲ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵ଺ܧܤܶ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ +ߚଵ଻ܽܤܱܮܫܰܭ + ߚଵ଼ܽܤܱܵܫܼܧ + ߚଵଽܽܤܱܫܰܦ + ߚଶ଴ܽܣܷܥܱܯܵܫܼܧ + ߚଶଵܽܣܷܥܱܯܫܰܦ + ߚଶଶܦܷܣܮܫܻܶ + ߚଶଷܱܽܶܶܥܱܯܲܧܰ + ߝ; where Y is replaced by AGDAC (columns 
2 and 3), AGDCF (columns 4 and 5), AGDPROD (columns 6 and 7), AGDDISEXP (columns 8 and 9). Definitions of variables are in Section 4.9. * , ** , ***  indicate significance at 
10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table T4.40. Aggressive earnings management and gender of interlocked directors – Controlling for the pair having similar individual 
signals of earnings management (no fundamentals as control variables) 
  Y=AGDAC   Y=AGDCF   Y=AGDPROD   Y=AGDDISEXP 
  Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square 
Intercept -2.3689 794***   -2.3286 760.524***  -2.2617 815.051***  -2.2566 823.584*** 
ILW_Y_MALEi,t 0.4278 2.168  0.2306 0.629  0.5552 4.481**  0.5633 4.742** 
ILW_Y_FEMALEi,t 0.0664 0.010  -0.3982 0.240  -0.0325 0.003  0.0264 0.003 
EDEBT_Y_PAIRi,t 0.3445 0.285  1.0597 1.774  -13.6401 0.000  -12.6680 0.000 
EDDEBT_Y_PAIRi,t -14.1554 0.001  -13.8247 0.001  -0.5055 0.612  -1.9966 3.682*  
ESEO_Y_PAIRi,t 0.7535 0.611  0.9913 1.285  -14.0209 0.000  0.8073 1.470 
EMA_Y_PAIRi,t -14.4714 0.000  -0.0576 0.000  -14.0088 0.000    
EOV_Y_PAIRi,t 0.6285 0.951  -1.9176 2.127  0.8120 0.935  1.0330 1.429 
EROA_Y_PAIRi,t            
EDROA_Y_PAIRi,t            
EDIV_Y_PAIRi,t -13.8501 0.000          
EDISTRESS_Y_PAIRi,t 1.1814 0.982  -0.0796 0.006  15.1141 0.000  28.4574 0.001 
ESIZE_Y_PAIRi,t          -12.8177 0.000 
ECYCLE_Y_PAIRi,t       -13.9681 0.000    
EAUDIT_Y_PAIRi,t -0.0172 0.001          
EBLOAT_Y_PAIRi,t -0.8130 0.311          
ECAP_Y_PAIRi,t -1.2354 0.821  -13.9098 0.000  -13.6602 0.000  -0.2933 0.066 
EBT_Y_PAIRi,t 1.3119 1.593   1.6361 5.39**   -13.9709 0.000   -13.0692 0.000 
aBOLINKi,t -0.0467 0.384  -0.0747 0.864  -0.1489 3.743*   -0.1643 4.744** 
aBOSIZEi,t -0.1234 6.932***  -0.2433 23.967***  0.0169 0.167  0.0202 0.242 
aBOINDi,t -1.3067 4.823**  -0.9916 2.745*   -1.3837 5.498**  0.0503 0.007 
aAUCOMSIZEi,t -0.1151 1.902  -0.0015 0.000  -0.0186 0.065  -0.0758 1.033 
aAUCOMINDi,t -0.5613 1.307  -0.1873 0.139  0.1617 0.095  0.1492 0.072 
DUALITYi,t 0.4375 3.238*   -0.0347 0.016  0.1948 0.534  0.0065 0.001 
aTOTCOMPENi,t -0.0001 0.038  0.0011 3.674*   -0.0001 0.020  -0.0006 1.011 
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients together with the chi-square statistics of the following logistic regressions: ܮ݋݃݅ݐ(ܻ) = ߙ + ߚଵܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܯܣܮܧ +ߚଶܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܨܧܯܣܮܧ + ߚଷܧܦܧܤܶ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚସܧܦܦܧܤܶ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚହܧܵܧܱ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚ଺ܧܯܣ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚ଻ܧܱܸ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚ଼ܧܴܱܣ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଽܧܦܴܱܣ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ +ߚଵ଴ܧܦܫܸ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵଵܧܦܫܴܵܶܧܵܵ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵଶܧܵܫܼܧ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵଷܧܥܻܥܮܧ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵସܧܣܷܦܫܶ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵହܧܤܮܱܣܶ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵ଺ܧܥܣܲ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ +ߚଵ଻ܧܤܶ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵ଼ܽܤܱܮܫܰܭ + ߚଵଽܽܤܱܵܫܼܧ + ߚଶ଴ܽܤܱܫܰܦ + ߚଶଵܽܣܷܥܱܯܵܫܼܧ + ߚଶଶܽܣܷܥܱܯܫܰܦ + ߚଶଷܦܷܣܮܫܻܶ + ߚଶସܱܽܶܶܥܱܯܲܧܰ + ߝ; where Y is replaced 
by AGDAC (columns 2 and 3), AGDCF (columns 4 and 5), AGDPROD (columns 6 and 7), AGDDISEXP (columns 8 and 9). Definitions of variables are in Section 4.9. * , * * , *** 
indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table T4.41. Aggressive earnings management and age of interlocked directors – Controlling for the pair having similar individual 
signals of earnings management (no fundamentals as control variables) 
  Y=AGDAC   Y=AGDCF   Y=AGDPROD   Y=AGDDISEXP 
  Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square 
Intercept -2.3643 806.668***  -2.3228 768.061***  -2.2617 827.617***  -2.2670 833.454*** 
ILW_Yi,t*ILW_Y_AGEi,t 0.0064 1.724  0.0023 0.212  0.0091 4.425**  0.0103 6.237** 
EDEBT_Y_PAIRi,t 0.3773 0.342  1.1475 2.089  -13.5875 0.000  -12.6373 0.000 
EDDEBT_Y_PAIRi,t -14.2341 0.001  -13.7748 0.001  -0.4877 0.581  -2.0660 3.948** 
ESEO_Y_PAIRi,t 0.7920 0.683  0.9290 1.133  -14.0337 0.000  0.7827 1.457 
EMA_Y_PAIRi,t -14.4704 0.000  -0.0341 0.000  -14.0269 0.000    
EOV_Y_PAIRi,t 0.6392 0.980  -1.8889 2.053  0.7527 0.811  0.8881 1.067 
EROA_Y_PAIRi,t            
EDROA_Y_PAIRi,t            
EDIV_Y_PAIRi,t -13.7926 0.000          
EDISTRESS_Y_PAIRi,t 1.1724 0.997  0.0192 0.000  15.1997 0.000  28.3398 0.001 
ESIZE_Y_PAIRi,t          -12.7239 0.000 
ECYCLE_Y_PAIRi,t       -13.9775 0.000    
EAUDIT_Y_PAIRi,t 0.0148 0.001          
EBLOAT_Y_PAIRi,t -0.8122 0.304          
ECAP_Y_PAIRi,t -1.2271 0.793  -14.0216 0.000  -13.6337 0.000  -0.2751 0.058 
EBT_Y_PAIRi,t 1.3220 1.637   1.6150 5.522**   -13.9430 0.000   -13.0140 0.000 
aBOLINKi,t -0.0435 0.336  -0.0662 0.688  -0.1477 3.695*   -0.1722 5.141** 
aBOSIZEi,t -0.1227 6.878***  -0.2423 23.831***  0.0166 0.161  0.0222 0.294 
aBOINDi,t -1.3065 4.823**  -0.9817 2.695  -1.3829 5.493**  0.0485 0.007 
aAUCOMSIZEi,t -0.1147 1.902  -0.0019 0.001  -0.0187 0.066  -0.0766 1.049 
aAUCOMINDi,t -0.5556 1.283  -0.1962 0.153  0.1651 0.099  0.1463 0.070 
DUALITYi,t 0.4397 3.272*   -0.0313 0.013  0.1964 0.542  0.0224 0.006 
aTOTCOMPENi,t -0.0001 0.043  0.0011 3.859**  -0.0001 0.018  -0.0006 0.947 
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients together with the chi-square statistics of the following logistic regressions: ܮ݋݃݅ݐ(ܻ) = ߙ + ߚଵ(ܫܮܹ_ܻ × ܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܣܩܧ) +ߚଶܧܦܧܤܶ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଷܧܦܦܧܤܶ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚସܧܵܧܱ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚହܧܯܣ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚ଺ܧܱܸ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚ଻ܧܴܱܣ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚ଼ܧܦܴܱܣ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଽܧܦܫܸ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ +ߚଵ଴ܧܦܫܴܵܶܧܵܵ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵଵܧܵܫܼܧ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵଶܧܥܻܥܮܧ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵଷܧܣܷܦܫܶ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵସܧܤܮܱܣܶ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵହܧܥܣܲ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵ଺ܧܤܶ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ +ߚଵ଻ܽܤܱܮܫܰܭ + ߚଵ଼ܽܤܱܵܫܼܧ + ߚଵଽܽܤܱܫܰܦ + ߚଶ଴ܽܣܷܥܱܯܵܫܼܧ + ߚଶଵܽܣܷܥܱܯܫܰܦ + ߚଶଶܦܷܣܮܫܻܶ + ߚଶଷܱܽܶܶܥܱܯܲܧܰ + ߝ; where Y is replaced by AGDAC (columns 
2 and 3), AGDCF (columns 4 and 5), AGDPROD (columns 6 and 7), AGDDISEXP (columns 8 and 9). Definitions of variables are in Section 4.9. * , ** , ***  indicate significance at 
10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table T4.42. Aggressive earnings management and nationality of interlocked directors – Controlling for the pair having similar 
individual signals of earnings management (no fundamentals as control variables) 
  Y=AGDAC   Y=AGDCF   Y=AGDPROD   Y=AGDDISEXP 
  Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square 
Intercept -2.3687 794.205***  -2.3300 760.128***  -2.2617 815.233***  -2.2557 824.015*** 
ILW_Y_BRITi,t 0.4215 1.933  0.3487 1.415  0.5930 5.038**  0.5376 4.498** 
ILW_Y_NONBRITi,t 0.2287 0.196  -0.8556 1.251  -0.1487 0.059  -0.0490 0.006 
EDEBT_Y_PAIRi,t 0.3667 0.325  1.0791 1.808  -13.6670 0.000  -12.6305 0.000 
EDDEBT_Y_PAIRi,t -14.1353 0.001  -13.8678 0.001  -0.5201 0.649  -1.9872 3.666*  
ESEO_Y_PAIRi,t 0.6982 0.522  0.9761 1.256  -13.8702 0.000  0.7746 1.368 
EMA_Y_PAIRi,t -14.4788 0.000  -0.1251 0.000  -14.0328 0.000    
EOV_Y_PAIRi,t 0.6250 0.934  -2.0073 2.294  0.7272 0.751  0.9184 1.131 
EROA_Y_PAIRi,t            
EDROA_Y_PAIRi,t            
EDIV_Y_PAIRi,t -14.0130 0.000          
EDISTRESS_Y_PAIRi,t 1.2590 1.150  -0.1318 0.017  14.9768 0.000  28.3781 0.001 
ESIZE_Y_PAIRi,t          -12.7925 0.000 
ECYCLE_Y_PAIRi,t       -13.9930 0.000    
EAUDIT_Y_PAIRi,t -0.0102 0.000          
EBLOAT_Y_PAIRi,t -0.8264 0.314          
ECAP_Y_PAIRi,t -1.2764 0.878  -13.8271 0.000  -13.6961 0.000  -0.2693 0.055 
EBT_Y_PAIRi,t 1.2457 1.469   1.6224 5.197**   -14.0141 0.000   -13.0239 0.000 
aBOLINKi,t -0.0443 0.348  -0.0777 0.934  -0.1484 3.745*   -0.1626 4.654** 
aBOSIZEi,t -0.1224 6.826***  -0.2451 24.311***  0.0170 0.169  0.0217 0.281 
aBOINDi,t -1.2998 4.764**  -1.0121 2.856*   -1.3897 5.539**  0.0537 0.009 
aAUCOMSIZEi,t -0.1178 2.000  0.0017 0.000  -0.0196 0.072  -0.0770 1.064 
aAUCOMINDi,t -0.5688 1.343  -0.1679 0.112  0.1721 0.107  0.1418 0.065 
DUALITYi,t 0.4409 3.289*   -0.0402 0.021  0.1931 0.524  0.0088 0.001 
aTOTCOMPENi,t -0.0001 0.036  0.0010 3.497*  -0.0001 0.022  -0.0006 0.915 
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients together with the chi-square statistics of the following logistic regressions: ܮ݋݃݅ݐ(ܻ) = ߙ + ߚଵܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܤܴܫܶ +ߚଶܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܰ ܱܰܤܴܫܶ + ߚଷܧܦܧܤܶ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚସܧܦܦܧܤܶ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚହܧܵܧܱ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚ଺ܧܯܣ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚ଻ܧܱܸ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚ଼ܧܴܱܣ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ +ߚଽܧܦܴܱܣ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵ଴ܧܦܫܸ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵଵܧܦܫܴܵܶܧܵܵ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵଶܧܵܫܼܧ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵଷܧܥܻܥܮܧ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵସܧܣܷܦܫܶ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵହܧܤܮܱܣܶ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ +ߚଵ଺ܧܥܣܲ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵ଻ܧܤܶ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵ଼ܽܤܱܮܫܰܭ + ߚଵଽܽܤܱܵܫܼܧ + ߚଶ଴ܽܤܱܫܰܦ + ߚଶଵܽܣܷܥܱܯܵܫܼܧ + ߚଶଶܽܣܷܥܱܯܫܰܦ + ߚଶଷܦܷܣܮܫܻܶ + ߚଶସܱܽܶܶܥܱܯܲܧܰ +ߝ; where Y is replaced by AGDAC (columns 2 and 3), AGDCF (columns 4 and 5), AGDPROD (columns 6 and 7), AGDDISEXP (columns 8 and 9). Definitions of variables are in 
Section 4.9. * , * * , *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table T4.43. Aggressive earnings management and positions of interlocked directors at the exposed firms – Controlling for the pair 
having similar individual signals of earnings management (no fundamentals as control variables) 
  Y=AGDAC   Y=AGDCF   Y=AGDPROD   Y=AGDDISEXP 
  Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square 
Intercept -2.3685 794.5***  -2.3249 763.177***  -2.2598 816.843***  -2.2558 823.951*** 
ILW_Y_FINEXi,t 0.3951 1.861  0.1990 0.496  0.4463 2.999*   0.4308 2.9* 
ILW_Y_NOFINEXi,t 0.2557 0.157  -0.7336 0.545  0.6571 1.031  0.6197 1.152 
EDEBT_Y_PAIRi,t 0.3719 0.335  1.2642 2.604  -13.5960 0.000  -12.7529 0.000 
EDDEBT_Y_PAIRi,t -14.1507 0.001  -13.8101 0.001  -0.5172 0.633  -1.9658 3.592*  
ESEO_Y_PAIRi,t 0.7426 0.596  0.9971 1.279  -14.1715 0.000  0.7353 1.223 
EMA_Y_PAIRi,t -14.4762 0.000  -0.0560 0.000  -13.9011 0.000    
EOV_Y_PAIRi,t 0.6207 0.923  -1.4863 1.352  0.7847 0.882  1.0220 1.400 
EROA_Y_PAIRi,t            
EDROA_Y_PAIRi,t            
EDIV_Y_PAIRi,t -14.1795 0.000          
EDISTRESS_Y_PAIRi,t 1.2975 1.244  -0.0698 0.005  15.2773 0.000  28.6654 0.001 
ESIZE_Y_PAIRi,t          -12.8714 0.000 
ECYCLE_Y_PAIRi,t       -13.8618 0.000    
EAUDIT_Y_PAIRi,t 0.0117 0.001          
EBLOAT_Y_PAIRi,t -0.8955 0.376          
ECAP_Y_PAIRi,t -1.3039 0.916  -14.4341 0.000  -13.5459 0.000  -0.1801 0.025 
EBT_Y_PAIRi,t 1.2293 1.433   1.7294 5.837**   -13.8838 0.000   -13.1290 0.000 
aBOLINKi,t -0.0433 0.334  -0.0694 0.761  -0.1391 3.363*   -0.1600 4.526** 
aBOSIZEi,t -0.1216 6.728***  -0.2394 23.233***  0.0163 0.157  0.0219 0.288 
aBOINDi,t -1.2998 4.752**  -0.9739 2.653  -1.3707 5.403**  0.0511 0.008 
aAUCOMSIZEi,t -0.1193 2.047  -0.0059 0.005  -0.0226 0.096  -0.0759 1.037 
aAUCOMINDi,t -0.5698 1.348  -0.2013 0.161  0.1382 0.069  0.1322 0.057 
DUALITYi,t 0.4425 3.305*   -0.0343 0.015  0.1974 0.548  0.0151 0.003 
aTOTCOMPENi,t -0.0001 0.032  0.0011 3.813*   -0.0001 0.015  -0.0006 0.956 
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients together with the chi-square statistics of the following logistic regressions: ܮ݋݃݅ݐ(ܻ) = ߙ + ߚଵܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܨܫܰܧܺ +ߚଶܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܰ ܱܨܫܰܧܺ + ߚଷܧܦܧܤܶ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚସܧܦܦܧܤܶ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚହܧܵܧܱ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚ଺ܧܯܣ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚ଻ܧܱܸ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚ଼ܧܴܱܣ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ +ߚଽܧܦܴܱܣ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵ଴ܧܦܫܸ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵଵܧܦܫܴܵܶܧܵܵ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵଶܧܵܫܼܧ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵଷܧܥܻܥܮܧ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵସܧܣܷܦܫܶ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵହܧܤܮܱܣܶ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ +ߚଵ଺ܧܥܣܲ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵ଻ܧܤܶ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵ଼ܽܤܱܮܫܰܭ + ߚଵଽܽܤܱܵܫܼܧ + ߚଶ଴ܽܤܱܫܰܦ + ߚଶଵܽܣܷܥܱܯܵܫܼܧ + ߚଶଶܽܣܷܥܱܯܫܰܦ + ߚଶଷܦܷܣܮܫܻܶ + ߚଶସܱܽܶܶܥܱܯܲܧܰ +ߝ; where Y is replaced by AGDAC (columns 2 and 3), AGDCF (columns 4 and 5), AGDPROD (columns 6 and 7), AGDDISEXP (columns 8 and 9). Definitions of variables are in 
Section 4.9. * , * * , *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
 285 
 
Table T4.44. Aggressive earnings management and positions of interlocked directors at the contagious firms – Controlling for the pair 
having similar individual signals of earnings management (no fundamentals as control variables) 
  Y=AGDAC   Y=AGDCF   Y=AGDPROD   Y=AGDDISEXP 
  Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square   Coef. Chi-square 
Intercept -2.3681 794.162***   -2.3261 763.575***   -2.2609 815.639***   -2.2587 821.909*** 
ILW_Y_FINCOi,t 0.3547 1.421  0.1884 0.434  0.5110 3.89**  0.5573 5.02** 
ILW_Y_NOFINCOi,t 0.4787 0.674  -0.1651 0.037  0.0954 0.016  -0.5132 0.427 
EDEBT_Y_PAIRi,t 0.3990 0.381  1.1451 2.131  -13.6015 0.000  -12.8046 0.000 
EDDEBT_Y_PAIRi,t -14.1461 0.001  -13.7980 0.001  -0.5093 0.618  -1.9384 3.482*  
ESEO_Y_PAIRi,t 0.7258 0.569  0.9637 1.168  -14.1251 0.000  0.9022 1.825 
EMA_Y_PAIRi,t -14.4693 0.000  0.2977 0.000  -13.5524 0.000    
EOV_Y_PAIRi,t 0.6144 0.900  -1.9346 2.127  0.7380 0.775  0.9004 1.091 
EROA_Y_PAIRi,t            
EDROA_Y_PAIRi,t            
EDIV_Y_PAIRi,t -14.1417 0.000          
EDISTRESS_Y_PAIRi,t 1.3716 1.365  -0.0716 0.005  15.2281 0.000  28.4657 0.001 
ESIZE_Y_PAIRi,t          -12.8080 0.000 
ECYCLE_Y_PAIRi,t       -13.9276 0.000    
EAUDIT_Y_PAIRi,t 0.0454 0.008          
EBLOAT_Y_PAIRi,t -0.9227 0.393          
ECAP_Y_PAIRi,t -1.3614 0.964  -13.9145 0.000  -13.1894 0.000  0.1505 0.016 
EBT_Y_PAIRi,t 1.1945 1.378   1.6084 5.283**   -13.9351 0.000   -13.2498 0.000 
aBOLINKi,t -0.0424 0.322  -0.0672 0.720  -0.1436 3.542*   -0.1730 5.144** 
aBOSIZEi,t -0.1217 6.761***  -0.2414 23.623***  0.0167 0.163  0.0211 0.266 
aBOINDi,t -1.3106 4.856**  -0.9703 2.633  -1.3670 5.374**  0.0864 0.022 
aAUCOMSIZEi,t -0.1178 2.000  -0.0041 0.003  -0.0227 0.097  -0.0720 0.940 
aAUCOMINDi,t -0.5666 1.335  -0.2121 0.179  0.1274 0.059  0.1008 0.033 
DUALITYi,t 0.4405 3.283*   -0.0260 0.009  0.1980 0.551  0.0135 0.002 
aTOTCOMPENi,t -0.0001 0.030  0.0011 3.795*   -0.0001 0.016  -0.0006 1.073 
Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients together with the chi-square statistics of the following logistic regressions: ܮ݋݃݅ݐ(ܻ) = ߙ + ߚଵܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܨܫܰܥܱ +ߚଶܫܮܹ_ܻ _ܰ ܱܨܫܰܥܱ + ߚଷܧܦܧܤܶ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚସܧܦܦܧܤܶ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚହܧܵܧܱ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚ଺ܧܯܣ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚ଻ܧܱܸ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚ଼ܧܴܱܣ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ +ߚଽܧܦܴܱܣ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵ଴ܧܦܫܸ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵଵܧܦܫܴܵܶܧܵܵ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵଶܧܵܫܼܧ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵଷܧܥܻܥܮܧ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵସܧܣܷܦܫܶ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵହܧܤܮܱܣܶ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ +ߚଵ଺ܧܥܣܲ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵ଻ܧܤܶ_ܻ _ܲ ܣܫܴ + ߚଵ଼ܽܤܱܮܫܰܭ + ߚଵଽܽܤܱܵܫܼܧ + ߚଶ଴ܽܤܱܫܰܦ + ߚଶଵܽܣܷܥܱܯܵܫܼܧ + ߚଶଶܽܣܷܥܱܯܫܰܦ + ߚଶଷܦܷܣܮܫܻܶ + ߚଶସܱܽܶܶܥܱܯܲܧܰ +ߝ; where Y is replaced by AGDAC (columns 2 and 3), AGDCF (columns 4 and 5), AGDPROD (columns 6 and 7), AGDDISEXP (columns 8 and 9). Definitions of variables are in 
Section 4.9. * , * * , *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
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4.7.3. Other robustness tests 
4.7.3.1. Alternative specifications to estimate discretionary accruals 
Consistent with the rest of the thesis, this chapter employs the modified-Jones 
model to estimate discretionary. Hence, the results regarding the spread of 
aggressive accruals earnings management might be subject to the same criticism 
faced by Chapter 2 in relation to the specification errors of the discretionary accruals 
model (see Section 2.2.4. and 2.6.2 for more in-depth discussions). In response to 
those concerns, all main analyses of the chapter are replicated using various 
specifications to estimate the discretionary accruals model, including (i) the working 
capital discretionary accruals model, (ii) the cross-sectional version of the original 
Jones model, (iii) using the balance sheet approach to estimate total accruals and (iv) 
suppressing the intercept from the modified-Jones model. Details of the estimation of 
those alternative specifications are the same as described in Section 2.5.1.1 and 
2.6.2. The results, untabulated for brevity, suggest that the main conclusions do not 
change qualitatively using those alternative specifications.  
4.7.3.2. Different cut-off points to define aggressive earnings management 
In the main test, aggressive earnings management is identified as those which 
belongs to the top decile sorted by the measures of earnings management within 
each industry-year (see Section 4.5.1). The choice of defining stocks as those above 
the 90th percentile as aggressive is admittedly arbitrage, although it is one of the 
decisions which need to be made eventually for a research of this kind to be 
implementable. However, to alleviate any concerns that the results might be sensitive 
to the research choice regarding the definition of aggressive firms, the chapter also 
replicates all main analyses using the cut-off points at 85th and 95th percentiles to 
define aggressive firms. Unreported results show that in general the contagion effect 
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still exists using those different benchmarks to define aggressive earnings 
management. 
4.8. CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter empirically investigates the spread of aggressive earnings 
management through board interlocks. The chapter provides evidence that a firm is 
significantly more likely to be an aggressive earnings management firm if it is 
interlocked with another aggressive firm during the contagious period, defined as the 
year in which aggressive earnings management is detected at the contagious firm 
and two years after that. In the existing literature of the contagion of financial 
statement restatements via board interlocks (Chiu et al., 2013), the actual accounting 
practices which later result in restatements could be completely different between the 
contagious and exposed firms. The chapter contributes to this literature by showing 
that the exposed firm would mimic the aggressive financial reporting practices of the 
contagious firm, i.e. if the contagious firm is managing earnings using accruals (or 
real earnings) management, the exposed firm would be more likely to be an 
aggressive accruals (real earnings) management firm. Finally, the chapter finds that 
the contagion of aggressive earnings management is more pronounced if the 
interlocked director is male, older, British, or charged with duties which could 
influence financial reporting. These findings have implications both for regulators and 
practitioners given the current pressures to reform corporate governance structure in 
response to recent accounting scandals throughout the corporate world. The study 
also contributes to the growing literature on the contagion effects introduced by board 
interlocks and is among the first that investigates this issue in the UK context. 
4.9. DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES USED IN CHAPTER 4 
DAC, DCF, DPROD, DDISEXP are the measures of earnings management as 
defined in Chapter 2 (see Section 2.8). 
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ESCORE is the aggregate index which accumulates 15 individual signals of earnings 
management as defined in Chapter 2 (see Section 2.8). 
ESEO, EDDEBT, EMA, EOV, EROA, EDROA, EDIV, EDISTRESS, EDEBT, ESIZE, 
ECYCLE, EAUDIT, EBLOAT, ECAP and EBT are the components of ESCORE as 
defined in Chapter 2 (see Section 2.8). 
BOSIZE, BOIND, AUCOMSIZE, DUALITY, TOTCOMPEN, MVE, MTB, ROA, DEBT, 
NOA, CAP, BOOKTAX are as defined in Chapter 2 (see Section 2.8). 
AGDAC (AGDCF, AGDPROD, AGDDISEXP) is one if a firm is in the top decile 
ranked in each industry-year by DAC (DCF, DPROD, DDISEXP, respectively), zero 
otherwise. 
ILW_Y is one if a firm is interlocked with a contagious firm [i.e. those which has Y of 
one] during the contagious period [i.e. the period including the year in which the 
contagious firm is defined as aggressive and two following years], zero otherwise, 
where Y represents AGDAC, AGDCF, AGDPROD, AGDDISEXP. 
ILW_Y_MALE is one if ILW_Y is one and the interlocked director is male, zero 
otherwise, where Y represents AGDAC, AGDCF, AGDPROD, AGDDISEXP. 
ILW_Y_FEMALE is one if ILW_Y is one and the interlocked director is female, zero 
otherwise, where Y represents AGDAC, AGDCF, AGDPROD, AGDDISEXP. 
ILW_Y_AGE is age of the interlocked director at fiscal year-end (rounded to the 
nearest whole number of years) if ILW_Y is one, zero otherwise, where Y represents 
AGDAC, AGDCF, AGDPROD, AGDDISEXP. 
ILW_Y_BRIT is one if ILW_Y is one and the interlocked director is British, zero 
otherwise, where Y represents AGDAC, AGDCF, AGDPROD, AGDDISEXP. 
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ILW_Y_NONBRIT is one if ILW_Y is one and the interlocked director is not British, 
zero otherwise, where Y represents AGDAC, AGDCF, AGDPROD, AGDDISEXP. 
ILW_Y_FINEX is one if ILW_Y is one and the interlocked director is a chairman, chief 
executive officer, chief financial officer or member of audit committee of the exposed 
firm, zero otherwise, where Y represents AGDAC, AGDCF, AGDPROD, 
AGDDISEXP. 
ILW_Y_NOFINEX is one if ILW_Y is one and the interlocked director is not a 
chairman, chief executive officer, chief financial officer or member of audit committee 
of the exposed firm, zero otherwise, where Y represents AGDAC, AGDCF, 
AGDPROD, AGDDISEXP. 
ILW_Y_FINCO is one if ILW_Y is one and the interlocked director is a chairman, chief 
executive officer, chief financial officer or member of audit committee of the 
contagious firm, zero otherwise, where Y represents AGDAC, AGDCF, AGDPROD, 
AGDDISEXP. 
ILW_Y_NOFINCO is one if ILW_Y is one and the interlocked director is not a 
chairman, chief executive officer, chief financial officer or member of audit committee 
of the contagious firm, zero otherwise, where Y represents AGDAC, AGDCF, 
AGDPROD, AGDDISEXP. 
aBOSIZE (aBOIND, aAUCOMSIZE, aTOTCOMPEN, aMTB, aROA, aDEBT, aNOA, 
aCAP, aBOOKTAX) is BOSIZE (BOIND, AUCOMSIZE, TOTCOMPEN, MTB, ROA, 
DEBT, NOA, CAP, BOOKTAX) of a firm minus the corresponding mean of all firms in 
the same industry-year. 
aBOLINK is BOLINK of a firm minus the corresponding mean of all firms in the same 
industry-year, where BOLINK is number of board interlocks with other firms 
(regardless of whether they are aggressive or not). 
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aLn(MVE) is natural log of MVE of a firm minus the corresponding mean of all firms 
in the same industry-year. 
aAUCOMIND is AUCOMIND of a firm minus the corresponding mean of all firms in 
the same industry-year, where AUCOMIND is percentage of non-executive directors 
on audit committee. 
aRD is RD of a firm minus the corresponding mean of all firms in the same industry-
year, where RD is research and development expenses divided by sales. 
ILW_Y_NEW is one if ILW_Y is one and the interlocked director is within the first year 
of his/her directorship at the exposed firm, zero otherwise, where Y represents 
AGDAC, AGDCF, AGDPROD, AGDDISEXP. 
ILW_Y_NEW2 is one if ILW_Y is one and the interlocked director is within the first 
two years of his/her directorship at the exposed firm, zero otherwise, where Y 
represents AGDAC, AGDCF, AGDPROD, AGDDISEXP. 
ESEX_Y_PAIR is one if ILW_Y is one and ESCORE of the contagious firm is equal 
to ESCORE of the exposed firm, zero otherwise, where Y represents AGDAC, 
AGDCF, AGDPROD, AGDDISEXP. 
ESSI_Y_PAIR is one if ILW_Y is one and ESCORE of the contagious firm is equal 
to, or larger or smaller than ESCORE of the exposed firm but not by more than one 
unit, zero otherwise, where Y represents AGDAC, AGDCF, AGDPROD, 
AGDDISEXP. 
IS_Y_PAIR is one if ILW_Y is one and both the exposed and contagious firms have 
IS of one, zero otherwise, where IS represents ESEO, EDDEBT, EMA, EOV, EROA, 
EDROA, EDIV, EDISTRESS, EDEBT, ESIZE, ECYCLE, EAUDIT, EBLOAT, ECAP, 








Earnings management has emerged as one of the most topical topics in 
accounting research which attracts a great deal of interest from accounting 
researchers during the last few decades. Knowledge of earnings management is 
important for market participants to better understand the information they have to 
rely on to make key resource allocation decisions, as well as for regulators to improve 
on the regulatory framework in which firms operate. The call for further research in 
earnings management is, therefore, still open with a lot of areas which are still 
considerably under-researched. This thesis aims at making original and significant 
contributions to three main areas on the earnings management research theme, 
namely the earnings management detection models, the application of earnings 
management model in stock investment, and the contagion effect of earnings 
management. The next section, Section 5.1, will summarize the work which has been 
done in the thesis and along the line will highlight the key results and contributions. 
Section 5.2 will offer a reflective account on the major limitations of the thesis and 
suggest some avenues for future research. 
5.1. THE MAIN FINDINGS AND CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE THESIS 
Using the UK stock market as the setting, the thesis empirically investigates 
three interesting and inter-related topics on the earnings management research 
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theme. Those topics is investigated and presented in three empirical chapters 
(Chapter 2, 3 and 4) which together form the main component of the thesis. The key 
findings and contributions of each of the empirical chapters are summarized below. 
Chapter 2 introduces an innovative approach to detect earnings management. 
The chapter develops an index which accumulates fifteen individual signals which 
have been suggested in the extant literature as related to earnings management. The 
index, named ESCORE, is shown to be able to capture earnings management 
through revealing the general context in which earnings management is likely to 
occur. In particular, empirical tests show that ESCORE is strongly related to other 
traditional measures of earnings management, such as discretionary accruals, real 
earnings management and ex-post earnings management cases being investigated.  
ESCORE has a number of advantages compared to existing earnings 
management detection models which makes the contribution in Chapter 2 a 
significant one. First, ESCORE only suggests the likelihood of earnings management 
rather than directly measures the magnitude of earnings management. Recently there 
is a valid and rather strong criticism that, in the absence of a fully developed theory 
on the accruals generating process, it is almost ‘impossible’ to reliably measure the 
magnitude of earnings management (McNichols, 2000; Dechow et al., 2010; Owens 
et al., 2013). The criticism, therefore, applicable to almost all existing earnings 
management detection models, such as the discretionary accruals and real earnings 
management models. ESCORE, on the other hand, is free from this limitation and this 
is one of the appealing features of the model which could provide subsequent studies 
a powerful way to capture earnings management without having to measure the 
‘immeasurable’. Second, the calculation of ESCORE does not require collection of 
large dataset for econometric regressions. In fact, ESCORE could be calculated for 
each firm using information which is publicly available. This feature of the ESCORE 
model is very helpful especially for studies in emerging markets where data constraint 
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is a major issue for estimating traditional earnings management detection models 
such as the discretionary accruals and real earnings management models. Last but 
not least, ESCORE could be a very handy ‘thermometer’ to flag up firms which are 
susceptible to earnings management. The application of ESCORE in the real world 
of investment, hence, has a lot of potential. 
Chapter 3 applies ESCORE as developed in Chapter 2 to investigate how 
investors process the information contained in ESCORE. The chapter finds that 
stocks with low ESCORE significantly outperform those with high ESCORE. The 
abnormal return earned from formulating trading strategies based on ESCORE is 
statistically and economically significant after controlling for other known anomalies 
embedded in ESCORE. The evidence suggests that ESCORE contains information 
which the market does not rationally process. To seek for an explanation for the 
observed empirical evidence, the chapter looks into the literature on heuristics and 
cognitive biases and argue that the documented evidence is consistent with the 
prediction of the base rate fallacy, a cognitive bias that would systematically bias 
human beings’ decision-making (Tversky and Kahneman, 1982). In particular, the 
base rate fallacy predicts that one tends to make judgement based too much on 
specific information and ignore the generic information. ESCORE is designed to 
capture the general context of earnings management accumulating fifteen individual 
signals which are readily observable. In this context, investors, as human beings, are 
influenced by the base rate fallacy leading to them focusing too much on the specifics 
and at the same time under-reacting to the general context of earnings management. 
The evidence that investors misprice the general context of earnings 
management is an original and significant contribution to both the literature on 
earnings management and behavioural finance. The chapter provides interesting 
insight to help us better understand how information is processed on the stock market. 
The chapter adds one more item to the list of ‘market anomalies’ compiled mostly in 
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the finance literature over the last few decades. For practitioners, the chapter offers 
very interesting knowledge for them to design trading strategies which could generate 
high returns by exploiting the sub-optimal behaviour of the majority of investors. 
Chapter 4 addresses an interesting and important issue related to the role of 
the board network in spreading aggressive earnings management. The chapter finds 
that being linked with an aggressor via board interlock significantly increases the 
likelihood that the firm is also aggressive in financial reporting. The chapter further 
shows that such contagion effect is more pronounced if the interlocked director is 
male, older, British or holds important financial-reporting-related positions. The 
empirical test has been carefully crafted to rule out some alternative explanations of 
the obtained results, including the endogenous appointment of directors by 
aggressive firms and the shared common characteristics of the pair of exposed and 
contagious firms. 
The chapter is the first study that provides evidence showing that aggressive 
earnings management is contagious through the board network. The importance of 
such knowledge cannot be understated. After several accounting scandals in the 
2000s, many critics have been channelled to the weaknesses of the existing 
corporate governance system in the Western world and call for reforms. One of the 
characteristics of the current corporate governance codes which attracts a lot of 
attention is how to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the board of directors. 
Recent revisions to corporate governance codes start looking at restricting directors 
from working for too many companies. The chapter shows that interlocks could 
spread ‘pernicious’ aggressive earnings management across firms, hence it directly 




5.2. LIMITATIONS OF THE THESIS AND SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
Having done substantial work in the thesis, nevertheless, time and resources 
constraint means the thesis, as with any academic work, is far from being perfect. In 
developing ESCORE in Chapter 2, many aspects of the context of earnings 
management have been dropped. In particular, the selection of individual signals to 
be included in ESCORE focuses mainly on the context which could be easily 
extracted from annual financial statements, hence the exclusion of areas such as 
compensation, corporate governance, institutional and managerial holdings etc. As 
explained in Chapter 2 (see Section 2.4), the exclusion of those dimensions is 
deliberate to develop a more parsimonious and practice-oriented model as well as to 
avoid data constraint issues. While the ESCORE model as designed in this thesis has 
been shown to work effectively, future studies which include signals related to 
corporate governance, performance-linked compensation, managerial and 
institutional holdings could potentially enhance the power of the model. It might be a 
good idea, for example, to create an aggregate index that captures the dimensions of 
corporate governance, compensation, managerial and institutional holdings 
separately or in conjunction with ESCORE and examine if the new index could 
capture the context of earnings management incrementally beyond what is captured 
by ESCORE. That kind of model promises a lot practical benefits and will be an 
interesting supplement to ESCORE. 
The ESCORE model as developed in Chapter 2 and used throughout the thesis 
uses the simple approach in which each individual signal is transformed into a binary 
variable and receives an equal weight. The use of binary variables might result in loss 
of information and the power of each signal is clearly not identical. Another method 
which is also popular in studies which attempt to create composite indices is to adopt 
logistic regressions or factor analysis to arrive at the weight for each signal (e.g. 
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Beneish, 1999a; Bird and Casavecchia, 2007; Dechow et al., 2011). The approach 
adopted in the thesis, however, is deliberate to make the model a simple one which 
could be easily applied in practice and has been adopted by a few influential studies 
(e.g. Piotroski, 2000; Mohanram, 2005). Chapter 2 has also proved that ESCORE 
constructed as in this thesis is highly effective in capturing the context of earnings 
management. Nevertheless, future research is invited to develop another version of 
ESCORE which takes into account the power of each individual signal in detecting 
earnings management and uses data which has not been transformed into binary 
variables. 
In validating ESCORE, Chapter 2 relies on other existing earnings management 
detecting models, such as the modified-Jones and real earnings management 
models. These models estimate a measure of earnings management as the deviation 
of the actual levels of accruals or some measures of real activities from the expected 
levels arrived at using some regressions. This approach is subject to a lot of criticism. 
In particular, critics have argued that in the absence of a proper theory which predicts 
what accruals or real activities would be if there is no earnings management, trying 
to specify models to estimate the predicted levels would introduce estimation errors. 
As a profession, we do not know how large those errors are, but the existence of error 
is in itself worrisome. Ideally, accounting research would get round this problem by 
using some ex-post measures of earnings management, such as observed cases of 
fraud, restatement or being subject to investigation. The advantage of those ex-post 
measures is they have low Type I error, i.e. if a firm has to restate earnings, for 
example, it is quite certain that earnings management has occurred. However, using 
those ex-post measures would suffer from small sample issue and sample selection 
bias because typically firms are not randomly selected for investigation. All 
advantages and disadvantages having been considered, using an ex-post measure 
would be a good supplement to the analysis done in Chapter 2. Section 2.5.5.3 has 
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made that attempt using a sample of firms being investigated by the FRRP. However, 
the FRRP sample is very small and the rate of Type I error is not very low compared 
to, for example, the GAO or AAER sample in the US. In particular, being investigated 
by the FRRP do not necessarily result in a later restatement, and even if it does, the 
restatement could be something which is not related to earnings at all (e.g. a 
reclassification on the balance sheet or cash flows statement, or a supplement of a 
disclosure). In the absence of a better sample compared to the FRRP’s cases, a 
replication of ESCORE in the US market and test if ESCORE could identify AAER or 
GAO firms is a very interesting step to further prove that ESCORE could capture 
earnings management. Nevertheless, the thesis does not attempt this replication due 
to time and resource constraint and would leave it for future research. Another 
direction to improve on this front is to benchmark ESCORE against more models of 
earnings management detection, such as those developed by Beneish (1997), 
Beneish (1999a), Kothari et al. (2005), Dechow et al. (2011) or Gerakos and 
Kovrijnykh (2013). However, due to space restriction and time constraint, the thesis 
could not cover all existing models of earnings management detection and only 
focuses on the major models which are most popularly used in the literature, i.e. the 
modified-Jones discretionary accruals and Roychowdhury’s (2006) real earnings 
management models. Future research which examines how ESCORE is related to 
other measures of earnings management is, hence, invited. 
On a related note, although the use of the UK market as the setting in this thesis 
is well justified and makes significant contributions to the advancement of knowledge, 
a valid concern is whether the results of the thesis are generalizable to other markets, 
especially the US where many previous studies in this area focus on. It is also 
interesting to see if ESCORE also works well in some emerging markets where data 
constraint might be a severe issue preventing researchers from estimating other 
traditional proxies for earnings management, for example using the modified-Jones 
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or Roychowdhury’s (2006) models. As argued earlier, ESCORE could be a useful tool 
in those settings to get round the problem of small sample. Nevertheless, due to time 
and other practical constraints, the thesis would leave such replicates to future 
research.35 
In examining the relationship between earnings management and the variables 
of interest in Chapter 2 and 4 (Section 2.5.5.2 and 4.6.2, respectively), the thesis has 
controlled for a wide range of factors which are shown in the extant literature to be 
determinants of earnings management. However, as with any other empirical 
research on earnings management, the thesis could not control for every possible 
control variables. Most notable is the exclusion of managerial and institutional 
holdings variables, mainly because of lack of access to a high quality source of data. 
While it might just be a minor limitation because there is no strong reason why 
controlling for managerial and institutional holdings variables would qualitatively 
change the main conclusions obtained in the thesis, future research is invited to 
incorporate those controls to strengthen the results of this thesis.  
Chapter 3 has arrived at the conclusion that ESCORE could predict future 
returns after controlling for a variety of factors which could potentially affect the 
results. However, the issue of omitted variables, i.e. there are other unobservable 
factors which are related to stock returns but not included as control variables in the 
regressions, remains a weakness the thesis could not completely overcome. Also, 
the conclusion that the returns obtained from the ESCORE-based trading strategies 
are ‘abnormal’ is also subject to the ‘joint hypothesis’ problem as even the thesis has 
used five measures of abnormal returns using various methodologies, the concerns 
                                                             
35
 A limited attempt to replicate the main analyses in Chapter 2 and 3 to the US market has 
actually been done by the time this thesis is submitted. Unreported results using all US listed 
stocks during the period from 1987 to 2013 (87,645 observations) show that all of the main 
conclusions obtained in Chapter 2 and 3 are generalizable to the US.  
 299 
 
that none of those models is capable of appropriately adjusting returns for risk 
remains a valid criticism. While there is no way to completely eliminate the above 
concerns given the current state of the literature and existing methodologies, there 
are a few things which could further improve on what the thesis has done but has not 
been attempted due to space and time constraints. One direction is to apply 
techniques such as difference-in-difference to see how ESCORE changes over time 
for each stock and how the stock’s returns performance would change accordingly. It 
would mitigate the concern over unobservable factors which could potentially explain 
why ESCORE is related to future returns. Another avenue for future research to follow 
is to employ other risk-adjusting methods which Chapter 3 has not attempted, for 
example the control firm matching approach introduced by Barber and Lyon (1997), 
the bootstrap techniques as used in Piotroski (2000) or the adjusted alpha from the 
four-factor model as used in Mitchell and Stafford (2000) and Huson et al. (2004).   
In Chapter 4, due to the lack of access to a database that provides 
comprehensive data on boards of directors and compensation for UK firms, especially 
those which have already been dead, the employed sample is quite biased towards 
surviving and larger firms, hence the generalization of the results could be 
deteriorated. Future research which could cover both live and dead firms is therefore 
invited.  
Chapter 4 also suffers from the restrictions imposed by data constraint. In 
particular, the chapter has to focus on the formal network through board interlock and, 
due to lack of data, is unable to extend to the social network that recent research has 
shown to be an important channel through which directors interact (e.g. Krishnan et 
al., 2011; Kramarz and Thesmar, 2013). The chapter has also not been able to collect 
data which allows further investigation of the role of the interlocked directors’ stature 
(e.g. degrees from elite universities, professional qualifications, media coverage etc.) 
on the spread of aggressive earnings management. Instead, the chapter has focused 
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on gender, age, nationality and financial-related positions of the interlocked directors. 
However, because the sample used in this chapter is quite bias in the sense that 
many directors at UK listed firms are male and British, the insight from the 
investigation on gender and nationality is quite limited. Future research is, therefore, 
invited to extend the analysis in this chapter to also cover the social network of board 
directors and collect data which allows a deeper analysis of the impact of interlocked 
directors’ stature on the contagion effect of aggressive earnings management. 
Endogeneity is a pervasive issue which almost all studies into the contagion 
effect of corporate behaviour, including Chapter 4, would have to resolve. Chapter 4 
has followed the existing literature to try to encounter this issue (in Section 4.7.1 and 
4.7.2), but like the rest of the literature, the chapter could not claim it has completely 
resolved the endogeneity issue. Due to limits imposed by available methodologies as 
well as space and time constraints, the chapter has only addressed the main 
endogeneity concerns, but not everything. For example, applying the difference-in-
difference technique to examine if a resignation of an interlocked director at an 
aggressive firm would lead the exposed firm to stopping aggressive earnings 
management practices could yield further evidence in support of the contagion effect 
rather than the endogenous matching story. Future research along this avenue would 
be fruitful.  
Finally, to make this thesis practicable, many interesting related issues which 
could have been attempted had been left as ‘out of scope’. Besides, the thesis might 
have other limitations that have not been recognized by the author. Also, there could 
still be some mistakes and errors which remain in the thesis even after the greatest 
level of caution exercised and most meticulous attention paid in the writing and final 




As a general conclusion, nevertheless, with what have been done and any 
major limitations fully acknowledged, the thesis has applied appropriate and rigorous 
methodologies on relevant data to make some original contributions and significantly 
add to the existing literature on earnings management. The thesis has also stopped 
at an interesting point which enables future research to build on and further extend 
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